Opinion · Supreme Court of Iowa
Marder, Luse & Co. v. Wright
Marder, Luse & Co. v. Wright, 70 Iowa 42 (Iowa 1886)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of Iowa
- Jurisdiction
- Iowa
- Date
- 1886-10-26
- Topic
- general
Reed, J. Plaintiffs alleged in their petition that the notes sued on were given for the price of the presses, type and-*43other printing materials in a printing office at Odebolt, Iowa, which they sold to the defendants Wright and Bennett, and that they have a vendor’s lien on said property. They also allegéd that defendant Schaller claimed some interest in the property, but that his interest was junior to their lien for the purchase money thereof, and, in addition to their prayer for judgment for the amount of the indebtedness, they asked that their lien on the property be adjudged superior to any interest of defendant Schaller therein, and that it be sold on special execution for the satisfaction of their debt. defendant Schaller answered, admitting that plaintiffs sold the property to his co-defendants, and that they gave the promissory notes sued on for the price thereof, but denying that plaintiffs have any lien on the property therefor; and he alleged that, after said sale by plaintiff, defendant Wriglit sold his interest in the property to defendant Bennett, and that subsequently to that transaction Bennett executed to Wright a chattel mortgage on the property to secure an indebtedness of $2,000. He also alleged that before the maturity of said indebtedness Wright assigned the promissory notes evidencing the same and said mortgage to the Eirst National Bank of Chicago, and that he subsequently purchased the same from said bank, and that neither he nor the bank had any …
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Marder, Luse & Co. v. Wright. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
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- 16 opinions
Plaintiffs alleged in their petition that the notes sued on were given for the price of the presses, type and-
defendant Schaller answered, admitting that plaintiffs sold the property to his co-defendants, and that they gave the promissory notes sued on for the price thereof, but denying that plaintiffs have any lien on the property therefor; and he alleged that, after said sale by plaintiff, defendant Wriglit sold his interest in the property to defendant Bennett, and that subsequently to that transaction Bennett executed to Wright a chattel mortgage on the property to secure an indebtedness of $2,000. He also alleged that before the maturity of said indebtedness Wright assigned the promissory notes evidencing the same and said mortgage to the Eirst National Bank of Chicago, and that he subsequently purchased the same from said bank, and that neither he nor the bank had any notice that plaintiff held a lien on the property; also that, after this purchase of said notes and mortgage, he foreclosed the mortgage by an action in the district court, and that the property was sold on special execution in said foreclosure proceedings to satisfy said indebtedness, and that he purchased the same at such sale.
Plaintiffs filed a reply, in which they alleged that the assignment of said notes and mortgage by Wright to said bank was made as collateral security for a debt he was owing the bank, and that, after said assignment was made, Wright made a general assignment of all his property for the benefit of his creditors, and that defendant was by the court appointed assignee of said estate, and qualified and entered
Wright had assigned to the bank, as collateral security, a number of notes, including those given by Bennett, and the mortgage securing the same, and when defendant purchased said note these securities were also turned over to him. He made the purchase in his individual capacity, and paid for the note with his own money. He subsequently realized from the foreclosure of the mortgage, and the sale of the other collaterals, more than the amount he paid the bank for said note. Plaintiffs have not claimed in this court that they have made any showing which entitles them to a judgment for the enforcement of a vendor’s lien on the property; but the only claim urged by their counsel is that, as defendant realized out of the collaterals a sum in excess of the debt for the security of which they were pledged, he is answerable for the amount of such excess; and, as the deed of general assignment from Wright conveyed to him in trust for the creditors all the right and title of the assignor therein, he should now be compelled to account to the creditors therefor. There are very potent reasons, we think, why this claim cannot be allowed in this proceeding.
I. The relief demanded by this claim is entirely distinct from that demanded by plaintiffs in their petition. They
II. Conceding that defendant is accountable for the money realized by him from the collaterals in excess of the MENTfor toeneñt of creditors: íne-issignSPsS Rands. amount of the note for the security of which they were pledged, such excess should be treated J 7. , . , . , , as assets ox the estate oi which he is assignee; anc^’ the statute of assignments, (chapter7, tit. 14, Code,) the creditors who have filed their claims in the assignment proceedings are entitled to have it applied in satisfaction of their debts, unless the other assets of the estate are sufficient for their payment. After the claims filed in the proceeding have been satisfied, a creditor who did file liis claim could doubtless reach, by proper proceedings, any residue of the assets remaining in the hands
The judgment of the district court will be
AFFIRMED,..