Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
United States Ex Rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock
190 U.S. 316
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1903-05-18
- Topic
- general
Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court. We have set out in the foregoing statement of facts, at very great length, a large portion of the contents of the petition and answer in this case. It has been done for the purpose of showing by the record itself the questions of law arising therefrom. Upon a per.usal of the record it appears that those questions are not merely formal ones nor are they so plain as not to require the careful judgment of any tribunal to which they u be referred for decision,' Their solution was properly submiUw *324 to the Land Department, which had full and complete jurisdiction over the matters arising under the act of June 4, 1897, and it thereby became the duty of the officers of that department to decide them.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed United States Ex Rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 130 opinions
Headnotes
- Environmental Law — Land Department — Authority Congress has constituted the Land Department, under the supervision and control of the Secretary of the Interior, a special tribunal with judicial functions, to which is confided the execution of the laws regulating the purchase, sale, care, and disposition of the public lands. 190 U.S. 316
- Administrative Law — Mandamus and Injunction — Discretionary Official Duties Neither injunction nor mandamus will lie against an officer of the Land Department to control him in the discharge of an official duty requiring the exercise of his judgment and discretion. 190 U.S. 316
- Administrative Law — Executive Officers — Duty to Exercise Judgment The official duties of the head of an executive department, whether imposed by act of Congress or by resolution, are not merely ministerial; in administering the important concerns of his office he is continually required to exercise judgment and discretion, including the expounding of the laws and resolutions under which he acts. 190 U.S. 316
- Administrative Law — Judicial Review Where an executive officer has jurisdiction to decide a matter at all, he necessarily has jurisdiction to decide it as he thinks the law is, and it is his duty so to do; under those circumstances the courts have no power to review his determination by mandamus or injunction, whether he decided right or wrong. 190 U.S. 316
- Administrative Law — Court Supervision of Land Department The courts have no general supervisory power over the officers of the Land Department by which to control their decisions upon questions within their jurisdiction. 190 U.S. 316
- Administrative Law — Mandamus — Limitations Mandamus has never been regarded as the proper writ to control the judgment and discretion of an officer as to a matter the law gave him the power and imposed upon him the duty to decide for himself; the writ cannot be used as a substitute for a writ of error, and the unavailability of a writ of error to review the officer's judgment furnishes no basis for awarding mandamus. 190 U.S. 316
RIVERSIDE OIL CO.v. HITCHCOCK,190 U.S. 316(1903)
23 S.Ct. 698
UNITED STATESex rel. RIVERSIDE OIL COMPANYv. HITCHCOCK.
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
No. 632.
Argued March 17, 18, 1903.
Decided May 18, 1903.
THE relator, plaintiff in error, filed its petition in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, asking for a writ of
mandamus to compel the defendant, the Secretary of the Interior,
to vacate a certain order made by him rejecting selections of
land by one Clarke, and to compel the defendant to order such
selections passed to patent and to cause to be prepared and
presented for signature to the proper officers of the United
States of America a patent for the selected land, or for such
other relief as might be proper. The court denied the petition,
and from that judgment the relator appealed to the Court of
Appeals of the District, which, after a hearing, affirmed the
judgment of the court below. The relator has brought the case
here by writ of error.
The petition for the writ filed in the court below, in
addition to various conclusions of law, made the following
averments of fact:
On October 28, 1898, one C.W. Clarke was the owner in fee of
certain land in the State of Oregon covered by a patent from the
United States to his grantors, which is described in the
petition, and the land was situated in a forest reservation in
that State, designated as the Cascade Range Forest Reservation.
On the day above mentioned Clarke executed a deed, which conveyed
in fee and relinquished to the United States the land above
described, and the deed was surrendered to the register and
receiver of the proper land office and received and accepted by
them. Certain land was thereupon selected by Clarke, which land
had been duly surveyed and classified as agricultural land prior
to the selection, and appeared on the records of the Land
Department as agricultural land, subject to disposition under the
act of June 4, 1897, relating to forest reserve lands. A copy of
the material portion of that act is set
Page 318
forth in the margin in the case immediately preceding,Cosmos
c. Co. v.Gray Eagle Co., ante, p. 301.
