In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation

*67 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

RE: ATTORNEYS’ FEES — PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS and “MINORITY” STATES

In Kramer v. Scientific Control Corporation, 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Kramer, 429 U.S. 830, 97 S.Ct. 90, 50 L.Ed.2d 94 (1976), our Court of Appeals, although acknowledging the benefits that accrue from class action law suits, noted that “critics have challenged the altruism of some class action lawyers and charged that the paramount motivation for such litigation was counsel’s desire to generate substantial fees.” Id. at 1090-91. Indeed, it is a “widely held notion” that in settled class actions, particularly in the securities and treble damage antitrust context, the great bulk of the money received from the defendants is not distributed to class members, but rather is “devoured by avaricious attorneys” who demand astronomical attorneys’ fees. See Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 Harv.L.Rev. 664, 667 (1979). As the Second-Circuit has stated:

Class actions, termed by some as “lawyer’s lawsuits”, see Developments in the Law — Class Actions, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1318, 1605 (1976), have received a good deal of criticism; and much of this has been directed at the substantial fees awarded to class attorneys. See, e.g., Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 481 F.2d 1045, 1049-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1092, 94 S.Ct. 722, 38 L.Ed.2d 549 (1973). Terms such as “golden harvest of fees”, Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, S.p.A., 55 F.R.D. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y.1972), “astronomical fees”, M. Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plaintiff’s Viewpoint), 55 F.R.D. 365, 366 (1972), and “enormous fees”, Comment, 54 U.Det.J.Urb.L. 598, 611 (1977), are used to describe the allowances which often run into the millions of dollars. Critics point particularly to overgenerous application of the equitable fund doctrine, by means of which massive fees are awarded attorneys with too little regard for the interests of the class members. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir.1977). [Much of] [t]his criticism ... is justified. ...

Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 573 F.2d 733, 735-36 (2d Cir.1978), aff’d, 444 U.S. 472, 100 *68 S.Ct. 745, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980) (footnote omitted).

Presently before the court in this antitrust class action proceeding, are the fee petitions of forty-one private law firms and state attorneys general for approximately $21 million in counsel fees and expenses out of $50,650,000 (net of interest) in settlement proceeds. These requests approximate 40 percent of the class recovery. Twenty of the applications seek fees (not including expenses) in excess of a quarter of a million dollars. A dozen firms seek more than a half a million dollars; six seek approximately $1 million or more; two firms each seek some $2 million in fees and one firm, consisting of only four attorneys, requests nearly $4.3 million in fees. These fee petitions are grossly excessive on their face and, regrettably, lend substance to the widely-held and mostly unfavorable impressions of the plaintiffs’ class action bar, sometimes referred to as the class action industry.

This Memorandum of Decision reflects my judgment on the fee petitions in question. My task has not been an easy one. The fee petitions and supporting documentation are voluminous and reflect the time of more than 160 attorneys and scores of paralegals and legal assistants. In addition, the court has had to consider serious and detailed objections to the fee petitions, the petitioners’ responses to these objections, hundreds of pages of transcript from the 41 days of fee hearings and over a thousand exhibits which were admitted into evidence during those hearings.

Before proceeding to individual fee petitions, I will outline the pertinent history of this litigation, describe the organizing activities of plaintiffs’ counsel, review generally the evidence adduced at the fee petition hearings and outline the legal principles which control my rulings.

1. The History of the Litigation

The Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation (MDL 323) began nearly six years ago in mid-1977 with the filing of fifteen complaints in eight separate District Courts. On March 3, 1978, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the fifteen cases before it under common docket number 323, and transferred them to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where a federal grand jury was investigating possible antitrust violations in the fine paper industry.1 See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 446 F.Supp. 759 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit.1978).

Within a year of the transfer, twenty-three additional cases had been filed, and a total of thirty-eight cases were consolidated. The named plaintiffs in the thirty-eight lawsuits were divided into two categories. One group of lawsuits became known as the Private Plaintiffs, which included certain “Minority State Plaintiffs”. These plaintiffs alleged a horizontal conspiracy among fifteen named defendants to fix and raise the prices at which fine paper was sold to their customers. These fifteen defendants, known as the “Mill-Defendants”, manufactured fine paper and sold it both to middlemen (“Merchants”) and other buyers, such as publishing houses, greeting card companies, printers and commercial and other industrial users.

The remaining fourteen plaintiffs were state governmental entities, known as the “Majority States”, which alleged a single horizontal and vertical conspiracy among the fifteen mill-defendants and the middlemen, “independent” merchants, to fix the prices of fine paper which was sold to governmental entities in the fourteen states.2

The plaintiffs filed two separate motions for class certification. One, filed on behalf of the private plaintiffs, requested the court to certify private plaintiffs (and the “Mi *69 nority States”) who alleged a horizontal conspiracy, as representatives of a nationwide direct purchaser class. The other was filed by the Majority States, requesting the court to certify fourteen separate statewide governmental entity classes, each alleging horizontal and vertical conspiracies. After a hearing and argument, I entered an order on February 10, 1979, which denied the Majority States’ class certification motion and certified the private plaintiffs and Minority States as class representatives on behalf of the following classes:

Nationwide Direct Purchaser Class:

All persons, other than governmental entities, in the United States (excluding defendants and named co-conspirators in the MDL 323 actions, their respective subsidiaries and affiliates) which during the period January 1, 1965 to June 30, 1977, purchased from any defendant, or any subsidiary or affiliate thereof, any kind, type or grade of Fine Paper as hereinafter defined, or any paper product into which such papers were converted by any such defendant, subsidiary or affiliate.

Statewide Governmental Entity Classes: Separate classes, each consisting of the respective State and all of its cities, counties and political subdivisions, and all school'districts, governmental universities and community colleges within the State, which during the period January 1, 1965 to June 30, 1977, purchased from any defendant, or any subsidiary or affiliate thereof, any kind, type or grade of Fine Paper as hereinafter defined, or any paper product into which such papers were converted by any such defendant, subsidiary or affiliate.

See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 143 (E.D.Pa.1979).

At the time the defendants were contesting the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, plaintiffs and certain defendants initiated settlement discussions. These resulted in settlements as follows: with St. Regis Paper Company on July 25, 1978, four and a half months after the MDL transfer, in the amount of $2 million; with International Paper Company on August 18, 1978 in the amount of $5.2 million; and with Potlatch Corporation on September 8, 1978 for $2 million.

A few months later, three more settlements were negotiated as follows: on December 20, 1978, a settlement with Union Camp in the amount of $2 million; on January 15, 1979, with Weyerhaeuser Corporation in the amount of $5 million; and on January 16, 1979, with Boise Cascade Corporation in the amount of $13.8 million. Thus, within nine months after the MDL 323 cases had been transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a settlement fund in the amount of $30 million had been established.

Following this series of settlements a multitude of motions were filed by the plaintiffs and the non-settling defendants. The issues raised included the right to contribution among defendants in antitrust cases and the disqualification of several of plaintiffs’ counsel for conflict of interest. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 22 (3d Cir.1980).

In preparing for trial against the remaining defendants, the plaintiffs deposed approximately 250 witnesses and, along with the defendants, inspected and copied many thousands of documents and briefed and argued numerous discovery motions.

The imminence of the September 22,1980 trial date led to the resumption of settlement discussions. On September 15, 1980, the private plaintiffs and Minority States entered into a settlement with Champion International Corporation in the amount of $4 million. On the first day of trial, settlements with the remaining defendants were reached. The additional settlements, including Champion, amounted to $20,650,000 bringing a total settlement fund in the private cases to $50,650,000. With accrued interest the amount of the settlement fund as of February 1, 1983 was $74,830,000, after disbursement of $866,000 representing 75% of claimed expenses.

Immediately after the private plaintiff cases settled, the Majority State cases were consolidated and called for trial on October *70 6, 1980. At the close of the plaintiffs’ case the defendants rested without offering any evidence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants on December 2, 1980. Subsequently the court adopted the findings of the jury, denied equitable relief, and entered judgments accordingly. The judgments were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.1982), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 801, 74 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983).

II. Organizational Structure of the Private Plaintiffs’ Case

The lawyers representing the private plaintiffs’ class created an organizational structure consisting of tiers of committees and subcommittees with numerous “Chairmen” and scores of “Co-Chairmen” for virtually every task in the case. This arrangement succeeded in utilizing the services of over three dozen law firms and state attorneys general and resulted in enormous charges against the fund by lawyers and numerous paralegals. This top-heavy structure was a model of inefficiency and worked to the detriment of thousands of unnamed class members on whose behalf counsel purported to act. For a three-year period, approximately 97,000 hours were billed to the class — 70,000 in lawyer hours and over 16,000 in paralegal hours. Most of this time, approximately 85,000 hours, was spent in the two-year period after the initial $30 million in settlements had been obtained. Such billing, most of which was at senior partner rates, resulted in an aggregate proposed lodestar of nearly $8 million and, with the application of the requested multipliers, a total fee request of over $20 million.

(A) Formation of the Organizational Structure

On July 18,1977 Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. filed a complaint in the Northern District of Illinois on behalf of Herst Litho, Inc., a New York based company. Specks’ co-counsel on this initial complaint was the New York firm of Robinson, Silverman, Pearce, Aronsohn & Berman. On October 11, 1977, Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. filed a second Fine Paper case in the District of Connecticut, this time on behalf of Phillip and Ruth Meroney of New Orleans. Specks’ co-counsel on this complaint was Fine, Waltzer & Bagneris, a New Orleans law firm. Each of these actions was brought on behalf of a national class of direct purchasers of fine paper similar to the class eventually certified by the court.

After filing these two complaints, Specks circulated copies of them to several lawyers with whom he had worked in prior class actions, including Jack Chestnut’s firm in Minneapolis, Leonard Barrack of Philadelphia, Lawrence Walner of Chicago, Gene Mesh of Cincinnati, David Berger of Philadelphia and Harold E. Kohn of Philadelphia. N.T., 2/1/82 at 40; Exhibits to Class Member Objectors’ Report in Support of Their Objections to Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses Filed by Class Counsel E 164, 584 (hereinafter referred to as “Class Objectors’ E [no.])”. These lawyers in turn filed actions in various United States District Courts. For example, Leonard Barrack filed a complaint for his Philadelphia-based client in the District of Connecticut. David Berger filed a complaint for his client in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, although Specks had asked Berger to file his complaint in the District of Connecticut. See Class Objectors’ E 164. Harold Kohn filed his complaint on behalf of his firm’s client in the Southern District of New York in November of 1977. Kohn testified that although his client was a member of the national class sought by Specks in his initial complaint, he decided to file his complaint because Specks “begged” him to “over a period of several months.” N.T., 4/21/82 at 2010. Lawrence Walner filed a complaint on behalf of Campbell Office Supply Company of Chicago in the Northern District of Illinois. Four other law firms were co-counsel with Walner on this complaint. Harold Kohn claims that one of these firms, Saveri & Saveri, was added by Walner to his complaint “as a favor” to Specks. Class Objectors’ E 586-87.

*71 At the time the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation entered its transfer order in March of 1978, there were fifteen actions filed in eight different federal districts. “All the actions were filed as purported class actions. While there .. . [were] some variations in the descriptions of the classes sought, most ... [were] national classes of all, or some group of fine paper purchasers.” Opinion of Panel, 446 F.Supp. at 759. Within a year of the Panel’s transfer order, twenty-three additional cases had been filed by various lawyers, despite the fact that their clients’ interests were already protected by the previously-filed class actions. Indeed, many of these complaints were filed as late as 1979, after the first $30 million of settlements had been obtained and the class already had been certified. As noted by the class objectors, the only logical reason for these new filings was to permit counsel to participate in the case and thereby to obtain attorneys’ fees. Class Objectors’ Report at 22.

(B) Preorganization Meetings Among Counsel

As the complaints were being filed, Granvil I. Specks and others began planning for the distribution of patronage, that is, deciding to which firms the work assignments would be allocated. The planning appears to have begun in January 1978 in anticipation of the February 3,1978 “organizational meeting” in Chicago (discussed below) at which the structure of the case was formally proposed, voted upon and determined by various plaintiffs’ counsel. The time records of Michael Freed of the firm of Much, Shelist, Freed, Denenberg, Ament & Eiger, P.C. clearly demonstrate that there were several meetings and phone calls which took place on January 23, 24, 25, 27 and February 2, 1978 between James Sloan of the Chicago firm of Sloan & Connelly, P.C., Freed, Specks and other unspecified “Chicago counsel” regarding the organization of the case. As a direct result of these conferences, on January 25,1978, Sloan & Connelly was brought into the case by being added as co-counsel on the complaint filed by the Much, Shelist firm, see N.T., 4/6/82 at 1975, and on the next day the Chicago firm of Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ltd. was added as co-counsel on the Campbell Office Supply complaint filed by Lawrence Walner.

In addition to these conferences in Chicago, on January 29, 1978, there was a meeting of plaintiffs’ counsel in Atlanta, Georgia where many of the same lawyers were attending a hearing in the Armored Car Antitrust Litigation. This meeting was referred to by Aaron M. Fine of Philadelphia, an experienced antitrust lawyer, who wrote to Specks on March 8, 1978 to complain about not being invited to participate in the Atlanta session. See Class Objectors’ E-155-56. Certain documents, including Mr. Fine’s letter, are quoted at length because they provide some insight into the workings of the class action bar and help to demonstrate that the polestar of plaintiffs’ organizational structure in this case was patronage, not efficiency:

I called you on Thursday, February 2, 1978, after receiving your notice that there was to be an organizational meeting of all plaintiffs’ counsel to be held on the following day in Chicago, because I had heard disquieting reports from a number of sources. As I told you, I had heard that there had been a meeting of selected plaintiffs’ counsel in Atlanta at which an Executive Committee had been agreed upon, and that Harold [Kohn] had made disparaging remarks about our firm and stated that we could not serve on any such committee.

When I called you on February 2, you told me that there had indeed been a meeting in Atlanta; and that we could not be on the Executive Committee, because Harold had said so. You stated, however, that we would certainly not be barred from serving on other committees and, indeed, you said that you had the highest regard for the legal abilities of our firm. When I asked you who was going to be on the Executive Committee, you identified lawyers in five Philadelphia firms, including Dave Berger. While I have great respect and admira *72 tion for Dave’s legal abilities, I questioned you about his inclusion on the Executive Committee when we were to be excluded, in view of the fact that he had not yet to our knowledge filed a fine paper case and that we had not only filed a case, but taken an active part in obtaining the impoundment of the Grand Jury documents and in the transfer hearing before the Multidistrict Panel. You replied that Dave would certainly have to have a case on file to be on the committee and that he was selected to be on the committee because of his “position in the industry.” I asked whether you meant his position in the fine paper industry, and you replied that you meant his position in the plaintiffs’ antitrust industry, which may, in fact, be an apt description of what is going on. I later learned that Dave did file a case on February 2, 1978, but instead of putting Dave on the Executive Committee, you put Laddie Montague of his firm on it. Again, I have great respect for Laddie and his abilities, but question why he should be on to the exclusion of somebody from our firm.

As you know, Allen Black attended the meeting in Chicago on February 3, 1978, and was unsuccessful in seeking to expand the Executive Committee to include our firm and others. I question whether the Chicago proceedings should be conclusive on the subject, however, since your January 27, 1978 notice to all plaintiffs’ counsel that there was to be an organizational meeting did not give clear notice that an Executive Committee was to be voted upon. Moreover, the outcome of the meeting appears to have been prearranged so as to exclude several very capable law firms, including our own, for no apparently valid reason. A number of plaintiffs’ counsel did not attend the meeting.

We have now received your status report of March 3, 1978, addressed to all plaintiffs’ counsel, except counsel for the states of Arizona and Colorado. The status report disclosed that the members of the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee had approved the establishment of standing committees. A list of the members of those committees was annexed to the report. We are not represented on any of the committees. A number of plaintiffs’ counsel, on the other hand, have multiple assignments, including yourself and Messrs. Kohn, Montague, Walner, Barrack, Rubin and others.

I would appreciate it if you would let me know on what basis the committee assignments were made and on what basis our firm was excluded from any assignment. I hope that it was not done in response to Harold Kohn’s expressed feelings about us. Particularly now that the litigation has been transferred to Philadelphia as a result of the applications made by Sy Kurland and us, I suggest that you may want to reconsider our exclusion from the Executive and other meaningful committees.

(C) The February 3, 1978 Organizational Meeting

The formal organizational meeting was held in Chicago on February 3, 1978. The minutes of this meeting show that 21 private law firms representing 13 clients (5 law firms represented Campbell Office Supply) and 11 state attorneys general were in attendance. The minutes state that “it was the consensus, voting on both a case basis and a counsel basis, that for the purpose of this meeting each Attorney General and each private law firm should have one vote on any matter .... ” Class Objectors’ E 158.

Following the above procedure, the meeting elected a four-man lead counsel team: Granvil Specks, Harold Kohn, Joseph Cotchett and John Noel. Later Seymour Kurland was added to this group. The meeting then elected a dozen-member Executive Committee (later expanded to 14), with two Co-Chairmen, Specks and Kohn, which had the power to appoint standing committees. The minutes of the meeting concluded with a “Statement of Guiding Principles”:

The Chairman [Granvil I. Specks] stated that the members of the Executive Committee were of the opinion that the *73 Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation should be governed by two guiding principles:

(1) There will be a fair and equitable allocation of work so that all plaintiffs’ counsel can actively participate in the litigation.

(2) That plaintiffs’ counsel will be reasonably compensated for services actually and productively rendered. As a corollary of this principle, the litigation should be run as efficiently as possible and duplicative work should be avoided. Class Objectors’ E 1613

Within a matter of a few weeks a host of committees and subcommittees had been formed by the Executive Committee. A plaintiffs’ Discovery Committee was formed with one chairman and three vice-chairmen. Fifteen individual defendants’ Discovery Subcommittees were formed with two chairmen for each subcommittee. Other committees included a Plaintiff’s Rule 37 Subcommittee, a Consolidated Amended Complaint Subcommittee, an Industrial Analysis Committee, and a Finance Committee, most with a chairman and a vice-chairman. See Specks’ Status Report dated March 3, 1978, Class Objectors’ E 588-93.4

At this court’s first pretrial conference on April 19, 1978, certain states’ attorneys general objected to the makeup of the Executive Committee established at the February 3rd organizational meeting. In particular, Michael Spiegel, Deputy Attorney General of California complained at length about' the organization of the case and about the voting procedures used by the private law firms, N.T., 4/19/78 at 28-33:

“I think what we are coming down to in this case is what really is at stake here. In this litigation you have got a group of States who have filed cases. These States are claiming damages for purchases that they have made. They have got clients, that is, the attorneys general representing them have clients with purchases, they have something at stake in this litigation.

Hs * * * *

“On the other side we have a group of private attorneys here without substantial clients!5! If you go down that list and look at the clients they represent you have three or four of the most prominent antitrust attorneys in this country representing a mom and pop greeting card store, a fishmonger from Fort Bragg, California who buys wrapping paper to wrap fish, and these people, just because they have had the ingenuity to allege a national class action representing the Fortune 500 corporations who also buy fine paper, it doesn’t seem to me that that ought to give them a position to walk into a courtroom and say we’re going to run this thing.

“What have they got at stake here? Their clients have nothing at stake. The defendants could buy all their clients for less than probably a month’s attorneys’ fees.

*74 “What is really at stake here is attorneys’ fees. These lawyers have filed these cases. They hope to proceed in this case so that at the end they can have an award of attorneys’ fees. That is their interest. From my point of view that is a conflict of interest.

“Your Honor can be very sure that the decisions that are made on the executive committees, on any committees between attorneys whose interest is down the line on what they are going to get out of this for their own pocket as opposed to what their client is going to get is very divergent.

“I think that is the real fight that is going on here in this courtroom."

“The interesting thing that occurred at the meeting in ... Chicago is that they decided to vote based on one attorney, one vote.

“I could have brought a 400-man staff out there and packed that meeting if I wanted to. They didn’t vote in terms of one client, one vote, you see, so that the mom and pop greeting card store with four attorneys got four votes, whereas at that meeting the State of Colorado would only get one vote.

“Now that is the way this thing was set up and, of course, this was set up before the cases were even transferred. So that whatever was done had no authority in terms of any court order, by any request of any court to have this committee set up.

“My experience in the past has simply been that this is the way that this is done, if somebody wants to make a run for it and grab the power and run the case you do it before anybody else has got together, before the panel has made any transfer, before anybody knows what happens.

“Then you walk into court and say now we have this executive committee and I am in charge of it and here are my four co-lead plaintiffs and we are going to run this thing and everybody else should sit down and be quiet.”

Mr. Kohn, who now complains about the voting and committee system, was a major proponent at that time. He stated, inter alia:

“We would ask that the arrangement which is provided for in our proposed pretrial order No. 2 be the one adopted by the Court. The Court, of course, has extremely wide discretion in this matter. The general procedure has been to follow the recommendations of counsel, particularly when they are arrived at in a democratic method, as we did arrive at them here. That is precisely what Judge Will and Judge Robinson did in the Folding Cartons case, which is the nearest analogy here. It is precisely what Judge Cahn did in the Eastern Sugar casé, where I think he went even further.... ” N.T., 4/19/78 at 15.6

In retrospect, I can recognize the force of Mr. Spiegel’s argument but at the time the court was persuaded by the array of distinguished counsel for the private plaintiffs and had no reason to anticipate that the case would not be prosecuted in the best interests of the class.

(D) The Addition of New Law Firms and the Exclusion of Others

The number of law firms appearing as counsel for the class continued to grow even after the organizational structure was in place. For example, eight of the petitioning firms did not become involved in the case until well after the first $30 million in settlements were in the bank and the class had been certified. Kohn repeatedly objected to the entry of additional firms, Class Objectors’ E 754-61, but Specks and other members of the Executive Committee nonetheless assigned work to the newcomers.7 *75 Incredibly, while tjew counsel were being invited to participate, other counsel, including some who had been involved from the outset were frozen out of the case. For example, Gene Mesh of Cincinnati failed in his bid for the Executive Committee; he then asked for the return of his assessment, and apparently dropped out of the case. Class Objectors’ E 169. Fine, Kaplan & Black was shut out of any committee assignments despite its protests. Class Objectors’ E 155-56, 601-02. Stewart Perry complained that he was being squeezed out of this case as well as future class action litigation and unsuccessfully asked Specks to include him in the work. Class Objectors’ E 546-49, 609. The Kohn firm’s request to Mr. Specks in May of 1979 that the Philadelphia firm of Greenfield & Schoen be given work assignments apparently went unheeded. See Class Objectors’ E 610, 168, 594, 595.

(E) The Operation of the Committee System

It was inevitable that this type of structure would generate wasted hours on useless tasks, propagate duplication and mask outright padding. The following are some examples:

1. Counsel have billed approximately one-half million dollars for 1,446 hours of preparation, travel and attendance at pretrial conferences. The class was ably represented at these conferences by lead counsel and except perhaps for their immediate assistants, the attendance of the other lawyers who merely sat and watched was superfluous.

2. Work on the pretrial memorandum was one of the major boondoggles of this case. Fifty-one plaintiffs’ lawyers, including twenty-one partners from nineteen different law firms, and deputy attorneys general devoted a total of over 4,500 hours to the preparation of this Memorandum — especially extravagant figures considering it was to be filed after the Majority States had already filed a similar document dealing with most of the same issues. Not only were these hours excessive, but many of the partner hours were poorly allocated because the same work could have been accomplished by associates and paralegals. Based on the fee petitions, the cost to the class for this one Memorandum is over $1 million.

3. In excess of 4,200 hours were charged to the development of a damage theory to be incorporated into the plaintiffs’ pretrial memorandum and for use at trial. Despite this enormous cost to the class, as of the date of trial, plaintiffs’ counsel had not developed a viable damage theory.

4. Sixteen law firms and attorneys general seek compensation from the class for some 460 hours devoted to researching and briefing motions pending before the Multidistrict Panel.

5. A total of 1,310.7 hours was billed to the class for discovery on the issue of class certification.

6. Approximately 1500 hours were billed to the class by nine law firms for preparing and taking the deposition of one third-party witness, James Nelson.

7. A dozen law firms and state attorneys general bill the class over 1800 hours for work on the Industrial Analysis Committee at a cost of approximately a quarter of a million dollars. The work of this committee, which was purportedly formed to gather information on various facets of the paper industry and the defendant corporations, resulted in little, if any, benefit to the class, largely because of grossly inefficient staffing. The time records disclose that most of the lawyer hours were devoted to researching and reviewing microfilm. Inexpensive retrieval systems, consultants or paralegals could have been utilized to provide the same information at much lower rates than those billed by the partners and associates on the committee.

8. Hundreds of hours were billed to the class by individual attorneys who spent time reading and reviewing a multitude of documents such as memoranda, correspondence, briefs, motions, and interrogatories, which crossed their desk during the course of this case, even though these attorneys were not closely involved with *76 or responsible for the subject matter of these documents.

9. Hundreds of hours were spent on coordination of brief writing. For example, fourteen firms list time for working on the moving brief for class certification. Most of these firms were billing simply for the time they spent reading and reviewing the work done by the Specks and Kohn firms. Eleven firms also bill time for the certification reply brief.

10. The work of the Rule 37 Committee, which was involved in obtaining and reviewing defendants’ discovery responses, was marked by overstaffing and by grossly excessive time changes. Useless mass meetings of plaintiffs’ attorneys, repetitive “read and review” time charged to the same defendants’ discovery responses, unproductive negotiating sessions by a gaggle of plaintiffs’ lawyers and approximately 1,271 hours devoted just to the briefing of motions are just some examples of these excesses.

11. Almost all 160 lawyers who participated in this case were involved in some phase of discovery, with a minimum of forty-five lawyers involved just in the taking of depositions. While time constraints imposed by the court may have contributed to the double tracking and triple tracking of depositions, the work of the fifteen discovery subcommittees seems to have been very poorly coordinated. This resulted in numerous meetings among counsel, reviewing and rereviewing thousands of discovery documents by dozens of partners, associates and paralegals, and tasks being performed by senior level personnel which more appropriately could be carried out by less expensive juniors.

III. Fee Negotiations

Immediately following the final round of settlements in September of 1980, the lawyers for the private plaintiffs turned their attention to the question of the total amount of fees that should be requested from the court. Beginning on October 3, 1980, the plaintiffs’ lawyers began a series of discussions in an attempt to arrive at a mutually agreed upon total fee request, hoping, with some justification, that in the absence of a fee dispute, the court would not feel compelled to subject the petitions to the type of scrutiny they are now undergoing.

On October 8, 1980, Specks sent a letter to all counsel asking that information concerning their time and expenses be sent to Messrs. Atkins, Cotchett, Kohn, Saveri and Specks so that the Executive Committee would “be in a position to make .. . estimates [of fees and expenses] and arrive at recommendations regarding reasonable guide lines [sic] with respect to multiples, etc.... ” Class Objectors’ E 618. On November 13, 1980, a meeting took place which was attended by Specks and other plaintiffs’ counsel for the purpose of reviewing the lodestar computations and out-of-pocket expenses of all plaintiffs’ counsel, this information having been obtained in response to the October 8th letter. According to Mr. Specks’ summary of the meeting, a “consensus” was reached “that counsel for the private plaintiffs and the certified states should seek fees aggregating approximately 25% of the settlement fund, including interest to the date of distribution.” Class Objectors’ E 619-22. This apparent “consensus” did not last long, for Harold Kohn would not agree, insisting that the total amount of fees awarded should not exceed 20% of the recovery or approximately $10 million.

In order to avoid a “blood bath over the fee applications”, see Sachnoff letter, 6/4/81, Class Objectors’ E 628,8 negotiations were undertaken by Messrs. Specks, Barrack, Sachnoff, Cochett and others to persuade Kohn to change his position. Kohn proposed that the plaintiffs’ attorneys make recommendations to the court with respect to all of the fee petitions with the exception *77 of the Specks, Saveri and Sloan petitions. Specks rejected this proposal. According to Kohn, Specks “refused, as he has refused every suggestion which would not give him and Saveri patently and grossly excessive fees.” Letter from Kohn to Sachnoff, 4/28/81, Class Objectors’ E 625.

In the spring of 1981, as the date for filing the fee petitions drew near, Kohn let it be known that he would file formal objections with the court unless the proposed fees totaled under $10 million. Another round of negotiations ensued in an attempt to dissuade Kohn from this action. During these negotiations, Kohn claims that some plaintiffs’ lawyers privately attempted to have him raise his fee request while publically stating that Kohn’s request was too high. See Kohn’s Memo in Opposition to Subpoena, filed 5/20/81; N.T., 5/3/82, at 2215-16; Letter to Sachnoff, 4/28/81, Class Objectors’ E 625.

The negotiations collapsed primarily because Specks, Saveri and Sloan feared that if the plaintiffs’ lawyers reduced their fee to the level suggested by Kohn then the court would use the new, lower suggested level as a base from which to cut the fees even further. Sachnoff letter to all counsel, 6/4/81, Class Objectors’ E 628, N.T., 5/12/82 at 2297. Other plaintiffs’ counsel also refused to trim their fee requests because they feared they would be excluded from further antitrust cases by Specks, Saveri and Sloan. N.T., 5/3/82 at 2227; 5/12/82 at 2297-2314.

The negotiations having failed, the plaintiffs’ counsel filed their fee petitions on March 20, 1981, the deadline set by the court. The fee requests did not even conform to the originally agreed upon ceiling of 25%. Instead the requested fees totaled approximately 21 million dollars or 40% of the settlement fund (without interest). Efforts to persuade Kohn not to file objections continued. See Sachnoff’s 6/4/81 letter, Class Objectors’ E 628.

IV. The Fee Petitions

In anticipation of the fee requests, this court entered Pretrial Order No. 143, amended by Pretrial Order No. 147, detailing the information to be included in the fee petitions. A copy is appended to this memorandum. (Appendix). Many of the petitions filed did not comply with the requirements of Pretrial Order No. 143 as amended, making a difficult task more time consuming and burdensome.

The fees and expenses requested range from a low of $16,529, by Litman, Litman, Harris & Specter of Pittsburgh, to a high of $4,397,321 by Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. of Chicago. The petitions totaled $20,220,962 for attorneys’ fees and $1,197,151 for expenses.

Granvil I. Specks, co-lead counsel for the plaintiffs, along with several other plaintiffs’ lawyers asked the court to appoint a Fee Review Committee which would consist of seven of the plaintiffs’ counsel. As explained by Specks, this committee would review each petition filed and make recommendations to the court “as to the overall gross fees and expenses that should be awarded as well as the individual fees and expenses based upon that analysis.” N.T., 3/27/81 at 22.

Kohn objected to a fee review committee made up of plaintiffs’ counsel on conflict of interest grounds. Objections, filed 3/26/81, Docket Entry No. 3275. I agreed that it would be inappropriate under the circumstances and declined to appoint the committee. N.T., 3/27/81, at 21.

At the time the fee petitions were filed, Specks and other counsel recognized that some of the fee requests were outrageous. According to Kohn, Specks called the fee petition of Saveri & Saveri, which requested fees in excess of 2 million dollars, including $650 per hour for every hour Guido Saveri spent on the case “ridiculous” and thought that the petition should be “substantially reduced and cannot be allowed.” Kohn’s Objections to Petition of Saveri & Saveri at 6. Lowell E. Sachnoff, one of the petitioning attorneys here, told Specks that many of the firm’s fee petitions had “inflated lodestar time, rates, and multiples” (Letter to Specks, 4/27/81, Class Objectors’ E *78 521-524) and, accordingly, he urged co-lead counsel to make the “Herculean effort” to “sweep out the Aegean [sic] stables.”9 N.T., 5/12/82 at 2298, 2308.

V. Objections to the Fee Petitions

Other interested parties also shared Specks’ and Sachnoff s sentiment that some of the fee petitions were outrageous. After the fee petitions were filed, detailed objections to them were filed by Harold Kohn and fifteen class member corporations.10

(A) Kohn’s Objections

Kohn filed specific objections on behalf of his client to sixteen of the fee petitions. He also made general recommendations with respect to all of the petitions. An acknowledged leader of the class action bar with vast experience in the antitrust field, Kohn asserted that the 97,000 hours claimed by the plaintiffs’ lawyers were excessive, and that the same work could have been accomplished with an expenditure of 5,000 to 15,000 hours by one competent firm. Kohn alleged that much of the time claimed was unnecessary and duplicated the work of others, pointing particularly to time charged for travel and attendance at hearings at which attorneys did nothing but sit and listen to other counsel make presentations. He also complained about the many hours charged by lawyers who on their own undertook to “review” the work of others.

Kohn also was of the opinion that the hourly rates requested by many of the attorneys were excessive, as were the rates claimed for paralegals, who performed simple clerical and administrative tasks and yet for whom hourly rates were sought in many cases for amounts five times what paralegals are actually paid. Moreover, Kohn contended that the multipliers requested by many of the petitioning firms were excessive, especially in light of the fact that many of these firms made claims after the January, 1979 settlements when there was no longer any contingency to be considered.

