Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Webster Coal & Coke Co. v. Cassatt
Webster Coal & Coke Co. v. Cassatt, 207 U.S. 181 (1907)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1907-12-02
- Topic
- general
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company did not except to the order nor attempt, to prosecute a writ of error therefrom if that were possible; the plaintiffs in error, who were officers of the company, excepted and carried the case up on this writ of error! They were not parties to the case between the Coal Company and the Railroad Company, had no property in the books and papers referred to, were mere custodians as officers, and any rights of theirs were not made to appear to be involved in the disclosures sought. The order as to them was purely interlocutory, not imposing penalty or liability, and not Tnally disposing of an independent proceeding. •What Mr.
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WEBSTER COAL CO.v. CASSATT,207 U.S. 181(1907)
28 S.Ct. 108
WEBSTER COAL AND COKE COMPANYv. CASSATT.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.
No. 283.
Argued October 28, 29, 1907.
Decided December 2, 1907.
THE Webster Coal and Coke Company commenced an action at law
in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania against the Pennsylvania Railroad
Company, defendant, to recover damages for its alleged violation
of the Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887, by
discriminating against plaintiff in the allowance of freight
rates on coal and coke. The defendant pleaded not guilty.
Page 182
In the opinion below it is stated:
"After issue was thus joined, and before the time for the
trial of the action, the plaintiff filed in the Circuit Court a
petition in which, after setting forth the nature of the action
at law and declaring that the defendant, and Alexander J.
Cassatt, president, John B. Thayer, fourth vice-president, and
ten other specifically-named officers and employes of the
defendant, had in their possession or power certain books and
papers containing evidence pertinent to the issue, there was a
prayer for an order requiring the defendant, and its said
officers and employes, to produce said books and papers at the
trial, and also for inspection by the plaintiff's representatives
before trial. The application for the order was based on § 724 of
the Revised Statutes, which is as follows:
"`In the trial of actions at law, the courts of the United
States may, on motion and due notice thereof, require the parties
to produce books or writings in their possession or power, which
contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and under
circumstances where they might be compelled to produce the same
by the ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery. If a plaintiff
fails to comply with such order, the court may, on motion, give
the like judgment for the defendant as in cases of non-suit; and
if a defendant fails to comply with such order, the court may, on
motion, give judgment against him by default.'
"On presentation of the petition to the Circuit Court, a rule
was allowed requiring the defendant and its officers and employes
named in the petition, to show cause before the court on a
certain day why they `should not produce on the trial of this
cause' the books and writings above referred to; and also why
they should not produce them at a certain time and place before
trial `and permit the plaintiff, its counsel and accountants, to
inspect the same and take such copies as they may deem proper.'
The defendant answered the petition setting forth (1) that the
action was for the recovery of damages in the nature of
penalties, and therefore that the defendant
Page 183
was not obliged to produce its books and papers, either before or
at the trial; (2) that even if the action were one in which the
defendant could be required to produce its books and papers at
the trial, it could not be required to do so before the trial;
(3) that the petition did not describe with sufficient
particularity the books and papers the production of which was
desired, or state the facts which the books and papers would tend
to prove; and (4) that the defendant could not produce any books
which would show the rebates and drawbacks alleged to have been
allowed to other companies, because they had not been so kept as
to show any such allowances. With the petition and answer before
it, the Circuit Court, on the return of the rule to show cause,
`adjudged, ordered and decreed' that Alexander J. Cassatt,
president, John B. Thayer, fourth vice-president, and the ten
other officers and employes of the defendant, `produce on the
trial of this cause' the books and papers described in the
petition, and also that they produce them before trial at a
specified time and place for the inspection of the plaintiff with
leave to the plaintiff to make copies thereof."
To review this order, Cassatt and the other officers and
agents of the Pennsylvania Company sued out, as individuals, a
writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, assigning as error (1) that the Circuit Court erred in
entering the order requiring plaintiffs in error to submit to the
inspection of the plaintiff below and its counsel, prior to the
trial of the cause, the books, records and papers referred to
therein; and (2) requiring the production at the trial of said
books, records and papers. The case was heard, together with two
similar cases, one of which was entitledPennsylvania Coal
Coke Companyv.Cassatt, and is numbered 284 on the present
docket.
