Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Goudy v. Meath

Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146 (1906)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1906-11-19
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that a county’s assessment of ad valorem tax on land owned by an Indian was permissible because the land was freely alienable under a federal treaty and subsequently, the General Allotment Act and a state Act
  • by rendering allotted lands alienable, General Allotment Act exposed them to state assessment and forced sale for taxes
  • Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612, 633 (1893)

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Goudy v. Meath. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Authority status
pending
Cited by
96 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Native American Law — Alienation of Allotted Lands — Tax Exemption Although Congress may grant Indians the power of voluntary alienation of allotted lands while exempting those lands from taxation or forced sale, such an exemption cannot arise by implication; because the purpose of restricting voluntary alienation is to protect the Indian from the cunning and rapacity of white neighbors, Congress's intent to withdraw that protection while continuing an exemption from taxation must be clearly manifested. 203 U.S. at 149–150
  2. Native American Law — Citizenship — Subjection to State Tax Laws Under the Act of February 8, 1887, allottee Indians became citizens of the United States and, by the terms of that Act, became subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State in which they reside; their property is therefore subject to taxation in the same manner as property of other citizens unless clearly exempted, and the rule of exemption is the same as for other citizens — no exemption exists by implication but must be clearly manifested. 203 U.S. at 150
  3. Native American Law — Treaties — Removal of Restrictions on Alienation Where a treaty exempts allotted Indian lands from levy, sale, or forfeiture until the state legislature, with the consent of Congress, removes the restriction, and Congress by statute postpones the operation of the state's removal statute for a definite period, the expiration of that period terminates all restriction upon alienation — both voluntary and involuntary, including alienation by operation of law through taxation and levy and sale thereunder. 203 U.S. at 150–151
  4. Native American Law — Taxation It requires a technical and narrow construction to hold that involuntary alienation of allotted Indian lands remains forbidden where the power of voluntary alienation has been granted, and it disregards the act of Congress to hold that an Indian who owns property and is subject to all the civil and criminal laws of the State is not subject to taxation. 203 U.S. at 151
GOUDYv. MEATH,203 U.S. 146(1906)
27 S.Ct. 48
GOUDYv. MEATH.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON.
No. 53.
Submitted October 23, 1906.
Decided November 19, 1906.
Where a State by statute makes the allotted lands of Indians alienable the same as lands of citizens, and Congress by statute postpones the operation of the state statute for a definite period, when that period has expired all restriction upon alienation both voluntary and involuntary by operation of law, such as taxation and levy and sale thereunder, ceases. Although Congress may by statute give Indians a right of voluntary alienation of allotted lands but exempt such lands from levy, sale and forfeiture, such an exemption cannot exist by implication but must be clearly manifested. By the act of February 8, 1887, allottee Indians became citizens and their property, unless clearly exempted by statute, is subject to taxation in the same manner as that of other citizens.38 Wn. 126, affirmed.
THIS case is before us on error to the Supreme Court of
Washington.38 Wn. 126. It was submitted to the state
courts on an agreed statement of facts and involves the question
of the liability of the land of the plaintiff, now plaintiff in
error, to taxation for the year 1904. He is a Puyallup Indian,
and claims exemption under and by virtue of the treaty of
December 26, 1854.10 Stat. 1132. That treaty provided for an
allotment of land in severalty to such members of the tribe as
were willing to avail themselves of the privilege, on the same
terms and subject to the same regulations as were named in the
treaty with the Omahas.
Page 147
The latter treaty, March 16, 1854,10 Stat. 1043, authorized the
President to issue a patent for any allotted land, "conditioned
that the tract shall not be aliened, or leased for a longer term
than two years; and shall be exempt from levy, sale or
forfeiture, which conditions shall continue in force until the
state constitution, embracing such lands within its boundaries,
shall have been formed, and the legislature of the State shall
remove the restrictions. . . . No state legislature shall remove
the restrictions herein provided for, without the consent of
Congress." Under this treaty, on January 30, 1886, a patent to
the plaintiff was issued. One of the facts agreed upon is the
following:
"That since the issuance of said patent, and by an act of
Congress passed and approved on the eighth day of February, 1887,
plaintiff became and now is a citizen of the United States, and
entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of such
citizens. Said act is found in the United States Statutes at
Large, vol. 24, chapter 119, at page 388."
In 1889, Washington was admitted as a State. Its first
legislature enacted:
"SECTION. 1. That the said Indians who now hold, or who may
hereafter hold, any of the lands of any reservation, in
severalty, located in this State, by virtue of treaties made
between them and the United States, shall have power to lease,
incumber, grant and alien the same in like manner and with like
effect as any other person may do under the laws of the United
States and of this State, and all restrictions in reference
thereto are hereby removed." Laws 1889-90, p. 362.
In 1893, Congress passed an act,27 Stat. 612, 633,
authorizing the appointment of a commission with power to
superintend the sale of the allotted lands, with this proviso:
"That the Indian allottees shall not have power of alienation
of the allotted lands not selected for sale by said commission
for a period of ten years from the date of the passage of this
act."
Construing these several acts, the Secretary of the Interior,
Page 148
on February 14, 1903, wrote to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, summing up his conclusions in these words:
"I am of the opinion that the requirements of the treaties
with respect to these lands have been fully met, and that the
provisions of the act of the legislature of the State of
Washington of March 22, 1890, and the Indian appropriation act of
March 3, 1893, referred to above, together operate to remove all
restrictions upon the alienation or sale thereof by the
allottees. I have therefore to direct that the Puyallup
commissioner be instructed to continue the selection and
appraisement of such portions of the Puyallup allotted lands,
but only with the consent of the Indians, as provided in the
act of March 3, 1893 — until the expiration of the ten-year
period mentioned, to wit, March 3, 1903, after which date, in my
judgment, the Puyallup Indian allottees will `have power to
lease, incumber, grant, and alien the same in like manner and
like effect as any other person may do under the laws of the
United States, and of' the State of Washington.
"You are further directed to instruct the commissioner to take
the necessary steps to complete and close up the business of his
office as soon as practicable after March 3, next."
Mr. Walter Christianfor plaintiff in error.Mr. Charles O. BatesandMr. Walter M. Harveyfor defendant in error.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
In the brief filed by the plaintiff in error no question is made of his right to sell and convey the land. The Supreme Court of the State, in its opinion, says: "It is conceded that the Indians may now sell their lands voluntarily and convey a title in fee, and that thereupon the lands so sold are subject to taxation in the hands of parties not Indians." But the contention is that although he has the power of voluntary salePage 149and conveyance, yet until he has exercised that power the land is not subject to taxation or forced sale. His argument rests mainly upon the contention that there is no express repeal of the exemption, provided in the original treaty, "from levy, sale or forfeiture." That Congress may grant the power of voluntary sale, while withholding the land from taxation or forced alienation, may be conceded. For illustration, see treaty of January 31, 1855, with the Wyandotts,10 Stat. 1159, 1161. But while Congress may make such provision, its intent to do so should be clearly manifested, for the purpose of the restriction upon voluntary alienation is protection of the Indian from the cunning and rapacity of his white neighbors, and it would seem strange to withdraw this protection and permit the Indian to dispose of his lands as he pleases, while at the same time releasing it from taxation. In other words, that the officers of a State enforcing its laws cannot be trusted to do justice, although each and every individual acting for himself may be so trusted.