Even more serious, Kohn claimed that five firms, Specks & Goldberg, Ltd., Saveri & Saveri, Sloan & Connelly, Lawrence Walner & Associates, Ltd. and Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ltd., gained control of the litigation through a voting block formed by lawyers who were importuned to file additional redundant class actions or who were simply added as co-counsel to complaints already filed. This coterie elected lead counsel and the Executive Committee who were responsible for handing out committee and other work assignments to themselves and to attorneys who voted for them. Such assignments were highly desirable because they enabled firms to increase their lodestar billing, frequently just for mere meetings and review tasks, and to claim multipliers for their leadership roles. Kohn alleged that these firms, in filing their fees petitions, had violated the good faith requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 by conspiring to produce overstaffing, overbilling, and needless “busy work.”11

In his objections, Kohn concluded that the maximum proportion of fees to the overall settlement fund should have been no more than twenty percent, especially considering that in similar cases the recovery has been in the range of 6% to 20%.12

*79 (B) Class Objectors

Among the members of the class were fifteen corporations13 who engaged the New York City firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges (“Weil, Gotshal”) to challenge the fee requests of class counsel. On May 15, 1981, the deadline for filing objections to the fee petitions, Weil, Gotshal filed a “Notice of Intention to Appear and Object to Applications For Attorneys’ Fees and Costs”. Simultaneously, on behalf of the class objectors they filed a motion for an order (1) granting them permission to review all the attorneys’ fee applications and (2) for an extension of time to file additional written objections to the fee applications after they had had an adequate amount of time to review the fee petitions. Over the objections of plaintiffs’ counsel except Mr. Kohn, N.T. 6/10/81, I granted the class objectors’ motion.

The class objectors submitted a 525 page report with 1200 pages of exhibits and appendices reflecting a detailed analysis of many aspects of the fee petitions and which, to a great extent, supported the Kohn assertions of gross inefficiency, incompetence and overreaching on the part of plaintiffs’ counsel.

The report also made a number of recommendations including (1) denying fees to counsel who misstated facts underlying their fee application or who deliberately participated in the logging of unnecessary hours, and (2) fixing the number of compensable hours at 15,000, the number attested to by Kohn as being reasonable but adding, however, that even if the number were doubled with a rate of $100 per hour and a multiplier of 1.5, it would result in a generous award of 4.5 million dollars.

VI. The Response to the Objections

(A) Retaliation Against Kohn

Plaintiffs’ counsel returned the volley by filing numerous objections to the Kohn firm’s fee petition.14

Although these same objectors did not challenge any other fee petitions, the objections to the Kohn petition apply equally to many other petitions.15 For example, Specks & Goldberg attacked Kohn’s average hourly rates of $610 per hour as “scandalous”, Preliminary Statement of Objectors to Kohn Petition at 5, but have not challenged Saveri’s hourly rate of $650. Lowell Sachnoff in his objection to Kohn’s fee petition alleges that Kohn oftentimes used lawyers for ministerial work when he could have used paralegals; however, these same objections could be applied to nearly all the firms in this case, including Sachnoff.16

*80 (B) Response to the Class Objectors’ Report

Not unexpectedly, the petitioners (except Kohn) defended the organizational structure and the hours charged claiming that the division of labor had been the most effective way of tackling the massive task confronting them and that only their long hours, hard work and sheer persistence produced the fund which benefited the class.17

Kohn, in his response, agreed with Weil, Gotshal that there had been tremendous waste, particularly, in the deposition program. However, he noted that he had “steadfastly opposed the proliferation of work among additional firms which were engaged and were assigned by Mr. Specks over [my] objections.” Reply at 12, filed 11/12/81. Furthermore, he added, “There is a limit as to what any one lawyer, however dedicated and able, can do when so many lawyers, for reasons of their own, are united in opposing him.... ” Reply at 12. Finally, he claimed that he had been wary of displaying plaintiffs’ disputes before the watchful eyes of defendants’ counsel while settlement negotiations were going on.

VII. The Fee Hearings

The court notified all interested parties that an evidentiary hearing on the fee issue would be granted to any person desiring one. A total of eight firms took advantage of this opportunity. Inexplicably, Sloan & Connelly, P.C., having objected only to Kohn’s petition, filed a motion requesting an order compelling evidentiary hearings for all petitioning attorneys and seeking a denial of any fees to petitioners who did not present evidence at a hearing. This motion was denied.18

The hearings commenced on February 1, 1982 and ended with a closing argument by the class objectors on June 7, 1982.19

VIII. The Legal Principles

Although American courts generally require every litigant to pay his own attorneys’ fees and costs, the common fund doctrine represents a well-recognized exception to that rule. Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 64 (3d Cir.1982). This doctrine permits a court of equity to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a party who produces or preserves a common fund for the benefit of others. Id. The basis of this equitable award is to prevent the unjust enrichment of those who benefited from but did not participate in, the litigation. Id.

In Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.1973) (“Lindy I”), and 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.1976) (“Lindy II”), our Court of Appeals set forth the guidelines for the computation of fee awards. First, the court must determine the hours expended by counsel which created, protected or preserved the fund. Lindy II at 111. Second, the number of hours is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate for the attorney’s services. Hourly rates may vary according to the status of the attorney (i.e., his experience, reputation, practice, qualifications, etc.) who performed the work or the nature of the services provided. *81 Lindy I at 167. This multiplication of the number of compensable hours by the reasonable hourly rate constitutes the “lodestar” of the court’s fee determination. Id. at 168.

The lodestar can be increased or decreased based upon the contingent nature of the particular case involved and the quality of the attorney’s work. An increase or decrease of the lodestar amount is referred to as a “multiplier”. In determining whether to increase the lodestar to reflect the contingent nature of the case “the district court should consider any information that may help to establish the probability of success.” Id. at 168. However, “[t]he court may find that the contingency was so slight or the amount found to constitute reasonable compensation for the hours worked was so large a proportion of the total recovery that an increased allowance for the contingent nature of the fee would be minimal.” Id. A multiplier for quality should only be awarded for “an unusual degree of skill, superior or inferior, exhibited by counsel in the specific case before the court.” Siiberman, supra, at 64.

IX. Guidelines

When applying the Lindy analysis to the fee petitions in the instant case, I have had to make numerous rulings with respect to compensable hours, hourly rates and multipliers which are applicable to most — if not all — of the fee petitions. Before proceeding to a Lindy analysis of each individual fee petition, it would seem appropriate to outline in a general way the standards by which I measured the accuracy of the data submitted, the reasonableness of the hours charged and rates sought and the appropriateness of a multiplier for contingency and quality.

(A) Compensable Hours

(1) Disallowed Hours

I have disallowed or reduced time for the following tasks:

(a) Pretrial Memorandum

As mentioned earlier, this was one of the major examples of maladministration in this case. No less than 51 plaintiff lawyers devoted a total of over 4,500 hours to this task at a cost (based on the fees requested) of over one million dollars. This was a grossly excessive amount of time to expend on this one brief and accordingly, I have reduced each firm’s hours expended on this task by one-half.

(b) Read and Review Time

As mentioned previously, hundreds of hours have been billed to the class by attorneys for reading and reviewing documents for which the attorneys were not responsible. This time has been disallowed for all attorneys except members of the fourteen member Executive Committee. See In re Equity Funding Corporation Securities Litigation, 438 F.Supp. 1303, 1329 (C.D.Cal.1977)

(c) Fee Petition Time

In accordance with the rule of Lindy II, time involved in the preparation of fee petitions is not compensable as it does not enure to the benefit of the class, 540 F.2d at 111.

(d) Pretrial Conferences

As noted above, counsel billed a total of 1446 hours for the 31 conferences. This large number of hours was primarily due to the attendance of attorneys who contributed nothing to the conferences but were merely there as spectators. The hours billed by these attorneys will not be compensated by the class. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir.1974).

(e) Hours Without Adequate Supporting Data

Hundreds of hours which were described by vague or meaningless terms or insufficiently documented, will not be compensated. See In re Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F.Supp. 1357, 1387 (N.D.Ga.1979), modified on other grounds, 645 F.2d *82 488 (5th Cir.1981). “The burden is clearly on counsel to file adequately-documented applications for fees and those who fail to meet that burden do so at their own risk.” In re Equity Funding Corporation Securities Litigation, 438 F.Supp. at 1327.

(f) Industrial Analysis Committee

Approximately 1800 lawyer and paralegal hours have been billed to the class for work on the Industrial Analysis Committee (“IAC”). Approximately 150 of these hours were spent in the IAC meetings alone. The membership of this committee consisted of: one chairman, four co-chairmen and seven other private law firms, Also on the committee were five assistant attorneys general of the Minority States. The members of the IAC performed such clerical and ministerial tasks as gathering and microfilming defendants’ 1973-77 Form 10-Ks for sales volume, trying to determine defendants’ market shares and reviewing Lockwood’s Directory for the names of subsidiaries and affiliates of the defendants.

The work of this committee was basically useless. It duplicated the efforts of others and resulted in no appreciable benefit to the class. It therefore will not be compensated by the class.

My conclusion is supported by co-lead counsel’s repeated and well-documented objections to the work of this committee. Commencing with a letter dated August 23, 1978, to Joseph Cotchett, Chairman of the IAC, Harold Kohn, as a member of the IAC, continually took the position that the work of the IAC should cease as it was wasteful and of no benefit to the class. In the August 23, 1978 letter, Class Objectors’ E 278-79, Kohn complained of the fact that 15 persons attended a two-day meeting of the Industrial Analysis Committee regarding industry statistics — much of which came from publicly available publications of which most people were already aware. He also noted that the industry’s statistics were of limited use and that there had already been two settlements in the case based on market share information obtained without any input from the IAC.

Kohn’s letters to Cotchett criticizing the work of the IAC continued. On November 21, 1978, he again wrote to Cotchett stating that the work of the IAC had not ceased; that the committee’s work did not justify the amount of time devoted to it; and that his firm had been obtaining on its own industry information sufficient to conduct negotiations and to conclude settlements. See Class Objectors’ E 282-83; see also letter of 10/12/78, Class Objectors’ E 280. Kohn specifically noted that the information he obtained was the type of information he should have been, but was not, receiving from the committee, and that such information should not take very much time to obtain. Kohn concluded by directing that the activities of this committee be suspended until after the class was certified, when the situation could be reexamined. Kohn warned Cotchett that he would object to any attorney fees requested for any time expended after November 21,1978 on IAC matters. Kohn continued to write Cotchett repeating his objections, but his warnings went unheeded. See letters of 12/15/78, 1/19/79, Class Objectors’ E 284-85, 287.

Because of his intimate knowledge of the workings of this committee and his vast experience, Kohn’s assessment of the value of this committee is persuasive. I am in accord with Kohn’s view that the Industrial Analysis Committee work was of no benefit to the class.

(2) Allowed Hours

The class objectors have objected to the following hours, but for the reasons given below, I have determined that the time should be compensated.

(a) Proceedings before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”)

Class objectors urge that time spent before the Panel should be disallowed because they claim it was of no benefit to the class since the actions would inevitably be consolidated no matter what was argued by the plaintiffs’ lawyers to the Panel. Block affidavit, filed 6/8/81 at 36. I am not persuaded by this argument and I note *83 it was specifically rejected by the court in Equity Funding, supra, 438 F.Supp. at 1334. Since the petitioning lawyers who argued before the JPML acted on behalf of their clients and the putative class and since counsels’ views and arguments are an essential part of the Panel’s decision-making process, the time will be compensated.

(b) Class Action Discovery

The class objectors object to the 1,310.7 hours devoted to class action discovery and they urge the court to disallow a substantial number of these hours because the class did not benefit from having 16 representatives certified.

Although this is an excessive number of hours to be spent on this one activity, all of it resulted from the action of the defendants, who requested the discovery of the 16 would-be class representatives. Since the responsibility for this inordinate number of hours lies with the defendants, not the plaintiffs’ lawyers, the petitioners should not be denied compensation for class discovery. On the other hand, to award the plaintiffs’ counsel fees for this time at their customary hourly rate would be an injustice to the class. I think a proper balance can be struck by compensating for class action discovery, but only at a rate of $50 per hour.20

(B) Hourly Rate

Because of the duplication, waste and inefficiency which resulted from the participation of 41 sets of attorneys and the committee structure established by counsel, “it is only proper that the fee award be adjusted to reflect this.” In Re Penn Central Securities Litigation, 416 F.Supp. at 916. Because of these circumstances, attorneys cannot expect to receive the same hourly rates awarded to them by other courts in class action litigation. The abundance of attorneys representing the class substantially diluted each attorney’s role and, therefore, the rates should be reduced accordingly to reflect their diminished contribution. In many instances, adequate representation for the class may result in some degree of duplication but the proliferation of lawyers here cannot be justified on any rational basis.

In this litigation, it was not unusual for senior partners to devote a great deal of time to clerical, administrative and investigative tasks such as document review. Partners will not be compensated at partner-level rates for tasks which are customarily performed by junior associates or paralegals. Lindy I, supra at 167; Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d at 717. As my colleague Judge Cahn has aptly stated: “[A]n attorney who charges $150 per hour for work that could properly be completed by an attorney whose time is valued at only $75 per hour, should be paid only $75 per hour from the settlement funds.” In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation (East Coast) MDL 201(A), slip. op. at 11 (E.D.Pa., filed September 30, 1980).

In light of all the circumstances presented here, I am satisfied that the following rates are fair and reasonable for the private attorneys:21

1. Hourly rate for partner-level work: $100.00.

2. Hourly rate for associate-level work performed by a partner or an associate: $50.00

3. Hourly rate for co-lead counsel (Specks and Kohn): $150.00.

These rates are in conformity with the regular hourly rates billed to noncontingent clients by private law firms in major metropolitan areas. Paralegals will be compensated at the rate of $25 per hour which I *84 find to be reasonable and which is the rate the majority of petitioners have requested. See Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 70 F.R.D. 366, 373-74 (E.D.Pa.1976); Entin v. Barg, 412 F.Supp. 508, 517 (E.D.Pa.1976) (In both cases paralegals were awarded $20 per hour).

(C) Multipliers

I will allow, for the contingency factor, a positive multiplier of 1.5 for all compensable time expended prior to the $30 million settlements consummated in January of 1979.22 Once the initial settlements were approved, there was no risk of nonpayment for services or reimbursement of expenses. As Robert Atkins, Esq., one of the petitioners here, stated when he wrote to the New Hampshire Attorney General:

As you know, there have been previous settlements with certain defendants amounting to $30 million; approximately $6 million in interest has accrued since that date. As a result of these settlements, which have been approved, reimbursement of your State’s assessment payments is virtually assured.

Class Objectors’ E 205. I have not chosen a higher multiplier because prior to January 1979, the risk of an unsuccessful result in this case was spread among 25 law firms and 7 attorneys general.23 Moreover, it appears that this was not a case of high risk because there was a “large number of attorneys who were willing to prosecute this case on a purely contingent basis. This was quite obviously not a case where counsel were reluctant to invest considerable time because of the fear that they would go unpaid.” In re Penn Central Securities Litigation, 416 F.Supp. at 919 n. 30.

No positive quality multiplier will be allowed. Under all the circumstances of the case, I am not persuaded that any counsel demonstrated such an unusually high degree of skill as would warrant compensation beyond that reflected in the hourly rates.

Specks & Goldberg, however, because of its dominant leadership role, must be charged with primary responsibility for all the wasted hours, duplication and gross inefficiency which marked this ease from its inception. While I recognize that in a case as large and complex as this, some duplication of effort is inevitable, nevertheless, the court cannot condone the needless proliferation of lawyers, wasted time and unnecessary expenses, all of which were orchestrated by Mr. Specks despite warnings and objections by his co-lead counsel.

Based on the record before me, a good case can be made for denying the Specks & Goldberg petition altogether. But weighing in the balance the positive aspects of the firm’s contribution such as the vital role Granvil Specks played in the settlement negotiations and the utilization of his broad experience in class action litigation, I am convinced that something less Draconian is in order.

Lindy I and its progeny authorize the application of a negative multiplier as a “penalty” based on “[a]n evaluation of the professional methods utilized in processing the case.” Lindy II at 118. This is the course I will follow and, accordingly, I will apply a negative multiplier of .5 to the Specks & Goldberg lodestar. This reflects my considered judgment that effective management could have produced the same results in less than half the time expended. The application of a negative multiplier is necessary in a case of this nature to remind counsel, particularly those in a leadership role, that a class action is something more than a fee-generating device. It is a cause *85 of action belonging to the members of the class to whom counsel owe a duty of fidelity. Their primary job is to create a fund for the class not the lawyers.

(D) Expenses

The petitioning attorneys here have asked the court for reimbursement of expenses totaling $1,197,151. The court has previously awarded counsel (except Messrs. Perry and Riordan) reimbursement for all but 25% of the expenses for which they have petitioned, with the understanding that if any of the requested expenses are disallowed, that amount will be subtracted from any fee awarded, or if necessary, repaid by counsel. Postjudgment Orders No. 5, filed 7/24/81, and No. 6, filed 8/13/80. My examination of the expense reimbursement requests prompts some general comments at this time with a more detailed analysis to follow.

First, where I have disallowed attorney time (e.g., for unnecessary attendance by an attorney at a pretrial conference), I have not permitted reimbursement for any expenses incurred' in connection with such time.

Second, I have assumed that the class members “have agreed to pay [only] modest to moderate travel and per diem costs when the trips served their beneficial interests.” In re Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F.Supp. at 1389. Accordingly, petitioners have not been reimbursed for “unnecessary or extravagant travel and related expenses.” Id.

Finally, I have scrutinized with particular care repeated charges for meals consumed at hometown restaurants and have disallowed those which appeared to have been arranged primarily for the benefit of the lawyer.

X. The Depth of the Review

In Lindy II, the Court of Appeals stated that it “did not ... intend that a district court, in setting an attorney’s fee, become enmeshed in a meticulous analysis of every detailed facet of the professional representation,” nor “that the inquiry into the adequacy of the fee assume massive proportions, perhaps even dwarfing the case in chief.” 540 F.2d at 116. Unfortunately, the expectations of Lindy II cannot be realized in this case. The internecine warfare which broke out among plaintiffs’ counsel resulted in charges of gross mismanagement, ethical misconduct, bad faith and overreaching. The eruption from within, in turn, generated an all out assault from without in the form of the class objectors’ investigations and report.24 These circumstances made it imperative for the court to undertake a thorough examination of each of the fee petitions.

I regret to say that my inquiry has given substance to the worst fears of the critics of the class action device — that it is being manipulated by lawyers to generate fees. Some of the petitioners here were reminded on a prior occasion that

[t]he principal attacks on the [Rule 23] are largely the result of conduct by counsel for plaintiffs in some cases who have acted as though the rule was adopted for their benefit rather than for the multitude of individuals comprising the class or classes whose rights they were presumably vindicating.... It would be ironic indeed if class actions . .. were to be restricted or eliminated as a result of the conduct of a very small segment of the bar specializing in plaintiffs’ representation.

Liebman v. J.W. Petersen Coal & Oil Co., 63 F.R.D. 684, 701 (N.D.Ill.1974).

My rulings with respect to the fees may seem harsh to many, but as long as Rule 23 and Lindy and its progeny impose upon the court the duty to protect the class from overreaching by class counsel, I have no alternative. Moreover, the court must take a firm stand if Rule 23 is to retain *86 respectability as a legitimate and effective tool of judicial administration.

XI. The Individual Fee Petitions

In alphabetical order by firm (except for Stewart Perry, Esq., whose petition is reviewed in conjunction with that of Walter Riordan, Esq.) the results of my analysis of the fee petitions follow. In sum, I have allowed fees totaling $4,343,103 and expenses of $1,121,020.

ADLER, BARISH, LEVIN AND CRES-KOFF

Adler, Barish is located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The firm was co-counsel with Wolf, Block for plaintiff, Moses Jaroslawicz, t/a J & B Toy Stationery, on a complaint filed in August of 1977.

It seeks compensation for 965.5 partner hours, 1382.25 associate hours and 98.75 paralegal hours. Its total lodestar request is $219,925 and with the application of a requested multiplier of two, the total fee sought is $439,850. Adler, Barish’s major responsibility was discovery of Scott Paper Company in conjunction with co-counsel Wolf, Block. Both firms performed this task under the supervision of the discovery chairman (Specks) and co-chairmen (Saveri and Cotchett).

I. Arnold Levin

(A) Hours Expended

Levin is a partner in the firm. He asks to be compensated for 965.5 hours of work. After a careful review of the time records submitted, I find that only 622.75 of the total hours claimed by Levin have benefited the class. Specifically, in accordance with the Guidelines set forth above, I find the following hours did not benefit the class and accordingly will not be allowed:

1. .75 hours for status phone calls to Levin’s client. Such activity did not benefit the class.

2. 39.5 hours are claimed for the argument before the MultiDistrict Litigation Panel. This claim is clearly excessive. The court will allow 12 hours for this endeavor.

3. In the monthly time sheets, 51 hours are described only as “correspondence.” Such entries are too vague or inadequately documented to allow compensation since it cannot be determined whether the time benefited the class and what an appropriate hourly rate would be.

4. 6.5 hours devoted to attendance at pretrial conferences will not be compensated since such attendance did not benefit the class. In this litigation, Adler, Barish had no leadership role; its participation was limited to Scott Paper discovery. Therefore, it was neither necessary nor beneficial to the class for Levin to attend pretrial conferences.

5. 225 hours spent by Levin reviewing documents, correspondence and filings for which Adler, Barish was not responsible (i.e., those not pertaining to Scott Paper Company) will not be compensated. For example: (1) On May 7,1979, Levin spent .5 hours reviewing the Potlach cast of characters, .5 hours reviewing the joint memorandum of merchant house defendants in opposition to motion for reconsideration and an additional .5 hours reviewing the reply brief of Potlach in opposition to motion for reconsideration; (2) On January 4, 1980, two hours were spent reviewing the Majority States’ answer to the merchant house defendants’ interrogatories; and (3) On April 2, 1980, 1.5 hours were spent by Levin reviewing the Majority States’ petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. As discussed earlier, in a case such as this, where there are 160 attorneys participating, every attorney cannot possibly be compensated for reading every piece of paper over the course of three years of litigation, as Levin apparently did.25

*87 6. 64 hours spent by Levin on the Trial Memorandum and Final Contentions (nearly 44 hours spent in meetings or conferences on the subject) appears excessive in light of the combined 4604.93 hours spent on these same tasks by all the lawyers in this case. Accordingly, I will reduce the 64 hours claimed by Levin by one-half. Only 32 of these hours will be compensated.

7. Finally, I have considered the class objectors’ challenge to the 19.4 hours Levin spent traveling and attending discovery-related meetings, most of them in Chicago, Illinois, and the general objection to his time spent in the discovery of Scott Paper Company. I have carefully considered these objections and especially share the objectors’ recommendation that meetings of plaintiff’s counsel, who are headquartered in various parts of the country, be kept to the bare minimum due to the expense of travel. I find, however, that since Levin played an appreciable role in the discovery of Scott Paper Company from the start to the finish of this litigation, the hours spent by him were reasonable and therefore compensable.

For all of the above reasons, then, Levin will be compensated for a total of 622.75 hours. The number of hours disallowed is 342.75.

(B) Hourly Rate

Levin asks for an hourly rate of $100 during the years 1977 through 1978 and $125 for 1979 through 1981. As was stated earlier, Levin’s compensable time in this litigation was devoted almost exclusively to Scott Paper discovery. He reviewed that defendant’s documents and took nine depositions. This task was performed in conjunction with members of the Wolf, Block office and under the supervision of Specks, Saveri & Cotchett. In short, it is of the type of work normally assigned to a junior partner or senior associate. On baianee, an average rate of $100 per hour for Levin’s time seems fair and appropriate.

(C) Total Lodestar

622.75 hours X $100/hour = $62,275

(D) Multiplier

A contingency multiplier of 1.5 will be applied to all compensable Adler, Barish time (171 hours) expended prior to the initial settlements. This includes 117.75 hours of Levin’s time and all of Michael Fishbein’s time. No adjustment to the lodestar is justified for the quality of Levin’s services. Adler, Barish did not have a leadership position in the case and the vast majority of Levin’s compensation is for routine discovery matters. A quality factor is inherent in Levin’s $100 hourly rate and an adjustment to that rate is not justified because Levin did not demonstrate an unusually high degree of skill.

II. Michael Fishbein

(A) Hours Expended

Fishbein, a 1977 law graduate, is an associate at Adler, Barish. He asks for compensation for 53.25 hours which were devoted to responding to the defendants’ discovery of the firm’s client and communications with or concerning that client.

The objectors challenge the award of compensation to Fishbein for class action discovery because the class did not benefit from having sixteen representatives certified. Nevertheless, the Adler, Barish client was a named party and a designated class representative. Certification was a necessary part of the proceedings and inured to the benefit of the class. Accordingly, I will allow compensation for the time Fishbein spent on this task.

(B) Hourly Rate

Adler, Barish has asked for $75 an hour for Fishbein’s time. However, since *88 Fishbein had only recently graduated from law school when he worked on this case, $50 an hour is a fair and appropriate hourly rate.

(C) Total Lodestar

53.25 hours X $50/hour = $2,662.50

(D) Multiplier

See I.D.

III. Arlene Lotman

(A) Hours Expended

Ms. Lotman is an associate of Adler, Barish. She spent a total of 1313.75 hours almost exclusively on discovery work, a substantial portion of which consisted of document review, microfilm review and deposition summarization pertaining to the Scott Paper discovery. After a review of the time records of Ms. Lotman, I find that the following hours of the total claimed by her are not compensable:

1. In the monthly time sheets submitted to the court 17.3 hours are merely described as “Telephone conversation with co-counsel.” Such entries are too vague or inadequately documented to allow compensation since it cannot be determined whether this time benefited the class or what an appropriate hourly rate would be for such time.26

2. 6.5 hours of Lotman’s time devoted to attendance at pretrial conferences will be disallowed; it did not benefit the class.

3. 7 hours for one day of telephone calls to the Wolf, Block firm and James Sloan, Esquire (Entry of June 10, 1980) is excessive on its face. Only one hour of such time will be compensated.

4. 9.5 hours spent on July 7, 1980 reviewing the Majority States Pretrial Memorandum will be disallowed; it did not benefit the class.

5. 4.5 hours spent on September 3, 1980 reviewing correspondence and private plaintiffs’ pretrial memorandum is excessive; only one hour of this time will be compensated.

6. 3.25 hours spent on September 4, 1980 for “tel. call to co-counsel and complete review of trial memo” will be disallowed. This entry of 3.25 hours is contained in the monthly time summaries submitted to the court. It is at variance with Lotman’s contemporaneous time sheets, which list only .75 hours for this same activity. Accordingly, she will be compensated for only .75 hours.

7. Finally, it is my view that Ms. Lotman’s claim of 149.75 hours devoted to the preparation of depositions pertaining to Scott Paper is excessive in view of the fact that (1) Levin spent 117.5 hours in preparation for the same depositions and (2) Ms. Lot-man devoted over 680 hours to review of Scott documents and microfilm and an additional 100 hours preparing a discovery book and report and an undated cast of characters for Scott. Given these circumstances, it is my judgment that 149.75 hours for preparation of these depositions is unreasonable; only 50 hours of this time will be allowed.

Accordingly, I will disallow a total of 145.05 hours of Ms. Lotman’s time. The total amount of compensable time is therefore 1168.7.

(B) Hourly Rate

Adler, Barish is asking for $75 an hour for Ms. Lotman’s time. As in the case of Mr. Fishbein, Ms. Lotman began work on Fine Paper as a recent law school graduate. In the light of the level of the work she performed and her junior associate status, an award of $50 per hour for her time is fair and appropriate.

(C) Total Lodestar

1168.7 hours X $50 = $58,435

(D) Multiplier

See I. .(D) supra, at 57.

*89 IV. Barbara Sarkin and Claudia Tesoro

These two attorneys first appear in the Adler, Barish time records in late September 1980, less than a week before the final settlement agreements in this case were concluded. They reviewed pleadings and other general materials but performed no substantive work prior to settlement. Prior to this time, neither had any prior experience in Fine Paper and their addition to an already-crowded array of some 160 attorneys was of no benefit to the class. Accordingly, all of their 15.25 hours will be disallowed.

V. Paralegal

Adler, Barish asks for compensation of 98.75 paralegal hours at the rate of $25 per hour. A review of the time records indicate that their work did benefit the class and that time expended was reasonable. For the reasons stated in the Guidelines section, I believe that $25 an hour for paralegal time is fair and appropriate. However, for reasons already stated, no multiplier will be awarded for paralegal time. Accordingly, Adler, Barish will be awarded $2,468.75 for paralegal time.

VI. Expenses

Adler, Barish’s total expenses are $30,-269.12, which I find reasonable. As explained earlier, the firm has already received 75% of these expenses. Accordingly, I will award the firm the remainder of its expenses in the amount of $7,568.12.

VII. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which Adler, Barish is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Levin 622.75 $100.00 $ 62,275.00 $ 68,162.50 $227,575.00

Fishbein 53.25 $ 50.00 $ 2,662.50 $ 3,993.75 $ 7,987.50

Lotman 1168.7 $ 50.00 $ 58,435.00 $ 58,435.00 $197,062.50

Sarkin 0.0 0 0 0 $ 1,725.00

Tesoro 0.0 0 0 0 $ 562.50

Paralegals

TOTAL $125,841.25 $133,060.00 $439,850.00

98.75 $ 25.00 $ 2,468.75 $ 2,468.75 $ 4,937.50

Expenses:

Amount Requested $ 30,269.12

Amount Previously Distributed $ 22,701.00

Amount Outstanding $ 7,568.12

Amount Awarded $ 7,568.12

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $133,060.00

Expenses $ 7,568.12

Final Award $140,628.12

AUSTIN, ROTH, SUNDE, McDONOUGH & TIERNEY, P.A.27

This Minneapolis firm became counsel of record for National School Studios, Inc., Universal Publications, Inc. and Prestige Portraits, Inc. on April 1, 1979. As in the case of other Minneapolis firms, the Austin firm became involved in this case at the importuning of Walter Riordan, Esquire, long after the initial 30 million dollar settle *90 ments were obtained, after the class was certified, and after there was already an abundance of counsel representing the class.

The firm claims to have spent 117 partner hours, 55.75 associate hours and 169.25 paralegal hours (totalling 342 hours), on such tasks as reviewing and indexing microfilmed documents of Kimberly-Clark Corporation, Hammermill Paper Company and Gilbert Paper Company. The firm was apparently assisting other firms that were responsible for obtaining discovery from these defendants.28 The firm seeks total fees of $29,584.38.

I. Robert M. Austin

(A) Hours Expended

This partner claims to have spent 117 hours on the litigation. After careful review of the time sheets submitted, I find that the 97 hours are not compensable:

1. 29 hours of work which did not benefit the class. These consist of 19 hours billed to work on the firm’s fee petition, 6 hours billed to conferences with Mr. Riordan in March and April, 1979 (apparently to obtain information about the case which the Austin firm was about to enter for the first time), and 4 hours devoted to the drafting of a complaint for the firm’s clients. Since the firm entered the case after the class was certified, these latter 10 hours were of no benefit to the class. The 19 hours spent on the firm’s fee petition are not compensable, since they conferred no benefit on the class.

2. 23 hours of Mr. Austin’s time were spent reading and reviewing materials for which the Austin firm did not have responsibility, such as Mead and Union Camp interrogatory answers. As discussed earlier, in a case such as this, where there are 160 attorneys participating, every attorney cannot possibly be compensated for reading or reviewing pleadings which do not directly pertain to their particular assignment.

3. 45 hours of Austin’s entries are so vague that, in view of his firm’s minimal role in the case, I am unable to discern what work was done, whether it benefited the class, whether it was duplicative or excessive, or at what rate the work should be compensated. Examples of such entries are “status conference,” “conference — Walter Riordan,” “general file review,” “background file — doc. procedure,” and “examining correspondence and pleadings.” Accordingly, the firm will not be compensated for this time.

The number of Austin’s disallowed hours amounts to 97. The remaining 20 hours spent by him on reviewing documents and document indices are compensable.

(B) Hourly Rate

Austin requests a rate of $100 to $125 per hour. This rate is not Austin’s non-contingent historical hourly rate, rather, as revealed in the petition, Austin’s historic hourly rate is $55 to $65 per hour. In view of these figures and the nature of the compensable tasks performed by Austin— document review — $50 per hour is a fair and appropriate rate for Austin’s time.

(C) Total Lodestar

20 hours X $50/hour = $1,000

(D) Multiplier

Austin requests a multiplier of 1.5 for the hours he expended in this case. This request, for obvious reasons, will be denied. At the time Austin’s firm entered the case, the risk of non-payment of attorney fees was virtually non-existent. The class already had been certified and $30 million dollars had already been obtained in settlements. As noted above, Robert Atkins, Chairman of plaintiffs’ finance committee, conceded the absence of a risk of *91 non-payment.29 Furthermore, no multiplier is appropriate for the quality of the firm’s work. Austin’s compensable time was spent reviewing documents and supervising the indexing of documents. This type of routine work, performed in a case in which some 160 other attorneys were involved, does not warrant an increment for quality.

II. Donna Geek

(A) Hours Expended

This associate devoted 54.25 hours to this litigation. After careful review of the time sheets submitted, I have concluded that only 12 hours of her time should be compensated by the class. Specifically, the following time will be disallowed:

1. 10 hours will be disallowed because the work was of no benefit to the class and duplicative of the work of other counsel in the case. These hours are reflected by the following entries: 2 hours for “conference re: rep. of client, status of case, recent developments, pleadings,” 1.5 hours for “conference re: fine paper settlement, strategy,” 1.5 hours “legal research” and for 5 hours for “examine corres., pleadings, and orders to determine the status of litigation, legal research.”

2. 4.75 hours are reflected by vague entries such as “conference on legal research on strategy,” or “intra-office conferences” in which the other participants and the subject thereof are unspecified. I cannot tell from such entries whether this time benefited the class or whether it was duplicative of the efforts of other counsel.

3. 27.5 hours devoted to reading and reviewing documents for which this firm had no responsibility such as unspecified pleadings and correspondence relating to unidentified defendants. As in the ease of Mr. Austin, Geek will not be compensated for this “read and review” time.

Geek’s 12 compensable hours were spent meeting with and supervising paralegals who were reviewing documents and Kimberly-Clark and Hammermill answers to interrogatories.

(B) Hourly Rate

Geek requests $50 to $55 for her time. $50 an hour is a fair and appropriate rate for her time.