The Circuit Court of Appeals gave an opinion in one case
applicable to the three, and reversed the judgments of the
Circuit Court with costs. 150 F. 32, 48. That court held
that the order in question was a "final decision" within
Page 184
§ 6 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891; that the proceeding
which resulted in the order was independent of and collateral to
the main action, and the order therefore reviewable on a writ of
error; that the corporation's officers and agents were not
"parties" within Revised Statutes, § 724; that that section did
not authorize an order requiring a party to produce books and
papers before trial, but if such relief was desired it must be
obtained by a bill of discovery. The present cause was then
brought to this court on certiorari, and is numbered 283 on its
docket. It was advanced for hearing and heard October 28, 29,
together with No. 284, also brought up on certiorari.
The Circuit Court of Appeals had no power to review the order of the lower court.
The order was not a collateral matter distinct from the general subject of litigation affecting only the parties to the particular controversy, and finally settling the controversy, such as was referred to inBrush Electric Companyv.ElectricImprovement Company, 51 F. 557, but had distinct and important bearing on the general subject of the litigation. In fact, the order did not affect the respondents as individuals at all, being directed against them in their representative capacities. If the penalty prescribed in § 724 Rev. Stat. for disobedience of the order is not exclusive and the court has power to punish disobedience or enforce compliance, then, under the authority ofAlexanderv.United States,201 U.S. 117, the order, prior to such action on the part of the court, is interlocutory in the principal suit.
On the other hand, if the penalty be considered exclusive, then the order, so far as concerns the respondents in certiorari, was merefulmen brutumand they were in no way aggrieved. Still further, the order was rendered in a proceeding for the protectionPage 185of the rights of the party to the suit for whose benefit it was made and for that reason not reviewable.Doylev.LondonGuarantee Co.,204 U.S. 599.Mr. John G. Johnson, with whomMr. Francis I. Gowenwas on the brief, for respondents:
The order of the Circuit Court was a final one and one, consequently, which the Court of Appeals was justified in reviewing. The procedure authorized by § 724, Rev. Stat. is a substitute for proceedings in equity in the nature of discovery.
If the petitioner had been at liberty to proceed in equity by a bill of discovery and had obtained an order or decree similar to that which it has obtained under § 724, an appeal from such order or decree would have been allowable.
But if the order now before the court would have been a final one in an equity proceeding of the character alluded to, it is a final one under the procedure authorized by § 724. The question of its finality, it would seem, ought not to be determined with reference to the character of the proceeding in which it was made, but should be determined solely with reference to the question whether the court has finally by its order or decree disposed of the controversy with respect to which the order was made.
The order was a final one, in the sense that it exhausted the power of the court in the proceeding in which it had been made. Even failure, on the part of the defendants, to comply with its directions, would not open the door to further proceedings or orders, for such failure would not subject them to any pains or penalties whatsoever. The penalty of such disobedience would be visited upon the defendant in the main action, for by the provisions of § 724, failure to produce books and papers by a defendant when ordered authorizes entry of judgment against the defendant by default, and this is the only penalty that follows such failure.
The order involved in the present proceeding was final. It finally and completely disposed of the question of the rightPage 186of the petitioner to have the defendant's papers submitted to its inspection in advance of trial and left open no question or matter for further consideration or action by the court and it was final, therefore, both as to the defendant and those to whom it was directed.Butlerv.Fayerweather, 91 F. 458, citing:Mackeyev.Mallory, 24 C. C.A. 420,S.C., 79 F. 1;Rousev.Hornsby, 14 C. C.A. 377,S.C., 67 F. 219;Gumbelv.Pitkin,113 U.S. 545,S.C.,5 Sup.Ct. 616;Central Trust Co. v.Grant Locomotive Works,135 U.S. 207;Alexanderv.United States,201 U.S. 117, discussed and distinguished.
What Mr. Justice Bradley said inWilliamsv.Morgan,111 U.S. 684,699, in holding a decree on intervention appealable, and citing many cases, was that the order appealed from there "was final in its nature, and was made in a matter distinct from the general subject of litigation, — a matter by itself, which affected only the parties to the particular controversy, and those whom they represented."
This order affected the plaintiff and defendant in the case itself, and not respondents as individuals at all, and if the court had power to punish disobedience or enforce compliancePage 187then the order prior to such action on the part of the court was clearly interlocutory in the suit.Alexanderv.UnitedStates,201 U.S. 117. If the provision of § 724 in respect of disobedience of such an order was exclusive, then, of course, respondents were in no way aggrieved.Doylev.LondonGuarantee Co.,204 U.S. 599.
Whether the order to produce was valid, and whether it warranted judgment by default against the defendant company were matters in which plaintiffs in error had no concern. There was here no attachment for contempt, no judgment on default, and no independent and collateral proceeding, the order disposing of which could be considered as a final decree.Judgment reversed and cause remanded with a direction todismiss the writ of error.