Opinion · Illinois Supreme Court
Home Star Bank and Financial Services, etc. v. Emergency Care and Health Organization, Ltd.
Home Star Bank & Fin. Servs., etc. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., Ltd., No. 115526, UP2671273 (Ill. Apr. 24, 2014)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Illinois Supreme Court
- Jurisdiction
- Illinois
- Date
- 2014-04-24
- Topic
- estate-planning
Illinois Official Reports Supreme Court Home Star Bank & Financial Services v. Emergency Care & Health Organization, Ltd., 2014 IL 115526 Caption in Supreme HOME STAR BANK AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, Guardian of Court: the Estate of Edward Anderson, a Disabled Person, et al., Appellees, v. EMERGENCY CARE AND HEALTH ORGANIZATION, LTD., et al., Appellants. Docket No. 115526 Filed March 20, 2014 Held When a hospital’s emergency room physician responded to a Code (Note: This syllabus Blue by going to the intensive care unit, his alleged negligence there constitutes no part of the was not immunized by the Good Samaritan Act, even though no fee opinion of the court but was charged for his services, where he was expected to respond to has been prepared by the Code Blues as part of his job. Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.) Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that Review court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Home Star Bank and Financial Services, etc. v. Emergency Care and Health Organization, Ltd.. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 27 opinions
Illinois Official Reports
Supreme Court
Home Star Bank & Financial Services v. Emergency Care & Health Organization, Ltd.,
2014 IL 115526
Caption in Supreme HOME STAR BANK AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, Guardian of
Court: the Estate of Edward Anderson, a Disabled Person, et al., Appellees,
v. EMERGENCY CARE AND HEALTH ORGANIZATION, LTD.,
et al., Appellants.
Docket No. 115526
Filed March 20, 2014
Held When a hospital’s emergency room physician responded to a Code
(Note: This syllabus Blue by going to the intensive care unit, his alleged negligence there
constitutes no part of the was not immunized by the Good Samaritan Act, even though no fee
opinion of the court but was charged for his services, where he was expected to respond to
has been prepared by the Code Blues as part of his job.
Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of
the reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that
Review court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon.
Elizabeth M. Budzinski, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Kevin J. Vedrine, Christopher J. Solfa and Robert L. Larsen, of
Appeal Cunningham, Meyer & Vedrine, P.C., of Warrenville, for appellant.
Keith A. Hebeisen, of Clifford Law Offices, of Chicago (Robert P.
Sheridan, of counsel), for appellees.
Mary Alice McLarty and Valerie M. Nannery, of Washington, D.C.,
and James P. Costello, of Costello, McMahon, Burke & Murphy, Ltd.,
of Chicago, for amicus curiae American Association for Justice.
Justices JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Karmeier,
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiffs, Darby Thomas and Home Star Bank & Financial Services, as guardian of the
estate of Edward Anderson, a disabled person, filed suit against defendants Michael T.
Murphy, D.O., and his employer, Emergency Care & Health Organization, Ltd. (ECHO),
alleging that Dr. Murphy was negligent in treating Anderson. The circuit court of Cook County
concluded that Dr. Murphy was immune from liability pursuant to section 25 of the Good
Samaritan Act (the Act) (745 ILCS 49/25 (West 2010)) and granted summary judgment to
defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Appellate Court, First District, reversed and remanded.
2012 IL App (1st) 112321
. The court held that the Act was meant to apply to volunteers, not to
those who treat patients within the scope of their employment and are compensated for doing
so. We allowed defendants’ petition for leave to appeal and, for the reasons that follow, we
affirm the appellate court.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 On August 22, 2001, Anderson was admitted to Provena St. Mary’s Hospital through the
emergency room and was later transferred to the intensive care unit. Anderson was diagnosed
with epiglottitis. On August 25, Anderson began having labored breathing and pain on
swallowing. A Code Blue was called at approximately 3:20 a.m. Dr. Murphy, who was
working in the emergency room at the time, responded to the Code Blue and attempted to
intubate Anderson. Anderson suffered a severe and permanent brain injury. Plaintiffs filed a
negligence action against Dr. Murphy and ECHO, alleging that Dr. Murphy’s care and
treatment of Anderson were the cause of Anderson’s injuries.
-2-
¶4 Dr. Murphy denied the allegations and moved for summary judgment, asserting that he was
immune from liability for negligence under section 25 of the Act. ECHO later joined the
motion for summary judgment. Section 25 provides as follows:
“Any person licensed under the Medical Practice Act of 1987 or any person licensed to
practice the treatment of human ailments in any other state or territory of the United
States who, in good faith, provides emergency care without fee to a person, shall not, as
a result of his or her acts or omissions, except willful or wanton misconduct on the part
of the person, in providing the care, be liable for civil damages.” 745 ILCS 49/25 (West
2010).
Dr. Murphy contended that section 25 applied because he provided emergency care to
Anderson, and Anderson was not billed for that care. Although ECHO had billed Anderson for
services its physicians provided him during a previous emergency room visit on August 22,
2001, it did not bill for Dr. Murphy’s services during the Code Blue. The hospital billed
Anderson for supplies used during the Code Blue, but not for any physician’s services.
¶5 In their response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs argued that the Good
Samaritan Act was inapplicable because Dr. Murphy was simply doing his job when he treated
Anderson, and he was not providing his services “without fee.” ECHO was the exclusive
provider of emergency room physicians at Provena, and Dr. Murphy was under contract with
ECHO. ECHO paid Dr. Murphy by the hour, and he was not allowed to bill patients directly.
Plaintiffs argued that, just because no discrete bill was sent for Dr. Murphy’s services, that did
not mean that Dr. Murphy was providing his services “without fee.”