(C) Total Lodestar

12 hours X $50/hour = $600

(D) Multiplier

No multiplier is requested for Geek’s time, nor does one appear warranted.

III. Other Attorneys

Richard Sunde, a partner in the firm, seeks to be compensated for one hour he spent locating and leasing a microfilm reader. He will be compensated for this time, but only at the paralegal rate of $25 an hour. Michael Tierney, an associate, devoted one-half an hour to this litigation for attendance at an intra-office conference. Since Tierney did not become further involved in this- case, and there being no description of the purpose of his involvement, no compensation will be awarded for his time. Obviously, no multiplier will be awarded to either of these attorneys.

IV. Paralegals

169.25 hours were expended by the firm’s paralegals on document review, indexing and “file maintenance”. These hours appear to have benefited the class. However, of these hours, 43 are charged to “file maintenance”. In view of the firm’s minor role in this case, 43 hours on “file maintenance” is excessive. The firm will only be compensated for 10 hours spent by paralegals on this task. Thus, the firm will be compensated for 136.25 paralegal hours at the rate of $25 per hour, not the $35 per hour rate requested here. Thus, the total award for paralegal time is $3,406.25.

V. Expenses

The Austin firm’s total expenses are $5,719.81 of which $4,500 represents the *92 firm’s contribution to the plaintiff’s litigation fund. The expenses appear reasonable. Since the firm has already received 75% of these expenses or $4,290, I will allow the remaining $1,429.81 for expenses.

VI. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Austin firm is entitled:

Attorney Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Award Total Request

Austin 20 $50 $1,000.00 $1,000.00 $20,709.38

Geek 12 $50 $ 600.00 $ 600.00 $ 2,858.75

Tierney 0 0 0 $ 27.50

Sunde 1 $25 $ 25.00 $ 25.00 $ 65.00

Paralegals 136.25 $3,406.25 $3,406.25 $ 5,923.75

$5,031.25 $29,584.38

Expenses

Amount Requested $5,719.81

Amount Previously Distributed $4,290.00

Amount Outstanding $1,429.81

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $5,031.25

Expenses $1.429.81

Final Award $6,461.06

BARRACK, RODOS & McMAHON

Barrack, Rodos & McMahon, a Philadelphia law firm, represented plaintiff William Fels in a complaint filed in October of 1977. The firm’s major contribution to the class was discovery of the Hammermill Corporation. Barrack was appointed chairman of the Hammermill discovery subcommittee under the supervision of the discovery committee chairman and co-chairmen. In connection with the Hammermill discovery, the Barrack firm reviewed documents and took depositions of Hammermill employees. The firm also prepared a discovery book and drafted the Hammermill contentions section of the pre-trial memorandum. Barrack was one of the two co-chairmen of the Rule 37 committee. The firm also notes in its fee petition that Barrack was a member of the trial team appointed as “Liaison to and Chairman of the support teams preparing for trial”. Finally, throughout the course of this litigation, the firm was a member of the Executive Committee.

The firm seeks total compensation for its services in the amount of $998,276.25. This is based on requested hourly rates of $100-$145 per hour for Barrack, $85 — $115 per hour for Rodos, $80-$105 per hour for McMahon, $75-$85 per hour for Bacine, $65-$75 per hour for Keener, and $25 per hour for all law clerks and paralegals. The firm also requests a multiplier of 2.5 to be applied to their lodestar over the period of June to September 1980 and a multiplier of 2 for the remaining time. The firm also seeks reimbursement for $75,079.65 in expenses.

I. Leonard Barrack

(A) Hours Expended

Barrack is a partner in the firm. He asks to be compensated for 1278 hours of work. Upon analysis of the time sheets submitted, I find, however, that Barrack should only be compensated for 722.63 hours of work in this litigation. This is the *93 only time which can reasonably be said to have benefited the class.

1. 134.5 hours will not be compensated because the supporting entries are too vague. It was impossible to determine exactly what work was done and, therefore, the court is unable to make a determination of benefit to the class. These include: (a) time spent in telephone conferences and/or calls without an explanation of what was discussed; (b) time noted merely as “review” and/or “read correspondence”, without further explanation or documentation; (c) all efforts expended in “conference” or “meetings” without an explanation of the subject matter; (d) hours marked “amended complaint”; (e) time billed to “analyze filings”; and (f) letter writing time to various parties without explanation or documentation. In addition to these general classifications, there were numerous others.30

2. 217.75 hours charged to discovery by Barrack are also disallowed because of vagueness. Disallowed time entries are those reflected by simple one or two word notations and include: (a) “general discovery review”, (b) “discovery”, (c) “documents”, (d) “document review”, (e) “examine documents”, (f) “review documents.” Such entries render impossible the court’s task of making a determination of benefit to the class. Fees are awarded on the basis of “whether the specific services benefited the fund ...” and such cursory explanations will not allow a general assumption of benefit to the class. Lindy II at 112 (emphasis added). It bears repeating that inadequately documented fee petitions are filed at the risk of the petitioning attorneys. In re Equity Funding Corporation of America Securities Litigation, 438 F.Supp. at 1327.

3. 59 hours spent in preparing for and attendance at pretrial conferences are also disallowed. Barrack had no substantial leadership position, and the firm’s designated responsibility was limited to Hammer-mill discovery. Furthermore, Messrs. Kohn and Specks were appointed spokesmen for the private plaintiffs with Kohn later being solely designated as senior spokesman in the courtroom. See Class Objectors’ E 743-44 and N.T., 9/3/80 at 4-5. I am not persuaded by Barrack’s argument that his attendance at these conferences, particularly the last two, was warranted because of his appointment to the trial team.31 Accordingly, Barrack’s preparation and attendance time is disallowed.

4. 41 hours spent in conferences concerning matters for which the firm was not responsible. This total reflects time spent in reading or review of documents of defendant companies other than Hammermill or on other matters for which the firm clearly was not responsible.32 As co-chair *94 man of the Rule 37 committee Barrack will be compensated for time spent in ensuring compliance with discovery by companies other than Hammermill. Other efforts by Barrack were plainly duplicative, including time charged to settlement discussions, and class brief review.

5. I have disallowed 54.12 hours spent on pretrial memorandum and final contentions as well as 38.25 hours spent in trial preparation.33 All of the attorneys involved in this litigation expended a combined total of 7874.52 hours on these tasks (4604.93 on pretrial memorandum and final contentions and 3269.59 on trial preparation). I find these hours to be excessive for such work and, accordingly, I have reduced Barrack’s requested compensable hours in these areas by one-half.34

6. 5 hours spent on 12/13/79 watching Harold Kohn argue the Kimberly-Clark disqualification appeal before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. See N.T., 5/12/82 at 2336. Likewise, 2.5 hours spent in review of the Third Circuit decision on 2/22/80 is also disallowed. These efforts were of no benefit to the class and Barrack had no responsibility in these matters.

7. 3.25 hours for preparation and attendance at the Executive Committee meeting in Chicago on 3/6/81. I fail to see the benefit to the class from meetings held almost six months after the final settlements. I will allow time for one Executive Committee meeting for administrative purposes after final settlement.

The total hours for which Barrack is not compensated is 555.37. The remaining 722.-63 hours of compensation which Barrack seeks for his work I will allow. The hours of work for which Barrack is compensated include the document and discovery work specifically connected with Hammermill. Likewise Barrack is compensated for the time he spent in taking six depositions of Hammermill employees and in representing plaintiff Fels at his deposition. Since Barrack was a member of the Executive Committee, I have allowed reasonable “read & review” time. I have also allowed a reasonable number of hours for pretrial memorandum, final contentions, and trial preparation work. Finally, Barrack is compensated for reasonable Rule 37 and Executive Committee time.

(B) Hourly Rate

Barrack seeks an hourly rate of $100-$145 an hour for his work in this litigation, although the firm does not have historical, non-contingent hourly rates. Barrack’s compensable time is largely made up of Hammermill discovery work including the six depositions he took pursuant to this assignment. He was not one of the lead counsel or co-chairmen of the Executive Committee. His role in trial preparation was insignificant and his designation as “Liaison to and Chairman of the Support Teams” did not in any way confer a benefit on the class.

Accordingly, based on the rates received by partners in other firms for similar work, particularly the rates awarded for those involved with this litigation, I have determined a reasonable compensable hourly rate for Barrack to be $100. This rate reflects a reasonable remuneration for the type of work Barrack performed. However, Barrack cannot be compensated at this rate for all of his work. Of the 722.63 compensable hours, 114 hours will be corn *95 pensated at a rate of $50 an hour. This time includes 58.75 hours devoted to the Hammermill discovery book, 21.5 hours in review of Florida Grand Jury documents, and 33.75 hours of class discovery. These tasks are usually performed by juniors or associates and, therefore, any other rate of compensation would be excessive.

(C) Total Lodestar

608.63 hours X $100/hour = $60,863

114.00 hours X $ 50/hour = $ 5,700

(D) Multiplier

The Barrack, Rodos & McMahon firm requests a multiplier of 2 for their work throughout this litigation except for the period from June until September of 1980 when a multiplier of 2.5 is requested. I find that no quality multiplier is merited. Barrack was only appointed chairman of the Hammermill discovery subcommittee; a title which was doled out to many other attorneys who were given “charge” of discovery of a particular defendant. Likewise the leadership role played by Barrack as only co-chairman of the Rule 37 committee was dubious at best. I find equally unimpressive Barrack’s role as “Liaison to and Chairman of the Support Teams” in light of the fact that the case was settled before trial. Barrack followed the lead of Messrs. Kohn or Specks (particularly Specks, sometimes to the exclusion of Kohn). Accordingly, I find nothing in the work of Barrack which demonstrates the type of exceptional quality which warrants the award of a positive quality multiplier.

A contingency multiplier of 1.5 will be awarded for the 137 compensable hours expended prior to the initial settlements.

II. Gerald J. Rodos

(A) Hours Expended

Rodos is a partner. He asks to be compensated for 577.5 hours of work. My analysis of the time sheets leads me to conclude that Rodos can be compensated for only 352.25 hours of work in this litigation. The following hours are disallowed:

1. 58 hours for which the supporting entries were incomplete. It was not possible to determine from these entries exactly what work was done and, therefore, not possible to make a determination of benefit to the class. Entries disallowed as too vague included: (a) telephone calls and/or conferences without an explanation of what was discussed; (b) entries marked simply “review microfilm”; (c) time noted merely as “review of file” and/or “document review”; (d) an entry marked “review of pleading” and “review brief”; (e) time noted “review [and/or] read correspondence”; (f) all time charged to “conference” or “meeting” without an explanation of the subject matter; and (g) time writing letters to various parties without documentation or explanation as to their content.

2. 16.75 hours devoted to discovery by Rodos are also disallowed because of vagueness. Time designations charged to discovery and disallowed because of vagueness include: (a) “general review”; (b) “review discovery”; (c) “document discovery”; (d) “document work”; and (e) “general discovery review”.

3. 5 hours to review proceedings before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”). Numerous other attorneys, including Barrack, not only reviewed the same proceedings but were in attendance. In light of the 13 hours allowed Barrack for this work the efforts by Rodos were superfluous.

4. 39.25 hours spent in reading or reviewing documents of defendant companies other than Hammermill and on other matters for which the firm was clearly not responsible including settlement review time and class brief review and entries concerning defendants other than Hammermill that indicated duplicative review.

5. 15.25 hours spent in attendance at pretrial conferences. At the first pretrial conference on April 19, 1978 Messrs. Barrack, McMahon, and Rodos were all in attendance. It is plainly duplicative and wasteful of class funds for three partners to bill for this time. Moreover, Rodos did not have the type of leadership role in this litigation *96 which warranted his attendance at pretrial conferences. Accordingly, all of his pretrial conference time is disallowed.

6. 29 hours Rodos charged to preparation for and attendance at both Executive Committee meetings and discovery meetings with Barrack.35 As Barrack also attended and prepared for each of these meetings, all of Rodos’ efforts were duplicative and of no benefit to the class.

7. 30.5 hours devoted to Hammermill deposition work by Rodos. These disallowed hours include all preparation, discussion, meeting, or review time in connection with any of these depositions. These efforts were of no benefit to the class since Rodos took no depositions of any Hammermill employees.

8. I have disallowed 22.87 hours spent on pretrial memorandum and final contentions as well as 8.63 hours spent in trial preparation. As previously noted, the total number of hours spent on these tasks by all the attorneys involved in this litigation is excessive. I have reduced Rodos’ requested compensable hours in these areas by one-half.

The total number of hours for which Rodos is not compensated is 225.25. The remaining 352.25 hours will be allowed. The hours of work for which Rodos is compensated include his document and discovery work specifically connected with Hammer-mill. Rodos also will be compensated for his briefing and contentions work.

(B) Hourly Rate

Rodos seeks an hourly rate of $85 — $115 an hour for his work in this litigation. However, Rodos’ compensable time is made up largely of Hammermill discovery, viz., document inspection, review, and microfilm analysis, tasks ordinarily performed by someone other than a senior partner.36 Accordingly, I will allow a rate of $50 an hour for Rodos.

(C) Total Lodestar

352.25 hours X $50/hour = $17,612.50

(D) Multiplier

As noted above, the Barrack firm requests a multiplier of 2.5 for their work in this litigation from June until September of 1980 and a multiplier of 2 for their work during' the remaining period. On balance Rodos’ role in the Barrack firm’s contribution to this litigation was limited. Furthermore, unlike Barrack, Rodos does not even make a pretense of having played a leadership role in this litigation. His efforts were confined largely to routine discovery work. Accordingly, I find nothing in the work of Rodos which demonstrates the type of exceptional quality which suggests the award of a positive quality multiplier. As with Barrack a 1.5 contingency multiplier will be allowed for his 105.75 compensable pre-January 1979 hours.

III. Paul J. McMahon

(A) Hours Expended

McMahon is a partner with the firm. He asks to be compensated for 874.25 hours of work in this litigation. However, I find that only 577 hours of work reasonably can be said to have benefited the class. Compensation for the following time will be disallowed:

1. 201.75 hours cannot be compensated because the supporting entries are too vague. The cursory explanations accompanying these time charges are an insufficient basis for determining the benefit, if any, to the *97 class. These include: (a) entries marked simply “interrogatories”; (b) “research”; (c) “file review”; (d) numerous entries (99.-75 hours) from February until May of 1978 noted only as “motion to compel”; (e) “documents” or “document review”; (f) “conference” or “meeting” without an explanation of the subject matter; (g) time spent in telephone conference without an explanation of what was discussed; and (h) “microfilm” or “microfilm review” time.

2. 62.75 hours devoted to discovery by McMahon are also disallowed because of vagueness.37 While some of the hours McMahon devoted to discovery were allowed because such work included an adequate explanation of exactly what was done, entries which are supported by one or two word notations such as “review discovery”, “discovery”, and “discovery review” are excluded.

3. 2 hours in preparation for the JPML proceedings. These hours are disallowed for the same reasons I have disallowed similar Rodos charges.

4. 5.5 hours in preparation and attendance at the pretrial conference on April 19,1978. As previously noted, three partners of the firm attended this conference. This wasteful and duplicative effort will not be compensated by the class.

5. 18.25 hours in review of the class brief. McMahon did not have any direct responsibilities concerning the class brief. This time merely duplicated the hours of many other attorneys involved in this litigation.

6. I have disallowed 2.5 hours spent on pretrial memorandum and final contentions as well as 4.5 hours spent in trial preparation. As previously noted, the total number of hours spent on these tasks is excessive. Accordingly, I have reduced McMahon’s compensable hours in these areas by one-half.

The total of disallowed hours is 297.25. The remaining 577 hours are compensable. The hours for which McMahon is compensated include his Hammermill discovery work and the three depositions he took pursuant to this activity. Likewise he is compensated for reasonable preparation of the Hammermill discovery book, plaintiffs’ contentions, and briefing activities.

(B) Hourly Rate

McMahon seeks an hourly rate of $80-$105 for his work in this litigation. However, McMahon’s compensable time consists almost exclusively of Hammermill discovery work. With the exception of the three depositions McMahon took, the type of tasks which McMahon performed in connection with this litigation were routine and of the type ordinarily assigned to junior associates. Accordingly, I will allow McMahon to be compensated at $85 an hour for 68.25 hours, the reasonable amount of time he spent in preparation for and deposing Hammermill employees. The remaining 508.75 hours of mostly general discovery work will be compensated at $50 an hour. In light of the rates awarded Barrack and Rodos as well as the rates requested for McMahon, this rate of compensation is reasonable.

(C) Total Lodestar

508.75 hours X $50/hour = $25,437.50

68.25 hours X $85/hour = $ 5,801.25

(D) Multiplier:

No positive quality multiplier will be applied to McMahon’s lodestar for the reasons I have not awarded one to Rodos. But, as with the others, a contingency multiplier will be applied to the compensable hours (57.5) expended prior to January 1979.

IV. Herbert B. Newberg

Newberg is a partner in the firm. According to the Barrack fee petition com *98 pensation for 10 hours of his time is requested. It is claimed that Newberg’s time involved reviewing briefs and memorandum. However, Newberg’s total requested hours, in light of the over 5200 hours requested by the entire Barrack firm, leads me to conclude that his services were insubstantial and of no benefit to the class. Furthermore, I am unable to find any documentation of Newberg’s 10 hours in the submitted time records of the Barrack firm. Only .5 hours are noted in the time sheets. Accordingly, compensation for Newberg’s time is denied.38

V. Donald E. Keener

(A) Hours Expended

Keener is an associate with the firm. He asks to be compensated for 2165.-85 hours of work in this litigation. However, on the basis of my analysis Keener can only be compensated for 1840.64 hours of work. This is the only time I found to be beneficial to the class. The following hours are disallowed:

1. 6.45 hours cannot be compensated because they are too vague. It is impossible to determine from these entries whether the work performed was beneficial to the class. These include: (a) telephone calls and/or conferences without an explanation of what was discussed; (b) time noted merely as “review correspondence”; (c) entries marked simply “research”; (d) time noted merely as “review file [and/or] pleadings”; and (e) entries logged as “file and document organization.”

2. 32.6 hours of work in October of 1980. All the defendants in Fine Paper settled in September of 1980. At this time there was already a $50,000,000 fund created for the class. In light of this I find none of the “post settlement” work billed by Keener to be beneficial to the class. In addition, I find Keener’s efforts did nothing to “protect” or preserve the class fund as his work during this month involved only document search, review and organization.

3. 135 hours in preparation and attendance at meetings with other members of the firm. This time expenditure was unnecessary and of no benefit to the class. The hours include Keener’s attendance with Barrack at discovery, pretrial memorandum, and trial preparation meetings in Chicago during June, July and August of 1980. In all three of these areas there was an excessive amount of time billed by all the attorneys involved in this litigation. The attendance at meetings by several attorneys from the same firm only compounded an already wasteful situation.

4. I have disallowed 83.83 hours spent on pretrial memorandum and final contentions as well as 67.33 hours spent in trial preparation. As already noted, there was an excessive amount of time spent on these tasks. Accordingly, I have reduced Keener’s requested hours in these areas by one-half.

The total hours for which Keener is not compensated is 325.21. The remaining 1840.64 hours I will allow. The hours of work for which Keener is compensated include his Hammermill discovery, on-site document production and review, Hammer-mill microfilm review, discovery book preparation, and preparation of the cast of characters. Additionally, Keener is reasonably compensated for pretrial memorandum and trial preparation work.

(B) Hourly Rate

Keener asks for an hourly rate of $65 to $75 an hour depending on when he rendered his services in this litigation. I find this rate request too high. The overwhelming majority of Keener’s compensable hours are devoted to Hammermill discovery work. My examination of his efforts shows this discovery work to have been simple and routine. Furthermore, all of Keener’s work in this litigation was accomplished between *99 his first and second year out of law school. Accordingly, I will allow a rate of $50 an hour as compensation. This is a reasonable rate for the type of work Keener performed.

(C) Total Lodestar

1840.64 hours X $50/hour = $92,032

(D) Multiplier

Keener’s compensable hours consist mainly of routine Hammermill discovery work. An examination of his work reveals nothing of exceptional quality for which I should award a positive multiplier. Furthermore, Keener was under the direct supervision of Messrs. Barrack, Rodos, or McMahon. Accordingly, his work does not warrant the award of a quality multiplier. Moreover, since all his time was logged after the initial settlements, there will be no award of a contingency multiplier.

VI. Daniel E. Bacine

Bacine is an associate of the firm. The firm asks to be compensated for 102.05 hours of his work in this litigation. However, my analysis of his time records leads me to conclude that Bacine can be compensated for only 23 hours. The following hours are disapproved:

1. 25.8 hours because of the vagueness of the supporting entries. It was impossible to determine from those entries exactly what work was done and, therefore, it was not possible to make a determination of benefit to the class. Entries disallowed as too vague included: (a) time marked simply “analysis” or “analysis of responses”; (b) an entry marked simply “memo”; (c) time noted as “telephone call” without reference to what was discussed; (d) time noted simply as “review correspondence”; (e) an entry noted as “review complaint”; (f) all time entered merely as “documents” or “document review.”

2. 53.25 hours devoted to discovery are also disallowed because of vagueness. In light of the total number of hours devoted to discovery by the Barrack firm, simple one or two word entries .do not provide sufficient basis for this court to make a determination of benefit to the class. Discovery entries disallowed because of vagueness include: (a) “document discovery”; (b) “discovery analysis”; (c) “discovery”; and (d) “review discovery.”

The remaining 23 hours of Bacine’s time appear to have benefited the class and therefore will be compensated. This includes 15.5 hours devoted to “Rule 37 preparation”, 3.25 hours devoted to motion to compel work, and 4.25 hours devoted to Rule 37 discovery and analysis. However, in view of the fact that Bacine’s time was spent on routine tasks, Bacine will be awarded $50 an hour for his time, not the $75 to $85 an hour requested. Thus, Ba-cine’s lodestar is $1150. No quality multiplier is warranted, but I will apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 7.5 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

VII. Paralegals

The Barrack firm asks to be compensated for 225.2 paralegal hours.39 I find the hours expended by the firm’s paralegals can reasonably be said to have benefited the class as an ancillary service to the work done by the attorneys of the firm. Furthermore, I have determined a reasonable hourly rate for the paralegal time to be $25 an hour.

VIII. Expenses

The Barrack firm seeks compensation for $75,079.65 in expenses. The firm has already been awarded 75% of these expenses or $56,310. After a careful review of the documentation supporting the firm’s claim for costs and expenses, I have concluded that the following expenses should not be paid for by the class.40

*100 1. $4,416 in office equipment and office space rental will not be reimbursed. The Barrack firm incurred this expense pursuant to their responsibilities as “trial headquarters”. However, in light of the fact the Adler, Barish firm provided space for this purpose at no charge, and the Kohn firm also kept a complete set of documents necessary for trial at its office, it would be an imposition on the class to allow these expenses. Accordingly, they are disallowed, as unnecessary and duplicative.

2. $8,043.74 in office supply expenses will not be reimbursed. For the reasons noted above, any expenses incurred because of the trial headquarters designation will not be compensated.

3. $320.72 in archive expenses. These expenditures are disallowed because it is uncertain exactly what this cost represents. Assuming, arguendo, it involved document storage for trial, then it was unnecessary as the Adler, Barish firm and the Kohn firm were providing adequate space as a document depository.

4. $226.39 in “special secretarial services” also will be disallowed. This amount represents money paid to employees for whom the firm is being reimbursed at an hourly rate.41

5. $5,604.32 in travel expenses will not be reimbursed because of a lack of adequate documentation. The only support provided was copies of checks made payable to the member of the firm requesting the reimbursement.42 Often these intra-office expense vouchers did not even offer a description of how the expenditure was related to the class. Pretrial Order No. 143 required all expenses and costs incurred in connection with this litigation to be accompanied by copies of the original supporting documentation. The intra-office expense vouchers as submitted do not meet this requirement.

6. $175 in travel expenses must be disallowed. A check in this amount was made payable to Paul J. McMahon on 6/27/79. Again, there is no supporting explanation.

7. $3,884.09 in air fare and travel expenses must be disallowed as the hours for the work involving this travel were also disallowed or there were no entries in the time records which substantiated the expenses. Included in this total: $214 in air fare expense to Chicago incurred by Paul McMahon in a check disbursed to him on 6/26/78; $198 in air fare to Chicago for Gerald Rodos on a TWA bill paid by a check dated 7/24/79; $365 in expenses and $260 in air fare to Chicago incurred by Donald Keener on an intra-office expense voucher and a TWA bill dated 7/28/80; $205.41 in expenses and $496 in air fare to Los Angeles, California for Gerald Rodos in checks dated 9/12/79 and 8/23/79;43 $298.94 in expenses

*101 and $620 in air fare to Los Angeles for Paul J. McMahon in a check dated 9/12/79;44 $257 in air fare to Chicago for Paul J. McMahon on a TWA bill paid by check dated 1/24/80; $121 in air fare to Chicago for Donald E. Keener on a TWA bill paid by a check dated 6/16/80; $132.75 in expenses and $252 in air fare to Chicago for Leonard Barrack without documentation paid in checks dated 8/15/80 and 8/26/80; and $463.99 in air fare to Chicago for Donald Keener on a TWA bill dated 9/26/80.

8. The following miscellaneous expenses totaling $326.39 are also disallowed: (a) $34 in train fare to Washington, D.C. on 5/16/79 for Paul McMahon as I find nothing in the time records to indicate he was in Washington in connection with Fine Paper on this date; (b) $63.83 paid to Paul McMahon in a check dated 7/27/79 for “148” [Fine Paper ] expenses without documentation; (c) $51.63 for car rental expenses in Kansas City, Missouri by Paul McMahon on 10/26/79 as there was no indication in his time records that he was in Kansas City on this date; (d) $36.50 in train fare to Washington, D.C. for Paul McMahon on 10/26/79

as there was nothing in McMahon’s time records to indicate he was in Washington on this date; (e) $24.36 paid to the Locust Club for “148” [Fine Paper ] expenses in a check dated 7/28/80 without documentation; (f) $100 in travel expenses incurred by Leonard Barrack in Chicago in a check dated 8/8/80 without documentation; and (g) $16.07 billed to “148” [Fine Paper ] expenses paid to “petty cash” in a check dated 11/12/80 without documentation.

The total expenses for which the Barrack firm is not compensated is $22,996.65. This means that of the total claimed expenses of $75,079.65, the Barrack firm will only be awarded $52,083. In light of the previous disbursement of $56,310 for expenses there has been an overpayment of $4,227 to the firm. Accordingly, I will deduct this amount from the final award.

IX. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Barrack firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Barrack 722.63 $50/100 $ 66,563.00 $ 73,413.00 $351,894.63

Rodos 352.25 $50 $ 17,612.50 $ 20,256.25 $120,927.50

McMahon 577.00 $50/85 $ 31,238.75 $ 32,895.00 $156,765.00

Newberg 0 0 0 $ 3,100.00

Keener 1840.64 $50 $ 92,032.00 $ 92,032.00 $336,610.25

Bacine 23 $50 $ 1,150.00 $ 1,337.50 $ 16,513.50

Paralegals 225.2 $25_ $ 5.630.00 $ 5.630.00 $ 12.465.37

Total $214,226.25 $225,563.75 $998,276.25

$ 75,079.65 Amount Requested

$ 56,310,00 Amount Previously Distributed

$ 18,769.65 Amount Outstanding

$ 22,996.65 Amount Disallowed

$ 4,227.00 Amount to be Returned to the Class

Expenses:

*102 TOTAL AWARD: ■

Attorneys’ Fees $225,563.75

Less: Amount of Previously Awarded Expenses to be Returned to the Class $ 4,227.00

Final Award $221,336.75

BARTSH AND McINTOSH45

Bartsh & McIntosh, a Minnesota law firm, became involved in this litigation as counsel for plaintiff Royal Stationery Co. in June of 1979. The firm participated in inspection of Hammermill, Kimberly-Clark, and Mead documents. The Bartsh firm also prepared for and took thirteen merchant depositions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6). Finally, the firm engaged in some trial preparation, viz., organization and coordination of merchant depositions and documents, and participated in obtaining immunity from prosecution for plaintiffs’ witness James Nelson.

The firm seeks total compensation for its services in the amount of $95,212.75. This is based on requested hourly rates of $90-$125 an hour for Bartsh, $95 an hour for McIntosh, $50-$60 an hour for Tripp, $55 an hour for Schwebach, and $20-$25 an hour for all paralegals. The Bartsh firm also requests a multiplier of between 1.5 and 2.5 to be applied to certain categories of work performed by its members in Fine Paper. Finally, the Bartsh firm seeks reimbursement for $8,274.87 in expenses.

Before proceeding to the Lindy analysis, it should be noted that although the Kohn firm did not file an objection to the Bartsh fee petition, it objected to the participation of the firm in the litigation. See Class Objectors’ E 755 and N.T., 4/5/82 at 1822-23.

I find it difficult to understand why the services of another firm were needed at this stage of the litigation, i.e., after a $30,000,-000 settlement had already been reached and given the number of lawyers already involved. As should have been expected, the Bartsh participation resulted in more duplication and unnecessary expenses. For example, work assigned this firm involved extensive travel to locations where other firms active in this litigation were based, clearly a most inefficient method of operation. In addition, many of the firms already involved in the litigation were looking for work and had written co-lead counsel requesting assignments46 See Class Objectors’ E 167, 168, 169 & 170. The participation of the Bartsh firm in Fine Paper under these circumstances is further evidence of the grossly inefficient utilization of lawyers’ time.

I. Thomas C. Bartsh

(A) Hours Expended

Bartsh is a partner in the firm. He asks to be compensated for 186.3 hours of work. However, my analysis of the time sheets leads me to conclude that only 154 hours are compensable. I have disallowed the following:

*103 1. 14.1 hours cannot be compensated because the entries are too vague. All of this time indicated Bartsh was in conference. While these entries sometimes indicated the parties with whom Bartsh was meeting, there was no adequate explanation of what was discussed.47 These hours are disallowed since I cannot make a determination of benefit to the class.

2. 18.2 hours devoted to “Protection of plaintiffs’ chief witness, James Nelson” must also be disallowed. I find this work to be of no benefit to the class. The work was performed solely for the benefit of Nelson and the Majority States and occurred after the final settlements.

The hours for which Bartsh will not be compensated total 32.3. The time for which Bartsh is compensated includes discovery work in connection with Mead, Hammermill and Kimberly-Clark. Bartsh will be allowed time charged to the preparation and depositions of paper merchants. Finally, Bartsh also will be compensated for trial preparation work, viz., analyzing and coordinating merchant depositions and documents for trial. All this compensable work was done at the specific direction of Granvil I. Specks. See N.T., 4/5/82 at 1832-35.

(B) Hourly Rate

Bartsh requests an hourly rate of $90 an hour for his work during 1979 and $125 an hour for his work during 1980. His compensable time consists primarily of the hours he expended in connection with the merchant deposition program. The thirteen depositions taken by Bartsh were not particularly long or complex. In addition, four of the depositions were of coarse paper, not fine paper, merchants. Another of the deponents was a mill representative who never dealt directly with the defendant mills.

Bartsh’s remaining efforts involved mostly document and microfilm inspection of defendant paper companies which were primarily the responsibility of other law firms participating in Fine Paper.48

It is evident that the services rendered by Bartsh were simple and routine. He accomplished nothing which could not have been done just as well by a junior partner or associate. Accordingly, I will allow $50 for this work.

(C) Total Lodestar

154 hours X $50/hour = $7,700

(D) Multiplier

The Bartsh firm has broken down its requested compensable services into one of five categories. Depending on where in the five categories the services rendered fall, a multiplier request of between 1.0 and 2.5 is sought. I have determined that no positive multiplier should be awarded to Bartsh’s lodestar.

There was no contingency factor since a $30,000,000 settlement fund was in existence at the time the firm entered this litigation, thus eliminating the risk of nonpayment.

There will be no award of a positive multiplier for any quality factor. I find nothing in the work of Bartsh or any member of his firm which demonstrates the type of exceptional quality which warrants the award of a positive multiplier. On page 6 of their response to the Class Objectors’ Report, Bartsh argues that the firm assumed a de facto leadership role in document discovery, merchant deposition coordi *104 nation, and the Nelson discovery. There is no doubt the Bartsh firm carried out those assignments, but it was under the direct supervision of Specks.

The inspection by Bartsh and other members of his firm of the Hammermill, Kimberly-Clark and Mead documents and microfilm was done at the direction of Specks. The number of hours which the Bartsh firm devoted to inspection of these documents pales in light of the numerous hours which the firms of Barrack, Rodos & McMahon; Chestnut & Brooks; and Sachnoff, Schrager, Jones, Weaver & Rubenstein spent in discovery and document review of these same defendants.

I find insubstantial any contribution made by the Bartsh firm in coordinating and organizing in preparation for trial of any defendants’ documents produced in discovery. Likewise, I see little benefit from the preparation of merchant deposition summaries. As already noted in this memorandum, there was an excessive amount of time spent in trial preparation by all the attorneys involved in Fine Paper. In light of this, I see little benefit from these additional activities of the Bartsh firm.

By and large, the Bartsh firm’s limited involvement burdened the class with duplicative effort and the “fruits” of the firm’s labors were run-of-the mill. Accordingly, Bartsh’s work as well as the work of the other members of his firm do not warrant the award of a quality multiplier.

II. Andrew C. McIntosh

(A) Hours Expended

McIntosh is a partner in the firm. He asks to be compensated for 187.8 hours of work involved with Fine Paper. However, my analysis of his time records leads me to conclude that McIntosh can be compensated only for 168.55 hours. This is the only time which can reasonably be said to have at least marginally benefited the class. The hours of work which I have disallowed include:

1. 13.95 hours cannot be compensated because the entries are too vague. All of the time disallowed because of vagueness included hours devoted to correspondence, conference, and telephone conversation. Simply listing who attended the meeting, with whom one was speaking, or to whom a letter is written is insufficient without an adequate explanation of either what was discussed or the subject matter addressed. Accordingly, the time is disallowed since I cannot make a determination of benefit to the class.