After the selection of the land the register certified that
the land thus selected in lieu of the land relinquished to the
United States was free from conflict, and that there was no
adverse filing, entry or claim thereto, and he thereupon entered
the selected land upon the records and tract books of the land
office. The Land Department thereafter required Clarke (without
authority of law as averred) to publish a notice of his selection
for a period of sixty days, and the register forwarded all the
papers to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, together
with his above-mentioned certificate, and reported to that office
that publication had been ordered pursuant to the circular of the
General Land Office of December 18, 1899. Clarke complied with
the requirements of the department and published the notice, and
on February 6, 1900, before the sixty days had expired, the Kern
Oil Company filed in the local office a protest against the
selection, with accompanying affidavits, which protest and
affidavits were also thereupon forwarded to the General Land
Office. The petitioner avers that the protest was insufficient to
constitute an issue as to whether or not the land selected by
Clarke was vacant land open to settlement at the time of such
selection, and it was averred that the protestant, by reason of
the non-discovery of mineral in the land, was wholly without
standing as an adverse claimant under the law and practice of the
Land Department.
On January 2, 1900, Clarke duly conveyed by deed the selected
land to the petitioner, and it thereby became vested with all of
Clarke's rights in and to the land, and it is still the owner
thereof and entitled to demand and receive from the United States
a patent therefor. The petitioner then filed in the General Land
Office a motion to dismiss the protest.
It was then averred that at the time of the selection by
Clarke no other person had any right, title or interest, vested
or inchoate, in or to the land so selected, and that the persons
mentioned in the protest and affidavits and alleged to have been
upon the land as locators at or before the time of the selection
by Clarke, and under whom the protestant asserted rights,
Page 319
were pretended explorers for minerals who had made no discovery
of minerals upon the land or any part thereof, but had merely
staked off pretended mining claims for the purpose of deceiving
others and discouraging and defeating them from acquiring title
to such land under the land laws, and that such staking off
initiated no lawful right, inchoate or vested, under such land
laws.
The hearing was had before the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, and a decision in the matter was given by him, by
which he held that the title of the selector did not vest until
approval by the Commissioner, and that the land in the selection
was yet open to exploration under the mining laws, and if at the
date of the decision the land is shown to be mineral it defeats
the selection.
From this decision the petitioner appealed to the Secretary of
Interior, and assigned among other things that the
Commissioner erred in not sustaining the motion to dismiss the
protest and in not passing the land selected to patent, and that
he also erred in ordering a hearing and in not holding that the
showing of the tract books and land records at the date of the
selection governed the character of the land for the purpose of
the selection, and also in holding that a discovery of mineral
upon the land selected subsequent to the selection and before
approval by the Commissioner would defeat such selection; that
the Commissioner also erred in calling upon the selector to
demand a hearing and assume the burden of proof upon the question
of the character of the land, and in directing that at such
hearing, if demanded, the character of the land subsequent to the
selection should be embraced in the issue.
On April 25, 1901, the defendant rendered a decision in the
matter, wherein, as averred, he held that questions respecting
the class and character of the selected land were to be
determined by the conditions existing at the time when all
requirements necessary to obtain title have been complied with by
the selector; that the mere recital in one of the forms approved
by the respondent, of an accompanying non-mineral and
non-occupancy affidavit, constituted a regulation of the
department requiring the filing of such affidavit as a condition
precedent to
Page 320
the vesting of selector's title; that such alleged regulation was
binding upon selector's forest reserve lieu land; that the
affidavits filed by the selector Clarke failed to allege
non-occupancy, and therefore he had not complied with the
requirements necessary to obtain title; that since the said
selection by Clarke valuable deposits of mineral petroleum oil
had been discovered, and that in view of the alleged admitted
occupancy subsequent to the said selection and the subsequently
discovered value of the land for mining purposes, it was apparent
that the required proofs of the then non-mineral character and
non-occupancy of the land could not then be supplied; that
therefore the selections must be rejected.
The petition averred that the defendant vacated the order of
the Commissioner directing a hearing, and arbitrarily, wrongfully
and unlawfully attempted to reject the selections and destroy the
vested rights of Clarke and his grantees.
