Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Security Mutual Life Insurance v. Prewitt
200 U.S. 446
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1906-02-19
- Topic
- general
Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion' of the court. -It appears that the laws of Kentucky require the annual renewal of the permit to any foreign insurance company, in order that the company may continue'to do business in the State, and without such license the company is prohibited from doing any business therein. ■The writ of error in this case was filed January 27, 1905. and the license was granted July 1,. 1904, and expired by its' terms, if not .sooner revoked, on the first day of July, 1905. The permit, even if illegally revoked prior to that time, became a dead letter on July 1, 1905, so fár as constituting any authority to the company to remain in the State and do business therein. If the court should now assume to cancel the revocation it could not thereby reinstate the permit, which has already expired, and the company would still be without power to do ■business in the State until another permit should be granted. To adjudge that the old- permit remained good until the expiration of the year is to "adjudge an abstract question, as no relief can be now awarded concerning it.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Security Mutual Life Insurance v. Prewitt. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 29 opinions
SECURITY LIFE INS. CO.v. PREWITT,200 U.S. 446(1906)
26 S.Ct. 314
SECURITY MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANYv. PREWITT, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
OF KENTUCKY.
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.
No. 178.
Argued January 16, 1906.
Decided February 19, 1906.
THE plaintiff in error seeks by this writ to review the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, reversing the
judgment of the court below and dismissing the petition of
plaintiff in error. The trial court granted such petition, which
was to cancel the revocation, by the state Insurance
Commissioner, of the permit granted by him to the plaintiff in
error to do business in the State.
The facts are as follows: The company is an insurance company,
existing under the laws of the State of New York and having its
principal office in the city of Binghampton, in that State. In
the year 1900 the company, pursuant to the laws of the State of
Kentucky, applied to the Insurance Commissioner of that State for
a permit to do business therein, and it was granted for one year
from the date of such permit, which was annually renewed
thereafter. On July 1, 1904, it was renewed for the last time,
and the permit contained a statement that it was granted for one
year, provided it was not sooner revoked. Section 635, Kentucky
Statutes, provides that these licenses or permits must be renewed
annually. At the time of the first application by the company for
admission (A.D.
Page 447
1900), the following statute of Kentucky was, and it ever since
has been, in existence. It is known as section 631, Kentucky
Statutes. The section reads as follows:
"Before authority is granted to any foreign insurance company
to do business in the State, it must file with the Commissioner,
a resolution adopted by its board of directors, consenting that
service of process upon any agent of such company in this State
or upon the Commissioner of Insurance of this State, in any
action brought or pending in this State, shall be a valid service
upon said company; and if process is served upon the Commissioner
it shall be his duty to at once send it by mail, addressed to the
company at its principal office; and if any company shall,
without the consent of the other party to any suit or proceeding
brought by or against it in any court of this State, remove said
suit or proceeding to any Federal court, or shall institute any
suit or proceeding against any citizen of this State in any
Federal court, it shall be the duty of the Commissioner to
forthwith revoke all authority to such company and its agents to
do business in this State, and to publish such revocation in some
newspaper of general circulation published in the State."
In September, 1904, certain parties, named Crain and Gayle,
sued the company in a state court of Kentucky, and the company,
without their consent, removed the suit to the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Thereupon
Crain and Gayle notified the state Insurance Commissioner of such
removal, and demanded that the Commissioner should revoke the
authority of the company to do business in the State, as provided
for by the above statute.
The company avers that the Insurance Commissioner did, on the
sole ground of such removal, revoke the authority of the company
to do business after September 29, 1904. The company thereupon
demanded of the Commissioner that he should set aside such
revocation and cancel the same, which the Commissioner refused to do.
Page 448
The company then commenced these proceedings in the proper
state court of Kentucky, asking that the Insurance Commissioner
be required to cancel the revocation of the authority of the
plaintiff and its agents to do business in the State, and that he
should grant, or continue, the authority to the plaintiff, and
its agents, to transact the business of life insurance in the
State; and that the Commissioner should be required to publish in
a newspaper the fact of such cancelation, and that he should be
restrained and enjoined from notifying the general agents of the
plaintiff of the suspension of its license. The company specially
set up the claim that, under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, it was entitled to remove the suit mentioned from
the state court into the United States Circuit Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, and that any statute of the State
of Kentucky in anywise restricting or affecting that right was
void as a violation of the Federal Constitution.
The defendant demurred to the petition on the ground that it
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The trial court overruled the demurrer, and the defendant
Commissioner declining to plead further, the prayer of the
insurance company was granted, and judgment was entered (1)
directing the defendant to cancel the revocation of the permit;
(2) granting authority to the company to transact business in the
State; (3) restraining the Commissioner from notifying the
general agents of the company of the suspension of its license
and its right to do business in the State; (4) enjoining the
Commissioner from applying to any judge for an injunction
restraining the company from further proceeding with its
business. The defendant prayed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
of the State, which was granted, and that court reversed the
judgment of the trial court, and remanded the case with
instructions to dismiss the petition, and judgment to that effect
was thereupon entered. 83 S.W. 611.
The writ of error in this case was filed January 27, 1905. and the license was granted July 1, 1904, and expired by its terms, if not sooner revoked, on the first day of July, 1905. The permit, even if illegally revoked prior to that time, became a dead letter on July 1, 1905, so far as constituting any authority to the company to remain in the State and do business therein. If the court should now assume to cancel the revocation it could not thereby reinstate the permit, which has already expired, and the company would still be without power to do business in the State until another permit should be granted. To adjudge that the old permit remained good until the expiration of the year is to adjudge an abstract question, as no relief can be now awarded concerning it. The refusal on the part of the Insurance Commissioner to grant authority to plaintiff to transact business after the old permit had expired does not raise a Federal question. Since the writ of error was filed the permit has ceased to have any effect, and, therefore, an event has occurred which renders it impossible for this court to grant any effectual relief in favor of plaintiff in error. In such case the court will dismiss the writ of error.Millsv.Page 450Green,159 U.S. 651;Tennesseev.Condon,189 U.S. 64;Jonesv.Montague,194 U.S. 147.
It would seem to be plain that the cancelation of a revocation of a permit, when the permit itself has become of no effect by virtue of the lapse of time, would be useless business, and would give no practical relief to the company.Writ dismissed.