2. 5.3 hours devoted to “Protection of plaintiffs’ Chief witness, James Nelson” must be disallowed. These hours are disallowed for the reasons I disallowed the same hours of work for Bartsh.

The total number of hours for which McIntosh is not compensated is 19.25. The remaining 168.55 hours of compensation which McIntosh seeks I will allow. McIntosh is compensated for his merchant deposition work and minor trial preparation work.

(B) Hourly Rate

McIntosh requests an hourly rate of $95 an hour for all of his work in this litigation. I find a reasonable rate of compensation for McIntosh’s work to be $50 an hour. McIntosh’s compensable time consists mostly of his merchant deposition work. As previously noted in both Bartsh’s hourly rate and multiplier analysis, I do not find this deposition work particularly complex. I also do not find the merchant deposition and discovery work to be especially beneficial to the class. Accordingly, I will allow this hourly rate for all but 10 of the total 168.55 hours of compensation I have awarded McIntosh. The remaining 10 hours, involving time spent locating missing deposition transcripts, will only be compensated at $25 an hour. A task such as this does not warrant compensation at an attorney’s rate; rather, this task could have been performed by a paralegal at the rate noted.

(C) Total Lodestar

158.55 hours X $50/hour = $7,927.50

10.00 hours X $25/hour = $ 250.00

*105 (D) Multiplier

An award of a positive multiplier to McIntosh’s lodestar is not warranted for the same reasons it was not awarded to Bartsh.

III. M. Joanne Schwebach

(A) Hours Expended

Schwebach is an associate with the firm. The firm seeks compensation for 27.5 hours of her work. I have concluded that Schwebach is not entitled to be compensated for any of her time charged to this litigation.

Schwebach’s time charges related to a document discovery and inspection of Hammermill, Kimberly-Clark, and Mead. Other law firms were primarily responsible for this work and I fail to see how Schwebach’s 26.1 hours of further “review” and 1.4 hours of travel aided these efforts.

IV. Samuel C. Tripp

(A) Hours Expended

Tripp is an associate for whom the firm seeks compensation for 59.2 hours of work. 31.8 hours will be approved. I have disallowed 27.4 hours because the entries are too vague. This total is made up of “conference” and “review” entries which do not permit the court to make a determination of benefit to the class.49

The 31.8 hours of work for which Tripp is compensated includes his discovery services, merchant deposition work, and some minor trial preparation efforts.

(B) Hourly Rate

I will allow an hourly rate of compensation for Tripp’s services of $50. I find this rate to be reasonable for the reasons I awarded the same rate to Bartsh and McIntosh.

(C) Total Lodestar

31.8 hours X $50/hour = $1,590

(D) Multiplier

No multiplier will be awarded to Tripp’s lodestar' for the same reasons I did not award a multiplier to Bartsh or McIntosh.

V. Paralegals

The Bartsh firm seeks compensation for 15 hours of paralegal time.50 I will allow the firm to be compensated for this time. I find the services rendered by the paralegals reasonably related to that work already accomplished and compensated by the attorneys of the firm. Furthermore, I will award the firm its requested hourly rates of $20 and $25 for 1979 and 1980 paralegal time. I find these rate requests reasonable.

VI. Expenses

The Bartsh firm seeks reimbursement for $8,274.87 in expenses. The firm has already been awarded 75% of these expenses or $6,206. After a careful review of the documentation supporting the firm’s claim for costs and expenses, I have concluded the following expenses should not be paid by the class:

1. $53.50 billed to “beverages” and $35.78 billed to “miscellaneous” on Bartsh’s bill at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel on May 12-13, 1980. Bartsh lodged here while taking a deposition in Los Angeles. I find these charges to be excessive given the insufficient headings under which they were billed. Accordingly, I fail to see the benefit to the class from these expenses and they will not be compensated.

2. $456.97 of the $913.94 which, in addition to the above expenses, was billed as travel expenses for the Los Angeles trip of Bartsh. *106 Considering the nature of the one deposition which Bartsh took on this trip, I find this sum, which principally resulted from Bartsh’s first class air fare and $125 a night accommodations, excessive. Accordingly, I have reduced the expenses for this trip by one-half as noted.

The total expenses for which the Bartsh firm is not compensated is $546.25. I will deduct this amount from the remaining $2,068.87 yet to be awarded to the firm. Accordingly, the final expenses to be awarded the Bartsh firm are $1,522.62.

VII. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Bartsh firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Bartsh 154 $50 $ 7,700.00 $ 7,700.00 $48,755.75

McIntosh 168.55 $25/50 $ 8,177.50' $ 8,177.50 $38,118.75

Schwebach 0 0 0 0 $ 2,268.75

Tripp 31 $50 $ 1,590.00. $ 1,590.00 $ 5,687.00

Paralegals 15.6 $20/25 $ 382.50 $ 382.50 $ 382.50

Total $17,850.00 $17,850.00 $95,212.75

Expenses:

Amount Requested $ 8,274.87

Amount Previously Distributed $ 6,206.00

Amount Outstanding $ 2,068.87

Amount Disallowed $ 546.25

Pinal Expense Award Not Yet Disbursed $ 1,522.62

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $17,467.50

Paralegal Fees $ 382.50

Expenses $ 1.522.62

$17,850.00

$19,372.62

BERGER & MONTAGUE

The Berger firm, located in Philadelphia, entered this litigation early in 1978 as counsel of record for the Archdiocese of Philadelphia.51 At the initial organizational meeting of plaintiffs’ counsel, H. Laddie Montague was elected to the Executive Committee. Montague was also made one of two co-chairmen (under Chairman Joseph Cotchett) of the Rule 37 Subcommittee. The firm was assigned joint responsibility with Litman, Litman, Harris & Specter for the discovery of defendant Union Camp.52 According to its fee petition, the firm also assisted Barrack, Rodos & McMahon in ana *107 lyzing documents produced by defendant Hammermill Corp.

After the July 23, 1980 Executive Committee meeting in Chicago when it had become apparent that the pricing analysis done by the Sloan & Connelly firm could not be used to support a damage theory at trial, co-lead counsel Harold Kohn asked the Berger firm to assist Kohn’s firm in preparing the case on damages.53 See letter from Berger to Kohn, August 18, 1980, Class Objectors’ E 448-454. Two economic experts and the accounting firm of Peat, Mar-wick were hired, and the Berger and Kohn firms set about doing what, as Berger saw it, the Chicago firms “were supposed, but failed to do.” Letter to Kohn, August 19, 1980, Class Objectors’ E 455. Pursuant to Pretrial Order No. 115, the Sloan firm sent Kohn a complete set of the pricing documents (some 18,000 sheets) it had collected from the discovery subcommittees.54 For the two months before the scheduled September 22 trial, the Chicago and Philadelphia groups, each with their own economic experts, engaged in separate, uncooperative, and even hostile efforts to develop a damage theory.55

I will defer my discussion of work by the other firms on the damage studies until I consider their respective fee petitions. I have determined that, unless otherwise disallowed, time spent by the Berger firm on developing a damage theory is compensable. When Kohn asked the Berger firm to take up the matter, the plaintiffs were two months from trial and had essentially no case to present on damages. As late as August 14, 1980, according to Berger, Perry Goldberg of the Chicago group had stated that “the case was in a settlement posture only and that the plaintiffs could not go to trial on [the] basis of the present damage case.” Letter from Berger to Kohn, August 18, 1980, Class Objectors’ E 453. I find that the work by the Berger firm to prepare the case on damages was done at the request of one of the co-lead counsel at a time when the interests of the class required that some action be taken to insure that this important element of plaintiffs’ case be adequately developed in time for trial. It may well be that the Berger firm’s involvement in this matter resulted, in part, from the battle between Kohn and Specks for control of the case, but I am *108 satisfied that the Berger firm acted in the best interests of the class.

I am, however, faced with another issue that must be addressed before I proceed with the Lindy analysis of the Berger firm’s fee petition. The firm has submitted computer print-outs of the daily time records of each attorney. Class objectors rightly point out that the descriptions contained in these computer records are extremely vague.56 Class Objectors’ Report at 242-243. As Judge Freeman said in Armored Car:

Working hours identified in only vague and meaningless terms, such as “general,” “miscellaneous,” or “special services,” should not be charged to an involuntary class of claimants. In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, slip. op. at 28. Indefinite documentation might be acceptable in the understandings developed over years of extended lawyer-client relationships but may not be allowed under the equitable fund theory of this nationwide class action.

In re Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F.Supp. at 1387. The use of standardized time categories may be sufficient for the purpose of preparing a bill for a client, but absent class members do not have contact with the lawyers representing their interests and cannot keep track of what the attorneys are doing or ask them to explain the “bill” (fee petition) when the work is completed. Attorneys with extensive experience in class actions should realize that these vague categories do not lend themselves to the Lindy analysis that the courts of this circuit are required to perform before granting attorneys’ fees.

I do, however, recognize the practical value of a computerized time system, and I am aware that Pretrial Order 143 (as modified by Pretrial Order 147) expressly permitted the submission of computer time records. Furthermore, I recognize the limitations of computer systems with their ever-present pressure for concise input and output. Nevertheless, I would not be justified, under Lindy, if I awarded fees based solely on such records. Standing alone they are inadequate.

The information that Pretrial Order 143 required to be included in the fee petitions as well as the opportunity each firm had to participate in the evidentiary hearings provided additional ways for firms to “explain their bill”. In my analysis of the fee petitions of firms who submitted computer records,571 have been particularly careful not to disallow time if it could be supported by information contained elsewhere in the record (e.g. narrative summaries of work done which are attested to by affidavit, the firm’s response to the class objectors, monthly summaries, or other documents in the record). Nothing will save an entry of “miscellaneous” or “pretrial” or “telephone”, but I have only disallowed time for vagueness if there is no basis for a determination of any possible benefit to the class.

The Berger firm chose not to participate in the evidentiary hearings, but its fee petition contains a lengthy discussion of the *109 firm’s contributions to the litigation as well as what work was done by those attorneys with significant involvement in the case. With the aid of these narrative summaries and additional information gleaned from the firm’s response to the class objectors and from the exhibits to the Class Objectors’ Report itself, I have been able to perform the required analysis of the submitted time records.

The Berger firm requésts an award of $266,100.50 in attorneys’ fees (including a multiplier of 2 for each attorney, paralegal, and law clerk) and $43,402.18 in expénses. The firm devoted a total of 2446.75 hours to the litigation.

I. David Berger

(A) Hours Expended

This senior attorney devoted 47.5 hours to Fine Paper. Over 40 of these hours were expended after the firm began work on developing a damage theory. Berger participated in three Executive Committee meetings, but the fee petition has little to say about the nature of his other activities apart from the vague computer entries. A total of 26.75 hours (exclusive of compensable Executive Committee time) was expended between 7/23/80 and 9/22/80, the period in which the firm worked on the damage issue. Although there is little to suggest that Berger’s involvement in the damage study was more than supervisory, I will compensate him for this time. I can find no basis apart from the inadequate computer entries to compensate the remaining 11.25 hours. Examples of such entries are “PRE-TRIAL REVIEW”; and “CONFERENCE TELEPHONE REVIEW”. This time will be disallowed leaving Berger with 36.25 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

To be consistent with the hourly rate awarded other senior attorneys for similar work, I will compensate Berger at an hourly rate of $100.

(C) Total Lodestar

36.25 hours X $100/hour = $3625

(D) Multiplier

Berger’s efforts were not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. Moreover, since all of his compensable time was expended after the first wave of settlements, I will not apply any contingency multiplier.

II. H. Laddie Montague

(A) Hours Expended

Montague devoted 102.75 hours to the case. He represented the firm on the Executive Committee (although in the latter stages of the case, David Berger attended the meetings in his place) and the Rule 37 Subcommittee. Montague also directed the discovery of defendant Union Camp. I have determined that the following hours must be disallowed:

1. 3.5 hours for attendance at the April 19, 1978 pretrial conference. The class was adequately represented by co-lead counsel at this conference.

2. 12.5 hours for which I can find no basis for a determination of any benefit to the class apart from the inadequate computer entries.

3. .5 hours devoted to the fee petition. With the disallowance of the above 16.5

hours, Montague is left with 86.25 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

To be consistent with the hourly rate awarded other senior attorneys for similar work, I will compensate Montague at an hourly rate of $100 subject to modification in one area. As explained in the Guidelines, time spent on class certification discovery will be compensated at $50/hour. Montague spent 15 hours on matters relating to the deposition of the firm’s client.

(C) Total Lodestar

71.25 hours X $100/hour = $7125

15 hours X $ 50/hour = $ 750

*110 (D) Multiplier

Montague’s work was not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 71 compensable hours expended prior to the end of the first wave of settlements.

III. Merrill Davidoff

(A) Hours Expended

Davidoff spent 71.25 hours on Fine Paper matters. The firm’s fee petition explains Davidoff’s contributions to the litigation only in connection with the damage study. I will, therefore, compensate him for the 26.5 hours expended between 7/28/80 and 9/22/80. For the remaining 44.75 hours, I have nowhere to look but the computer time sheets. Of this time I will compensate the 8 hours spent preparing and making arrangements for the depositions of Union Camp employees but I disallow3

1. 2 hours for attendance at the 3/7/79 pretrial conference. The class was adequately represented by co-lead counsel at this conference.

2. The remaining 34.75 hours for which I can find no basis for making a determination of any benefit to the class apart from the inadequate computer entries. Examples of such entries include: “MEETING REVIEW FILE REVIEW”; “CONFERENCE FILE STRATEGY”; and “TELEPHONE CORRESPONDENCE.”

With the disallowance of the above 36.75 hours, Davidoff is left with 34.5 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

I find that $50/hour is a reasonable rate for the work done by Davidoff. As far as I can determine, it consisted primarily of associate-level tasks (preparing for depositions, attending in-house conferences on the damage study). There certainly is no basis for a higher hourly rate in the time sheets.

(C) Total Lodestar

34.5 hours X $50/hour = $1725

(D) Multiplier

I will not apply any multiplier to Davidoff’s time because the work — to the extent I can determine its substance — was not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. Moreover, since all the compensable time was expended after the first wave of settlements, I will not apply any contingency multiplier.

IV. Sherrie Savett

(A) Hours Expended

Savett devoted 57.5 hours to this litigation. The fee petition indicates that she spent most of her time working on the damage study. Savett and Daniel Berger worked with the economic experts hired by the firm to analyze the price sheets and to serve as possible expert witnesses at trial. I will compensate Savett for the 53 hours •spent on this matter, but I can find no basis apart from the inadequate computer records for determining whether the remaining 4.5 hours benefited the class. These hours will be disallowed.

(B) Hourly Rate

I find that $50/hour is a reasonable rate for the work done by Savett. As far as I can determine, it consisted primarily of associate-level tasks. There clearly is no basis for a higher hourly rate in the time sheets.

(C) Total Lodestar

53 hours X $50/hour = $2650

(D) Multiplier

I will not apply any multiplier to Savett’s time for the reasons stated above in the discussion of Merrill Davidoff’s fee request.

V. Daniel Berger

(A) Hours Expended

Daniel Berger spent 156.75 hours working on Fine Paper. Nearly all of this time was devoted to the damage study. I will compensate him for the 143.5 hours logged between 7/23/80 and 9/22/80, but I can find *111 no basis apart from the inadequate computer records for a determination of whether the remaining 13.25 hours benefited the class. This time will be disallowed.

(B) Hourly Rate

I find that $50/hour is a reasonable rate for the work done by Daniel Berger. As far as I can determine, it consisted of associate-level tasks. There certainly is no basis for a higher hourly rate in the time sheets.

(C) Total Lodestar

143.5 hours X $50/hour = $7175

(D) Multiplier

I will not apply any multiplier to Berger’s time for the reasons stated above in the discussion of Merrill Davidoff’s fee request.

VI. Roger Bernstein

(A) Hours Expended

This attorney devoted 205 hours to the case. He worked on drafting the complaint, Rule 37 Subcommittee matters, and the discovery of both the client and defendant Union Camp. Bernstein took the depositions of two Union Camp employees and attended the defendant’s document production sessions in New York and Virginia. I have determined that the following hours must be disallowed:

1. 57.5 hours for which I can find no basis for a determination of any possible benefit to the class apart from the inadequate computer entries. Examples of such entries are: “PRETRIAL REVIEW”; “DISCOVERY TELEPHONE”; and “CLASS ACTION DISCOVERY PREPARATION.”

2. 3.25 hours for attendance at the 4/19/78 and 6/14/78 pretrial conferences. The class was adequately represented by co-lead counsel at these conferences.

3. 5 hours spent on matters related to attorneys’ fees and the fee petition.

With the disallowance of the above 65.75 hours, Bernstein is left with 139.25 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

I find that $50/hour is a reasonable rate for the work done by Bernstein. Most of his work consisted of discovery-related matters (class action interrogatories, taking depositions, reviewing documents) justifying compensation at an associate-level rate.

(C) Total Lodestar

139.25 hours X $50/hour = $6962.50

(D) Multiplier

Bernstein’s work was not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 86.75 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

VIL Joan Zubras

Zubras spent 470.25 hours on Fine Paper. She worked on the discovery of the client and defendant Union Camp as well as Rule 37 matters and the damage study.

Unfortunately, although the firm’s fee petition gives some indication of the nature of Zubras’ work, many of her computer entries are so vague that I cannot tell whether or not the work was of the type described in the fee petition. For example, a total of 85.25 hours are described only as “REVIEW”. Many others indicate only “PREPARATION” or “TELEPHONE”. A total of 214.5 hours are described in a manner that I find unnecessarily vague even for computer records. These entries are too numerous to justify full compensation. Accordingly, I will disallow half of the time (107.25 hours).

Zubras spent 8.25 hours working on the fee petition. This time must also be disallowed, leaving her with 354.75 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

I find that $50/hour is a reasonable rate for the work done by Zubras. As far as I can determine, it consisted of associate-level *112 tasks. There certainly is no basis for a higher rate in the time sheets.

(C) Total Lodestar

354.75 hours X $50/hour = $17,737.50

(D) Multiplier

I will not apply any multiplier to Zubras’ time for the reasons stated above in the discussion of Merrill Davidoff’s fee request.

VIII. Other Attorneys and Law Clerk

The firm seeks compensation for the time of seven other attorneys and one summer law clerk, none of whom spent more than 5 hours on the case.58 I have determined that only Russell Henkin’s time (3.75 hours) is compensable. The fee petition says nothing about what any of these individuals did. Only Henkin’s time entries (drafting requests for discovery) provide any basis for determining whether the work benefited the class. The other attorneys’ time is variously described as “PREPARATION CONFERENCE”; “REVIEW”; “PRE-TRIAL MEETING FILE REVIEW”; “TELEPHONE”; etc. In view of their minimal involvement in the litigation, I cannot justify charging the class for time that is not described more precisely. The law clerk’s time is disallowed because he merely attended the 6/14/78 pretrial conference.

I will compensate Henkin’s time at $50/hour. No multiplier will be applied since the work was not of the type to justify a quality multiplier and was done after the first wave of settlements.

IX. Paralegals

The firm employed 11 paralegals who devoted a total of 1318.25 hours to Fine Paper. Nearly all of this time was spent on document analysis in connection with class certification discovery, the discovery of Union Camp and Hammermill, the damage study, and preparation for expert testimony. I find that all of this time is compensable at $25/hour. No multiplier is applied to paralegal time.

X. Expenses

The firm seeks reimbursement of $43,-402.18 in expenses. It has already received 75% of this figure ($32,551). I find the requested expenses to be reasonable and will therefore allow reimbursement of the outstanding $10,851.18.

XI. Conclusion

The following is my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Berger firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

David Berger 36.25 $100 $ 3,625.00 $ 3,625.00 $ 24,230.00

Montague 86.25 $50/100 $ 7,875.00 $11,050.00 $ 30,862.50

Davidoff 34.5 $50 $ 1,725.00 $ 1,725.00 $ 15,272.50

Savett 53 $50 $ 2,650.00 $ 2,650.00 $ 11,410.00

Daniel Berger 143.5 $50 $ 7,175.00 $ 7,175.00 $ 29,055.00

Bernstein 139.25 $50 $ 6,962.50 $ 9,131.25 $ 24,417.50

Zubras 354.75 $50 $17,737.50 $17,737.50 $ 56,142.50

Henkin 3.75 $50 $ 187.50 $ 187.50 $ 637.50

Paralegals 1318.25 $25 $32,956.25 $32,956,25 $ 72.092.00

Total $80,892.75 $86,237.50 $266,100,50 59

*113 Expenses:

Amount Requested $43,402.18

Amount Previously Distributed $32,551.00

Amount Outstanding $10,851.18

Amount Disallowed _0

Amount to be Distributed $10,851.18

TOTAL AWARD

Attorneys’ Fees $86,237.50

Expenses $10,851.18

Final Award $97,088.68

CHESTNUT & BROOKS

Chestnut & Brooks, a Minnesota law firm, entered the Fine Paper litigation on February 17, 1978 as counsel of record for plaintiffs Artcraft Press, Inc. and Prompt Printing, Inc. The firm was assigned joint responsibility with the Illinois Attorney General’s Office for discovery of defendant Kimberly-Clark Corporation. Chestnut & Brooks was also put in charge of the Rule 30(b)(6) Merchant Discovery Program and was lead counsel for ten merchant depositions. Other contributions to the litigation included Industrial Analysis Committee work, providing office space and supportive assistance for the James Nelson deposition, and arranging a settlement conference with defendant Wausau Paper Mills Co. The firm seeks an award of $262,268.75 in fees for 2447.7 hours of work and reimbursement of $36,434.21 in expenses.

I. Jack Chestnut

(A) Hours Expended

Jack Chestnut, the firm’s president, was co-chairman of the Kimberly-Clark discovery subcommittee and chairman of the Rule 30(b)(6) merchant discovery subcommittee. Many of his 177.7 hours were devoted to supervision and coordination of these programs. In addition, he argued against the Minneapolis merchants’ motion to quash the subpoena served on them and participated in settlement negotiations with Wausau Paper Mills Co.

After a careful review of Chestnut’s time records, I conclude that the following time must be disallowed:

1. 24.3 hours are supported by entries which are either illegible or too vague to provide any basis for determining if the time spent was of any benefit to the class. Many entries simply give the name of another plaintiffs’ counsel and indicate that a meeting or telephone call occurred.

2. 7 hours spent preparing for and attending the April 19,1978 pretrial conference in Philadelphia. The class was adequately represented by co-lead counsel at this conference.

3. 2.9 hours for Industrial Analysis Committee work. As stated in the Guidelines, I find that this work was of no benefit to the class.

4. 13.1 hours devoted to “read and review” of matters that were not Chestnut & Brooks’ responsibility. Since he was not a member of the Executive Committee, Chestnut will not be permitted to charge the class for time spent reading plaintiffs’ counsel status reports or reviewing settlement agreements between the states and the defendants.

5. 10.8 hours spent on the fee petition.

*114 (B) Hourly Rate

Chestnut & Brooks asks for a rate of $150-175/hour for Chestnut. However, to be consistent with the fees awarded to other attorneys of similar experience and ability for similar work, Chestnut’s time will be compensated at $100/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

119.6 hours X $100/hour = $11,960

(D) Multiplier

Although Chestnut headed two subcommittees, his role in the litigation was primarily ministerial. His substantive efforts (e.g. arguing against motion to quash), although quite capable, did not exhibit such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, allow Chestnut a 1.5 contingency multiplier for the 21.6 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

II. Thomas Malone

(A) Hours Expended

Malone, an associate, devoted 533 hours to the litigation. He spent many hours reviewing Kimberly-Clark documents and was lead counsel at the two depositions of Kimberly-Clark employees. Malone also took several paper merchant depositions as part of the 30(b)(6) program. I find that all of Malone’s time is compensable except:

1. 31.8 hours which are supported by entries that are too vague to permit any determination of whether the time benefited the class.

2. 4.5 hours spent reading and reviewing material for which Chestnut & Brooks had no responsibility.

3. 5 hours spent attending the Nelson deposition. This time was duplicative and of no benefit to the class.

(B) Hourly Rate

Malone asks for $55-65/hour for his time. I find that $50/hour is a fair and reasonable compensation for this associate-level work.

(C) Total Lodestar

491.7 hours X $50/hour = $24,585

(D) Multiplier

Malone seeks a multiplier of 1.75. Because he was not in a position of leadership and spent most of his time on associate-level discovery work (e.g. reviewing documents, preparing for and taking depositions), he does not merit a quality multiplier. Furthermore, since all of Malone’s time was logged after the first wave of settlements, I will not apply any contingency multiplier.

III. Floyd Boline

(A) Hours Expended

Boline was a partner in the firm until March 1980. He spent 308.3 hours working on Fine Paper. The time records show that Boline prepared pleadings, answered defendants’ interrogatories, participated in. Kimberly-Clark discovery, attended Discovery Committee meetings, and did Industrial Analysis Committee work. I find that the following time is not compensable:

1. 16.1 hours supported by entries too vague to permit a determination of whether or not the time benefited the class. Most of this time was comprised of small fractions of an hour devoted to “review of new correspondence”.

2. 26.5 hours devoted to reviewing settlement agreements, reading new complaints, and reviewing the discovery of other defendants. Chestnut & Brooks was not responsible for these matters and Boline (not a member of the Executive Committee) may not charge the class for this time.

3. 37.8 hours spent on Industrial Analysis Committee work. As explained in the Guidelines, I find that this work did not benefit the class.

4. 3.5 hours spent on the fee petition.

(B) Hourly Rate

Boline requests $150/hour for his time. An examination of his records reveals that *115 he spent a good deal of time answering interrogatories, reviewing defendants’ answers to interrogatories and reviewing documents. Accordingly, I will award Boline $50/hour for the 90.3 hours he spent doing associate-level work. The remaining 134.1 compensable hours will be paid at $100/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

134.1 hours X $100/hour = $13,410

90.3 hours X $ 50/hour = $ 4,515

(D) Multiplier

I find that Boline’s work was not of such unusually high skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 105 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

IV. Michael Burns

(A) Hours Expended

Burns devoted 99.7 hours to this litigation. His efforts consisted primarily of reviewing and annotating Kimberly-Clark documents and participating in one of the merit depositions. I find that all of this time is compensable.

(B) Hourly Rate

Since nearly all of Burns’ time was spent reviewing documents, I find that an hourly rate of $50 is reasonable for his services.

(C) Total Lodestar

99.7 hours X $50/hour = $4,985

(D) Multiplier

I will not apply any multiplier to Burns’ lodestar since the nature of the work does not suggest that a quality adjustment is justified. Moreover, all of his time was logged after January 1979 so there is no contingency factor to be considered.

V. Karl Cambronne

(A) Hours Expended

Cambronne spent 46.1 hours on Fine Paper matters. He attended the deposition of Chestnut & Brooks’ client Prompt Printing, Inc., worked on the response to the merchants’ motion to quash the subpoena, and participated in the deposition of a Kimberly-Clark employee. I find that all of this time is compensable.

(B) Hourly Rate

Cambronne requests an hourly rate of $85. However, to be consistent with the rates awarded for similar associate-level work, I find that $50/hour is fair compensation.

(C) Total Lodestar

46.1 hours X $50/hour = $2,305

(D) Multiplier

Cambronne’s work was not of such unusually high skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 13 hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

VI. Thomas Stringer

(A) Hours Expended

Stringer devoted 8.6 hours to conferences with clients and the drafting of pleadings. I find that all but .9 hours are compensable. The disallowed time is supported by entries that are too vague to permit a determination of any benefit to the class.

(B) Hourly Rate

The nature of these activities does not warrant the hourly rate of $100 that Stringer requests. A rate of $50/hour is fair and reasonable for such services.

(C) Total Lodestar

7.7 hours X $50/hours = $385

*116 (D) Multiplier

Stringer’s minimal role in the litigation does not merit a quality multiplier. Indeed, Chestnut & Brooks does not ask for one. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to Stringer’s lodestar since all of his time was expended before January 1979.

VII. Joseph Burkard

(A) Hours Expended

Burkard, a partner in the firm, spent 2.5 hours very early in the litigation. Most of this time was in a conference relating to the original pleadings filed by Chestnut & Brooks. I find that all of this time is compensable.

(B) Hourly Rate

Although he is a partner in the firm, Burkard’s involvement in this litigation was minimal. It does not merit the hourly rate of $150 he requests. Accordingly, Burkard will be compensated at a rate of $50/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

2.5 hours X $50/hour = $125

(D) Multiplier

No quality multiplier is warranted here. To be consistent, however, I will apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to Burkard’s time since it was expended before the end of the first wave of settlements in January 1979.

VIII. Paralegals

Two paralegals worked on Fine Paper matters. Gayle Wahl spent 1196.8 hours and Gary Peterson spent 62.7 hours on the case. I find that all of this time is compensable except the time devoted to the fee petition. Accordingly, I will disallow 84 hours of Wahl’s time and 28.1 hours of Peterson’s time. The remaining time will be compensated at an hourly rate of $25. No multiplier is applied to paralegal time.

IX. Bradley Johnson

Johnson, a college student at the time, worked a total of 12.3 hours. He obtained subpoenas, prepared notices of deposition for distribution to process servers, and filed the notices with the court. Chestnut & Brooks asks that he be compensated at a rate of $20/hour, but I find that an hourly rate of $10 is fair and reasonable for such services.

X. Expenses

Chestnut & Brooks requests reimbursement for $36,434.21 in expenses. Seventy-five percent of this figure ($27,325) has already been awarded. Of the remaining $9,109.21, I disallow:

1. $444.93 for transportation, meals and lodging for Jack Chestnut to attend the April 19, 1978 pretrial conference in Philadelphia. Attorney’s fees for this time have been disallowed as duplicative and unnecessary.

2. $155 for transportation, meals and lodging for Floyd Boline to attend the Industrial Analysis Committee meeting in Chicago in September 1978. The work of this committee did not benefit the class.

The remaining $8,509.28 in expenses may be recovered from the class fund.60

XI. Conclusion

The following chart summarizes the compensable fees of Chestnut & Brooks:

*117 Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Chestnut 119.6 $100 $11,960.00 $13,040.00 $ 61,037.50

Malone 491.7 $50 $24,585.00 $24,585.00 $ 58,210.25

Boline 224.4 $50/100 $17,925.00 $21,925.00 $ 92,490.00

Burns 99.7 $50 $ 4,985.00 $ 4,985.00 $ 11,216.25

Cambronne 46.1 $50 $ 2,305.00 $ 2,630.00 $ 5,877.75

Stringer 7.7 $50 $ 385.00 $ 577.50 $ 860.00

Burkard 2.5 $50 $ 125.00 $ 187.50 $ 375.00

Wahl 1112.8 $25 $27,820.00 $27,820.00 $ 30,287.50

Peterson 34.6 $25 $ 865.00 $ 865.00 $ 1,668.50

Johnson 12.3 $10 $ 123.00 $ 123.00 $ 246.00

Total $91,078.00 $96,738.00 $262,268.75

EXPENSES:

Amount Requested $ 36,434.21

Amount Previously Distributed $ 27,325.00

Amount Outstanding $ 9,109.21

Amount Disallowed $ 599.93

Final Expense Award Not Yet Disbursed $ 8,509.28

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ fees $ 96,738.00

Expenses $ 8.509.28

FINAL AWARD $105,247.28

CONTARINO, HUTCHINSON & SCHERIN

The Contarino firm located in Los Angeles, California, submitted a joint fee petition with the firms of Cotchett, Dyer & Illston and Johnson, Johnson & Eklund and with the Attorney General of South Dakota. Contarino, Hutchinson & Scherin served as co-counsel with the Cotchett firm on the complaint which Royal Printing Company filed in January 1977. This was the first fine paper action. Five months later the Supreme Court decided Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977), which held that only direct purchasers can recover from an antitrust violator. In July 1977 the district court granted summary judgment against Royal Printing because it had not purchased its paper directly from the defendants. Royal Printing appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In April 1980 the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment against Royal Printing on the ground that its “indirect” purchases were largely made from divisions or subsidiaries of the defendants. Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark, 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.1980). This case, decided only a few months before the Fine Paper plaintiffs were to go to trial, was of some importance to the class since many class members had made their purchases from subsidiaries of the defendants.61 The Royal Printing *118 case was ultimately transferred to the MDL proceedings in Philadelphia.

I find that the work done on the Royal Printing case benefited the Fine Paper class. The Third Circuit’s Stotter decision in 1978 lessened the impact of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, but the Royal Printing appeal was fully briefed (although not argued) before the Third Circuit decided Stotter. Moreover, Stotter left unresolved an important issue that the Ninth Circuit decided in favor of the class. Therefore, I find that the time spent on the Royal Printing litigation (unless otherwise disallowed) is compensable.

(A) Hours Expended

Royal Printing hired Contarino to represent it in December 1976. Contarino brought the Cotchett firm into the litigation as associate counsel. It appears from the time records that the two firms devoted about the same amount of time to the case, but that the Cotchett firm did most of the substantive work. The Contarino firm seeks compensation for 289 hours expended by Alfred Contarino at an hourly rate of $125 and a multiplier of 2.5. Much of Contarino’s time was spent directing the research of two students, in conference or on the telephone with members of the Cotchett firm, and reviewing documents. Moreover, most of his time records are cryptic and vague. After a careful analysis of these records, I find that the following time must be disallowed.