The protest mentioned in nowise questioned the sufficiency in
substance and form of the selection made by Clarke, nor was the
point of the alleged insufficiency of the affidavit raised by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office in his decision of
December 18, 1900, and the United States has in nowise notified
the selector of any defect in the exchange, and there is no issue
in the record charging a failure to comply with the law.
The affidavits, though not essential to the validity of the
contract of exchange tendered by Congress, and accepted and
completed by the relinquishment and selection aforesaid, did in
law and in fact allege the non-occupancy of the land as
understood in the law and the practice of the Land Department, as
they expressly negative all the elements of legal occupancy.
A motion for a review of the hearing was made and granted, and
was thereafter had before the Assistant Attorney General of the
United States for the Interior Department.
On April 12, 1902, the defendant rendered a decision, adhering
to the ruling already given, ignoring the curative effect of
supplemental affidavits of non-occupancy, and denied the motion
for a review.
By this decision the Secretary of the Interior erroneously
held and decided that the land selected was not "vacant land,"
Page 321
though in truth and in fact unoccupied, and such vacancy and lack
of occupancy was not shown by an affidavit of selector, made and
filed at the time and as a part of the selection; that the
defendant erroneously held and decided that, in order to be
vacant land within the meaning of the act of 1897, the selected
land must not only be free from the presence of any one on the
land as a matter of fact, but must be shown to be free from such
presence of any one on the land at the date of selection by an
affidavit of selector. It was then alleged that in fact there was
no person present on the selected land at the time of the
selection; that the decision of the Secretary of the Interior on
review turned solely on a question of law, and not on any
question of fact or on any question of mixed law and fact, and
that the only question of law involved is the meaning of the act
of June 4, 1897, and the particular words therein, "vacant land
open to settlement."
The defendant arbitrarily refused to pass the selection to
patent, and has arbitrarily ordered the case of the selector
dismissed from his docket solely because of the alleged absence
from the record of selection of a non-occupancy affidavit, and
not because of any ground or cause of objection to the selection
set up in said protest.
In conclusion, the petitioner prays for a writ of mandamus to
command the defendant "to forthwith recall and vacate his said
order rejecting said selections of said Clarke, and if said
selections have already been cancelled to vacate and recall said
cancellation and reinstate the proceedings relating to the said
selections, and thereupon to proceed therein as required by law,
and to order said selections passed to patent, and cause to be
prepared and presented for signature to and by the proper officer
of the United States of America a patent or patents for the said
selected lands, and that the petitioner may have such other or
further relief as the premises warrant and to the court may seem
meet."
To this petition the defendant made answer, admitting many
averments in the petition, and setting up the facts as understood
by the defendant, as follows: The defendant averred that Clarke
did file his deed with the local land officers and assumed
Page 322
to select other land under the act of June 4, 1897; that a form
of application to select land under the act had been prescribed
by the Commissioner of the General Land Office in April, 1898,
and approved by the Secretary of the Interior, and was in force
when the selection was made, and which form contained, among
other things, the following clause:
"There are also submitted certificates from the proper
officers showing that the land relinquished or surrendered is
free from incumbrance of any kind, also that all taxes thereon to
the present time have been paid, and an affidavit showing the
lands selected to be non-mineral in character and unoccupied."
It is then averred that the allegation showing the land
selected to be non-mineral in character and unoccupied was an
essential averment, for the reason that, unless the lands were
non-mineral in character and unoccupied, the same were not vacant
lands open to settlement within the intent and meaning of the act
of 1897.
The regulation was not complied with and no evidence of
non-occupancy was given, and the allegation contained in the
proposed form as to the non-mineral character of the land, was
not complied with, as it was stated by the selector in this case
that his affidavit as to the character of the lands was made
"upon the evidence found upon the surface of the ground, and that
the affiant does not undertake to express any opinion as to what
may be under the ground."
The answer then set up the facts as to the protest of the Kern
Oil Company and the various hearings and decisions of the
Commissioner and the Secretary, in substance as set forth in the
petition.