¶6 The parties submitted various exhibits and discovery depositions in support of their
positions. First, with respect to Dr. Murphy’s job responsibilities, an “independent contractor
agreement” between ECHO and Dr. Murphy provided that Dr. Murphy would provide
emergency medical services in the hospital’s emergency department and that he would be paid
by the hour. The hourly amount would be the sole amount he would receive for his services. In
addition to Dr. Murphy’s responsibilities in the emergency department, the agreement
provided that Dr. Murphy would have the following “inpatient” responsibilities:
“Physician shall not provide any general or routine care of patients already
hospitalized under the care of another physician.
However, in dire emergencies, i.e., cardiorespiratory (or impending) arrest,
Physician may render service to any patient, as long as there is not an emergency
department patient requiring his/her immediate presence, and only until the patient[’]s
personal physician has assumed ongoing care.”
The agreement further provided that Dr. Murphy would abide by, and render emergency
medical services in accordance with, the bylaws, rules and regulations of the hospital and
departmental policies and procedures, using his professional judgment.
¶7 The “exclusive emergency room services agreement” between ECHO and the hospital
provided that ECHO would be the exclusive provider of emergency room physician services at
the hospital. Under the agreement, the “primary obligation of ECHO’s physicians when in
service at HOSPITAL’s emergency room shall be to care for any and all patients presenting
themselves for treatment at the emergency room.” The agreement made clear that ECHO’s
physicians were independent contractors rather than employees of the hospital, and that they
were to provide treatment only until the patient’s attending physician could be present and
-3-
assume responsibility. ECHO’s physicians were required to discharge their duties in
accordance with the “Bylaws, Rules, Regulations, and policies of HOSPITAL and the
MEDICAL STAFF Bylaws.” Further, ECHO would bill patients directly for the services its
physicians provided.
¶8 The hospital’s “Clinical Operations/Nursing” policy set forth the procedures for the “Code
Blue and Cardiac Arrest Team.” This policy set forth the Code Blue responsibilities of the ER
physician as follows:
“Responds to all Code Blues in the hospital. Directs Code Blue Team in CPR,
defibrillation and cardioversion and medication therapy. Intubates the patient. For
DNR patients in Ancillary Departments, assess for Code continuance.”
Nancy Frizzell, who was the nursing supervisor at St. Mary’s on the night of Anderson’s Code
Blue, explained in her deposition that, although this document is a nursing policy, every
employee of the hospital was expected to follow it. It was Frizzell’s experience that when a
Code Blue occurs at night, the emergency room physician normally responds. She said that
when a Code Blue was called, the emergency room doctor would drop what he or she was
doing to respond to the code. Also, even when physicians on the unit responded to a Code
Blue, the emergency room doctor would come when he or she could.
¶9 In his deposition, Dr. Murphy left no doubt that responding to Code Blues was part of his
job:
“Q. Had you responded to any Code Blues at St. Mary’s before this one?
A. Yes.
Q. And was the emergency—was the emergency room physician on duty the
physician who would be expected to respond to a Code Blue?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you the only emergency physician working at that—that night at the
hospital?
A. Yes.
Q. As soon as you were notified of the code, did you go immediately to the room?
A. I believe so, yes.”
¶ 10 Dr. Joseph Danna, the president and CEO of ECHO, was more equivocal in his deposition.
When asked whether it was part of Dr. Murphy’s job to respond to Code Blues, Danna said,
“no,” and that it “was not an inherent prescribed part of his work, of his job.” Danna said that,
rather, if there were a dire emergency elsewhere in the hospital, an ECHO physician would
respond “in the manner a good samaritan would respond to that dire emergency.” He assumed
that Dr. Murphy responded to the Code Blue because he was the only person available to
respond. Danna was aware that ECHO physicians responded to Code Blues at the hospital, but
said that he had “no understanding” that they were “part of the team.” Rather, they were one of
many resources available, and an ECHO physician would typically be the last person that
would respond.
¶ 11 Eunice Rimer was a certified registered nurse anesthetist who responded to Anderson’s
Code Blue. She testified in her deposition that she had worked at the hospital since 1994 and it
was her understanding that the emergency room physician would respond when Code Blues
were called. According to Rimer, the emergency room physician was “usually there first.”
-4-
¶ 12 Anderson’s laryngologist, Kenneth Johnson, testified that he received a call at home during
the early morning of August 25. He was told that Anderson was having serious respiratory
problems and that Dr. Murphy, the emergency room physician, was attempting an intubation.
It was Dr. Johnson’s understanding that an in-house emergency room physician would respond
to Code Blues.
¶ 13 Paula Jacobi, the president and CEO of St. Mary’s, acknowledged in her deposition that
ECHO’s agreement with the hospital did not specifically address whether ECHO physicians
would respond to Code Blues. The nursing department “Code Blue and Cardiac Arrest Team”
policy addressed the responsibility of the emergency room physician during a Code Blue, but
Jacobi did not know if this was addressed in writing anywhere else. However, Jacobi testified
that it had been hospital policy for many years that the emergency room physician would
respond to Code Blues, but she did not know how that system was set up. Jacobi did not believe
that anything specific needed to be said in the agreement with ECHO because she assumed that
the long-standing practice would continue. If the emergency room physician was already
treating a patient when the Code Blue was called, then the physician would have to exercise his
medical judgment as to who had the more emergent needs.
¶ 14 With regard to billing for Code Blues, Jacobi explained that a Code Blue was a billable
event. The hospital would typically bill for facility charges, and this was done in Anderson’s
case. The hospital billed for the drugs and equipment used on Anderson during the Code Blue.
ECHO was responsible for billing for the services of its physicians, and Jacobi did not know
whether ECHO billed for the services of its physicians during Code Blues.
¶ 15 Dr. Danna explained that ECHO contracted with a company called Per-Se Technologies to
do its billing. ECHO billed only for services that its physicians provided in the emergency
department. According to Dr. Danna, ECHO would never bill when a physician responded to a
code outside the emergency department. ECHO did not bill for the services Dr. Murphy
provided to Anderson and had never received payment for those services. ECHO would also
sometimes choose not to bill in a situation in which a patient was particularly unhappy with
emergency department care, or when the patient simply came in for a recheck or something
very minor. In such a situation, the emergency room physician would have to request that the
patient not be billed.
