Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. Tonsellito

N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. Tonsellito, 244 U.S. 360 (1917)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1917-06-04
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that FELA is “comprehensive and also exclusive in respect of a railroad’s liability for injuries suffered by its employees while engaging in interstate commence” (quotation omitted)
  • FELA precludes claim brought by father for “loss of services” of minor son injured in course of employment with railroad
  • “[FELA] is comprehensive and also exclusive in respect of a railroad’s liability for injuries suffered by its employees while engaging in interstate commerce.” (quotation omitted)
  • jury not entitled to consider damages for non-railroad employees

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. Tonsellito. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
71 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Transportation Law — Standard of Review Where a plaintiff suing under the Federal Employers' Liability Act presents adequate evidence on the questions whether he was engaged in interstate commerce when injured, whether the railroad was negligent, whether he assumed the risk, and whether he was a mere volunteer, and the charge contains no material error and both state courts have sustained the judgment, the Supreme Court will announce its conclusion without extended discussion. 244 U.S. 360, 362
  2. Transportation Law — Exclusivity of Remedy The Federal Employers' Liability Act is comprehensive and exclusive as to a railroad's liability for injuries suffered by its employees while engaged in interstate commerce; it establishes a rule intended to operate uniformly in all the States, and in that field it is both paramount and exclusive. 244 U.S. 360, 362-363
  3. Transportation Law — Preemption Congress having declared when, how far, and to whom carriers shall be liable for accidents in the class covered by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, that liability can neither be extended nor abridged by the common or statutory laws of a State. 244 U.S. 360, 363
  4. Transportation Law — Right of Action by Parent The Federal Employers' Liability Act does not give a father a right of action for expenses incurred for medical attention to his minor son and for loss of the son's services resulting from the son's injuries, in addition to the son's own right of action under the Act. 244 U.S. 360, 362-363
NEW YORK CENT. c. R.R. CO.v. TONSELLITO,244 U.S. 360(1917)
37 S.Ct. 620
NEW YORK CENTRAL HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANYv. TONSELLITO, AN INFANT,
ETC.
NEW YORK CENTRAL HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANYv. TONSELLITO.
ERROR TO THE COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.
Nos. 239, 240.
Submitted April 30, 1917.
Decided June 4, 1917.
In an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act the questions whether plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce when injured, whether the railroad was negligent, whether he assumed the risk, and whether he was a mere volunteer, will not evoke discussion by this court where there was adequate evidence upon them for submission to the jury, where there was no evident, material error in the charge, where both state courts below have sustained the judgment, and no special circumstances are present demanding comment. The Federal Employers' Liability Act does not allow the father a right of action for expenses and loss of service resulting from his minor son's injuries in addition to the son's right of action. The rights of action provided by the Federal Employers' Liability Act are exclusive as to the cases which it covers and no other can be added by the law of a State.New York CentralR.R. Co. v.Winfield, ante, 147.87 N.J.L. 651, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
THE case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. Albert C. WallandMr. John A. Hartpencefor plaintiff in error.Mr. Alexander Simpsonfor defendants in error.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the court.
By stipulation, these causes were tried together before the same jury and upon the same testimony. MichaelPage 361Tonsellito, an infant seventeen years old, suing by his father, James Tonsellito, as next friend and relying upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act, obtained a judgment for personal injuries suffered while employed by plaintiff in error — Number 239. These injuries, he alleged, resulted from negligence in constructing and maintaining its roadbed and in starting a locomotive without giving him a reasonable opportunity to climb thereon. James Tonsellito recovered for himself on account of expenses incurred for medical attention to his son and loss of the latter's services — Number 240. Both judgments were affirmed by the Court of Errors and Appeals.87 N.J.L. 651.

Reversal is asked in the cause instituted by Michael Tonsellito because (1) he was not engaged in interstate commerce when injured; (2) no negligence by the railroad was shown; (3) he assumed the risk; and (4) he was a mere volunteer when the accident occurred. We think there was adequate evidence to justify submission of all these matters to the jury; and we are unable to say the charge contains material error. Both state courts have sustained the judgment; there are no special circumstances demanding comment; and it seems enough to announce our conclusion.Great Northern Ry. Co. v.Knapp,240 U.S. 464,466;Erie Railroad Co. v.Welsh,242 U.S. 303.

The Court of Errors and Appeals ruled, and it is now maintained, that the right of action asserted by the father existed at common law and was not taken away by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. But the contrary view, we think, is clearly settled by our recent opinions inNew York Central R.R.Co. v.Winfield ante, 147, andErie Railroad Co. v.Winfield, ante, 170. There we held the act "is comprehensive and, also, exclusive" in respect of a railroad's liability for injuries suffered by its employees while engaging in interstate commerce. "It establishes a rule or regulation which is intended to operatePage 362uniformly in all the States, as respects interstate commerce, and in that field it is both paramount and exclusive." Congress having declared when, how far, and to whom carriers shall be liable on account of accidents in the specified class, such liability can neither be extended nor abridged by common or statutory laws of the State.

The judgment in Number 239 isAffirmed.

In Number 240 the judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS concurs in the result announced in No. 240.