The defendant then averred that by the laws of the United
States the duty was imposed upon him to construe the acts
governing the disposition of the public lands of the United
States, and in pursuance of the duties so imposed upon him he was
required to construe and apply the terms of the act of Congress
of June 4, 1897, and that in the exercise of his judgment and
discretion in that behalf he did construe the term, "vacant land
open to settlement," as meaning to exclude land in the actual
occupation of any person or persons under the local customs
Page 323
or rules of miners which are by the statute incorporated into and
have become part of the laws of the United States; that, in the
exercise of his proper duty and function as Secretary of the
Interior, the defendant decided that, by reason of the failure of
Clarke to show in due and proper form that the lands were at the
date of selection subject to selection as "vacant land open to
settlement," the attempted selection thereof must be rejected,
and it thereupon became and was unlawful for this respondent as
such Secretary to order any patent or patents to the said lands
to issue to the said Clarke as in the said petition prayed to be
commanded.
To this answer the petitioner demurred on the ground that the
same was insufficient and bad in form and substance. After the
demurrer was overruled the petitioner elected to stand by it, and
the court thereupon adjudged that the rule to show cause should
be discharged, the prayer of petitioner denied and the petition
itself dismissed.
"The Secretary is the guardian of the people of the United States over the public lands. The obligations of his oath of office oblige him to see that the law is carried out, and that none of the public domain is wasted or is disposed of to a party not entitled to it. He represents the Government, which is a party in interest in every case involving the surveying and disposal of the public lands."
Congress has constituted the Land Department, under the supervision and control of the Secretary of the Interior, a special tribunal with judicial functions, to which is confided the execution of the laws which regulate the purchase, selling and care and disposition of the public lands.
Neither an injunction nor mandamus will lie against an officer of the Land Department to control him in discharging an official duty which requires the exercise of his judgment and discretion.Marquezv.Frisbie,101 U.S. 473;Gainesv.Thompson, 7 Wall. 347;United Statesv.Black,128 U.S. 40;UnitedStatesv.Windom,137 U.S. 636.
InDecaturv.Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, it was held that, in general, the official duties of the head of one of the executive departments, whether imposed by act of Congress or by resolution, are not mere ministerial duties. The head of an executive department of the Government in the administration of the various and important concerns of his office is continually required to exercise judgment and discretion. He must exercise his judgment in expounding the laws and resolutions of Congress under which he is from time to time required to act.
That the decision of the questions presented to the Secretary of the Interior was no merely formal or ministerial act is shown beyond the necessity of argument by a perusal of the foregoing statement of the issues presented by this record for the decision of the Secretary. (Whether he decided right or wrong, is not the question. Having jurisdiction to decide at all, he hadPage 325necessarily jurisdiction, and it was his duty to decide as he thought the law was, and the courts have no power whatever under those circumstances to review his determination by mandamus or injunction. The court has no general supervisory power over the officers of the Land Department, by which to control their decisions upon questions within their jurisdiction. If this writ were granted we would require the Secretary of the Interior to repudiate and disaffirm a decision which he regarded it his duty to make in the exercise of that judgment which is reposed in him by law, and we should require him to come to a determination upon the issues involved directly opposite to that which he had reached, and which the law conferred upon him the jurisdiction to make. Mandamus has never been regarded as the proper writ to control the judgment and discretion of an officer as to the decision of a matter which the law gave him the power and imposed upon him the duty to decide for himself. The writ never can be used as a substitute for a writ of error. Nor does the fact that no writ of error will lie in such a case as this, by which to review the judgment of the Secretary, furnish any foundation for the claim that mandamus may therefore be awarded. The responsibility as well as the power rests with the Secretary, uncontrolled by the courts.
Neither the case ofRobertsv.United States,176 U.S. 221, nor that ofAmerican School of Magnetic Healingv.McAnnulty,187 U.S. 94, decides anything opposing these views.
In theRobertscase it was simply decided that the duty of the Treasurer to pay the money in question in that case was ministerial in its nature and should have been performed by him on demand, and that, therefore, mandamus was the proper remedy for his failure to do it.
In theMcAnnultycase it was held that the order of the Postmaster General to the postmaster in the city of Nevada, not to deliver the mail to the relator, was not a justification for such refusal, because the order was given without authority of law, and the postmaster could, notwithstanding such order, be compelled by mandamus to do his duty and deliver the mail. The case has no relevancy to the one in hand.Page 326
We are so clearly of opinion that the decision of the defendant in this case was judicial in its nature that further argument upon the subject is needless.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia isAffirmed.