¶ 16 Heather Cluver, the office manager for ECHO management and consulting, testified that
she was not familiar with how billing would be handled for Code Blues. However, she testified
that sometimes a decision was made not to bill a patient for services in the emergency
department. In such a situation, a request not to bill would have to come from the physician,
and it would go through Dr. Danna. Dr. Danna would decide whether the patient would be
billed.
¶ 17 Richard Mullin, partner/owner of Abrix Emergency Billing Services, LLC, testified that
Abrix provides billing services for physician practices. Abrix handled the billing for ECHO’s
emergency room physicians from 1999 to 2003. ECHO would send a patient’s chart to Abrix,
and then Abrix would bill the insurance company. Mullin testified that they would get records
from ECHO only if a patient was treated in the emergency room. Abrix no longer had any
records for Anderson; they would have either been destroyed pursuant to a retention policy or
turned over to a succeeding entity. Mullin did not recall any situations in which ECHO sent
patient records to Abrix but then requested that they not bill.
-5-
¶ 18 The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court believed that Illinois
law supported defendants’ position. Because ECHO never sent a bill to Anderson or his
insurance carrier, Dr. Murphy was immune from liability under the Good Samaritan Act. The
trial court acknowledged that a federal district court opinion, Henslee v. Provena Hospitals,
373 F. Supp. 2d 802
(N.D. Ill. 2005), would have compelled the opposite result. However, the
court found that Henslee was out of step with Illinois law. The trial court gave plaintiffs leave
to file an amended complaint alleging wilful and wanton misconduct. Plaintiffs filed fourth
and fifth amended complaints alleging wilful and wanton misconduct, and later asked the trial
court to make a Rule 304(a) finding with respect to the summary judgment on the negligence
counts. The court granted the motion, finding no just reason to delay appeal or enforcement of
the order.
¶ 19 Plaintiffs appealed, and the Appellate Court, First District, reversed. The appellate court
acknowledged that the rule developed in the Illinois cases was typified by the second district’s
opinion in Estate of Heanue v. Edgcomb, 355 Ill. App. 3d 645
(2005), where the court held that
application of section 25 of the Good Samaritan Act turned on whether or not the physician had
billed for the emergency services. 2012 IL App (1st) 112321, ¶ 30
. However, the appellate
court determined that this construction was out of step with what the legislature intended in
enacting section 25. The appellate court agreed with Henslee that the word “fee” in the statute
is ambiguous. Id. ¶ 37. It could refer to a patient being billed for a service, but it could also
encompass the physician being paid. Because the statute is ambiguous, the appellate court
stated that it needed to consider other statutory construction aids to determine the legislature’s
intent. Id. ¶¶ 36, 41. The appellate court considered the legislative history of section 25, the
statement of legislative policy provided by the legislature in section 2 of the Act, and the
consequences of construing the statute one way or the other. The appellate court ultimately
concluded, as had Henslee, that the purpose of the Act is to promote volunteerism and that
section 25 was never meant to apply to a physician who responds to an emergency because he
or she is paid to do so. Id. ¶ 50. The court remanded to the trial court to consider Dr. Murphy’s
alternative argument that he was entitled to summary judgment because he had not deviated
from the standard of care. Id. ¶ 54.
¶ 20 This court allowed defendants’ petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26,
2010). Additionally, this court allowed the American Association for Justice to file an amicus
curiae brief in support of plaintiffs’ position. The Association contends that, until the appellate
court’s decision in the present case, Illinois’s construction of its Good Samaritan statute was
out of step with the way similar statutes are construed in other states.
¶ 21 ANALYSIS
¶ 22 This appeal arises from an order granting summary judgment to defendants. Summary
judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2010). This
court reviews summary judgment orders de novo. Schultz v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.,
237 Ill. 2d 391, 399-400
(2010). Additionally, resolving the issue before the court requires us
to construe section 25 of the Act, and issues of statutory construction are also reviewed
de novo. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Hamer, 2013 IL 114234, ¶ 18
.
-6-
¶ 23 Resolving the issue on appeal requires us to consider two different lines of authority
interpreting section 25 of the Act. Defendants contend that the trial court properly granted
them summary judgment under the law as it has always existed in Illinois. According to
defendants, the correct interpretation of section 25 is found in such cases as Heanue and Neal
v. Yang, 352 Ill. App. 3d 820
(2004). Under this interpretation, the word “fee” in the statute is
unambiguous, and a physician is entitled to claim immunity for negligently performing
emergency services so long as he or she does not bill the patient, and the decision not to bill is
made in good faith. By contrast, plaintiffs contend that the correct interpretation of section 25
is that set forth by the appellate court below and by the federal district court in Henslee. Under
this view, “fee” is ambiguous and can refer either to a patient being billed or a physician being
paid. Courts adopting this view have looked at other aids for construction to determine
legislative intent, and have concluded that the Act was meant to apply only to those who
volunteer their services.
¶ 24 The issue is thus one of statutory construction, and the principles guiding our review are
familiar. The primary goal of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is
to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Jackson v. Board of Election
Commissioners, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 48
. The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory
language, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Metropolitan Life, 2013 IL 114234, ¶ 18
. It is improper for a court to depart from the plain statutory language by reading
into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the clearly expressed
legislative intent. Id.
Words and phrases should not be viewed in isolation, but should be
considered in light of other relevant provisions of the statute. Midstate Siding & Window Co. v.
Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 320
(2003). Further, each word, clause and sentence of a statute must
be given a reasonable construction, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. Prazen
v. Shoop, 2013 IL 115035
, ¶ 21. Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it will be
given effect without resort to other aids of construction. Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 534
(1997). However, if the meaning of an enactment is unclear from the statutory language itself,
the court may look beyond the language employed and consider the purpose behind the law
and the evils the law was designed to remedy, as well as other sources such as legislative
history. Gruszeczka v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2013 IL 114212, ¶ 12
. A
statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed
persons in two or more different senses. Id. ¶ 16. In determining legislative intent, we may also
consider the consequences that would result from construing the statute one way or the other,
and, in doing so, we presume that the legislature did not intend absurd, inconvenient, or unjust
consequences. Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass’n, 236 Ill. 2d 433, 441
(2010).