But further, by the act of February 8, 1887, plaintiff became and is a citizen of the United States. That act, in addition to the grant of citizenship, provided that "Indians to whom allotments have been made shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside."Matter of Heff,197 U.S. 488.

Among the laws to which the plaintiff as a citizen became subject were those in respect to taxation. His property, unless exempt, became subject to taxation in the same manner as property belonging to other citizens, and the rule of exemption for him must be the same as for other citizens — that is, that no exemption exists by implication but must be clearly manifested. No exemption is clearly shown by the legislation in respect to these Indian lands. The original treaty provided that they should be exempt from levy, sale or forfeiture until the legislature of the State should, with the consent of Congress, remove the restriction. This, of course,Page 150meant involuntary as well as voluntary alienation. When the State was admitted and its constitution formed, its legislature granted the power of alienation "in like manner and with like effect as any other person may do under the laws of the United States and of this State, and all restrictions in reference thereto are hereby removed." What restrictions? Evidently those upon alienation. The Indian may not only voluntarily convey his land (authority to do that is provided by the use of the word "grant"), but he may also permit its alienation by any action or omission which in due course of law results in forced sale. Congress postponed the operation of this statute for ten years. When the ten years expired (and they had expired before this tax was attempted to be levied) all restriction upon alienation ceased. It requires a technical and narrow construction to hold that involuntary alienation continues to be forbidden while the power of voluntary alienation is granted; and it is disregarding the act of Congress to hold that the Indian, having property, is not subject to taxation when he is subject to all the laws, civil and criminal, of the State.

We see no error in the ruling of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, and its judgment isAffirmed.Page 151