1. 80.5 hours supported by entries too vague to permit any determination of possible benefit to the class. Most of these entries simply indicate that a telephone conversation took place with a member of the Cotchett firm. Included in these disallowed hours is time spent by Contarino traveling from Los Angeles to San Francisco for meetings with members of the Cotchett firm. I note that no member of the Cotchett firm ever found it necessary to travel to Los Angeles to confer with Contarino, and in view of the numerous telephone calls between the two firms, I can find nothing in Contarino’s records to show the necessity of charging the class for this travel time. 2. 4.5 hours devoted to review of documents and court opinions at a time when such review was duplicative. The class objectors would like all of Contarino’s “read and review” time disallowed as duplicative. Most of this time, however, was spent in 1977 when there was no Executive Committee and the cases had not yet been consolidated by the MDL panel. Since I have found that time spent on the Royal Printing case is compensable, I will not disallow any of Contarino’s 1977 “read and review” time. He was co-counsel with Cotchett at that point. However, once the MDL proceedings got underway, it was of no benefit to the class for Contarino to review the work of others.

8. 7.75 hours reviewing his file for and attending oral argument on Royal Printing’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The argument was handled by a member of the Cotchett firm. I can see no benefit to the class from Contarino’s presence at the argument.

4. 2 hours devoted to writing a memorandum on time and expenses to be incorporated into the joint fee petition.

With the disallowance of the above 94.75 hours, Contarino is left with 194.25 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

Contarino directed the initial investigation into the pricing practices of the defendants. This work accounted for 94 hours of his time. The remaining 100.25 compensable hours were devoted to conferences, review of documents, the deposition of his client and further research. The initial 94 *119 hours will be compensated at the partner-level rate of $100/hour, but the remainder of the work was of the type normally done by associates. After the initial investigation Contarino played a secondary role in the Royal Printing case. This associate-level work will be compensated at $50/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

94 hours X $100/hour = $9400.00

100.25 hours X $ 50/hour = $5012.50

(D) Multiplier

• Contarino’s work was not of such unusually high quality to warrant a quality multiplier, but I will apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to his time since all of his compensable hours were expended prior to the end of the first wave of settlements in January 1979.

(E) Expenses

Contarino requests reimbursement for $1516.84 in expenses. He has already received 75% or $1,137. I find that his expenses are reasonable except for $674.20 requested for several trips to San Francisco to meet with members of the Cotchett firm. As discussed above, I see nothing in Contarino’s time records to indicate that these trips provided any benefit to the class. Since Contarino has already received more for his expenses than I find compensable, I will deduct $294.36 from his award for attorney’s fees.

(F) Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Contarino firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Hourly Name Hours Rate Lodestar Total Total Awarded Requested

Contarino 194.25 $50/100 $14,412.50 $21,618.75 $90,312.50

Expenses:

Amount Requested $ 1,516.84

Amount Previously Distributed $ 1.137.00

Amount Outstanding $ 379.84

Amount Disallowed $ 674.20

Amount to be returned to the class $ 294.36

TOTAL AWARD

Attorneys’ Fees $21,618.75

Less: Amount of previously awarded expenses to be returned to the class $ 294.36

Final Award $21,324.39

COTCHETT, DYER & ILLSTON

The Cotchett firm, located in San Mateo, California, served as co-counsel with the Contarino firm on the Royal Printing complaint that was filed in January 1977. During the pendency of Royal Printing’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit of the summary judgment granted against it, the Cotchett firm was contacted by the South Dakota firm of Johnson, Johnson & Eklund about representing the State of South Dakota in its action against several fine paper manufacturers.62 Most of the firm’s time in the *120 MDL proceedings was devoted to representing South Dakota.63

At the February 3, 1978 organizational meeting Joseph Cotchett was elected to the Executive Committee and chosen as one of the co-lead counsel. It appears that his firm’s representation of one of the certified states was a factor in Cotchett’s appointments. See, e.g., letter from John Noel, Illinois Assistant Attorney General, 3/28/78, Class Objectors’ E 766-68, and N.T., 4/19/78 at 24-25. Cotchett was later chosen as spokesman for the nine certified states to the extent that their proof differed from that presented by the private plaintiffs. He was to have given the opening statement for the certified states at trial.

The class objectors want to exclude a large portion of the Cotchett firm’s time as benefiting only South Dakota or only the certified states and not of any benefit to the private plaintiffs’ class. Class Objectors’ Report at 261-62. They contend that the private plaintiffs should not be required to pay for work done to benefit the certified states. This argument is quite clearly misdirected. The fund from which petitioners seek attorneys’ fees resulted from settlements with the private plaintiffs and the certified states. The certified states are just as entitled to a pro rata portion of the settlement fund as are the private plaintiffs. Consequently, attorneys whose efforts benefited the certified states are entitled to receive reasonable fees from the fund. Moreover, I note that the Cotchett firm, Johnson, Johnson & Eklund and the South Dakota Attorney General’s Office agreed that South Dakota would pay no fees to the two outside firms. It was agreed that any fees would be those awarded by the court pursuant to a fee petition. It would be inequitable for the court to deny the Cotchett firm any fees for the work it did for South Dakota since that work also benefited the class of private purchasers.

The Cotchett firm was involved in several areas of this litigation. It was primarily responsible for the discovery of Boise Cascade Corp. and for limited discovery of defendant Crown Zellerbach Corp. Members of the firm did Industrial Analysis Committee work, participated in the Rule 37 motions, assisted the Sloan firm with the price analysis project, and worked on the final pretrial memorandum. The firm seeks an award of $1,372,190.38 in fees and $59,298.74 in expenses for its efforts. The time records reveal that the firm devoted 3914.3 hours to the case.

I. Joseph Cotchett

This senior attorney had perhaps the greatest number of titles of any attorney in the case. In an organizational structure in which nearly every senior attorney was given a title or two, Cotchett was one of five co-lead counsel, a member of the Executive Committee, vice-chairman of the Discovery Committee, chairman of the Rule 37 Subcommittee, and chairman of the Industrial Analysis Committee. He was also a member of the trial team and spokesman for the certified states.

Cotchett was involved in nearly every major aspect of the litigation. He drafted Royal Printing’s complaint, argued before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, directed the work of the Industrial Analysis Committee, conducted discovery of Boise Cascade, participated in settlement talks, assisted in the price analysis study, contributed to the final pretrial memorandum, and prepared an opening statement on behalf of the certified states. Cotchett seeks an award of $864,675 for 1647 hours of work.

(A) Hours Expended

In view of Cotchett’s membership on the Executive Committee and, more im *121 portantly, his position as one of the trial counsel, I find that Cotchett may properly charge the class for time spent keeping abreast of aspects of the litigation outside his firm’s areas of responsibility. Furthermore, since Cotchett was a spokesman for the certified states, I find that his attendance at various pretrial conferences, discovery committee meetings, etc. is compensable. Nevertheless, my review of Cotchett’s time sheets reveals that the following hours must be disallowed:

1. 17.9 hours supported by entries too vague to permit any determination of whether the time benefited the class. Such entries simply show that a conference or a telephone conversation took place without any indication of the subject matter. Entries of “correspondence” without further explanation are similarly disallowed.

2. 1 hour devoted to drafting the firm’s fee agreement with South Dakota.

3. 105.8 hours devoted to Industrial Analysis Committee work. As explained in the Guidelines, I have determined that this work did not benefit the class.

4. 222 hours were spent working on the final pretrial memorandum. As explained in the Guidelines, only half of this time will be compensated in view of the excessive total number of hours claimed for work on this document by all the attorneys involved. Accordingly, Cotchett will be compensated for 111 hours.

With the disallowance of the above 235.7 hours, Cotchett is left with 1411.3 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

Cotchett requests an hourly rate of $150. To be consistent with rates awarded other senior attorneys for partner-level work, I will award Cotchett $100/hour subject to reductions in two areas. Cotchett spent 15.6 hours on tasks such as setting up files, preparing interrogatories, and reviewing prior court decisions that could have been assigned to an associate. This time will be compensated at $50/hour. In addition, he spent 20.5 hours working on matters related to the defendants’ discovery of his client South Dakota. As explained in the Guidelines, this class action discovery will be compensated at $50/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

1375.2 hours X $100/hour = $137,520 36.1 hours X $ 50/hour = $ 1,805

(D) Multiplier

Cotchett’s work on behalf of the class was quite commendable. Nevertheless, I do not think it was of such unusually high quality to justify a quality multiplier. Senior trial attorneys are expected to work at a level of competence that justifies their higher hourly rates. Cotchett’s efforts were commensurate with his position of responsibility in the litigation.

I will apply a contingency multiplier of I. 5 to the 445.1 compensable hours Cotchett expended prior to the end of the first wave of settlements.

II. Susan Illston

(A) Hours Expended

Susan Illston spent 1486.3 hours on Fine Paper. Her involvement in the ease was as extensive as Cotchett’s. She did Industrial Analysis Committee work, participated in every stage of the discovery of Boise Cascade, assisted in the price analysis study, contributed to the final pretrial memorandum, and worked on settlement documents. She also argued Royal Printing’s successful appeal to the Ninth Circuit. As with her partner Cotchett, I find that most of 111-ston’s time benefited the class. My analysis, nevertheless, reveals that the following hours must be disallowed:

1. 5.3 hours supported by entries too vague to permit a determination of any possible benefit to the class. Such entries include “Call to Contarino” and “analysis of correspondence” without further explanation of the subject matter.

2. 101.1 hours expended on Industrial Analysis Committee work. As explained in the Guidelines, I have determined the work of this committee did not benefit the class. *122 3. 211.4 hours were devoted to the final pretrial memorandum. As explained in the Guidelines, only half of this time will be compensated in view of the excessive total number of hours claimed for work on this document by all the attorneys involved. Accordingly, Illston will be compensated for 105.7 hours.

With the disallowance of the above 212.1 hours, Illston is left with 1274.2 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

Class objectors suggest that a substantial portion of Illston’s time should be compensated at an associate rate because she essentially acted as Cotchett’s associate in this case. Class Objectors’ Report at 266-67. My analysis reveals that the class objectors overstate their case. I have determined that 199.8 hours were spent on matters that warrant an hourly rate of only $50/hour. This time included preparation of interrogatories, organization of files, document inspection, making travel arrangements, preparation for the microfilming of Boise Cascade documents, and preparing materials for use at depositions taken by Cotchett. On these matters, she was acting as Cotchett’s associate and will be compensated accordingly, but in view of this firm’s many responsibilities in the litigation, I find that the great bulk of Illston’s time deserves compensation at the partner-level rate of $100/hour.

The above considerations notwithstanding, the 35.1 hours spent on class action discovery (e.g. answering defendants’ interrogatories, preparing for the deposition of the firm’s client) will be compensated at $50/hour as explained in the Guidelines.

(C) Total Lodestar

1039.3 hours X $100/hour = $103,930

234.9 hours X $ 50/hour = 11,745

(D) Multiplier

The work done by Illston was not of such an unusually high degree of skill to warrant a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 429.1 hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

III. Other Attorneys

Eight of the attorneys request compensation for a total of 170.2 hours spent on Fine Paper.64 I find that all of this time is compensable except for .9 hours of Charles Dyer’s time which must be disallowed for vagueness and 4.8 hours of his time which was devoted to Industrial Analysis Committee work. Furthermore, I have determined that all of Dyer’s compensable time warrants an hourly rate of $100 and that the seven associates will be paid $50/hour. Finally, while none of the work done by these attorneys justifies a quality multiplier, I will apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 97.3 hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

IV. Paralegals

The firm requests compensation for 610.8 hours of paralegal time. I find the work done to be compensable at $25/hour. No multiplier is applied to paralegal time.

V. Expenses

The firm seeks reimbursement of $59,-298.74 in expenses. It has already received 75% of this figure ($44,474). I find that the remaining expenses are reasonable with the exception of $1272.01 spent on travel, meals and lodging for attendance at the two meetings of the Industrial Analysis Committee in Chicago. Attorneys’ fees have been disallowed for this time.

VI. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Cotchett firm is entitled under Lindy:

*123 Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Cotchett 1411.3 $50/100 $139,325 $160,892.50 $ 864,675.00

Illston •1274.2 $50/100 $115,675 $134,662.50 $ 464,468.75

Dyer 33 $100 $ 3,300 $ 4,450.00 $ 8,968.75

Fisher 20 $50 $ 1,000 $ 1,500.00 $ 3,325.00

Annand 20.8 $50 $ 1,040 $ 1,135.00 $ 3,458.00

Nicol 3.2 $50 $ 160 $ 240.00 $ 532.00

Nielsen 13 $50 $ 650 $ 975.00 $ 2,161.25

Danneskiold 21.6 $50 $ 1,080 $ 1,080.00 $ 3,591.00

M. McKim 16 $50 $ 800 $ 800.00 $ 2,660.00

D. McKim 36.9 $50 $ 1,845 $ 2,702.50 $ 6,134.63

Paralegals 610.8 $ 15,270 $ 15,270.00 $ 12,216.00

TOTAL $280,145 $323,707.50 $1,372,190.38

Expenses:

Amount Requested $ 59,298.74

Amount Previously Distributed $ 44.474.00

Amount Outstanding $ 14,824.74

Amount Disallowed $ 1,272.01

Amount to be Distributed $ 13,552.73

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $323,707.50

Expenses $ 13.552.73

Final Award $337,260.23

FINE, KAPLAN & BLACK

The Fine, Kaplan & Black firm is located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The firm became co-counsel with the Sachnoff, Schrager firm for Joli Greeting Card Company on January 17, 1978. The Fine firm seeks compensation for 90.25 hours of work performed by Messrs. Fine, Kaplan and Black. Each of these attorneys is a partner in the firm.

The fee petition requests this court to accept one of two suggested lodestar figures. The lodestar requested based on the current rates the firm charges is $12,830. The requested lodestar based on the rates charged during the course of the firm’s involvement in this litigation is $8,268.75. Regardless of which lodestar figure is used the firm seeks a total compensation for attorneys’ fees of $20,000. By presenting the alternate lodestar requests with a multiplier request of 1.56 for the current rates figure and 2.42 for the historical rates figure the firm is able to arrive at the bottom line amount of $20,000. In addition, the Fine fee petition seeks $1,844.43 in expenses. The firm seeks no compensation for associate or paralegal hours.

Fine, Kaplan & Black have not billed for any time subsequent to April of 1978.65 *124 Most of the hours for which compensation is sought were expended in multidistrict panel proceedings and in seeking access to Grand Jury documents. The remainder of the requested time was spent in more general reading, review and preparation endeavors. On balance, the Fine firm’s involvement in this litigation was very limited.

I. Allen D. Black

(A) Hours Expended

Black, a partner, asks to be compensated for 73.75 hours of work. Upon analysis of the time sheets submitted I find, however, that Black can only be compensated for 47.75 hours. This is the only time which reasonably can be said to have benefited the class. According to the Guidelines set forth in the beginning of this Memorandum, I have determined Black cannot be compensated for the following hours:

1. 11.5 hours spent in reading, review, or discussion related to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation proceedings. Black’s efforts in this area were duplicative. There was no discernible benefit to the class from these efforts.

2. 8.75 hours spent in general discussions with various counsel and other undefined miscellaneous time which is inadequately documented, rendering impossible a determination of benefit to the class.

3. 5.75 hours spent in preparation for and attendance at pretrial conferences and meetings. Black was not chairman of any of the committees and had no leadership position in this litigation. In view of the firm’s limited support role Black’s attendance at these pretrial conferences was neither necessary nor beneficial to the class.

I will allow the remaining 47.75 hours which Black seeks relating to the Grand Jury documents, preparation and drafting of documents, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation work and attendance at the Chicago discovery meeting.

(B) Hourly Rate

Black suggests alternative computations based on either the historical or current rates which range between $90 and $140 an hour. Black’s compensable hours, however, involve only that time devoted to Grand Jury documents, initial complaint drafting, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation proceedings, and the Chicago discovery meeting. Almost all of this work was completed early in the history of this litigation and within two months of the firm’s entry into the action. The rate at which Black was being compensated at this time was $90 an hour. This rate is reasonable and, therefore, I will allow it as compensation.66

(C) Total Lodestar

47.75 hours X $90/hour = $4297.50

(D) Multiplier

There will be no adjustment for quality. Mere success in an undertaking by a firm, as with the Grand Jury documents, is not demonstrative of exceptional work for which a positive quality multiplier will be awarded. However, I will apply a contingency factor of 1.5 to Black’s lodestar since all his time was expended prior to January 1979.

II. Arthur M. Kaplan

(A) Hours Expended

Kaplan is a partner in the firm. He asks to be compensated for 13.25 hours *125 of work. After analysis of the time sheets submitted, I have concluded that Kaplan should not be compensated for any of his work in this litigation. Of the hours Kaplan expended, none can reasonably be said to have benefited the class. According to the Guidelines set forth in the beginning of this decision, Kaplan should not be compensated for the following:

1. 1.5 hours reviewing Pretrial Orders No. 1 and correspondence in preparation for attendance at a conference with plaintiffs’ counsel in Washington will not be allowed as such work made no significant contribution to the creation or preservation of the settlement fund. Considering the firm’s limited involvement in this litigation and the number of other firms and lawyers who were participating, Kaplan’s work was duplicative and simply does not warrant compensation.

2. Similarly, 11.75 hours in travel time, attendance, and follow-up review of the April 1978 Washington conference of plaintiffs’ counsel will not be compensated. Kaplan was not a chairman of any of the committees and he had no leadership position in this litigation. Kaplan’s attendance at this conference was neither necessary nor beneficial to the class.

Since no compensation will be allowed for Kaplan, it is unnecessary to analyze any hourly rate, compute a lodestar, or discuss a multiplier figure.

III. Aaron M. Fine

Fine is a senior partner in the firm. He asks to be compensated for 3.25 hours of work in 1978. I will allow compensation for three hours at the rate of $100 per hour. The .25-hour charged to telephone conversation with partner Black and co-counsel will be disallowed. On the face of it, there is no discernible benefit to the class from this telephone call. Since Fine’s time was logged before the initial settlements, I will apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to his lodestar. No quality multiplier is warranted.

IV. Expenses

The Fine, Kaplan & Black firm lists total expenses as $1,844.43. As previously explained, the firm has already received 75% of these expenses or $1,383. However, I will not allow $98.59 of the claimed expenses. This figure represents travel costs to the conference in Washington for which attorneys’ fees have been disallowed.

V. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Total67 Requested Hourly Total Rate Lodestar Awarded

Black 47.75 $16,054.42 $ 90 $4,297.50 $6,446.25

Kaplan 0 $ 2,884.35 0 0 0

Fine 3.00 $ 1.061.23 $100 $ 300.00 $ 450.00

TOTAL $20,000.00 $4,597.50 $6,896.25

Expenses:

Amount Requested $1,844.43

Amount Previously Distributed $1,383.00

Amount Outstanding $ 461.43

Amount Disallowed $ 98.59

Amount to be Distributed $ 362.84

*126 TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $6,896.25

Expenses $ 362.84

Final Award $7,259.09

FINE, WALTZER & BAGNERIS

This firm, located in New Orleans, Louisiana, seeks compensation for the work of Bruce C. Waltzer, a partner, and for the time of two para-professionals. The firm, along with Specks & Goldberg, Ltd., represented Phillip and Ruth Meroney in this litigation. Waltzer claims to have been co-chairman with two other law firms of the Champion International discovery subcommittee. He bills the class for 260.3 attorney and paralegal hours spent on administrative, ministerial, and general associate-level and non-lawyer work in connection with Champion discovery. The firm asks for a total fee award of $77,986.

(A) Hours Expended

Waltzer claims compensation for 220.2 hours.68 After a careful review of Waltzer’s time records, I find that only 181.2 of the total hours claimed by him have benefited the class. Specifically, in accordance with the Guidelines set forth above, I find the following hours did not benefit the class:

1. 22 hours for time and travel from New Orleans to Chicago for discovery-related meetings. These trips were unnecessary, duplicative and of no benefit to the class since one of his co-chairmen for Champion discovery, Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ltd., was already located in Chicago and Waltzer’s co-counsel on the Meroney complaint, Mr. Specks, was present at these meetings.

2. 14.5 hours expended on a trip to New York City from New Orleans to recruit a document review staff, rent microfilm readers and obtain office space in connection with the Champion discovery. This trip was wasteful and duplicative since either co-counsel Robinson, Silverman, Pearse, Aronsohn & Berman, a New York City law firm, or Kleinman, Steinberg & Lapuk of Hartford, Connecticut, who were co-chairman with Waltzer for Champion discovery, could have easily taken care of these ministerial tasks.

3. 2.5 hours for “Discussions with Specks and D. Nast”. (Entry September, 1978). This entry is too vague and inadequately documented to allow compensation since it cannot be determined whether the time benefited the class or what an appropriate hourly rate would be.

For these reasons, then, Waltzer will be compensated for a total of 181.2 hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

Waltzer asks $150 per hour for his time. This is too high. Waltzer’s compensable time was spent reviewing microfilm and documents, telephoning other attorneys in the case and preparing a report on Champion discovery and depositions. This type of work — routine discovery and administrative tasks — is the kind normally assigned to an associate in a law firm and consequently does not warrant the inflated rate asked for here by Waltzer. Waltzer will be paid an associate’s rate of $50 an hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

181.2 hours X $50/hour = $9,060

(D) Para-Professionals

Fine, Waltzer seeks compensation for 37 hours of work by “para-professionals” Dennis BagneriS, a law student whose *127 brother is a partner of the firm, and Collette Creppel, an undergraduate college student, both of whom reviewed Champion microfilm. Fine, Waltzer seeks $20 per hour for their time. These two individuals did not have formal paralegal training although Bagneris had a law school background. They will not be awarded normal paralegal rates but an average rate of $10 per hour seems fair and appropriate.69 Accordingly, I will award Fine, Waltzer $370 for 37 hours of “para-professional” time.

(E) Multiplier

Fine, Waltzer requests the application of a multiplier of 2.3 to the lodestar. Aside from a contingency multiplier of 1.5 to Waltzer’s 72.1 compensable hours spent prior to the January 1979 settlements, no positive multiplier will be applied. As explained in the Guidelines section, given the circumstances of the case, a lawyer who played such a minor role does not warrant a positive multiplier on the basis of quality. Similarly, no multiplier will be applied for “para-professional” time.

In accordance with the above discussion, the total fee award for Fine, Waltzer is $11,232.50.

(F) Expenses

Fine, Waltzer asks reimbursement for $7,910.22 in expenses. After careful review of the firm’s petition and documentation in support thereof, I will not permit reimbursement for the following expenses:

1. Fine, Waltzer seeks reimbursement for $1,303.86 for telephone charges and “taxi fares, gratuities, meals and other miscellaneous expenses” without submitting any invoices, bills, cancelled checks, check stubs or any other documentation in support thereof other than an affidavit listing the items for which reimbursement is sought. Since this missing documentation was required to be submitted to the Court by Pretrial Order No. 143,70 these claimed expenses will be disallowed.

2. The firm will not be reimbursed for trips made to Miami, Florida, Chicago and New York City for which attorneys’ fees have been disallowed. These trips did not benefit the class. Included are the following bills which Fine, Waltzer attached to its fee petition:

(a) Invoice of February 1, 1979 ($206) for round trip air fare — New Orleans to Miami (one-half of which was billed to class).

(b) Invoice of June 6, 1979 ($248) for round trip air fare: Chicago — -New Orleans.

(c) Invoice of July 8, 1979 ($480) for round trip air fare for “S. Fine and T. Christopher”: New Orleans — New York City.

(d) Invoice of July 31,1976 ($612) for round trip air fare: New Orleans — Miami; Miami to Santo Domingo; Santo Domingo — New York; New York to New Orleans (one-half of which was billed to class).

(e) Numerous (and mostly illegible) invoices for restaurants and hotels utilized during these trips. For example, $534.27 bill for stay at Waldorf-Astoria in New York City; $139.60 bill for meal at Romea-Salta restaurant in New York City.

3. Other bills (again, many illegible) which were submitted by the firm for reimbursement are not appropriate for payment by the class. For example: Invoice of June 18, 1979 ($412) for round trip air fare: Los Angeles — New Orleans. There is no indication in the fee petition that a member of Fine, Waltzer was or had to be in Los Angeles for the Fine Paper case.

4. Fine, Waltzer will not be reimbursed for a number of bills for meals consumed in hometown restaurants.71 Examples of these bills are as follows:

(a) $90.68 for meal at “Willy Coin’s restaurant” in Gretna, Louisiana (on the *128 voucher it was written “Ruth and Phil Meroney Review of Fine Paper Antitrust Case”).

(b) $65.34 for meals at Bienville House, New Orleans.

(c) $71.13 for meal at “Ruth’s Steak and Lobster House” in New Orleans.

(d) $61.85 for meal at “ — on Ton Restaurant” in New Orleans.

The remaining expense vouchers totaling $2,762.33 appear to be proper. Since I have already distributed $5,932 to Fine, Waltzer for its expenses, the firm has been overpaid $3,169.67. Accordingly, this sum will be deducted from the fee award. Thus, the total award to Fine, Waltzer, including reimbursement for expenses, is $8,062.83.

G. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which Fine, Waltzer is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Waltzer 181.2 $50 $9,060.00 $10,862.50 $77,246.00

Para-professionals 37.0 $10 $ 370.00 $ 370.00 $ 740.00

TOTAL $9,430.00 $11,232.50 $77,986.00

Expenses:

Amount Requested $ 7,910.22

Amount Previously Distributed $ 5,932.00

Amount Outstanding $ 1,978.22

Amount Disallowed $ 5,147.89

Amount to be returned to Class $ 3,169.67

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ fees $11,232.50

Less: Amount to be Returned to Class $ 3.169.67

Pinal Award $ 8,062.83

FREEMAN, ATKINS & COLEMAN, LTD.

Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ltd., located in Chicago, entered the Fine Paper litigation on January 26, 1978 as counsel of record for Campbell Office Supply.72 The firm was a member of the Executive Committee and participated in the financing of this case through its membership on the Finance Committee. Additionally, Freeman, Atkins & Coleman was assigned joint responsibility with the firms of Kleinman, Steinberg & Lapuk, and Fine, Walter & Bagneris for discovery of defendants Potlach and Champion. The firm was also represented on the Industrial Analysis Committee. The fee petition seeks an award of $727,105 in fees for 5479.5 hours of work and reimbursement of $39,974.57 for expenses.

I. Robert S. Atkins

(A) Hours Expended

Robert S. Atkins, a partner with the firm, was a member of the Executive Committee and chairman of the Finance Committee. *129 A large portion of the time expended by Atkins related to the firm’s responsibility for discovery of defendants Potlach and Champion. Atkins prepared for and took eleven depositions of Champion personnel and supervised the analysis of Potlach documents with the assistance of the California Attorney General’s Office. Additionally, as a member of the Industrial Analysis Committee, Atkins analyzed data regarding the fine paper industry.

After carefully reviewing Atkins’ time records, I conclude that the following time must be disallowed:

1. 32 hours are supported by entries which are too vague to provide any basis for determining if the time spent was of any benefit to the class. Many entries simply supply the name of another plaintiffs’ counsel and indicate that a meeting or telephone call occurred.

2. 17 hours spent traveling to and attending the April 19,1978 pretrial conference in Philadelphia. The class was adequately represented by co-lead counsel at this conference.

3. 15.8 hours for Industrial Analysis Committee work. As stated in the Guidelines, I find that this work was of no benefit to the class.

4. 95.1 hours were spent working on the final pretrial memorandum. As explained in the Guidelines, only half of this time will be compensated in view of the excessive total number of hours claimed for work on this document by all the attorneys involved. Accordingly, Atkins will be compensated for 47.6 hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

Robert S. Atkins requests a rate of $150/hour. To be consistent with rates awarded other senior attorneys for partner-level work, however, I will award Atkins $100/hour, subject to reduction in two areas. Atkins spent 69.4 hours reviewing various discovery documents which could have been reviewed by associates. This time, therefore, will be compensated at $50/hour. Atkins also spent 12.7 hours on settlement administration and review of computer companies’ bids for’the purchase of equipment to process claims. I have determined that this non-legal work should be compensated at $25/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

979.2 hours X $100/hour = $97,920.00

69.4 hours X $ 50/hour = $ 3,470.00

12.7 hours X $ 25/hour =■$ 317.50

(D) Multiplier

Although Atkins was a member of four committees, his role in the litigation was often supervisory. His substantive efforts (e.g., taking depositions of defendants’ personnel), were not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, allow Atkins a 1.5 contingency multiplier for the 45.9 compensable hours expended prior to the end of the first wave of settlements in January 1979.

II. Robert C. Goldberg

(A) Hours Expended

Robert C. Goldberg, a partner in the petitioner’s firm, devoted a substantial portion of his 256.9 hours to Industrial Analysis work and review of Champion discovery documents. Additionally, he made an FOIA request to the Federal Trade Commission and reviewed government documents relating to the investigation of the fine paper industry.

After reviewing Goldberg’s time records, I concluded that the following time must be disallowed:

1. 14.3 hours are supported by entries which are too vague to provide any basis for determining if the time spent was of value to the class. Many entries simply give the names of other attorneys and indicate that a conference or telephone call occurred.

2. 58.1 hours spent on Industrial Analysis Committee work. As stated in the Guidelines, I find that this work was of no benefit to the class.

3. 8.5 hours were spent preparing for the depositions of Champion personnel. This *130 was duplicative of the work performed by Atkins.

(B) Hourly Rate

Robert Goldberg requests an hourly rate of $125. To be consistent with rates awarded other attorneys for partner-level work, however, I will award Goldberg $100/hour subject to reductions in two areas. Goldberg spent 93.6 hours reviewing Champion discovery and Federal Trade Commission documents. This work could have been assigned to an associate and, therefore, it will be compensated at $50/hour. In addition, Goldberg spent 19 hours on matters related to the defendants’ discovery of his client, Campbell Office Supply. As explained in the Guidelines, this class action discovery will be compensated at $50/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

63.4 hours X $100/hour = $6,340

112.6 hours X $ 50/hour = $5,630

(D) Multiplier

I do not think Goldberg’s work on behalf of the class was of such an unusually high degree of skill to justify a quality multiplier. Goldberg’s efforts were commensurate with his position of responsibility in the litigation. I will, however, apply a contingency multiplier of 1.5 to the 64.1 compensable hours Goldberg expended prior to the end of the first wave of settlements in January 1979.

III. Nora Mahaney

(A) Hours Expended

Nora Mahaney, an associate with Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, devoted 366.2 hours to the Fine Paper litigation during the period June 1979 to December 1979. A substantial portion of Ms. Mahaney’s time was spent preparing the Champion discovery book, attending Champion document production sessions and preparing reports on defendants’ interrogatory responses. I find that all of Mahaney’s time is compensable except 112.9 hours which are supported by entries which are too vague to provide any basis for determining if the time spent was of any benefit to the class. Many entries merely state that Mahaney received and reviewed incoming correspondence and pleadings without any further description of the documents. Other entries simply give the names of other attorneys and indicate that a meeting or telephone conversation occurred.

(B) Hourly Rate

Nora Mahaney requests an hourly rate of $85. I find that $50/hour is fair and reasonable compensation for her associate-level work.

(C) Total Lodestar

253.3 hours X $50/hour = $12,665

(D) Multiplier

Mahaney seeks a multiplier of 1.75. In light of the fact that she was not in a position of leadership and spent most of her time doing associate-level discovery work, she does not merit a quality multiplier. Furthermore, since all of Mahaney’s time was logged after the first wave of settlements, I will not apply any contingency multiplier.

IV. Scott L. Fredericksen

(A) Hours Expended

As an associate of Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Scott L. Fredericksen devoted 43.2 hours to Fine Paper in 1980. The bulk of Fredericksen’s work involved examination of documents on uniformity of freight charges and sales terms for the plaintiffs’ pricing project. I find that all of Fredericksen’s hours are compensable.

(B) Hourly Rate

Fredericksen seeks an hourly rate of $85. I find that $50/hour is fair and reasonable compensation for this associate-level work.

(C) Total Lodestar

43.2 hours X $50/hour = $2,160

*131 (D) Multiplier

Fredericksen requests a multiplier of 1.75. However, he was not in a position of leadership and spent most of his time doing associate-level discovery work. Therefore, he does not merit a quality multiplier. Furthermore, since all of Fredericksen’s time was logged after the first wave of settlements, I will not apply any contingency multiplier.

V. Kenneth Ross

(A) Hours Expended

As an associate of Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ross devoted 21.8 hours to Fine Paper in July and September, 1980. A substantial portion of Ross’ time was spent abstracting depositions. I find that all of the hours expended by Ross are compensable.

(B) Hourly Rate

Ross requests an hourly rate of $85. I find that $50/hour is fair and reasonable for this associate-level work.

(C) Total Lodestar

21.8 hours X $50/hour = $1,090

(D) Multiplier

Ross seeks a multiplier of 1.75. However, he spent most of his time doing associate-level work such as abstracting depositions. Therefore, he does not merit a quality multiplier. Furthermore, since all of Ross’ time was logged after the first wave of settlements, I will not apply any contingency multiplier.

VI. Paralegals

Seven paralegals worked on Fine Paper for a total of 3617.8 hours. I find that all of this time is compensable at an hourly rate of $25. No multiplier is applied to paralegal time.

VII. Expenses

Freeman, Atkins & Coleman requests reimbursement for $39,974.57 in expenses incurred in connection with this litigation. Seventy-five percent of this figure ($29;981) has already been awarded. Of the total expenses I have disallowed $41.29 incurred by Robert S. Atkins for transportation to the April 19, 1978 pretrial conference in Philadelphia. Attorneys’ fees for this time have been disallowed as duplicative and unnecessary. The remaining $9,952.28 in expenses may be recovered from the class fund.