¶ 25 The predecessor statute to section 25 was section 2a of the Medical Practice Act. Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1965, ch. 91, ¶ 2a. As originally enacted, the statute had a much narrower focus:
“Any person licensed pursuant to this Act or any person licensed to practice the
treatment of human ailments in any other state or territory of the United States, except a
person licensed to practice midwifery, who in good faith provides emergency care
without fee at the scene of a motor vehicle accident or in case of nuclear attack shall
not, as a result of his acts or omissions, except wilful or wanton misconduct on the part
of such person, in providing such care, be liable for civil damages.” Id.
The statute underwent various amendments, and the legislature gradually broadened its scope.
First, the legislature removed the words “motor vehicle,” thus broadening the statute to apply
-7-
at the scene of any accident. Pub. Act 76-1205 (eff. Sept. 11, 1969) (amending Ill. Rev. Stat.
1967, ch. 91, ¶ 21). The legislature later removed the phrase “victim of an accident at the scene
of an accident or in case of nuclear attack” and simply replaced it with “person.” See Pub. Act
78-385 (eff. Aug. 23, 1973) (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 91, ¶ 2a). At the same time, the
legislature added in the requirement that, for the statute to apply, the physician must not have
“prior notice of the illness or injury.” Id.
In 1996, the legislature enacted the Good Samaritan
Act, and the exemption that was originally provided for in section 2a of the Medical Practice
Act became section 25 of the Good Samaritan Act. See 745 ILCS 49/25 (West 1996). Finally,
the statute was amended in 1998 to eliminate the requirement that the physician must not have
had prior notice of the injury.1 Pub. Act 90-742, § 40 (eff. Aug. 13, 1998). Thus, as currently
enacted, the statute provides immunity when a physician in good faith renders emergency care
without fee. However, there is now a division in the case law over what it means to render care
“without fee.”
¶ 26 This court has not previously spoken on the scope of section 25. The appellate court,
however, has considered several section 25 cases. In Johnson v. Matviuw, 176 Ill. App. 3d 907
(1988), the court held that a physician who responded to a Code Blue at a nurse’s request could
claim immunity under the Act because the patient had not been billed for the physician’s
services. The court found that the record was unclear as to whether or not the physician had a
preexisting duty to respond, but found this fact to be irrelevant. The court also did not consider
it relevant that the emergency took place in a hospital setting. Rather, the court held that all that
mattered for application of the statute was that the physician had responded to an emergency of
which he or she had no prior notice and had not charged a fee. Johnson, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 916-18
. Subsequent decisions would continue to apply the Act to physicians who responded to
emergencies in hospitals or medical centers. See, e.g., Neal, 352 Ill. App. 3d 820
(anesthesiologist immune for alleged negligence during emergency delivery when she had no
prior notice and did not charge a fee; court holds it irrelevant that she had a preexisting duty to
treat plaintiff under her employment contract with hospital); Blanchard v. Murray, 331 Ill. App. 3d 961
(2002) (reversing summary judgment on basis that physician had prior notice of
the emergency before going to hospital, but concluding that the statute otherwise would have
provided immunity because no fee was charged); Rivera v. Arana, 322 Ill. App. 3d 641
(2001)
(Act applied to physician who rendered emergency care in a medical center because no bill was
sent for the services); Roberts v. Myers, 210 Ill. App. 3d 408
(1991) (physician who was not
patient’s regular doctor immune from negligence claim involving emergency prenatal care and
delivery because he had no prior notice of the illness or injury, responded to an emergency, and
did not receive a fee for his services).
¶ 27 Originally, the courts were not willing to look into the reasons why a fee was not charged.
For instance, in Villamil v. Benages, 257 Ill. App. 3d 81
(1993), a physician who was at the
hospital delivered a baby in an emergency situation when the patient’s regular obstetrician did
not respond to the call. Id. at 85
. The patient sued the physician for malpractice, alleging that
1
At oral argument, defense counsel treated the “without prior notice” requirement that previously
existed as synonymous with a requirement that the physician must not have had a preexisting duty to
act. These are clearly not the same thing, as the facts of this case demonstrate. Dr. Murray did not have
prior notice of Anderson’s emergency, but he had a duty to respond to such emergencies. See also Neal,
352 Ill. App. 3d at 830
(finding physician had preexisting duty to respond to the emergency but no prior
notice of the emergency).
-8-
his negligence in the delivery had caused the baby’s death. The plaintiff testified that she had
received a cover letter requesting her public aid card so that public aid could be billed for the
delivery. Id. at 89. However, neither public aid nor the plaintiff was ever actually billed for the
delivery. Thus, the court held that the physician was immune. The court considered the request
for the plaintiff’s public aid number to be irrelevant because, even if it showed an intent to bill,
the controlling fact was that no bill was ever sent. Id. at 92.
¶ 28 Later, in Heanue, the appellate court would hold, for the first time, that the decision not to
bill must be made in good faith for the Act to apply. In Heanue, the patient underwent an
elective IJ dialysis catheter insertion and was then taken to the recovery room at Swedish
American Hospital. Dr. Mark Whitman performed the procedure. A nurse later observed that
the medication was not working and attempted to page Dr. Whitman. She could not get in
touch with him, and Rockford Surgical Service sent Dr. Edgcomb, who was a partner of Dr.
Whitman. Dr. Edgcomb took over the patient’s treatment. The plaintiffs brought a negligence
action against Dr. Edgcomb, and he moved to dismiss, asserting immunity under the Act. The
trial court granted the defendant’s motion. Heanue, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 646-47
.
