Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Goldenberg v. Murphy
Goldenberg v. Murphy, 108 U.S. 162 (1883)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1883-03-26
- Topic
- litigation
How later courts describe this case
- “To ‘bring’ an action or suit has a settled customary meaning at law, and refers to the initiation of legal proceedings in a suit.”
- “A suit is brought when in law it is commenced... .”
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Goldenberg v. Murphy. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 40 opinions
Headnotes
- Statutory Interpretation — Limitations Periods — Meaning of "Brought" and "Commenced" In federal legislation governing the limitation of actions, the words "brought" and "commenced" are used interchangeably and mean the same thing; a suit is brought when in law it is commenced.
- Civil Procedure — Commencement of Actions — State Law Governing in Federal Question Cases Tried in State Court Where a suit is begun in a state court, the laws of that state determine when the action was brought, and where the state's rule is prescribed by statute, there is no need to inquire into the practice of other states or the rules of the common law.
- Civil Procedure — Commencement of Actions — Delivery of Summons to Sheriff Under a statute providing that an attempt to commence an action is deemed equivalent to its commencement when the summons is delivered, with intent that it be actually served, to the sheriff of the county in which the defendant resides, a suit against a collector is timely commenced upon delivery of the summons to the sheriff within the limitations period, even though actual service is made after the period expires.
delivered the opinion'of the court.
This was a suit to recover back duties on imports paid under, protest, commenced in the- Superior Court of the City of New *163 York, before the enactment of the Revised. Statutes, and the only question presented by the writ ©f error, is, whether the suit was “ brought within ninety days after the decision of' the Secretary,” as required by the act of June 30th, 1864,. c. 171, sec. 14, 13 Stat. 215, then in force. The facts are, that the decision was made by the Secretary on the 28th of May, 1872, and it was agreed at the trial that the ninety days* expired on •the 26th of August. A summons in the case was made out in due form of law, bearing date August 21st, 1872, and efforts were made to serve it on the collector without the intervention of the sheriff, but failing in this, the summons was, on the 26th of August, delivered to and received by the sheriff of the county of New York, where the collector resided, with the intent that it should be actually served.' Service was in fact made on the 27th.
The New York Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 99, is as follows :
“ An action is commenced as to each defendant when the summons is served on him, or on a- co-defendant, who is a joint contractor, or otherwise united in interest with him.
“An attempt to commence an action is.deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof, within the meaning of this title, when the summons is delivered, with intent that it shall be actually served, to the sheriff or other officer of the county in which the defendants, or one of them, usually or last resided.”
A suit is brought when in law it is commenced, and we see no significance in the fact that in the legislation of Congress on the subject of limitations the word “ commenced ” is sometimes used, and at other times the word “ brought.” In this connection the two words evidently mean the same thing; and are used interchangeably. As this suit was begun in a State court of New York, the laws of that State must determine , when it was brought,, and as that is prescribed by statute, we have no need of inquiry as to the practice in other States, or the rules of the common law.
. As it was conceded that under the decision of this court in Arthur v. Lahey, 96 U. S. 112, the importers were entitled to *164 a verdict if the suit was brought in time, it follows that the instruction'of the court to find for collector was erroneous.
The judgment is reversed, and the canse remanded for a new trial.