VIII. Conclusion

The following graph summarizes the compensable fees of Freeman, Atkins & Coleman:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Atkins 1061.3 $25/50/ 100 $101,707.50 $106,672.50 $440,100.00

Goldberg 176.0 $50/100 11,970.00 $ 16,897.50 $ 64,225.00

Mahaney 253.3 $50 $ 12,665.00 $ 12,665.00 $ 54,472.25

Fredericksen 43.2 $50 $ 2,160.00 $ 2,160.00 $ 6,426.00

Ross 21.8 $50 $ 1,090.00 $ 1,090.00 $ 3,242.75

Paralegals 3617.8 $25 $ 90,445.00 $ 90,445.00 $158,639.00

$220,037.50 $229,930.00 $727,105.00

Expenses:

Amount Requested $ 39,974.57

Amount Previously Distributed $ 29.981.00

Amount Outstanding $ 9,993.57

*132 Amount Disallowed $ 41.29

Amount to be Distributed $ 9,952.28

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $229,930.00

Expenses $ 9,952.28

Final Award $239,882.28

PHILLIP C. GOLDSTICK & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

This Chicago law firm entered the case on March 10,1979, two months after the 30 million dollar settlement. At the time, the firm filed a complaint on behalf of its client, Franz Stationery Company. Goldstick & Associates seeks fees in the amount of $31,203.76 for 6.6 hours of partner time, 155.9 hours of associate time and 48.9 hours of paralegal time. The firm assisted in evaluating defendant’s document production, took one deposition and assisted in briefing the Motions to Compel Production of Documents and the Motion to Dismiss the Appeal of the State of New York. The firm had no committee appointments, did not participate in settlement negotiations, had no leadership positions and did no trial preparation work. Again, it is difficult to understand why the plaintiffs’ Executive Committee or its co-chairmen assigned work to this firm at all in view of the number of lawyers already participating.

I. Phillip C. Goldstick

No fees will be awarded to Goldstick, a partner of the firm, for the 6.6 hours he claims he devoted to Fine Paper for the following reasons:

1. 2.4 hours are described by such vague entries as “conf. call R. Atkins” and “conference w/ALF MST & MLM”. As stated earlier, such entries are too vague to permit compensation since it cannot be determined whether the time benefited the class and what an appropriate hourly rate would be.

2. The remaining 4.2 hours of Goldstick’s time were devoted to meeting and communicating with his client and work on the client’s complaint. These efforts were of no benefit to the class, especially since they took place long after class certification. The complaint was merely a vehicle to enable the firm to enter the case and consequently was only a benefit to the Goldstick firm.

II. Alan L. Fulkerson

Fulkerson is an associate with the firm. He seeks compensation for 18.75 hours spent on the case. For the following reasons, all of this time will be disallowed:

1. 10 hours devoted to the drafting, filing and service of the Franz Stationery complaint is not compensable for, as noted above, such activity did not benefit the class.

2. 2.75 hours of reading and reviewing documents, correspondence and filings for which the firm was not responsible will not be compensated. For example, on April 20, 1979 and on May 7, 1979, Fulkerson reviewed the Motion to Disqualify Certain Counsel and the Majority States Motion for Reconsideration. Such unnecessary and duplicative read and review time was of no benefit to the class.

3. 5.5 hours of Fulkerson’s time entries are too vague to permit compensation. For example, 3.5 hours were spent “reviewing correspondence”. I cannot discern from these nebulous entries whether the work was of any benefit to the class.

4. Fulkerson spent .5 hours on phone calls to Specks and Sara Wolff relating to document review. The petition and time records do not indicate that Fulkerson ever performed such review, and, accordingly, *133 these telephone calls did not benefit the class. Thus, the firm will not receive remuneration for this time.

III. Michael Tepper

Tepper, an associate with the firm, seeks compensation for 5.5 hours. All of his time was spent reviewing various filings and documents. Tepper did not draft any of these documents and apparently never took any action as a result of his review. Tepper’s efforts, therefore, did not benefit the class and will not be compensated. As stated earlier, in a case such as this, with scores of lawyers participating, massive duplication would result if every attorney is to be compensated for reading every piece of correspondence and every document.

IV. Stewart M. Weltman

(A) Hours Expended

Weltman, a 1978 law school graduate, is an associate with the law firm. The firm seeks compensation for 132 hours of his time. After careful review of the time sheets submitted, I find the following time is not compensable:

1. 11.1 hours will be disallowed because they are described only as “correspondence and document review”. Because of the vagueness of these entries, I am unable to determine whether such activity benefited the class.

2. 7 hours expended at two conferences on February 6, 1980, the date of Weltman’s first appearance in Fine Paper, will not be compensated. At the one meeting, Welt-man spoke with Specks and Howard Fink about a document search Weltman never did participate in or perform. At the second conference, Weltman met with Mary Burke, a paralegal at the Sloan & Connelly firm, concerning third party depositions. Weltman, however, took only one third party deposition nearly four months later. I cannot detect any benefit to the class as a result of either of these meetings and, therefore, these seven hours will be disallowed.

I have considered the class objectors’ challenge to the 18.6 hours devoted to Weltman’s preparing for, traveling to and taking of the depositions of the Paper Converters Association (“PCA”) at Washington, D.C. Although I share the objectors’ doubt as to the benefit conferred on the class by this deposition since the goal of the deposition — to authenticate and lay a foundation for the introduction into evidence of documents — was never attained, this failure, however, was due to PCA’s designation of a deponent who had no knowledge of the origin of the documents. Moreover, during the course of the deposition, Weltman did obtain disclosure of the identity of an individual who was able to authenticate the documents. The deposition, therefore, did benefit the class but at a cost. Since Weltman acted in good faith in taking this deposition, he should receive reasonable compensation for his effort. Thus, the total number of Weltman’s compensable hours is 113.9.73

(B) Hourly Rate

The Goldstick firm asks for an hourly rate of $75 per hour for Weltman’s research, brief drafting and the PCA deposition. This rate is too high for a very recent law school graduate. Fifty dollars an hour is more appropriate.

(C) Total Lodestar

113,9 hours X $50/hour = $5,695

(D) Multiplier

The firm asks that a multiplier of 2.5 be applied to Weltman’s time. This request is denied. In addition to the reasons stated in the Guidelines section of this memorandum, this result is justified because all of Welt-man’s time was expended after the initial $30 million of settlements and a substantial portion of his total hours was billed after the September 1980 final settlements. *134 Thus, no substantial contingency factor exists which would justify an increase in his lodestar amount. Similarly, no increment to the lodestar is justified for the quality of his services. Weltman did not have a leadership position; all of his compensation is for routine discovery matters; and his taking of the PCA deposition was not handled in the most efficient manner. A quality factor is inherent in Weltman’s $50 hourly rate and an adjustment to that rate is not justified because he did not demonstrate an unusually high degree of skill.

V. Paralegals

The Goldstick firm seeks compensation for 48.9 hours of work for Margaret C. May, a paralegal of the firm, at the rate of $30 an hour. A review of Ms. May’s time records indicated that her work did benefit the class and the time expended was reasonable. For the reasons set forth earlier, $25 an hour for paralegal time is fair and appropriate. As also stated above, no multiple will be applied to paralegal time. Accordingly, the Goldstick firm will be awarded $1,222.50 for Ms. May’s time.

VI. Expenses

The Goldstick firm’s total expenses are $2,505.35. The firm has already received 75% of these expenses or $1,878. The firm’s total expenses appear reasonable, and accordingly, I will award the firm the remainder of its expenses, the total of which is $627.35.

VII. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Goldstick firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Total Awarded Requested

Goldstick 0.0 0 0 0 $ 2,062.50

Fulkerson 0.0 0 0 0 $ 3,515.63

Teppery 0.0 0 0 0 $ 965.63

Weltman 113.9 $50 $5,695.00 $5,695.00 $20,992.50

Paralegals 48.9 $25 $1.222.50 $1,222.50 $ 3.667.50

Total $6,917.50 $6,917.50 $31,203.76

Expenses:

$2,505.35 Amount Requested

$1,878.00 Amount Previously Distributed

$ 627.35 Amount Outstanding and Awarded

TOTAL AWARD:

$6,917.50 Attorneys’ Fees

$ 627.35 Expenses

$7,544.85

GREENFIELD & SCHOEN, P.C.

Greenfield & Schoen (“G & S”), a Philadelphia law firm, was substituted for Pomerantz, Levy, Haudek & Black as counsel for Irving Kanter, t/a Ever-Ready Kanter Press. The firm played a very limited role in this litigation. It was not responsible for any brief, did not participate in any merits discovery, and was not on any committee. The firm assumed no leadership role whatsoever. The only member of the firm seeking compensation is Richard D. Greenfield. He wants to be compensated for a total of 164.7 hours devoted to representing his client with respect to the preparation for and taking of his deposition as a class representative. Greenfield also responded to de *135 fendants’ interrogatories on Kanter’s behalf. In addition, Greenfield asks for remuneration for serving “as liaison with plaintiff” and for “moniter[ing] [sic] the progress of the litigation for plaintiff.” G & S Petition at 1.

After the class was certified and Kanter was certified as one of the many class representatives on February 10, 1979, Greenfield’s work on class action discovery ceased. Greenfield now seeks compensation for 164.7 hours at rates of $115 — $135 per hour for the period 1977 through 1979 and requests a multiplier of 2 for a total award of $70,154.

The class objectors oppose the award of any fee to Greenfield because most of his time was devoted to class action discovery and the class did not benefit from having sixteen representatives certified. This same objection has been raised against numerous petitioners here, and for the reasons stated in the Guidelines section, it is not a bar to Greenfield’s recovery of reasonable fees. Accordingly, I proceed to the Lindy analysis.

(A) Hours Expended

Greenfield asks for remuneration for 164.7 hours. According to my calculations, the time listings on Greenfield’s petition total 163.5 hours. Of this total number, 28.5 were expended after the class was certified. There is no detailed explanation provided in the petition as to what Greenfield did during this post-certification period; however, since the class was already certified, this time could not have been spent on class action discovery but rather must have been devoted to Greenfield’s assumed role as “liaison” for Kanter or for monitoring the litigation for his client. Obviously, the effort did not benefit the class and will not be compensated from the fund.

The remaining 135 hours were presumably spent solely on class-action discovery. An examination of Greenfield’s answers to defendants’ interrogatories filed on behalf of Kanter show that Greenfield adopted verbatim the answers and objections previously filed by class representative Magazine Management. Docket Entry Nos. 319, 320, filed 8/3/78. I have also reviewed Kanter’s deposition, which was attended by Greenfield and my reading of it convinces me that neither a high degree of preparation was needed nor was demonstrated by Greenfield. Docket Entry No. 984, filed 11/21/78. Based on this analysis it seems that the 135 hours Greenfield spent on class-action discovery was excessive. Eighty-five hours would be a reasonable time within which to accomplish this task and Greenfield will be compensated accordingly.

(B) Hourly Rate

Greenfield seeks an hourly rate of $115— $135. As stated in the Guidelines, the type of work Greenfield performed in this litigation — class action discovery — will be compensated at the associate level rate of $50 an hour. Accordingly, Greenfield will not be paid at his requested rate.

(C) Total Lodestar

85 hours X $50/hour = $4,250

(D) Multiplier

Since all of Greenfield’s allowed time occurred prior to the initial settlements, a contingency multiplier of 1.5 will be applied. No increment to the lodestar is justified for the quality of Greenfield’s services. He did not have a leadership position; his time was spent on routine matters; and he did not demonstrate an unusually high degree of skill.

Accordingly, the total fee award for attorney time for Greenfield & Schoen, P.C. is $6,375.

(E) Expenses

The firm’s total expenses are listed as $345.19. As noted previously, the firm has already received 75% of this amount. Since the firm’s expenses appear reasonable and proper, I will permit reimbursement of the outstanding $87.19.

*136 (F) Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which Greenfield & Schoen is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Hourly Name Hours Rate Total Total Lodestar Awarded Requested

Greenfield 85 $50 $4,250 $6,375 $70,154

Expenses:

Amount Requested $ 345.19

Amount Previously Distributed $ 258.00

Amount Outstanding $ 87.19

Amount Disallowed 0.00

Total Awarded $ 87.19

TOTAL AWARD $6,462.19

GROSS & SKLAR

The Philadelphia firm of Gross & Sklar was counsel of record on the complaint of The Pengad Companies, Inc., filed in this district in September 1977.74 Two attorneys and one legal assistant expended a total of 924.5 hours on the case. The firm requests an award of $274,592.81 in attorneys’ fees (including an across the board multiplier of 2.25) and $20,694.17 in expenses.

Gross & Sklar was represented on the Executive Committee. and the Compliance with Defendants’ Discovery Subcommittee. In the early stages of the litigation, the firm was involved in the MDL proceedings and in the effort to impound Grand Jury documents. The firm was assigned responsibility for the discovery of defendant St. Regis Paper Co.75 It also participated in the discovery of defendants Hammermill Paper Co. and Mead Corp.

For the first six months of its involvement in the litigation, Gross & Sklar has submitted time records that do not contain any written description of the work done. The entries are grouped under general categories of legal services (e.g., “Pleadings”, “Discovery”, “Court Appearances”, and “Legal Research & Briefs”). Standing alone, these categories do not lend themselves to a meaningful Lindy analysis. My review of the entries for these six months is guided by considerations discussed above in connection with the fee petition of Berger & Montague. I have not disallowed time for vagueness if I can find some basis elsewhere in the record for a determination that the work benefited the class.

I. Warren Rubin

(A) Hours Expended

Rubin devoted 575 hours to the litigation. He was a member of the Executive Committee and co-chairman (under chairman John Noel) of Plaintiffs’ Compliance with Defendants’ Discovery Subcommittee. His early contributions to the litigation included involvement in the MDL proceedings, opposition to defendants’ Rule 11 motions, and seeking the impoundment of Grand Jury documents. He also directed the discovery of St. Regis Paper Co. and participated in the discovery of Hammer-mill Paper Co. Rubin took the depositions of the president of St. Regis and a former chief executive officer of Hammermill. He *137 spent a good deal of time reviewing the documents produced by these defendants. The firm requests a fee of $156,709.68 for his time. I have determined that the following hours must be disallowed:

1. 34.75 hours for which I can find no basis for a determination of any benefit to the class. This figure includes 26.25 of the 69 hours logged from September 1977 through January 1978 which merely group the time entries under general categories of legal service and contain no written description of the work.

2. 10.5 hours for attendance at the pretrial conferences on 4/19/78, 6/14/78, 3/7/79, 9/10/79, 9/27/79 and 9/3/80. The class was adequately represented by co-lead counsel at these conferences.

3. 22 hours for attendance at Rule 37 Subcommittee meetings. Rubin was not a member of this subcommittee, and I will not permit him to charge the class for this time.

4. 2 hours for the 3/6/81 Executive Committee meeting. I cannot see any benefit to the class from such a meeting so many months after the final settlements.

5. 15.5 hours spent working on the fee petition.

With the disallowance of the above 84.75 hours, Rubin is left with 490.25 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

I find $100/hour to be a reasonable rate for Rubin’s efforts subject to modification in two areas. As explained in the Guidelines, his 19.5 hours spent on class certification discovery will be compensated at $50/hour.76 Rubin also spent 142.25 hours on tasks (e.g. reviewing defendants’ answers to interrogatories, preparing a cast of characters for St. Regis and reviewing documents produced by the defendants) that warrant compensation at the reduced rate of $50/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

328.5 hours X $100/hour = $32,850.00

161.75 hours X $ 50/hour = $ 8,087.50

(D) Multiplier

Rubin’s work was not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 167.25 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

II. Bernard Gross

(A) Hours Expended

This attorney worked on the motion for class certification and participated in the discovery of St. Regis Paper Co. and Hammermill Paper Co. The firm requests a total fee of $116,519.06 for 325.25 hours of work, but I have determined that a good deal of this time may not be charged to the class. My review of the records submitted for Gross reveals that the following hours must be disallowed:

1. 68.75 hours for which I can find no basis for a determination of any benefit to the class. This figure includes 32 of the 60.5 hours logged from October 1977 through February 1978 which merely group the time entries under general categories of legal service and contain no written description of the work. Most of the descriptions for the remaining hours are either illegible or indicate only that some type of correspondence or communication with another attorney took place.

2. 12 hours for attendance at the MDL proceedings. I have compensated Rubin for 13.25 hours in connection with this hearing. I will not permit both attorneys to charge the class for this time.

3. 91.25 hours spent reading and reviewing various status reports, pleadings, motions, *138 briefs, and settlement agreements. As explained in the Guidelines, there were too many attorneys involved in this litigation to permit all of them to charge the class for their “read and review” time. Since Gross was not a member of the Executive Committee, I have disallowed the time spent reviewing documents outside the firm’s area of responsibility.

4. 12.75 hours of preparation for and attendance at the pretrial conferences on 4/19/78, 6/14/78, 7/10/78, 12/19/78, 3/7/79, and 9/10/79. The class was adequately represented by co-lead counsel at these conferences.

5. 1.5 hours devoted to the fee petition.

With the disallowance of the above 186.25 hours, Gross is left with 139 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

To be consistent with hourly rates awarded other senior attorneys, I will compensate Gross at a rate of $100/hour subject to modification in one area. Gross spent a total of 24 hours reviewing documents produced by St. Regis Paper Co. Since this type of work does not warrant a higher rate, I will compensate the time at $50/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

115 hours X $100/hour = $11,500

24 hours X $ 50/hour = $ 1,200

(D) Multiplier

Gross’ work was not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 40 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

III. Paralegals

The firm requests compensation for 24.25 hours of paralegal time in July 1979, but provides absolutely no explanation of what type of work was done. In the absence of any basis for a determination of whether the work benefited the class, I must disallow this time.

IV. Expenses

The firm seeks reimbursement of $20,694.17 in expenses. It has already received 75% of the figure ($15,520). Because I have disallowed attorney time for the following activities, I also disallow the associated expenses:

1. $179.35 spent by Gross on April 7, 1978, two days before the first pretrial conference, for a “meeting with plaintiff’s counsel” at La Famiglia Restaurant in Philadelphia.

2. $224.95 in travel expenses by Rubin for attendance at two Rule 37 Subcommittee meetings.

3. $38.75 in expenses by Gross in connection with his attendance at the 6/13/78 pretrial conference.

4. $113 in travel expenses by Rubin for attendance at the 3/6/81 Executive Committee meeting.

Subtracting the above $556.05 from the amount of expenses still outstanding results in an award of $4,618.12.

V. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which Gross & Sklar is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Total Awarded Requested

Rubin 490.25 $50/100 $40,937.50 $48,756.25 $156,709.68

Gross 139 $50/100 $12,700.00 $14,700.00 $116,519.06

Paralegal - _$ 1.364.07

$274,592.81 $53,637.50 $63,456.25

*139 Expenses:

Amount Requested $20,694.17

Amount Already Distributed $15,520.00

Amount Outstanding $ 5,174.17

Amount Disallowed $ 556,05

Amount to be Distributed $ 4,618.12

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $63,456.25

Expenses $ 4.618.12

Final Award $68.074.37

JOHNSON, JOHNSON & EKLUND

Johnson, Johnson & Eklund, located in Gregory, South Dakota, entered this litigation in October 1977 as special assistant attorney general with the Cotchett firm to represent the State of South Dakota. Johnson, Johnson & Eklund did the local work in South Dakota, and the Cotchett firm handled matters outside the state. As discussed in the section on the Cotchett firm, it was agreed that no attorneys’ fees would be paid to the firms by the state. The firms agreed to seek their fees in a joint petition to the court should a fund for such fees become available.

Johnson, Johnson & Eklund’s involvement in Fine Paper was limited to conducting local discovery and locating and interviewing potential third party witnesses with knowledge of defendants’ pricing practices. The firm seeks an award of $47,-349.99 in fees and $3,705 in expenses.

(A) Hours Expended

The firm’s time records reveal that a total of 253.6 hours were devoted to this litigation.77 I find that the following reductions must be made from the firm’s fee request:

1. 152.1 hours were spent corresponding with other counsel in the litigation and reading various pleadings, motions, briefs, and memoranda. The time records contain repeated entries such as “Letter from Joe”; “Letter to Joe”; “Letter from Susan 111-ston”; “Letter from Specks”. It is apparent from the great number of these entries and from the time spent reviewing the work of others, that Charles Johnson was keeping himself informed on the progress of the litigation outside South Dakota. This time was more of a benefit to Johnson than it was to the class. The class objectors do not want this firm to be awarded any fee at all. However, since Johnson was aware of what was going on outside South Dakota, he undoubtedly geared his substantive efforts (e.g. local discovery, locating and interviewing witnesses) to assisting the national litigation. For this reason, I will not disallow all of Johnson’s time. Nevertheless, I find the 152.1 hours devoted to correspondence and “read and review” to be excessive in view of the firm’s limited role in the litigation. Accordingly, only half of this time (76.05 hours) will be compensated.

2. 49.5 hours must be disallowed for three trips made by Johnson to meet with Joseph Cotchett. In February 1979 Johnson went to San Francisco to discuss class certification. In January 1980 he went to Las Vegas to confer with Cotchett on “Deps. and motions”.78 In July 1980, Johnson went to San Mateo for a meeting “on settlement and trial preparation”. In view of the constant communication by telephone and letter between the Cotchett and Johnson *140 firms, it is difficult to see the necessity of these trips. The firm’s response to the report of the class objectors insists that the firm “worked only on matters local to South Dakota”, leaving matters outside the state to the Cotchett firm. Response of Johnson, Johnson & Eklund, Docket No. 3610, filed 11/16/81 at 3. I can find no justification for these trips on the record before me.

3. .5 hours must be disallowed since the time was devoted to preparation of material for the joint fee petition.

With the disallowance of the above 126.05 hours, the Johnson firm is left with 127.55 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

The firm requests an hourly rate of $75 for the time of Charles Johnson and Wally Eklund and $50 for Gary Davis. My analysis of the firm’s time records indicates that this firm played a very limited role in the litigation. General discovery and interviewing potential third party witnesses is not the type of work that justifies partner-level compensation. Accordingly, I will award an hourly rate of $50.

(C) Total Lodestar

127.55 hours X $50/hour = $6377.50

(D) Multiplier

The firm’s efforts were not of such an unusually high caliber to-warrant a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 80.5 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements in January 1979.

(E) Expenses

The firm requests reimbursement for $3705 in expenses. It has already received 75% of this figure ($2,778). Apart from notations made on the monthly time summaries, the firm has provided no documentation to support its expenses. Pretrial Order No. 143 required that all expenses and costs be accompanied by copies of the original supporting documentation. Johnson, Johnson & Eklund has not supplied the court with any documentation. Accordingly, the firm will not be reimbursed for any expenses, and the $2,778 already disbursed will be subtracted from the award for fees.

(F) Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Johnson firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Johnson 79 127.55 $50 $6,377.50 $8,390.00 $47,349.99

Expenses

Amount Requested Amount Previously Distributed $3,705 $2.778

Amount Outstanding $ 927

Amount Disallowed $3,705

Amount to be returned to the class $2,778

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $8,390.00

Less: amount of previously awarded expenses to be returned to the class $2,778.00

Final Award $5,612.00

*141 KLEINMAN, STEINBERG & LAPUK

The firm of Kleinman, Steinberg & Lapuk (formerly Kleinman, O’Neill, Steinberg & Lapuk), located in Hartford, Connecticut, devoted 770.72 hours to this litigation.80 It was retained in June 1977 as special counsel for the State of Connecticut on the latter’s fine paper complaint.81 The firm also served as local counsel on the two other complaints filed in Connecticut in 1977. Four attorneys (514.6 hours) and- three summer law clerks (256.12 hours) ask for an award of $147,185.97 in fees and $24,564.74 in expenses. The firm’s fee request includes a multiplier of 3 applied to the time of each attorney and law student.

The Kleinman firm was represented on the Executive Committee, the Industrial Analysis Committee, and the discovery subcommittee for defendant Champion International.82 In addition, the firm represented Connecticut when the State of New York appealed this court’s overruling of New York’s objections to the initial settlements.83

Class objectors recommend that this firm not be awarded any fees because its computer records are not specific enough to permit an analysis of whether the time benefited the class. Class Objectors’ Report at 318. As discussed above in connection with the fee request of Berger & Montague, I have taken the limitations of computerized timekeeping systems into consideration in my review of such records.84 Nevertheless, certain entries here are so vague that the information elsewhere in the fee petition, in the firm’s response to the class objectors, and in other documents on the record sheds absolutely no light on the substance of the work done. A total of 146 of the 514.6 attorney hours are supported by computer entries which reveal no more than that a telephone conversation or a conference took place followed by the name of another attorney. In view of the Kleinman firm’s limited role in the litigation and the absence of any explanation of the subject matter of these hours, I will not permit the firm to charge the class for all of this time. Accordingly, I am disallowing half of this time as both excessive and too vague to be compensable even for computer records.

I. Norris O’Neill

Norris O’Neill represented Connecticut in this litigation from the beginning of its involvement until May, 1978, when he withdrew his appearance in anticipation of becoming a judge of the Connecticut Superior Court. During this time, he handled all Fine Paper matters involving the Kleinman firm. O’Neill was a member of the Executive Committee, one of the four co-chairmen (under chairman Joseph Cotchett) of the Industrial Analysis Committee, and a co-chairman of the discovery subcommittee assigned to Champion International. He devoted 173.23 hours to the case and requests an award of $44,174.49.

(A) Hours Expended

Although many of the computer entries for O’Neill are rather vague, I have determined that a good deal of the time is compensable. Since O’Neill was on the Executive Committee, he will be compensated *142 for time spent reviewing pleadings, motions, and memoranda. Members of that committee had to keep abreast of all aspects of the litigation. Since Connecticut’s complaint was one of the earliest filed, O’Neill will be compensated for time spent on early factual investigation and legal research. I have concluded, however, that the 69.68 hours (40.2% of O’Neill’s time) supported by entries such as “PH Conf w/other atty” or “Conf w/client” are too vague and too numerous to warrant full compensation. Disallowing half of this time (34.84 hours) leaves O’Neill with a total of 138.39 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

The firm asks for an hourly rate of $85 for O’Neill’s time. I find this to be a reasonable request subject to adjustment in two areas. As stated in the Guidelines, time spent on class certification discovery will be compensated at $50/hour. O’Neill spent 7.18 hours on such matters. Furthermore, my review indicates that 3.29 hours were devoted to tasks (e.g. “attendance at clerk’s office”, “service of process”) that must be compensated at a reduced rate of $50/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

127.92 hours X $85/hour = $10,873.20

10.47 hours X $50/hour = $ 523.50

(D) Multiplier

O’Neill’s contributions were not of such an unusually high degree of skill to warrant a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to all of his time since it was all expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

II. Marvin Lapuk

When Norris O’Neill assumed his judicial duties, Marvin Lapuk took over as the firm’s principal participant in the litigation. He succeeded O’Neill on the Executive Committee and the discovery subcommittee for Champion International. Lapuk’s total requested fee is $41,326.74.

(A) Hours Expended

Lapuk devoted 177.32 hours to the case. Since he took over O’Neill’s position of responsibility on the Executive Committee in May, 1978, Lapuk will be compensated for his “read and review” time after that date. Lapuk went to several pretrial conferences, some of which coincided with meetings of the Executive Committee. He will be compensated for the time spent in the Executive Committee conferences but not for his “attendance at court” (computer entry to describe the pretrial conferences in this litigation). The class was sufficiently represented by co-lead counsel on these occasions. Travel time for these pretrial conferences will only be compensated if Lapuk was going to an Executive Committee meeting as well. With these considerations in mind, I have disallowed the following hours:

1. 9.25 hours for “attendance” at and, where appropriate, travel to the pretrial conferences of 4/19/78, 6/14/78, and 3/7/79. The class was adequately represented by co-lead counsel at these conferences.

2. 17.01 hours devoted to Industrial Analysis Committee work. As explained in the Guidelines, I have determined that the work of this committee did not benefit the class.

3. 47.93 hours (27% of Lapuk’s time) are supported by computer entries such as “PH Conf w/other atty” or “PH Conf w/client”, which I find to be too numerous and too vague to warrant full compensation. Accordingly, one-half (23.96 hours) will be disallowed.

With the disallowance of the above 50.22 hours, Lapuk is left with 127.1 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

The firm seeks an hourly rate of $75-$85 for Lapuk’s time. I find $85/hour to be a reasonable request subject to adjustment in two areas. Two hours spent on class certification discovery (e.g. deposition of the client) will be compensated at $50/hour as explained in the Guidelines. Furthermore, *143 16 hours devoted to review of Champion documents will also be compensated at $50/hour since the nature of this work does not justify a higher rate.

(C) Total Lodestar

109.1 hours X $85/hour = $9,273.50

18 hours X $50/hour = $ 900.00

(D) Multiplier

Lapuk’s efforts were not of such an unusually high degree of skill to warrant a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 65.99 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

III. Daniel Kleinman

(A) Hours Expended

Work on class certification discovery of the firm’s client accounts for more than half of this attorney’s 25.42 hours. With a proposed multiplier of 3, Kleinman’s total requested fee is $4,575.

I will only disallow time for those hours supported by computer entries such as “PM Conf w/other atty” which I find to be too numerous and too vague to warrant full compensation. Kleinman has a total of 7.34 hours (28.9% of his time) supported by such entries. Disallowing half (3.67 hours) leaves Kleinman with 21.75 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

The firm seeks an hourly rate of $60 for Kleinman’s time. I find this to be a reasonable request subject to reduction to $50, as explained in the Guidelines, for the 13 hours devoted to class certification discovery.

(C) Total Lodestar

8.75 hours X $60/hour = $525

13 hours X $50/hour = $650

(D) Multiplier

The work done by Kleinman was not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. All of his time was logged before January, 1979, so I will apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to all 21.75 compensable hours.

IV. Donald Holtman

This attorney got involved in Fine Paper in mid-1979. He did some work on Champion International discovery, but his major contribution to the litigation was handling the appeal taken by the State of New York from the overruling of its objections to the initial settlements. Holtman briefed and argued the case to the Third Circuit on behalf of Connecticut and in support of the settlements. The Kleinman firm requests a fee of $31,207.50 for his efforts.

(A) Hours Expended

Holtman devoted 138.7 hours to this litigation. I have determined that the following time must be disallowed:

1. 21.05 hours (15.2% of his time) are supported by computer entries such as “PH Conf w/atty” followed by a name. As explained above, I find that these entries are too numerous and too vague to warrant full compensation. Half of this time (10.52 hours) will be disallowed.

2. 6 hours spent at the 12/20/79 Discovery Committee meeting. Marvin Lapuk also attended this meeting and has charged the class for 6 hours. I cannot see the benefit to the class of having both attorneys attend the meeting. The firm will only receive compensation for one attorney’s time.

3. 1.5 hours for “attendance” at the 9/3/80 pretrial conference. There was an Executive Committee meeting that day which Holtman attended in Lapuk’s place. He will be compensated for the time at the Executive Committee meeting but not for attending the pretrial conference.

After disallowing the above 18.02 hours, Holtman is left with 120.68 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

The firm requests an hourly rate of $75 for Holtman’s work. I find this to be reasonable.

*144 (C) Total Lodestar

120.68 hours X $75/hour = $9,051

(D) Multiplier

Since Holtman’s efforts were not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier, and since all of his time was expended after the initial settlements had eliminated any contingency, I will not award any multiplier.

V. Law Clerks

The firm employed three law students as summer clerks who spent a total of 256.12 hours on Fine Paper matters. I find that this time is compensable at $25/hour. No multiplier is applied to law student time.

VI. Expenses

The firm requests reimbursement for $24,564.74 in expenses. It has already received 75% of this figure ($18,423). I have determined that all but certain travel expenses may be reimbursed by the class. All the disallowed expenses relate to trips for which attorneys’ fees have been disallowed. The firm has not requested reimbursement for all travel expenses and I have not disallowed any expenses for travel when the attorney was also going to attend an Executive Committee meeting. With these considerations in mind, I have disallowed the following expenses:

1. $263.73 for travel by Marvin Lapuk to the 8/11/78 Industrial Analysis Committee meeting.

2. $164.46 for travel by Lapuk to the 4/19/78 pretrial conference.

3. $155.20 for travel by one attorney to the 12/20/79 Discovery Committee meeting. Both Lapuk and Holtman attended this meeting. I will not permit both to charge the class for their expenses.

VII. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Kleinman firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

O’Neill 138.39 $50/85 $11,396.70 $17,095.05 $ 44,174.49

Lapuk 127.1 $50/85 $10,173.50 $12,943.08 $ 41,326.74

Kleinman 21.75 $50/60 $ 1,175.00 $ 1,762.50 $ 4,575.00

Holtman 120.68 $75 $ 9,051.00 $ 9,051.00 $ 31,207.50

Law Students 256.12 $25 $ 6.403.00 $ 6.403.00 $ 25.902.24

TOTAL $38,199.20 $47,254.63 $147,185.97

Expenses:

Amount Requested $24,564.74

Amount Previously Distributed $18.423.00

Amount Outstanding $ 6,141.74

Amount Disallowed $ 583.39

Amount to be Distributed $ 5,558.35

Total Award:

Attorneys’ Fees $47,254.63

Expenses $ 5.558.35

$52,812.98

*145 KOHN, SAVETT, MARION & GRAF

The Kohn firm entered this litigation in November 1977 by filing a complaint in the Southern District of New York on behalf of Magazine Management Co. (hereinafter “MM”).85 Harold Kohn, the senior partner of the firm, served as co-lead counsel, co-chairman of the Executive Committee, chairman of the Briefing Committee, and was designated as Senior Trial Spokesman. The firm had joint responsibility with Specks & Goldberg for the discovery of defendant International Paper Co. Members of the firm, in particular Kohn and his associate Dianne Nast, were involved in nearly every major aspect of the case. The fee petition divides the litigation into three phases and requests multipliers of 2 to 3 for attorney time in Phase I (pre-January 1979), 1.5 to 2.5 for Phase II (January 1979 to January 1980), and 1.25 to 2 for Phase III (post-January 1980). With the application of these multipliers, the firm’s total fee request comes to $1,914,287 for 9,777.75 hours of work. The firm also seeks reimbursement of $124,625.07 in expenses.