¶ 29 On appeal, the court first held that the existence of a preexisting duty to treat the patient
was not fatal to a physician’s claim of immunity under the Act. Id. at 648
. However, the court
held that a preexisting duty could be relevant to whether a decision not to bill was in good faith.
Id. at 650
. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Dr. Edgcomb could not seek
immunity under the Act because he received an economic benefit from his relationship with
Rockford Surgical. Rather, the court held that the word “fee” in the Act has a set, narrow
meaning: “a fee is generated by and tied to the service performed.” Id. at 649
. Thus, because
the patient was not billed for Dr. Edgcomb’s services, his treatment of her was without fee.
However, the court held that previous Illinois decisions had failed to recognize that the term
“good faith” in the statute modifies both “provides emergency care” and “without fee.” Id. at 650
. Thus, a physician who did not bill a patient simply to obtain immunity under the Act
would not be acting in good faith. The court explained that it is at this part of the analysis that
the preexisting duty issue might be relevant: if a physician has a preexisting duty to treat, and
he or she ordinarily would bill for such services, then an inference may arise that the decision
not to bill was not in good faith. Id. at 650-51
. The court held that, on the record before it, there
was an inference that the decision not to bill might not have been in good faith, because the
patient was billed for treatment prior to and following the emergency on the same day. Thus,
the court reversed and remanded for a determination of whether defendant’s decision not to
charge a fee was in good faith. Id. at 651
.
¶ 30 Thus, the law in Illinois at the time the federal district court issued its opinion in Henslee
was that a physician would be immune under the Act if he or she, in good faith, provided
emergency treatment and did not bill the plaintiff for his or her services. A preexisting duty to
treat the plaintiff would not prevent application of the Act, and it did not matter if the physician
received any sort of economic benefit or compensation for his time, assuming that he or she did
not did not specifically bill the patient for the treatment he or she provided.
¶ 31 In Henslee, the court surveyed Illinois law and concluded that the Illinois decisions had
strayed far from what the legislature intended in enacting the Good Samaritan Act. In that case,
Dr. Drubka worked at Provena Immediate Care Center. He was employed and compensated by
Midwest Emergency Associates (MEA), which had a contract with Provena St. Joseph’s
Hospital to provide physicians for the Care Center and the emergency room. Dr. Drubka was
-9-
paid on a per diem basis. He did not account for his time other than signing in an out of the care
center, and he did not bill patients directly. MEA also did not bill patients directly, but rather
billed the hospital for their physicians’ time. Provena was responsible for billing patients seen
at the Care Center. Dr. Drubka was sued for his alleged negligent treatment of a patient who
had a peanut allergy and had experienced an anaphylactic reaction from eating Chinese food.
The patient was never billed for Dr. Drubka’s treatment at the Care Center, although she was
billed for care she received after being transferred to Provena St. Joseph Hospital. Although
the patient was never billed for Dr. Drubka’s treatment, Dr. Drubka was paid for working at the
Care Center on the date in question. Henslee, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 804-05
.
¶ 32 The plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court, because their suit included a claim that
the defendants had violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395
et seq.). Henslee,373 F. Supp. 2d at 805
. Dr. Drubka moved for summary judgment
on the state law negligence claim, arguing that he was immune under section 25 because the
patient had not been billed for his treatment. The court denied the motion. The court noted that,
as the Illinois Supreme Court had never interpreted section 25, its task was to resolve the state
law question as it thought that this court would. Id.
at 807 (citing United States v. Navistar
International Transportation Corp., 152 F.3d 702, 713
(7th Cir. 1998)). The court ultimately
concluded that this court would not follow the Illinois Appellate Court’s construction of the
statute.
¶ 33 The court began by noting the narrow focus of the statute when it was originally enacted.
As the court explained, the Act was originally designed to “encourage physicians fearful of
malpractice suits to stop and render aid to those injured in automobile accidents.” Henslee, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 807
. The court further noted that the legislature had included a statement of
legislative purpose in the statute that showed that the intent of the Act was to encourage people
to volunteer their time and talents to help others (see 745 ILCS 49/2 (West 2010)) and that the
available legislative history also showed that the legislature’s intent was to promote
volunteerism. Henslee, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 808
. The court then reviewed the Illinois Appellate
Court cases construing section 25 and determined that, despite the legislature’s clear intent in
enacting the statute, the Illinois courts had used the statute almost exclusively to immunize
doctors who provide emergency care in hospitals. Id. at 808-09
.
¶ 34 Henslee determined that the Illinois appellate cases had gone astray in determining that the
phrase “without fee” in the statute was clear and unambiguous. Because the courts in those
cases saw no ambiguity in the statute, they did not consider any statutory construction aids. Id. at 812
. Although the term is undefined in the statute, the Illinois courts had determined that the
word “fee” “means only a situation where a patient is billed for the specific services the doctor
provides.” Id. at 809
. The court noted that the definition of “fee” is simply a “ ‘charge for labor
or services, esp. professional services.’ ” Id.
at 812 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 629 (7th
ed. 1999)). The court found that the Illinois appellate court decisions had too narrowly
considered only one side of a typical fee situation—the client being billed. However, the court
found that a typical fee transaction implicitly includes two steps: a party being billed and a
professional being paid. Henslee found that the term “fee” is broad enough to include either a
doctor being paid for his services or a client paying a bill for the services. The court noted that,
under this definition, a “fee” would exist when “a doctor is paid for the emergency services he
renders.” Id.
- 10 -
¶ 35 Because it found the phrase “without fee” ambiguous, the court found it necessary to
consider other statutory construction aids to determine the legislature’s intent. Once it did so,
the court found it clear that a broader definition of “fee” than that adopted by the Illinois
Appellate Court would better effectuate the legislature’s intent. The court found it beyond
dispute that the legislature’s intent was to encourage and promote volunteerism, and a doctor
who is paid for his services is not acting as a volunteer. The appellate court’s interpretation
would thwart this clear legislative intent. Id. at 812-13
. The court thus determined that Dr.
