Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Mandeville v. Joseph Riddle & Co.
Mandeville v. Joseph Riddle & Co., 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 290 (1803)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1803-02-26
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- "[T]here is a privity between the assignor and his immediate assignee"
Citator
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- Cited by
- 23 opinions
Headnotes
- Contracts Law — Assignability of Promissory Notes Although a statute making promissory notes assignable gives the assignee a right of action in his own name against the maker of the note, it does not, of itself, give the assignee any right of action against the assignor.
- Contracts Law — Assignment Where a statute conferring assignability confers no right to sue the assignor, an action against the assignor can be maintained only on the promise which the law implies from the assignment, and such an action can therefore be sustained only by and against the persons to and from whom the law implies that promise to have been made.
- Contracts Law — Privity Between Assignor and Remote Assignee The law implies a promise from an assignment only to the immediate assignee and raises no promise to any other person, so that privity exists between the assignor and his immediate assignee but not between the assignor and a remote assignee.
- Contracts Law — Assignability of the Implied Promise The implied promise arising from an indorsement is not made assignable by the statute that renders promissory notes assignable, and consequently an assignee of that promise cannot maintain an action of indebitatus assumpsit upon it.
delivered the opinion of the court.
“ The only question in this case is, Whether an action “ of indebitatus assumpsit can be maintained by the assignee “ of a promissory note made in Virginia, against a re- “ mote assignor.
“ The act of the Virginia assembly which makes notes “ assignable, gives the assignee an action of debt in his own “ name against the maker of the note, but is silent with “ respect to the claim of the assignee against the assignor. “ It was therefore long a doubt whether the assignor be- “ came liable on his mere assignment, without any special “ agreement, for the contents of the note, in the event “ of the insolvency of the maker. This doubt has at “ length been settled in Virginia, so far as to declare the “ liability of the assignor on such assignment; but not the “ amount for which he is liable. It seems to be yet a ques- “ tion whether he is answerable for the sum mentioned in “ the note, or for only so much as he received for it, “ provided he shall be able to prove the sum actually re- “ ceived. It is also a question whether the assignee can “ have recourse to any other than his immediate assignor.
“ As the act of assembly gives no right to sue the as- “ signor, such an action can only be maintained on the “ promise which the law implies from the assignment, and “ consequently can only be sustained by and against the “ persons to and from whom the law implies such a pro- “ mise to have been made. As the assignment is made to “ a particular person, the law implies a promise to that “ person; but it raises no promise to any other. There “ is no fact on which to imply such promise.
“ In the language of the books, there is a privity be- “ tween the assignor and his immediate assignee; but no “ privity is perceived between the assignor and his remote “ assignee. The implied promise growing out of the in- “ dorsement, is not considered as having been made as- “ signable by the act of assembly, and therefore the as- “ signee of that promise can not maintain an action of “ indebitatus assumpsit on it.
*299 “ It is therefore the opinion of the court that this ac- “ tion is not maintainable and that the judgment ought “ to be reversed.” *
See note (A.) in the appendix to this volume of reports.