Although no one disputes the many important contributions made by the Kohn firm to this litigation, both the class objectors and several of Kohn’s fellow plaintiffs’ counsel have raised questions about the hours, rates and multipliers in the firm’s petition.86 Some of these objections will be discussed before proceeding with the Lindy analysis of the fee petition.

An objection is made to the firm’s billing the class for the attendance of associates at certain arguments, conferences and depositions. Dianne Nast was Kohn’s primary associate in this case and attended most arguments and conferences with him. Moreover, the firm sent either Nast, Jay Cohen, Robert LaRocca or Elkan Katz to attend discovery committee meetings and monitor several depositions that were thought to be important.

It is a truism that cases of this nature are too big to be handled by one attorney. On the other hand, this case is an unfortunate example of what can happen when the “litigation by committee” system is not tightly controlled. In my judgment, Kohn’s use of associates to assist him in keeping abreast of all aspects of the litigation was an efficient way to carry out his responsibilities as co-lead counsel. The class is best served when lead counsel are as well informed and prepared as possible.87 These associates will, of course, be compensated at the appropriate associate-level rate, but it is my determination that this time was beneficial to the class.

A second objection is made to the so-called “unauthorized damage study” undertaken at Kohn’s direction by members of the Kohn and Berger firms.88 There seems to be no dispute that as of the end of July, 1980, the plaintiffs had essentially no case to present on damages. Kohn is accused of proceeding “in direct violation of specific instructions by Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee not to undertake a pricing study.” Preliminary Statement of Certain Plaintiffs in Support of Objections to the Petition of Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, filed 6/5/81, Docket Entry No. 3411, at 11 (hereinafter “Preliminary Statement”). The Kohn firm claims some 275 hours for this work.

*146 A third objection involves trial preparation. Although my treatment of the time spent on the pretrial memorandum (see the Guidelines) will apply equally to the Kohn firm, the problem of duplicative trial preparation extended beyond the work done on that document. In the final months before the scheduled trial, a schism developed between Kohn and Specks over control of the case. It was nothing more than an out-and-out power struggle that began with name calling89 and ended with the establishment of separate camps (rival trial headquarters) in Philadelphia in anticipation of the trial. The Kohn contingent prepared for trial at the Adler, Barish office; the Specks group worked from the Barrack office.

The class objectors recommend that the court “make an adjustment for the admittedly duplicative time spent in the pretrial period for two sets of attorneys simultaneously engaged in the same preparation for the same trial.” Class Objectors’ Report at 177.

I will deal with the Specks camp in due course. As for the Kohn camp, I begin by recognizing that not only was Kohn co-lead counsel, but he was designated as Senior Trial Spokesman for the class. If anyone had the ultimate responsibility to make final preparations for trial, it was Kohn. Therefore, I will not disallow any damage study or trial preparation time (apart from work on the pretrial memorandum) for Kohn’s firm. Nevertheless, there was clear duplication of effort and I will not permit the class to be saddled with the additional costs generated by the discord among their lawyers.

It is my considered judgment that rather than involve the court in the nearly impossible and somewhat arbitrary process of resolving counsel’s battles over who authored the disqualification brief (Kohn firm or Sachnoff firm) or whose damage study was of greater benefit to the class (Specks-Sloan or Kohn-Berger) or which camp should have been the one to prepare for trial in Philadelphia (Specks or Kohn), the interests of the class will be as well served by simply denying a multiplier for quality. Accordingly, as discussed below, despite its considerable contributions to the class effort, the Kohn firm will receive no multiplier for quality.

With these considerations in mind, I now proceed with the Lindy analysis of the Kohn firm’s fee petition.

I. Harold Kohn

As co-lead counsel, Kohn was heavily involved in all aspects of the action except discovery.90 He made major contributions in the areas of settlement negotiations, briefing and appellate work. He was gen *147 erally the spokesman for the class at conferences and arguments and would have been Senior Trial Spokesman had the case gone to trial. With the application of the requested multipliers of 3, 2.5 and 2 for the three phases described above, Kohn’s total fee award would be $1,006,682 for 1649.75 hours of work.

(A) Hours Expended

I have determined that the following hours must be disallowed:

1. 38.5 hours supported by entries too vague to permit a determination of whether the time benefited the class. Much of this time is merely reported as “51”, the firm’s time code for “pleadings and briefs”. Other entries indicate only that a meeting or telephone conversation took place without any description of the subject discussed.

2. 120.5 hours were spent working on the final pretrial memorandum. As explained in the Guidelines, only half of this time will be compensated in view of the excessive total number of hours claimed for work on this document by all the attorneys involved. Accordingly, Kohn will be compensated for 60.25 hours.

With the disallowance of the above 98.75 hours, Kohn is left with 1551 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

Kohn requests an hourly rate of $250 for the time expended before January 1981 and $270/hour for the remainder of his time. As explained above, I have determined that $150/hour is a fair and reasonable rate for lead counsel to charge the class in this case.

(C) Total Lodestar

1551 hours X $150/hour = $232,650

(D) Multiplier

Kohn’s efforts on behalf of the class were often quite impressive. If any attorney for the class displayed the unusually high degree of skill that Lindy II requires for the award of a quality multiplier, it was Kohn. Certainly he has been awarded generous multipliers in other cases. Nevertheless, Lindy II also teaches that a quality multiplier “may be considered in the nature of a bonus or penalty. The heavy burden of proving entitlement to such an adjustment is on the moving party.” Lindy II at 118. Although there' is sufficient support in the record for rewarding Kohn for efficient use of his own time and that of his associates in carrying out the firm’s many responsibilities, I am not persuaded that any participant in plaintiffs’ top-heavy organizational structure deserves a bonus.91

I recognize that Kohn’s objections helped bring into focus the enormous excesses of this case and I commend his integrity. On the other hand, I cannot overlook the internal power struggle that generated needless duplication of work and a deplorable breakdown in communications in the final weeks before trial. Kohn must share some of the responsibility for that state of affairs. Accordingly, although I will apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to his 443.5 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements, I will not award any quality multiplier to Kohn’s lodestar.

II. Dianne Nast

(A) Hours Expended

As Kohn’s principal associate in this case, Dianne Nast had extensive involvement in nearly every area of the litigation. She participated in the research and drafting of briefs, orders, and class notices, assisted Kohn at settlement conferences, pretrial conferences and oral arguments, monitored a number of depositions, and worked on trial preparation, damage study, and settlement administration matters. With the application of the requested multipliers of 2.5, 2, and 1.5 for the three phases described above, Nast’s total fee award would be $570,916 for 3526.25 hours of work. I have determined that the following hours must be disallowed:

*148 1. 30.5 hours supported by entries too vague to permit a determination of whether the time benefited the class. The great bulk of this time is described only as telephone calls or correspondence without any further indication of the substance of the matters discussed.

2. 68.5 hours were spent working on the final pretrial memorandum. As explained in the Guidelines, only half of this time will be compensated in view of the excessive total number of hours claimed for work on this document by all the attorneys involved. Accordingly, Nast will be compensated for 34.25 hours.

3. 12.25 hours spent traveling to and attending the Executive Committee meeting on 3/6/81. I can see no benefit to the class from such a meeting so long after the final settlements were reached. Nast’s expense records for this time indicate that the subject of the meeting was the filing of fee petitions.

With the disallowance of the above 77 hours, Nast is left with 3449.25 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

As Kohn’s associate, Nast will be compensated at an hourly rate of $50 subject to modification in one area. She spent 55.5 hours working on such settlement administration matters as answering inquiries and handling telephone calls from class members pertaining to the class notice. This non-legal work will be compensated at $25/hour.92

(C) Total Lodestar

3393.75 hours X $50/hour = $169,687.50

55.5 hours X $25/hour = $ 1,387.50

(D) Multiplier

Although Nast’s involvement in the case was extensive and her efforts on behalf of the class quite commendable, she did not have a position of leadership and acted primarily as Kohn’s assistant. This type of work does not merit the application of a quality multiplier since it does not rise to the unusually high degree of skill required by Lindy II. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 1111.25 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

III. Jay Cohen

(A) Hours Expended

This associate did most of his work on discovery-related matters. He summarized depositions and discovery responses, analyzed International Paper Co. documents and prepared a cast of characters for that defendant. In addition, Cohen worked on briefing, trial preparation, damage study, and settlement administration matters. With the application of the requested multipliers of 2,1.5, and 1.25 for the three phases described above, Cohen’s total fee award would be $151,414 for 1908 hours of work. I have determined that the following hours must be disallowed:

1. 9.5 hours supported by entries too vague to permit a determination of whether the time benefited the class.

2. 4 hours for attendance at the pretrial conferences on 6/14/78 and 3/7/79. I have compensated Kohn for the second conference and Nast for both. I will not permit Cohen to charge his time to the class as well.

3. 82 hours were spent working on the final pretrial memorandum. As explained in the Guidelines, only half of this time will be compensated in view of the excessive total number of hours claimed for work on this document by all the attorneys involved. Accordingly, Cohen will be compensated for 41 hours.

With the disallowance of the above 54.5 hours, Cohen is left with 1853.5 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

Cohen will be compensated at the associate rate of $50/hour subject to modification *149 in one area. His 285.5 hours spent on such settlement administration matters as responding to inquiries from class members will be compensated at $25/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

1568 hours X $50/hour = $78,400.00

285.5 hours X $25/hour = $ 7,137.50

(D) Multiplier

Cohen’s work was not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 239.75 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

IV. Robert LaRocca

(A) Hours Expended

LaRocca devoted most of his time to briefing motions and to work on plaintiffs’ case in opposition to the appeal of the denial of Kimberly-Clark’s motion to disqualify certain class counsel. With the application of the requested multipliers of 2, 1.5, and 1.25 to the three phases described above, LaRocca’s total fee award would be $79,598 for 884.25 hours of work. I have determined that all of this time is compensable except for the 8.75 hours charged for attendance at the pretrial conferences on 4/19/79 and 6/5/79. I have compensated both Kohn and Nast for these conferences and will not permit LaRocca to charge the class for this time. LaRocca is thus left with 875.5 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

LaRocca will be compensated at the associate rate of $50/hour subject to modification in one area. His 19.75 hours devoted to such settlement administration matters as handling inquiries from class members will be compensated at $25/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

855.75 hours X $50/hour = $42,787.50

19.75 hours X $25/hour = $ 493.75

(D) Multiplier

LaRocca’s efforts were not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 46.75 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

V. Elkan Katz

(A) Hours Expended

Katz had discovery-related responsibilities similar to those of Jay Cohen. He summarized depositions, prepared a digest of defendants’ interrogatory responses, and reviewed International Paper Co. documents. He also was involved in trial preparation, damage study, and settlement administration work. With the application of the requested multipliers of 2, 1.5, and 1.25 for the three phases described above, Katz’ total fee award would be $61,736 for 744.75 hours of work. I have determined that all of this time is' compensable except 4.25 hours which are supported by entries too vague to permit an analysis of whether the time benefited the class. These entries either indicate that a telephone call took place without further elaboration or contain no description of how the time was spent. Katz is thus left with 740.5 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

Katz will be compensated at the associate rate of $50/hour subject to modification in one area. His 31.75 hours devoted to such settlement administration matters as handling inquiries for class members and maintaining a class list will be compensated at $25/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

708.75 hours X $50/hour = $35,437.50

31.75 hours X $25/hour = $ 793.75

(D) Multiplier

Katz’ work was not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to his 194.75 compensable *150 hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

VI. Steven Raab

(A) Hours Expended

This attorney worked on settlement administration for six weeks in the summer of 1979. He sent out letters to class members and handled inquiries regarding the early settlements and the submission of claims. With the application of the requested multiplier of 1.5, Raab’s total fee award would be $15,189 for 225 hours of work. I have determined that all of his time is compensable.

(B) Hourly Rate

The type of work done by Raab does not warrant the $45 hourly rate requested by the firm. It was essentially non-legal — indeed, often clerical — in nature and will be compensated at a rate of $25/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

225 hours X $25/hour = $5625

(D) Multiplier

No multiplier will be applied to Raab’s time since it was not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier and was all logged after the end of the first wave of settlements.

VII. Other Attorneys

The firm seeks compensation for the time of eleven other attorneys, none of whom worked more than 21 hours on the case.93 The total number of hours claimed for these attorneys is 106.25 and would result in a total award of $17,598 for their time.

I have determined that:

1. All the time for Marion, Swift, Savett, Weinberg, Klein, Weinstein, and Roda must be disallowed. Most of this time indicates only participation in early meetings to discuss the case. Many hours are not described at all. Others indicate only file review or telephone calls. A total of 53.25 hours is disallowed.

2. Of the four remaining attorneys, I will compensate the 13 hours Graf spent on document review, the 11 hours Thomas spent on the case in New York before the MDL transfer to Philadelphia, the 7 hours Hausfeld spent traveling to and attending a discovery committee meeting, and the 8.5 hours Bazier spent attending and summarizing a deposition. The remaining 13.5 hours are disallowed for vagueness or duplicative attendance at conferences.

The 39.5 compensable hours will all be compensated at $50/hour. No quality multiplier is warranted, but a 1.5 contingency multiplier will be applied to the compensable time of Thomas and Hausfeld since it was logged before the end of the first wave of settlements.

VIII. Paralegal/Law Clerks

The firm used one paralegal and two law clerks during the litigation. It seeks an hourly rate of $15 for the 723.75 paralegal hours, $20/hour for one law clerk (5.75 hours) and $25/hour for the other (4 hours). I find this to be reasonable compensation.

IX. Expenses

The Kohn firm requests reimbursement of $124,625.07 in expenses. It has already received 75% of this figure ($93,468). Of the outstanding $31,157.07 I disallow only $410 in travel expenses for Dianne Nast’s attendance at the 3/6/81 Executive Committee meeting in Chicago. Attorneys’ fees have been disallowed for this meeting. I find the remainder of the firm’s expenses to be reasonable.

X. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Kohn firm is entitled under Lindy:

h

*151 Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Kohn 1551 $150 $232,650.00 $265,912.50 $1,006,682

Nast 3449.25 $25/50 $171,075.00 $198,856.25 $ 570,916

Cohen 1853.5 $25/50 $ 85,537.50 $ 91,531.25 $ 151,414

LaRocca 875.5 $25/50 $ 43,281.25 $ 44,450.00 $ 79,598

Katz 740.5 $25/50 $ 36,231.25 $ 41,100.00 $ 61,736

Raab 225 $25 $ 5,625.00 $ 5,625.00 $ 15,189

Graf 13 $50 $ 650.00 $ 650.00 $ 3,113

Thomas 11 $50 $ 550.00 $ 825.00 $ 2,646

Hausfeld 7 $50 $ 350.00 $ 525.00 *

Bazier 8.5 $50 $ 425.00 $ 425.00 *

Paralegal/ $15/20/

Law Clerks 733.5 25 $ 11,071.25 $ 11,071.25 11,154 **

Total 94 $587,446.25 $660,971.25 $1,914,287

EXPENSES:

Amount Requested $124,625.07

Amount Previously Distributed $ 93,468.00

Amount Outstanding $ 31,157.07

Amount Disallowed $ 410.00

Amount to be Distributed $ 30,747.07

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $660,971.25

Expenses $ 30,747.07

FINAL AWARD $691,718.32

LITMAN, LITMAN, HARRIS & SPECTER, P.A.

The Litman, Litman, Harris & Specter firm is located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The Litman firm became counsel for Copies Unlimited, Inc. on August 3,1977. Formerly, Gene Mesh had been co-counsel with the Litman firm in this litigation but Mesh dropped out of the case early and has not filed a fee petition with this court.

The firm seeks • compensation for 35.1 partner hours, 40.9 associate hours, and 31.6 paralegal hours. The total lodestar requested is $7,065 and with the application of the requested multiplier of 1.84 the total fee award sought is $12,999.60. In addition, the Litman firm seeks reimbursement for $3,529 in expenses. Litman’s involvement in the litigation consisted primarily of discovery of defendant Union Camp with some minor document review and preparation. On balance, the firm’s overall involvement in this litigation was very limited.

*152 I. Howard Specter

(A) Hours Expended

Specter is a partner in the firm. He asks to be compensated for 34.1 hours of work. Upon analysis of the time sheets submitted I find, however, that Specter can be compensated for only 5.9 hours as this is the only time which can reasonably be said to have benefited the class. I have determined that Specter should not be compensated for the following:

1. 13 hours spent in meetings with other counsel and at pretrial conferences. Specter was not chairman of any of the committees formed for this class action, and the firm’s discovery activities were limited to one company, Union Camp. The Litman firm had no leadership position, and its limited support role meant Specter’s attendance at pretrial conferences was neither necessary nor beneficial to the class. This is especially so since the firm’s discovery responsibilities were later turned over to the firm of Berger & Montague. Similarly, Specter’s meeting with Mr. Mesh, who dropped out of the case, cannot be compensated as this meeting was of no benefit to the class.

2. .4 hours Specter seeks as compensation for “other general matters” related to this litigation. The classification is too vague and inadequately documented to allow a determination of whether there was any benefit to the class.

3. 14.8 hours for review of documents and court activities not related to the firm’s discovery assignment will not be allowed as such work made an insignificant contribution to the creation and/or preservation of the fund. The Litman firm’s activities were limited to its client and the discovery of one paper company. The time spent on review of documents and court activities unrelated to the firm’s assigned task was unnecessary and duplicative in light of the number of other firms involved, the distribution of work, and the Berger & Montague firm’s later discovery of Union Camp. Furthermore, a number of time entries under this category are inadequately described.

The remaining 5.9 hours of compensation which Specter seeks for specific Union Camp discovery and initial industry review I will allow. The total number of hours for which Specter is not compensated is 28.2.

(B) Hourly Rate

Specter seeks an hourly rate of $100 for all work done prior to January 1, 1979 and an hourly rate of $125 for all work done since that date. Specter’s compensable time, however, involves those hours devoted to discovery of Union Camp and some initial review concerning the paper industry as a whole. Although this type of work need not have been performed by a senior partner, an hourly rate of $100 would not be unreasonable.

(C) Total Lodestar

5.9 hours X $100/hour = $590

(D) Multiplier

No positive quality multiplier will be applied to Specter’s Lodestar. As noted, the discovery work and review performed by Specter were of the routine variety. I find no diseernable demonstration of exceptional quality from Specter’s performance and completion of these tasks. However, a contingency factor of 1.5 will be applied to all of Specter’s compensable hours since they were expended prior to the January 1979 settlements.

II. Michael Buchwach

(A) Hours Expended

Buchwach is an associate. The firm seeks compensation for 39.9 hours of his time. Upon analysis of the time sheets submitted, I find, however, that only 27.2 hours are compensable. Buchwach will not be compensated for the following hours:

1. 6.3 hours for “other general matters” related to this litigation are too vague. This classification is inadequately documented and renders impossible a determination of benefit to the class.

2. 6.4 hours for preparation and review of pleadings, motions, briefs, and memos will *153 not be allowed as such work made no contribution to the creation or preservation of the fund.

The remaining 27.2 hours Buchwach spent in review of Union Camp discovery documents or in attendance at the Chicago discovery meeting I will allow.

(B) Hourly Rate

The hourly rate at which Buchwach is to be compensated is $50. This hourly rate reflects reasonable compensation measured both objectively and by what the Litman firm was charging for its attorneys’ services during the time in question.

(C) Total Lodestar

27.2 hours X $50/hour = $1,360

(D) Multiplier

No positive quality multiplier will be applied to Buchwach’s lodestar for the same reasons no increment was added to Specter’s lodestar. For the reasons stated earlier, a contingency multiplier of 1.5 will be applied to the .3 hours of Buchwach’s compensable time spent prior to the January 1979 settlements.

III. Irving Portnoy and M. Beth Troiano

Portnoy is a partner in the firm and Troiano was an associate with the firm during the relevant time period. Both attorneys seek to be compensated for one hour of work each. I find there can be no compensation for the work either of the two attorneys performed in this litigation. The time is disallowed as follows:

1. The one hour of work expended by Portnoy was allocated to document review and preparation. The time involved 60 minutes of conversation with the client. It is difficult to discern any real benefit to the class from the time expended by Portnoy.

2. The one hour of work expended by Troiano was allocated to document review and preparation. The hour involved 10 minutes to prepare a notice of appearance and the remaining 50 minutes to locate Lockwood’s directory for Mr. Specter. On the face of it these activities lacked any real benefit to the class.

Accordingly, no compensation will be allowed for either attorney and it is unnecessary to analyze any hourly rate, compute a lodestar, or arrive at a multiplier figure.

IV. Paralegals

The Litman firm seeks compensation for 31.6 hours of paralegal time. I have determined the firm is entitled to be compensated for only 10 of these hours at $25 an hour for a total of $250. My review of the records indicates that this was the only time spent by the support staff working directly with Union Camp or Copies Unlimited documents. This is the only time which can reasonably be said to have benefited the class as an ancillary service to that work already compensated and accomplished by the attorneys of the Litman firm.

V. Expenses

The Litman firm lists total expenses of $3529. The firm has already received 75% of these expenses. I will award the firm the outstanding $883 since all the expenses appear to have been necessary and reasonable.

VI. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Litman firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Total Awarded Requested

Specter 5.9 $100 $ 590.00 $ 885.00 $ 6,407.80

Buchwach 27.2 $ 50 $1,360.00 $1,367.50 $ 4,871.40

Portnoy 0.0 0 0 0 $ 147.20

*154 Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Troiano 0.0 0 0 $ 119.60 0

Paralegals 10.0 $ 25 $ 250.00 $ 1,453.60 $ 250.00

TOTAL $2,502.50 $12,999.60 $2,200.00

Expenses:

Amount Requested $3,529.00

Amount Previously Distributed $2,646.00

Amount to be Distributed $ 883.00

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $2,502.50

Expenses $ 883.00

Final Award $3,385.50

MEAGHER, GEER, MARKHAM, ANDERSON, ADAMSON, FLASKAMP & BRENNAN

At the urging of Walter Riordan, this Minneapolis firm entered the Fine Paper case on April 20,1979 as counsel for Federated Insurance Company. See Perry Affidavit, Class Objectors’ E 527-28. It also entered its appearance on behalf of three other companies.

The firm claims that it devoted 62.5 partner hours, 133.5 associate hours and 37.75 paralegal hours to this litigation. The total fee requested is $24,972.50, based on hourly rates of $70 and $100 for a partner, $50 to $60 for associates and $40 for legal assistants with a multiplier of 1.75.

The firm’s contribution to the prosecution of this case was very limited. Indeed, as explained below, most of the firm’s time was of no benefit to the class. The lawyers and paralegals of the firm spent all of their time drafting complaints on behalf of their clients, communicating with their clients, reviewing their clients’ records to determine the amount of their purchases, reviewing documents on microfilm, and preparing an index.

At the time this firm entered the litigation there was already an abundance of attorneys, the class had been certified and thirty million dollars in settlements were in the bank. Both the class objectors and Kohn have urged that no fees be awarded to this firm, primarily because of their late entry into the case and since the “firm’s work was undertaken almost exclusively on behalf of its client....” Kohn Objections at ¶ 1.

I. William D. Flaskamp

Flaskamp, a partner of the firm, seeks reimbursement for 62.5 hours. After a careful review of the time records submitted, I have concluded that petitioner should not be awarded any compensation for his time. Nearly all his hours were devoted to meetings and communications with his clients and co-counsel, none of which time benefited the class. He did spend some minimal time doing research and reviewing pleadings, but this effort was plainly duplicative of the already enormous amount of research and review time expended by the numerous other attorneys in the case. Accordingly, no compensation will be awarded for Flaskamp’s time and it is therefore unnecessary to determine an hourly rate, compute a lodestar, or arrive at a multiplier figure for his time.

II. Donald C. Mark

This associate requests compensation for 5.25 hours spent in review of pleadings and documents, meetings with Flaskamp, and correspondence and conferences with clients. I fail to see any benefit to the class from these hours and, accordingly, no compensation will be awarded for Mark’s time. *155 It is therefore unnecessary to determine an hourly rate, compute a lodestar, or arrive at a multiplier figure for Mark’s time.

III. Douglas J. Muirhead

(A) Hours Expended

The firm requests compensation for 45.5 hours of this associate’s time spent reviewing defendants’ records on microfiche and preparing a report for “plaintiffs’ class action committee”. This appears reasonable and to have benefited the class. Accordingly, compensation will be allowed.

(B) Hourly Rate

The firm requests $50 per hour for Muir-head’s time. This appears reasonable.

(C) Total Lodestar

45.5 hours X $50/hour = $2,275

(D) Multiplier

For the reasons stated below, no multiplier will be awarded to Muirhead or any other member of the firm.

IV. David A. Larson

(A) Hours Expended

The firm requests compensation for 82.75 hours of this associate’s time. After careful review of the time records submitted, I find that all but the following hours are compensable:

1. 12.75 hours spent in preparation of the firm’s fee petition. Such time is not compensable.

2. 49.5 hours spent on various activities which were of no benefit to the class such as “file review,” “review of class action mailings,” meetings with and telephone calls and letters to clients, telephone calls to co-counsel regarding status of the case, and “review of new pleadings and correspondence.”

The remaining 20.5 hours spent reviewing microfiche of defendants’ records and responding to requests of plaintiffs’ co-lead counsel, appear to have benefited the class. The firm, therefore, will receive remuneration for this time.

(B) Hourly Rate

The firm requests $50 an hour for Larson’s time which I have found to be compensable. This rate appears reasonable and therefore will be awarded for Larson’s time.

(C) Total Lodestar

20.5 hours X $50/hour = $1,025

(D) Multiplier

For the reasons stated below, no multiplier will be awarded to Larson or any other member of the firm.

V. Paralegals

The firm seeks compensation for 37.75 hours of four paralegals spent organizing files, making library pickups and reviewing microfilm. All of these hours, with the exception of 5.75 hours devoted to fee petition preparation, appear reasonable and to have benefited the class. This time will be reimbursed at $25 per hour, however, not the $40 requested here. Thus, the total award for paralegal time is $800.

VI. Multiplier

The firm requests a multiplier of 1.75 to be applied to all of the firm’s time. This request is denied. The Meagher firm entered this litigation well after the $30 million dollar settlements were consummated and thus an award of a positive multiplier is not warranted on the basis of non-payment. Furthermore, the quality of the firm’s work was not of such superior or unusual quality as to merit an increment to the firm’s lodestar for quality. The firm had no leadership role and did no more than review documents. Therefore, no multiplier will be awarded to this firm.

VII. Expenses

The Meagher firm’s total expenses are $681.88. The firm has already received 75% of these expenses or $511. The firm’s total *156 expenses appear reasonable. Accordingly, I will award the firm the remainder of its expenses, the total of which is $170.88.

VIII. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Meagher firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Request

Flaskamp 0 0 0 0 $10,333.75

Mark 0 0 0 0 $ 551.25

Muirhead 45.5 $50 $2,275.00 $2,275.00 $ 3,981.25

Larson 20.5 $50 $1,025.00 $1,025.00 $ 7,463.75

Paralegals 32 $25 $ 800.00 $ 800.00 $ 2,642.50

$4,100.00 $4,100.00 $24,972.50

Expenses

Amount Requested $ 681.88

Amount Previously Distributed $ 511.00

Amount Outstanding $ 170.88

Amount Disallowed 0.00

Amount to be Distributed $ 170.88

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $4,100.00

Expenses $ 170.88

Final Award $4,270.88

MUCH, SHELIST, FREED, DENENBERG, AMENT & EIGER, P.C.

This Chicago law firm represented Merchandisers Association, Inc. and was also co-counsel with Sloan and Connelly and Wolf, Popper for David Weiss Wholesale Jewelers, Inc. and Peoria Supplies. None of the clients of the Much, Shelist firm filed a proof of claim.

The firm seeks reimbursement for 3,692.8 hours of attorney, law clerk and paralegal time devoted primarily to discovery of Great Northern Nekoosa (“GNN”). This effort involved examination of documents and twenty-four days of depositions of sixteen deponents. The firm also participated in the drafting of Rule 37 motions against GNN and one motion against multiple defendants. Two associates of the firm also spent a large amount of time just prior to the trial researching Canadian paper prices for an alternative damage theory. The total award requested, after the application of a multiplier of 2.5 for associates and 3.0 for partners, is $787,433.25 for attorney fees and $50,410.29 for expenses.

I. Lawrence H. Eiger

(A) Hours Expended

Eiger, a partner, requests compensation for 801.1 hours spent on this case. After careful consideration of Eiger’s daily time sheets, I have concluded that all but the following hours are compensable:

1. 7.1 hours spent preparing the fee petition.

2. 88.75 hours spent on the trial memorandum and final contentions appears excessive in light of the combined 4604.93 hours spent on these same tasks by all of the lawyers, including Eiger. Accordingly, I will reduce the 88.75 hours claimed by Eiger by one-half. Only 44.38 of these hours will be compensated by the Class.

3. 40.6 hours are described by such vague entries as “conferences” or “telephone *157 calls” with no description of the subject matter. The time will not be compensated since such entries are too ambiguous to permit a determination of precisely what was done, whether it was of benefit to the class, whether it was duplicative of work performed by others, or an appropriate hourly rate.

4. 7.5 hours were spent by Eiger at a meeting of plaintiffs’ Executive Committee on July 23, 1980 and to prepare deposition summonses. All of this time will not be compensated since Eiger was not a member of the Executive Committee and there was no benefit to the class from his attendance. Accordingly, Eiger will be compensated for 4.5 hours of this 7.5 hour entry.95

The total number of disallowed hours for Eiger therefore is 95.07, leaving 706.03 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

Eiger has requested compensation at the rate of $115 to $125. As was stated earlier, Eiger’s compensable time in this litigation was devoted almost exclusively to discovery of Great Northern Nekoosa. He reviewed that defendant’s documents and took several depositions. This task was performed in conjunction with members of the Wolf, Popper office and under the supervision of discovery chairmen, Specks, Saveri and Cotchett. In view of Eiger’s limited role, and in view of the multitude of lawyers representing the class, compensation of $100 per hour for all of Eiger’s partner-level time is fair and appropriate. However, based on the entries in his time records, 86.8 hours of Eiger’s time were spent on associate-level tasks such as reviewing and collating documents, doing legal research, summarizing depositions and organizing price work sheets. Only $50 per hour will be awarded for this associate-level work.

(C) Total Lodestar

86.8 hours X $ 50/hour = $ 4,340

619.23 hours X $100/hour = $61,923

(D) Multiplier

Eiger asks for a multiplier of 3 for his time. As explained below, no quality multiplier will be awarded any member of the firm. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to Eiger’s 47.9 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

II. Michael J. Freed

Freed, a partner of the firm, expended most of his hours during the early part of the case attending meetings and organizing and assigning discovery work. He claims a total of 112 hours. After a careful review of Freed’s daily time records, I have concluded that all but the following hours are compensable:

1. 3.3 hours spent in conversations with the firm’s client and on the preparation of a contingent fee agreement for the client. This effort did not benefit the class.

2. 9.5 hours spent prior to the February 3, 1978 formal organizational meeting of counsel on conversations and meetings with Specks and Sloan and other Chicago counsel concerning the organization of the case. This time did not benefit the class; rather, as discussed earlier in this memorandum, the record reveals that these meetings were used by counsel to line up votes or establish “power-blocks” to assure control over the course of the litigation. Accordingly, Freed will not be compensated for this time.

3. 3.3 hours spent at the February 3, 1978 organizational meeting. Freed’s partner, Lawrence Eiger, also attended this meeting and has received compensation for his attendance. Thus, Freed’s attendance at this meeting was superfluous, of no benefit to the class, and, therefore, not compensable.

4. 10 hours expended traveling to and attending the April 19, 1978 pretrial conference in Philadelphia. The essential purpose of this conference was to seek Court approval of the agreements made by plain *158 tiffs’ counsel at their organizational meeting on February 3, 1978. During the hearing, Messrs. Kohn and Specks were spokesmen for the private plaintiffs and, therefore, Freed’s attendance was unnecessary, duplicative, and of no benefit to the class.

A total of 26.1 hours, therefore, will be disallowed. The remaining 85.9 hours logged by Freed are compensable but, as explained below, only at associate rates.

(B) Hourly Rates

The firm asks for $100 to $125 per hour for Freed’s time. However, Freed spent most of his time in conferences or on the phone with other co-counsel reading and reviewing various pleadings and documents filed in the case, drafting a complaint for his client and attending depositions taken by others. In view of Freed’s minor role in this case, the number of lawyers involved in the case, and the tasks Freed performed, $50 per hour for his time is a fair and appropriate rate.

(C) Total Lodestar

85.9 hours X $50/hour = $4,295

(D) Multiplier

Freed asks for a multiplier of 3 for his time. As explained below, no quality multiplier will be awarded to any member of the firm. I. will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to Freed’s 62.7 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

III. Robert A. Skirnick96

(A) Hours Expended

Skirnick, a partner of the firm, requests compensation for 95.1 hours spent principally on document review, and research and drafting Rule 37 motions. After a careful review of Skirnick’s time records, I have concluded that all but the following hours are compensable:

1. 13 hours spent at the February 3, 1978 organizational meeting and at the March 1, 1979 discovery meeting will be disallowed. Michael Freed attended the discovery conference and Lawrence Eiger was present at the organizational meeting. Both men have been compensated for this time. Skirnick’s presence at these meetings was superfluous and of no benefit to the class.

2. 7.7 hours are described by such vague entries as “review of discovery material”, “conference with Freed”, or “telephone conference with Walner”. Such entries are too ambiguous to permit compensation since it cannot be determined whether this time was of any benefit to the class.