Drubka could not claim immunity under the Act because he was paid for his time at the Care
Center and simply responded to the emergency as part of his job. The court also determined
that a broader definition of the word “fee” was necessary in light of modern billing practices:
“because most doctors are no longer compensated directly by their patients, and thus it is
difficult to link a charge for services and the eventual payment, a definition of ‘fee’ should
include both the doctor’s compensation and the patient’s eventual payment.” Id. at 814
.
¶ 36 Finally, the court determined that public policy considerations supported a broader
meaning of the word “fee.” The court was concerned that physicians could engineer immunity
by declining to bill for the specific service provided. The court noted that Heanue had
addressed this problem by determining that the decision not to bill had to be made in good faith
and not for the purpose of avoiding liability. However, the court did not consider that solution
adequate to protect patients: “shifting the burden onto the plaintiff to prove the reasons why a
hospital did or did not bill for specific services creates an unnecessary level of complex proof.”
Id.
The court was also concerned that the appellate court’s one-sided definition of “fee” could
set up an inequitable situation where the Act would apply differently to those without means. A
person who had private insurance and was billed for a doctor’s emergency treatment would be
able to sue the doctor for negligent care. If the same doctor treated a poor person without
insurance, the same doctor could be shielded from his negligence. Id. at 814-15
. ¶ 37 A later federal district court opinion, Rodas v. SwedishAmerican Health System Corp.,594 F. Supp. 2d 1033
(N.D. Ill. 2009), would disagree with Henslee. Rodas concluded that, if asked
to resolve the issue, this court would follow the long line of Illinois Appellate Court cases
rather than rejecting them. Id. at 1041
. Thus, Rodas granted summary judgment to two
physicians, Dr. Seidlin and Dr. Soleanicov, who had provided emergency care to the patient
during a delivery. Summary judgment was proper because “neither doctor billed plaintiff for
their services rendered or received an economic benefit that was derived directly from the
services performed.” Id.
¶ 38 The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the summary judgments for both doctors. Rodas v.
Seidlin, 656 F.3d 610
(7th Cir. 2011). The court concluded that, based on the facts before it, it
was not required to resolve the conflict between Heanue and Henslee over whether receiving
compensation for medical services was itself sufficient to put one outside the reach of the Good
Samaritan statute. Id.
at 628 n.4. The court believed that the defendants were reading Heanue
too narrowly, and it determined that even Heanue would have mandated that the summary
judgments be reversed. Id. at 626-28
. With respect to Dr. Seidlin, the court concluded that
material questions of fact existed as to whether the decision not to bill was made in good faith.
Id. at 629
. With respect to Dr. Soleanicov, the court found it irrelevant that the patient was not
directly billed for her services. Dr. Soleanicov was paid a salary by University of Illinois
College of Medicine at Rockford (UIC). The patient had been receiving her prenatal care from
Crusader Central Clinic Association. Id. at 612
. Crusader Clinic had an Agreement for
- 11 -
Professional Services with UIC whereby UIC obstetricians and gynecologists would provide
back-up professional services to Crusader Clinic patients who were admitted for treatment at
local hospitals. Under the agreement, Crusader Clinic would pay UIC a fixed amount each
year, and Crusader Clinic reserved the right to bill its patients after receiving documentation of
services rendered from the UIC physician. Id. at 613
; Rodas,594 F. Supp. 2d at 1036
. In this
case, Dr. Soleanicov had submitted documentation to Crusader Clinic of the services she had
provided to the patient. Rodas, 656 F.3d at 613
. Crusader Clinic ultimately billed Medicaid for
the delivery. Medicaid wrote off part of the amount and paid Crusader Clinic the remaining
balance. Rodas, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1037
. The plaintiff was never billed directly from UIC or
any of the physicians. Id.
Seidlin and Soleanicov were paid their normal salary for the date in
question, and neither received any additional compensation from the amount billed to
Medicaid. Id. at 1037-38
. Because Soleanicov submitted a billing form to Crusader Clinic,
there was “no serious question that she charged a fee for her emergency services.” Rodas, 656 F.3d at 629
. The court elaborated:
“We see no evidence that the legislature, with its use of the unassuming word ‘fee’
intended anything to turn on how a fee is processed or the compensation structures of
the physicians who provide treatment. For good reason. The moment the General
Assembly makes the coverage of the Good Samaritan Act turn on the business model
used to collect physicians’ fees is the moment every medical practice restructures so
that every doctor can be a good Samaritan. That outcome would do nothing to advance
the enacted purpose of the Good Samaritan Act, which is to promote volunteerism and
shield from liability ‘the generous and compassionate acts’ of Illinois citizens. 745
ILCS 49/2.” Id. at 628
.
¶ 39 Having considered all of the above authority, we must agree with Henslee that the term
“fee” is ambiguous. We agree with that court that previous Illinois Appellate Court cases
simply assumed that the term was unambiguous and gave it its narrowest possible definition.
This resulted in a line of cases that thwarted unmistakably obvious legislative intent. As
Henslee correctly pointed out, the term “fee” is broad enough to include both a patient being
billed and a doctor being paid. The term “fee” is variously defined as “compensation often in
the form of a fixed charge for professional service” (emphasis added) (Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 833 (2002)); “[a] charge for labor or services, esp. professional
services” (Black’s Law Dictionary 647 (8th ed. 2004)); “[a] recompense for an official or
professional service or a charge or emolument or compensation for a particular act or service.
A fixed charge or perquisite charged as recompense for labor; reward, compensation, or wage
given to a person for performance of services or something done or to be done” (emphasis
added) (Black’s Law Dictionary 553 (5th ed. 1979)); “payment asked or given for professional
services” (emphasis added) (Webster’s New World Dictionary 512 (2d coll. ed. 1986)); “a
charge or payment for services” (emphasis added) (The Random House Dictionary of the
English Language 521 (1983)). One can find dictionary definitions to support either the
definition adopted by the previous appellate court decisions or by Henslee and the appellate
court below. The existence of these different dictionary definitions, each which would make
sense in the statute, indicates that the term is ambiguous. See Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C.,
235 Ill. 2d 1, 11
(2009). The term is clearly capable of being understood by reasonable persons
in more than one way.
- 12 -
¶ 40 Thus, we find it necessary to turn to other statutory construction aids to determine the
legislature’s intent in enacting the statute. First, we note that the legislature chose the title
“Good Samaritan Act” for the statute. While a statute’s title cannot be used to limit the plain
meaning of statutory text, it can provide guidance in resolving statutory ambiguities. Alvarez v.
Pappas, 229 Ill. 2d 217, 230-31
(2008). As Webster’s explains, the term “Good Samaritan”
derives from the biblical parable found at Luke 10:30-37, and refers to “one who
compassionately renders personal assistance to the unfortunate.” Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 979 (2002); see also The Random House Dictionary of the English
Language 609 (1983) (defining “good Samaritan” as “a person who gratuitously gives help or
sympathy to those in distress” (emphasis added)). Moreover, a “good Samaritan law” has a
commonly understood meaning in the law. See Black’s Law Dictionary 715 (8th ed. 2004)
(explaining that a “good-samaritan law” is a “statute that exempts from liability a person (such
as an off-duty physician) who voluntarily renders aid to another in imminent danger but
negligently causes injury while rendering the aid” (emphases added)).
¶ 41 Second, the legislature left no doubt that it intended the commonly understood meaning of
“good Samaritan law” when it enacted the “Good Samaritan Act.” In the Act, the legislature
codified a statement of legislative purpose to make its intentions clear:
Ҥ 2. Legislative purpose. The General Assembly has established numerous
protections for the generous and compassionate acts of its citizens who volunteer their
time and talents to help others. These protections or good samaritan provisions have
been codified in many Acts of the Illinois Compiled Statutes. This Act recodifies
existing good samaritan provisions. Further, without limitation the provisions of this
Act shall be liberally construed to encourage persons to volunteer their time and
talents.” (Emphases added.) 745 ILCS 49/2 (West 2010).
¶ 42 Third, during the legislative debates on the various amendments to the statute, the
legislators who spoke out about the statute’s purpose clearly indicated that its purpose is to
promote volunteerism. In the legislative debates on Public Act 78-385 (eff. Aug. 28, 1973),
which added the “prior notice” requirement to the statute, Senator Schaffer explained:
“This bill only gives a doctor a safeguard that [sic] if he comes upon an emergency
situation if one of us falls down the stairs and rolls to the foot of the stairs here and a
doctor treats us, and this is on the spot, not in his doctor’s office or in the hospital on the
operating table, that he has a little protection that if we have bad effects because he
wasn’t able to do the things he might do in a hospital, he would be somewhat
protected.” (Emphasis added.) 78th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 22,
1973, at 49-50 (statements of Senator Schaffer).
¶ 43 When the legislature enacted Public Act 90-742, which removed the “prior notice”
requirement, Representative Lang asked Representative Winters whether it was his position
that “ ‘the passage of th[e] [Act] would encourage good samaritans to do the right thing on the
streets of Illinois, I suppose, without fear of repercussions in a court of law.’ ” Representative
Winters responded, “ ‘[t]hat is exactly the point of the Bill. To make it patently obvious to
anyone that this state does encourage voluntary action that professionals who do that kind of
action, will not have repercussions against them for their voluntary action.’ ” (Emphases
added.) 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Mar. 25, 1996, at 100 (statements of
Representatives Lang and Winters).
- 13 -
¶ 44 This same exchange between Representatives Lang and Winters also shows that the
legislature intended a broad and flexible definition of the word “fee”:
“Lang: ‘Just to clarify this. It only covers services that are rendered without
compensation. Is this correct?’
***
Winters: ‘That is correct. If a person is serving under … you know, for pay in his
line of duty, this Good Samaritan Bill would not affect that. He would still be liable for
lawsuits. It’s only where there is no compensation.’ ” (Emphases added.) 89th Ill. Gen.
Assem., House Proceedings, Mar. 25, 1996, at 100-01 (statements of Representatives
Lang and Winters).
¶ 45 Fourth, as persuasively argued by the California Court of Appeals in Colby v. Schwartz,
144 Cal. Rptr. 624
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978), physicians who respond to emergencies because they
are paid to do so do not need the incentive to act that is at the very heart of Good Samaritan
statutes. In that case, several physicians responded to an emergency in a hospital because they
were serving on the hospital’s emergency call surgical panel. Id. at 626
. When they were sued
for negligence, they claimed immunity under California’s Good Samaritan statutes, which
were similar to the Illinois statute, but did not say anything about compensation. The court
explained that the purpose of Good Samaritan statutes is to encourage people to act when they
otherwise have no duty to do so:
“Sections 2144 and 2144.5 were enacted to aid the class of individuals though
requiring immediate medical care were not receiving it. Typically, it was the roadside
accident victim who, as a result of the strictures of the common law malpractice
doctrines, was left uncared for. However, hospital patients, such as the decedent have
historically enjoyed the benefits of full medical attention. There is no need for special
legislation to encourage physicians to treat this class of individuals.
On the other side of the doctor-patient equation, sections 2144 and 2144.5 were not
directed towards the class of physicians of which defendants are members. Physicians,
like defendants, who treat patients requiring immediate medical care as part of their
normal course of practice do not need the added inducement that immunity from civil
liability would provide. Moreover, excusing such physicians of their negligence could
have the adverse effect of lowering the quality of their medical care without
justification. And further, to extend immunity to such physicians would deny an overly
broad spectrum of malpractice victims of their legal remedies.” Id. at 628
; see also
Clayton v. Kelly, 357 S.E.2d 865, 868
(Ga. App. 1987) (explaining that, if a doctor
responds to an emergency because his employment requires him to do so, then he does
not need a special inducement to offer aid).
¶ 46 Fifth, Colby also recognized that immunity is important in this volunteer setting because
the physician will likely be acting without the necessary equipment and facilities, and might be
acting outside of his area of expertise:
“These sections were directed towards physicians who, by chance and on an
irregular basis, come upon or are called to render emergency medical care. Often,
under these circumstances, the medical needs of the individual would not be matched
by the expertise of the physician and facilities could be severely limited. The general
practitioner might well find himself treating an individual for needs outside his training
- 14 -
or the specialist forced to practice in an unrelated speciality. However, in the instant
case, defendants in performing the exploratory surgical procedure were practicing
within their area of expertise and with all of the benefits of full hospital facilities. It is
therefore not unreasonable to hold them to the level of skill and training required under
such circumstances.” Colby, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 628
.
¶ 47 Sixth, in determining legislative intent, we will consider the consequences of construing
the statute one way or another, and we will presume that the legislature did not presume
absurd, unjust, or inconvenient results. Solon, 236 Ill. 2d at 441
. Here, those considerations
clearly support a broad, flexible reading of the word “fee.” As detailed above, the broader
definition of “fee” first adopted by the Henslee court will effectuate the legislature’s clear
intent. Under this definition, volunteerism is promoted. By contrast, the narrow definition
previously adopted by the appellate court thwarts legislative intent. Rather than promoting
volunteerism, that interpretation simply promotes immunity for doctors who do not bill. But
the appellate court has never explained why the legislature would intend such a thing, and has
never attempted to justify its interpretation from a policy standpoint. In fact, the appellate court
has previously acknowledged that its interpretation of section 25 is contrary to the statement of
legislative purpose. See, e.g., Neal, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 826
. This was a result of the appellate
court assuming that the statute is clear and unambiguous. See id.
¶ 48 Another consequence of employing the narrow interpretation of “fee” is that an unfair
system could emerge in which the wealthy had a greater access to justice than the poor. As the
appellate court noted below:
“Heanue’s one-sided definition of ‘fee’ could result in a disparity of legal remedies
between the affluent and the less-privileged. See Ben Bridges, Comments, Curb Your
Immunity: The Improper Expansion of Good Samaritan Protection in Illinois, 34 S. Ill. U. L.J. 373
, 391 (2010). If a hospital physician paid by the hour negligently provided
emergency care to an affluent patient and the patient or the patient’s insurer was billed
for that care, the doctor would not be immune under the Act. Bridges, supra, at 391. If
the same doctor provided negligent emergency care to an indigent uninsured patient
and the hospital did not bill the patient because it would not be able to collect payment,
the doctor would be immune under the Act. Bridges, supra, at 391. The affluent patient
would be able to file a negligence action against the physician and the indigent patient
would not. Bridges, supra, at 391. The physician could arguably provide substandard
care to all poor, uninsured patients because those patients would have no legal recourse
against him. Bridges, supra, at 391. The legislature cannot have intended such a
result.” 2012 IL App (1st) 112321, ¶ 47
.
¶ 49 And finally, as Henslee pointed out, giving “fee” its narrowest possible definition makes
the statute difficult to apply, given the modern realities of billing for medical services:
“[B]illing for medical services is no longer a simple transaction between two parties.
Before the days of private health insurance, physician’s groups, and Medicaid, doctors
used to bill patients directly for their services; in return, the patient would pay the
doctor directly. Charging for medical services is no longer so simple. For example, in
this case, Dr. Drubka worked for MEA, which had a contract with Provena Saint
Joseph’s Hospital to provide physicians for both the hospital emergency room and the
Care Center. The doctors never billed the patients directly; neither, for that matter, did
MEA. Instead, the hospital billing department was the unit responsible for charging
- 15 -
Johnson for Dr. Drubka’s services. Had the hospital billed Johnson for Dr. Drubka’s
services, it would have had to send a bill to Johnson specifying the doctor’s individual
services and then most likely attempt to collect money from Johnson’s insurance
carriers. Paying Dr. Drubka a per diem fee for his services was a system most likely
constructed by the hospital to deal with the realities of the new generation of health care
in this country.” Henslee, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 813-14
.
Henslee thus concluded that “fee” should be given a broader reading than that previously
adopted by the Illinois Appellate Court, because “it is difficult to link a charge for services and
the eventual payment.” Id. at 814
.
¶ 50 Considering all of the above, we agree with the appellate court below that “fee” must be
given a broader definition than that employed by the earlier appellate court decisions. The
phrase “without fee” is ambiguous, and giving it a construction that includes a doctor’s
compensation will ensure that the legislature’s intent is effectuated rather than thwarted. We
agree with the appellate court’s conclusion that Dr. Murphy did not provide his services to
Anderson “without fee.” He was fully compensated for his time that day, and it is clear that he
responded to the emergency not because he was volunteering to help but because it was his job
to do so. Dr. Murphy testified that it was his responsibility to respond to Code Blues.
Moreover, it is clear from both the agreement that ECHO had with the hospital and the
agreement that ECHO had with Dr. Murphy that ECHO physicians were required to comply
with hospital policies, and the hospital’s written policy made clear that emergency room
physicians were to respond to Code Blues. The agreement between Dr. Murphy and ECHO
also specifically addresses physicians responding to emergencies outside the emergency room.
In his brief before this court, Dr. Murphy made a very short argument that he was a volunteer.
However, at oral argument his attorney conceded that Dr. Murphy was not a volunteer in this
situation and that he could not ignore a Code Blue if he was available. The evidence marshaled
for and against the summary judgment motion supports no conclusion other than that Dr.
Murphy responded to the Code Blue because it was his job to do so. The legislature never
intended that Good Samaritan immunity would be available in this situation.
¶ 51 CONCLUSION
¶ 52 We thus conclude that Dr. Murphy did not provide his services “without fee,” and he may
not claim immunity under the Good Samaritan Act. We therefore affirm the decision of the
appellate court, which reversed the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Murphy and remanded
for a determination of Dr. Murphy’s alternative argument in support of summary judgment.
¶ 53 Affirmed.
- 16 -