A total of 20.7 hours, therefore, will be disallowed from the total time claimed by Skirnick, leaving 74.4 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

The firm asks for $115 to $125 for Skirnick’s time. However, all of Skirnick’s work while at the Much, Shelist firm — document review, research and the drafting of motions — was of the type normally performed by an associate and therefore only $50 per hour will be awarded for Skirnick’s time.

(C) Total Lodestar

74.4 hours X $50/hour = $3,720

(D) Multiplier

Skirnick asks for a multiplier of 3 for his time. As explained below, no quality multiplier will be awarded to any member of the firm. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to Skirnick’s 57.4 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

IV. Anthony C. Valiulis

(A) Hours Expended

Valiulis, a partner in the firm since June 1,1979, requests compensation for 5.6 hours devoted to legal research and the drafting *159 of motions. I find this time compensable with the exception of 2.3 hours, which are described by such vague entries as “conference”, “telephone calls”, or “legal research”. These nebulous entries do not tell the Court whether the time they reflect benefited the class; accordingly, Valiulis will not be compensated for this time. The number of compensable hours therefore is 3.3 hours.

Since the tasks performed by Valiulis are normally performed by an associate, $50 per hour will be awarded for his time, not the requested $65 to $110 per hour. The total lodestar therefore is $165. No multiplier is sought for Valiulis’ time and none will be awarded.

V. Michael B. Hyman

(A) Hours Expended

Hyman, an associate of the firm, seeks compensation for 1261.5 hours he devoted to this litigation. After a careful review of Hyman’s daily records, I have concluded that all but the following hours are compensable:

1. 5.7 hours expended after the final settlements were consummated on the preparation of the firm’s fee petition and other matters which were of no benefit to the class.

2. 17.1 hours spent preparing for and attending a discovery committee meeting in Philadelphia on December 20, 1979 and on matters related thereto. This meeting was also attended by Eiger who has received compensation for his attendance, and thus Hyman’s time spent on this meeting was duplicative, of no benefit to the class, and therefore not compensable.

3. 10.5 hours spent by Hyman attending and travelling to Philadelphia on March 31, 1980 for Eiger’s argument to this Court regarding plaintiff’s Rule 37 motion against GNN. Hyman’s attendance was duplicative, unnecessary, and of no benefit to the Class.97

4. 26 hours are vaguely described as “telephone calls” or “meetings” without an indication of the other participants or the subject matter, or merely as “review and organize file” or “review correspondence and pleadings”. I cannot tell from these entries whether this time benefited the class and therefore no compensation will be allowed.

5. 88.45 of Hyman’s hours were spent preparing the plaintiffs’ trial memorandum and final contentions. This appears excessive in light of the combined 4604.93 hours spent on these same tasks by all of the lawyers, including Hyman. Accordingly, I will reduce the 88.45 hours claimed by Hyman by one-half. Only 44.23 of these hours will be compensated by the class.

The total number of Hyman’s hours which will be disallowed is 103.52, leaving 1157.98 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

Much, Shelist seeks $75 to $85 per hour for Hyman’s time. Hyman is a 1977 law school graduate. A review of his time records and the evidence presented at the firm’s evidentiary hearing indicates that he spent 350 hours reviewing documents, see N.T., 4/6/82 at 1918, and that the remaining hours were devoted to preparing partners for depositions, drafting motions, abstracting and indexing depositions and documents for use in the trial memorandum and final contentions, and working on Canadian Paper price materials immediately prior to trial.

The Class Objectors’ Report recommends that much of Hyman’s time be compensated at only $25 per hour since many of the tasks he performed could have been done by a paralegal. Lawrence Eiger, at his firm’s evidentiary hearing, countered this suggestion by stating that in view of the 140,000 GNN documents the firm reviewed, it was *160 more efficient to have Hyman and Stephen A. Kanner, another associate of the firm, review them since these two lawyers were more familiar with the case and had more knowledge of the antitrust laws and the discovery process than the paralegals employed by the firm. See N.T., 4/6/82 at 1914 — 1918. In view of this record, I will award an associate-level hourly rate for Hyman’s time, but not at the inflated figure requested by the firm. In view of Hyman’s limited contribution to this litigation and the vast number of lawyers involved in this case, $50 an hour is a fair and appropriate rate for Hyman’s work.

(C) Total Lodestar

1,157.98 hours X $50/hour = $57,899

(D) Multiplier

Much, Shelist requests a multiplier of 2.5 for Hyman’s time. As explained below, no quality multiplier will be awarded to any member of the firm. Moreover, since all Hyman’s time was logged after the first wave of settlements, I will not apply any contingency multiplier.

VI. Stephen A. Kanner

Kanner, an associate in the firm, seeks compensation for 819.2 hours he devoted to this litigation. After a careful review of Kanner’s daily records, I have concluded that all but the following hours are compensable:

1. 2.9 hours spent on preparation of the fee petition.

2. 30.82 hours spent reviewing unspecified documents, or having conferences where the participants’ names or the subject matter were not listed. These time entries are too vague to warrant compensation.

3. 105.95 hours spent preparing the plaintiff’s trial memorandum and final contentions. Most of this time was devoted to reviewing and abstracting documents or depositions. This large number of hours appears excessive in light of the combined 4604.93 hours spent on these tasks by all of the lawyers, including Kanner. Accordingly, I will reduce the 105.95 hours claimed by Kanner by one-half. Only 52.98 of these hours will be compensated by the class.

The total number of kanner’s hours which will be disallowed is 86.69, leaving 732.51 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

The firm requests $65 for Kanner’s time. Kanner graduated from law school in 1979 and began work on the Fine Paper case soon thereafter. His compensable hours were spent on basic discovery work, abstracting depositions, working on the Canadian Pricing Analysis,98 and reviewing price lists and other documents. Most of his efforts — abstracting, price document review and designátion of documents — were of the type normally assigned to a paralegal. Nonetheless, for the same reasons given with respect to Mr. Hyman’s time, I will award Kanner an associate level rate, but not the high rate requested by the firm. $50 an hour is a fair and appropriate rate for Kanner’s time.

*161 (C) Total Lodestar

732.51 hours X $50/hour = $36,625.50

(D) Multiplier

Much, Shelist requests a multiplier of 2.5 for Kanner’s time. As explained below, no quality multiplier will be awarded to any member of the firm. Moreover, since all Kanner’s time was logged after the first wave of settlements, I will not apply any contingency multiplier.

VII. Fred G. Yeager

The firm asks for compensation for 10.2 hours of Yeager’s time spent preparing a memorandum on his economic study of the paper industry pricing structure. I find this time reasonable and to have benefitted the class. Curiously, no resume of Yeager’s background and qualifications was submitted as required by Pretrial Order No. 143, even though the firm supplied this information with respect to other attorneys and paralegals. Yeager is merely described as “an attorney attending the University of Chicago School of Business”. Petition at 22. The petition states, however, that it “does not request any fees on behalf of the Firm for any lawyer who is not a partner, associate or employee of the Firm,” petition at 2, so I must assume that Yeager is an associate or an employee of the firm, rather than merely an outsider temporarily hired for a specific task.99 The firm asks $35 an hour for Yeager’s time, but no documentation is supplied which shows that this is Yeager’s historic or customary rate, as required by Pretrial Order No. 143. Because I am without the benefit of this information, and in view of the non-legal work done by Yeager, I will not award him the rate of $35 per hour as requested. Instead, he will be compensated at the paralegal rate of $25 per hour. Thus, Yeager’s total lodestar is $255. No multiplier has been requested for Yeager’s time and none will be awarded.

IX. Paralegals and Law Clerks

Much, Shelist asks for compensation for 478.1 paralegal hours and 88.6 law clerk hours for a total of 566.7 hours. I find all but the following hours reasonable and to have benefited the class:

1. 10.4 hours spent after the final settlements were consummated on administrative and “house-keeping” matters which were of no benefit to the class.

2. 15.9 hours are described by such vague entries as “telephone calls”, “conference with Eiger”, “prepare for meeting in Philadelphia”, and “research”. I cannot tell from these ambiguous entries whether the time benefited the class or was duplicative of the efforts of others. Accordingly, this time will be disallowed.

The total number of paralegal/law clerk hours which will be compensated therefore is 540.4, the number of disallowed hours being 26.3. Much, Shelist requests an hourly rate of $35 for all paralegals and law clerks. This request is denied. As stated earlier, $25 per hour will be awarded for all paralegals’ and law clerks’ time in the case. No multiplier for paralegals or law clerks is requested and none will be awarded. Accordingly, Much, Shelist will be awarded $13,510 for all paralegal time.

X. Quality Multiplier

The quality of the firm’s work was not unusually high. The firm was not one of the two co-chairmen, five co-lead counsel, six-man trial team, or even a member of the fourteen-member Executive Committee. It was responsible for discovery of one defendant, along with the Wolf, Popper firm. While the members of the firm performed this task competently, they did not exhibit an unusually superior degree of skill so as to warrant the award of a positive quality multiplier. Accordingly, given the firm’s support role and limited contribution to this *162 litigation, no multiplier is warranted for the quality of the firm’s work.

XI. Expenses

The Much, Shelist firm requests reimbursement for $50,410.29 in expenses. Seventy-five percent of this amount, or $37,807, has already been distributed to the firm. After carefully reviewing the two large volumes of expense vouchers submitted by the firm, I have concluded that the following expenses should not be reimbursed by the class:

1. $228 for airfare and $119.78 in travel expenses incurred by Hyman for traveling to and attending the Discovery Conference in Philadelphia with Eiger on December 20, 1979 for which attorney fees have been disallowed. I will also disallow one-half ($33.77) of Eiger’s bill of $67.54 for a meal at the Fish Market Restaurant in Philadelphia on December 19, 1978 on the assumption that Hyman joined Eiger at this meal.

2. $242 for airfare and $31.15 for travel expenses incurred by Hyman for traveling to and attending the March 31,1980 pretrial conferences with Eiger for which attorney fees have been disallowed.

3. $94.20 for flight insurance for Eiger. Eiger justifies these charges on the ground that he normally bills his other clients for this expense. N.T., 4/6/82 at 1956. However, I fail to see any benefit to the class from this insurance. Under the rule of Lindy, therefore, this is not a legitimate expense which should be reimbursed by the class.

4. In its petition, Much, Shelist requests reimbursement for payment of Stephen Kanner’s $30 American Express membership fee. The class objectors objected to any reimbursement for this cost in their report. In response, the Much, Shelist firm stated that this $30 expense was erroneously submitted in the petition and have asked that it be withdrawn. Accordingly, this $30 expense will be disallowed.

5. In its petition, the firm requested reimbursement of $1,772 for work done by a Chicago law firm on some corporate problems of Much, Shelist’s client, which were unrelated to Fine Paper. The class objectors have challenged any remuneration for this expense. In response, Much, Shelist again pleads “error” and withdraws its request for reimbursement. Accordingly, this “expense” will be disallowed.

6. $12.74 incurred by Skirnick for lunch with “Gig & Gary Specks” on April 19,1979 will be disallowed. Skirnick’s time records indicate he did not work on Fine Paper on that day nor does it appear that this luncheon was of any benefit to the class.

7. $162 for airfare, $58.30 for a meal and $50 in travel advance incurred by Freed for travel and attendance at a pretrial conference on April 19, 1978 for which attorney fees have been disallowed.

8. $100 for travel advance to Michael J. Freed on January 25, 1978. Freed’s time records indicate that on this day he had a meeting with Specks and Chicago attorneys regarding organization of the case. Freed has not been awarded any attorney fees for this time, and, accordingly, will not be reimbursed for this expense.

Finally, I wish to note that my examination of the firm’s request for reimbursement of expenses has been made very difficult by Much, Shelist’s failure to arrange its expense vouchers in chronological order. Moreover, numerous vouchers were submitted which represent expenses for which, presumably, the firm is not asking any remuneration since they did not add these vouchers into their typewritten summary of expenses. For example, according to the time records submitted from March 14 to April 18, 1978, Michael Freed spent no time on the Fine Paper case, yet for this same time period, the firm submits almost ten vouchers for costly expenses incurred by Freed during a trip to Aspen, Colorado.100

*163 I find the remaining expenses of the firm to be reasonable and to have benefitted the class. The total amount of expenses which will be disallowed is $2,933.94. The total amount of expenses for which the firm has not yet received reimbursement is $12,-603.29. Thus, the firm will be awarded $9,669.35.

XII. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which Much, Shelist is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Request

Eiger 706.3 $50/100 $ 66,263.00 $ 68,233.00 $298,960.50

Freed 85.9 $50 $ 4,295.00 $ 5,862.50 $ 39,052.50

Skirnick 74.4 $50 $ 3,720.00 $ 5,155.00 $ 33,547.50

Valiulis 3.3 $50 $ 165.00 $ 165.00 $ 524.00

Hyman 1,157.98 $50 $ 57,899.00 $ 57,899.00 $263,878.75

Kanner 732.51 $50 $ 36,625.50 $ 36,625.50 $133,120.00

Yeager 10.2 $25 $ ' 255.00 $ 255.00 $ 357.00

Pavón 21 $25 $ 525.00 $ 525.00 $ 1,260.00

Paralegals & Law Clerks 540.4 $25 $ 13,510.00 $ 13.510.00 $ 16.733.00

$183,257.50 $188,230.00 $787,433.25

Expenses:

Amount Requested $ 50,410.29

Amount Previously Distributed $ 37,807.00

Amount Outstanding $ 12,603.29

Amount Disallowed $ 2,933.94

Amount Awarded $ 9,669.35

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $188,230.00

Expenses $ 9.669.35

Final Award $197,899.35

O’BRIEN & HALLISEY

O’Brien & Hallisey is located in San Francisco, California. The firm became involved in this litigation in September of 1977, and filed a class action complaint on behalf of William Grader on October 27 of that year. Early the following year the firm filed a complaint on behalf of Fred Ernst. It seeks compensation for 694.05 partner hours, 1373.94 associate hours, and 388.65 paralegal hours.101 The requested hourly rate for partner time varies from $50 to $100 an hour. The firm asks for a lodestar of $241,927.55 and with the re *164 quested multiplier of 3 the total compensation sought by O’Brien & Hallisey is $725,-782.65. Finally, the firm seeks reimbursement for $35,783.69 in expenses.

Primarily, O’Brien & Hallisey was charged with the responsibility for discovery of Crown Zellerbach but in addition, they conducted an initial paper industry analysis, performed class certification activities, and some minor multidistrict litigation work. Members of the firm also attended Executive Committee meetings and assisted their clients in preparing answers to interrogatories served by defendants’ counsel. They also charged time to “general review”, “reading”, or “preparation”.

I. Jeremiah F. Hallisey

(A) Hours Expended

Hallisey is a partner. He asks to be compensated for 694.05 hours of work. Upon analysis of the time sheets submitted, I find, however, that Hallisey can be compensated only for 539.43 hours as the only time which can reasonably be said to have benefited the class. In accordance with the guidelines heretofore set forth I have determined Hallisey cannot be compensated for the following hours:

1. 11.5 hours spent in review of documents and materials produced in discovery by other paper companies which were not O’Brien & Hallisey’s responsibility.

2. Entries for 68.25 hours are too vague.102 It was impossible to determine from the entries exactly what work was done and, therefore, it was not possible to make a determination of benefit to the class. All entries for telephone conversations without reference to what was discussed were disallowed. Likewise all conference time which was entered without specifying the subject matter was disallowed. Finally, all entries noted simply as review of documents, correspondence, or file maintenance will not be compensated.103

3. 3.75 hours spent in reviewing the Multidistrict Panel proceedings, grand jury stipulation, and pretrial conference material. Also time spent in a telephone conference concerning the Boston consulting group deposition and in review of the majority states’ report. These efforts were duplicative of the work of many other firms in this litigation and clearly of no benefit to the class.104

4. 22 hours for traveling to and attending pretrial conferences will not be compensated. Hallisey’s attendance at these conferences did not benefit the class and duplicated the efforts of many other attorneys who were in attendance.

5. 18 hours for travel to and attendance at Executive Committee meetings. Hallisey was not a member of this committee.

6. 62.25 hours are billed generally to pretrial memorandum work, viz., brief writing, contentions, etc. Over 4604 hours were expended for these tasks by many attorneys involved in this litigation. This “$1,000,000 brief” plainly reflects duplication. In addition, I have allowed Hallisey to be compensated for some of his trial preparation work which involved similar types of effort. Accordingly, I have reduced the number of requested compensable hours in this area by one-half. Hallisey will be compensated for 31.13 hours.

The total hours for which Hallisey will not be compensated is 154.62. The remaining 539.43 hours will be allowed. The hours for which Hallisey will be compensated include depositions and other discovery of the Crown Zellerbach Company. Furthermore, *165 Hallisey is to be compensated for the time he expended in traveling to, attending, or preparing for the discovery meetings in Chicago. Brief and Motion preparation time as related to Crown Zellerbach is also compensated. Finally, Hallisey is compensated for the hours he expended on the deposition of Grader and in responding to the interrogatories addressed to his client.

(B) Hourly Rate

Hallisey seeks an hourly rate of $150 for all his work throughout the entire course of this litigation. The firm has not provided the court with a statement of its historical rates; rather, it has provided estimates of fees charged. In any event, I find the requested' rate excessive. Based on rates received by partners in other firms for similar work, particularly those involved in this litigation, I have determined a reasonable compensable hourly rate ’ for Hallisey is $100. However, I can only allow this rate of compensation for the hours of work which Hallisey expended on the depositions" of Crown Zellerbach executives and travel to and attendance at the discovery committee meetings. The remaining compensable hours, 219.55, involved the type of general research, conference time, correspondence, and review which could have readily been performed by an associate.' Accordingly, this time will be compensated at a rate of $50 an hour with the remaining 319.88 allowed hours to be compensated at the $100 an hour rate.

(C) Total Lodestar

319.88 hours X $100/hour = $31,988.00

219.55 hours X $ 50/hour = $10,977.50

(D) Multiplier

Hallisey asks for a multiplier of 3 for himself and other members of the firm. No quality multiplier will be applied to Hallisey’s lodestar. His work was not so extraordinary as to warrant compensation beyond the hourly rate. His contributions to the discovery efforts, brief preparation and other work are reflected in the hourly rate allowed. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 17.67 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

II. Anne Treseder

(A) Hours Expended

Treseder is an associate. She seeks to be compensated for 771.3 hours of work. Upon analysis of the time sheets, submitted, however, I find that Treseder should be compensated only for 550.06 hours. Treseder will not be compensated for the following hours:

1. The entries for 78.25 hours of time are too vague. It was impossible to determine exactly what work was done and, therefore, it was not possible to make a determination of benefit to the class. Entries disallowed as too vague include: (a) hours spent in review, reading, conference, or telephone conversation without further explanation; (b) time noted simply as “arranging and cleaning files”,105 (c) hours spent in “designation of documents” without further notation; (d) all entries noted merely as “researching and arranging”; (e) time logged under the general category of “prep exhibits”; (f) “depo designation”; and (g) “microfilm search”.

2. 50.25 of the hours spent in preparation for depositions of Crown Zellerbach executives. Much of the effort by Treseder plainly duplicated Hallisey’s, who devoted approximately 140 hours to the samé task. While it is understandable that the attendance of two attorneys might be necessary at a particularly long and complicated deposition session, I find the concurrent time expended by Hallisey and Treseder to be excessive. Accordingly, since I have permitted Hallisey to be reimbursed for all of his deposition preparation time, I will not allow compensation to Treseder for these hours.

3. 82.59 hours billed generally to pretrial memorandum work, viz., brief writing, contentions, etc. will be disallowed. This figure represents ½ the total hours Treseder *166 billed for this work. As noted, the total number of hours expended for these tasks by all the attorneys involved in this litigation was excessive and warrants this reduction.

4. 6.15 hours expended in review of documents and reports concerning other defendants and the Majority States case for which the firm was not responsible. Such redundant activity was clearly of no benefit to the class.

5. 4 hours of Xerox and copying work. This is a job for non-legal support staff.

The total hours for which Treseder is not compensated is 221.24. The remaining 550.-06 hours of compensation which Treseder seeks I will allow. The hours of work for which Treseder is compensated include her review and organization of Crown Zellerbach documents and preparation of exhibits for trial.

(B) Hourly Rate

Treseder seeks an hourly rate of $95. I find this requested rate to be quite excessive. Treseder began working on the Fine Paper case only six months after graduating from law school and, therefore, was only a first to second year associate for nearly the entire period of her involvement with this case. In light of her limited experience and in the absence of explicit historic rates, I have determined a reasonable compensable rate for Treseder’s work to be $50 an hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

550.06 hours X $50/hour = $27,503

(D) Multiplier

No multiplier will be applied to Treseder’s lodestar. The routine and basic tasks of discovery, review, and preparation for which she is being compensated were not of such exceptional quality as would warrant the application of a positive multiplier. Furthermore, since all Treseder’s time was logged after the first wave of settlements, I will not make any contingency adjustment.

III. Gary Reiss

(A) Hours Expended

Reiss is an associate and the firm seeks compensation for 470.47 hours of his time. However, I conclude that only 371.92 hours of his time is compensable. According to the Guidelines set forth earlier, compensation will not be allowed for the following hours:

1. 17.1 hours reviewing documents produced in discovery by firms other than Crown Zellerbach.

2. 81.45 hours of time entries will not be compensated as too vague. It was impossible to make a determination of benefit to the class from these entries as it was not possible to determine exactly what was done. Entries disallowed as too vague include: (a) time spent in research, review, or teleconference without further explanation; (b) “file organization”; (c) “file maintenance”; (d) meetings without an adequate explanation of the subject matter discussed; (e) all entries marked simply “mail”, “read correspondence”, “document summary”, or “discovery”; and (f) time writing letters without subject matter explanation.

The total hours which will be disallowed is 98.55. The remaining 371.92 hours of Reiss’ time will be approved. These hours include defense of the firm’s clients’ class action depositions, definitive review and indexing of Crown Zellerbach documents, and preparation of the discovery book.

(B) Hourly Rate

The nature of the work performed by Reiss was quite routine and ordinary. The requested rate of $95 an hour is excessive in light of Reiss’ contribution to this litigation. Like his fellow associate Treseder, Reiss had only limited experience. As a 1977 law school graduate, Reiss was only a second to third year associate with the firm throughout this litigation. For reasons already noted with respect to Treseder, a reasonable compensable rate for Reiss’ work is $50 an hour.

*167 (C) Total Lodestar

371.92 hours X $50/hour = $18,596

(D) Multiplier

For the same reasons I denied the application of a quality multiplier to Hallisey’s and Treseder’s hours, no such multiplier will be awarded to Reiss’ lodestar. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to his 117.11 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

IV. Daniel B. Leraul

(A) Hours Expended

Leraul is an associate and the firm asks to be compensated for 56.25 hours of his time. However, I find that only 48.67 hours are compensable. I have determined Leraul cannot be compensated for the following hours:

1. 1.2 hours spent in review of motions concerning transfer of this litigation before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. I cannot discern any benefit to the class.

2. 6.38 hours cannot be compensated as too vague. Entries disallowed because of vagueness include those marked as simply “file maintenance”, “review of documents”, “complete filing system”, “research”, “conference”, and “correspondence”. The lack of an adequate explanation following these entries makes it impossible to determine exactly what work was done and whether the class was benefited.

The remaining 48.67 hours of compensation which Leraul seeks for his work in preparing the Grader complaint, definitive document review, and initial document discovery coordination I will allow. The total number of- hours for which Reiss is not compensated is 7.58.

(B) Hourly Rate

Leraul seeks to be compensated for his work at a rate of $60 an hour. $50 an hour is appropriate under the circumstances.

(C) Total Lodestar

48.67 hours X $50/hour = $2,433.50

(D) Multiplier

No quality multiplier will be awarded for Leraul’s lodestar for the same reasons no such multiplier has been awarded to the hours of Hallisey and the other members of the firm. I will apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to all 48.67 compensable hours since they were all logged before the end of the first wave of settlements.

V. George J. McNabb

(A) Hours Expended

McNabb is an associate for whom the firm seeks compensation for 36.1 hours of work in this litigation. However, the total number of hours for which I will allow McNabb to be compensated is 35.8. I will not allow compensation for the .3 hours entered as staff conference time concurrently with Mr. Reiss. These entries lack an adequate subject matter explanation and are too vague. Again, it is impossible to make a determination of benefit to the class from these types of entries.

The remaining 35.8 hours of work spent in preparing the discovery book and cast of characters and examining the expenses reports I will allow.

(B) Hourly Rate

McNabb seeks to be compensated at $50 an hour. I find this is a reasonable rate of compensation for the type of work accomplished by McNabb. Therefore, I will allow him to be compensated at this rate.

(C) Total Lodestar

35.8 hours X $50/hour = $1,790

(D) Multiplier

No quality multiplier can be awarded for McNabb’s lodestar for the same reasons no such multiplier is awarded to the other members of the firm. I will apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to his 1.67 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

*168 VI. Robert Murphy

(A) Hours Expended

Murphy is an associate with the firm. The firm seeks to be compensated for 19.07 hours of his work. However, 2.37 hours of work cannot be compensated as too vague or duplicative and, therefore, of no benefit to the class. Murphy spent 2.32 hours in teleconference and conference but has no explanation of the subject matter discussed. It was impossible to make a determination of benefit to the class from these entries. In addition, Murphy spent .05 hour in telephone conversation concerning the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, and this time cannot be compensated for it did not result in any appreciable benefit to the class.

The remaining 16.7 hours of work involving initial industry research and complaint preparation I will allow to be compensated.

(B) Hourly Rate

Murphy asks to be compensated at $75 an hour. However, I have determined a reasonable hourly rate for Murphy’s work to be $50 an hour. The type of work for which Murphy is being compensated is of routine variety which warrants compensation at this lesser rate.

(C) Total Lodestar

16.7 hours X $50/hour = $835

(D) Multiplier

I will not award a quality multiplier for Murphy’s lodestar for the same reasons no such multiplier has been awarded to the other members of the firm. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to Murphy’s 14.25 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

VII. Don B. Kates

(A) Hours Expended

Kates is an associate with the firm. He claims compensation on the basis of 8.5 hours of work. I have determined that 2.7 hours of work represented by entries simply marked as “staff conference”, “office memorandum”, “research”, “call to U.S. District Court”, or “conference” without further explanation will not be compensated. It was impossible to make a determination of benefit to the class from such entries. Also disallowed is an entry marked “travel to depo or JFH” as this time is duplicative of Hallisey’s efforts.

The remaining 5.8 hours of work devoted to a discovery motion aimed at Crown Zellerbach will be allowed.

(B) Hourly Rate

The firm asks for $100 an hour for Kates’ time. His work in preparing a discovery motion in order to obtain more documents from Crown Zellerbach was of a routine nature usually performed by lower echelon attorneys and therefore a reasonable rate of $50 an hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

5.8 hours X $50/hour = $290

(D) Multiplier

I will not award a quality multiplier for Kates’ lodestar for the same reasons no such multiplier is awarded to the other members of the firm. Moreover, since all Kates’ time was logged after the initial settlements, I will not make any contingency adjustment.

VIII. Stanley S. Taylor and Kenneth Gos-horn

Both Taylor and Goshorn are associates for whom the firm seeks to be compensated based upon 3 hours and 7.25 hours of work, respectively. Upon analysis of the time sheets submitted, I find, however, that none of this time is compensable. Their hours are disallowed as follows:

1. 3 hours charged by Taylor with absolutely no explanation of what was done.

2. 6.7 hours charged by Goshorn for preparation, attendance at, and review of a deposition of the firm’s client Grader. However, the exact same work was done by Reiss for *169 which compensation has been allowed. The remaining .55 hours will not be allowed as the supporting entries are too vague. Time spent in a “staff conference” without indicating the subject matter of the conference cannot be compensated because it is impossible to determine if there was a benefit to the class.

Accordingly, no compensation will be allowed for either Taylor or Goshorn and it is unnecessary to analyze any hourly rate, compute a lodestar, or discuss the application of a multiplier figure.

IX. Paralegals

O’Brien & Hallisey asks to be compensated for 388.65 paralegal hours. I find the hours expended by the firm’s paralegals in this litigation benefited the class as an ancillary service to the work performed by the attorneys of the firm. A reasonable hourly rate for the paralegal time is $25 an hour. The total amount awarded for paralegal time is $9,716.25.

X. Expenses

O’Brien & Hallisey lists total expenses as $35,783.69. As previously explained in the memorandum, the firm has already received 75% of these expenses. I will award O’Brien & Hallisey the remainder of its expenses less $80 for meals claimed by Hallisey on September 3, 1980 which is not documented and $101.05 for Hallisey’s attendance at the Executive Committee meetings. Accordingly, the O’Brien & Hallisey firm will receive final reimbursement for expenses in the amount of $8,764.64.

XI. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Hallisey 539.43 $50/100 $ 42,965.50 $ 43,828.25 $312,337.50

Treseder 550.06 $50 $ 27,503.00 $ 27,503.00 $219,877.50

Reiss 371.92 $50 $ 18,596.00 $ 21,523.75 $134,083.95

Leraul 48.67 $50 $ 2,433.50 $ 3,650.25 $ 10,121.40

McNabb 35.80 $50 ' $ 1,790.00 $ 1,831.75 $ 5,416.80

Murphy 16.70 $50 $ 835.00 $ 1,191.25 $ 4,290.75

Kates 5.80 $50 $ 290.00 $ 290.00 $ 2,550.00

Taylor 0 0 0 $ 1,631.25

Goshorn 0 0 0 $ 495.00

Paralegals 388.65 $25 $ 9,716,25 $ 9,716.25 $ 34.978.50

TOTAL $104,129.25 $109,534.50 $725,782.65

Expenses:

Amount Requested $ 35,783.69

Amount Previously Distributed $ 26,838,00

$ 8,945.69

Amount Disallowed $ 181.05

Total Awarded $ 8,764.64

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $109,534.50

Expenses $ 8.764.64

Final Award $118,299.14

*170 WALTER E. RIORDAN, P.A. and STEWART PERRY

Perhaps, more than any other fee petition filed in this case, these two bring into sharp focus the potential for abuse which casts a shadow on the integrity of the class action device. In addition, they raise serious questions about counsel’s good faith and the efficiency of the standards used in fee determination. The activities of Riordan and Perry are so intertwined that their petitions will be considered jointly.

I. Entry into the Case

Walter E. Riordan, P.A., is a law firm consisting only of Mr. Riordan. Riordan has been practicing law since 1943 principally in Minneapolis, Minnesota and has been primarily engaged in plaintiff’s personal injury work. However, Riordan has had a limited amount of experience in class action antitrust work.

Riordan has been critical of the plaintiffs’ antitrust bar. He accused them of being “vociferous crocodiles” and “pirates” who “just get in, get [their] fees,_____the public and go on to the next [case]”. He stated that “[t]hey are careful not to take too much because they deal with the same [defense] lawyers over and over. They are close.” Class Objectors’ E 149; Perry affidavit, September 1981; Perry deposition at 89.

Riordan first heard about the Fine Paper case in the early part of 1979. He read about the first 30 million dollars in settlements in the Wall Street Journal. According to Perry, Riordan thought the Fine Paper case was worth much more than 30 million dollars and that plaintiffs’ lawyers were “selling-out” the class.106 Perry affidavit, September 1981. Riordan then decided to get into the case. As he testified: “I thought there was a better way to prove this case up than what I had been seeing .. . . ” N.T., 3/2/82 at 1047.

So Riordan contacted his longtime friend, Minneapolis attorney Stewart Perry, and other attorneys from his hometown107 and asked them to get involved in the Fine Paper case. Perry was a particularly close associate of Riordan. Although both men had their own firms, the two were associated in numerous personal injury claims on a fee sharing basis.108 According to Perry, Perry was a “depository” for Riordan’s “crap cases” and on many occasions, he converted Riordan’s “junked cases into size-able fees”. Class Objectors’ E 144. Perry had also been Riordan’s attorney for a number of lawsuits in which Riordan was a named defendant.

Riordan told Perry and the other interested Minneapolis lawyers “that there were large fees to be made in [class action] cases” which could be shared among the firms if they could find a client. Perry affidavit, September 1981 at 3. According to Perry: “He [Riordan] stated that we should try to get on the committees running the case; through the committee positions, we would be able to work substantial hours in the case for which we would be entitled to high hourly rates, and large multipliers as well; and we would perform a service to the class by our work ... by preventing [a] ‘sellout’.” Id.109 All of the firms, including Riordan, managed to find clients and they *171 each filed complaints on behalf of their respective plaintiffs in the spring of 1979.110

II. General Paper Corporation and James Nelson

As the various Minneapolis firms entered the Fine Paper case, they were asked to pay assessments to the Fine Paper Finance Committee by Robert Atkins, the chairman of that committee.111 In return for the payment of their assessments, these new firms received various work assignments from the Executive Committee, consisting generally of searching and reviewing documents of defendants already assigned to other law firms in the case.

Meanwhile, Riordan was conducting his own independent investigation of the paper industry. Specifically, Riordan was searching for a bankrupt paper company which still had its records intact. Riordan reasoned that a bankrupt’s records would not have undergone a recent “housecleaning,” and therefore there would be more of a chance to find documents which would incriminate the defendants. Riordan found such a company, the General Paper Company (“GPC”), a paper distributor located in Minneapolis. After making application to the Bankruptcy Court, Riordan had himself retained on August 2, 1979, as counsel for the Trustee of GPC in connection with the possible claim as a class member in the Fine Paper case and other pending antitrust actions.

About this time and entirely separate from Riordan’s efforts, Stewart Perry met Douglas Nelson, son of the former president of General Paper Corporation, James Nelson. Perry surmised that the Nelsons, especially James Nelson, could be of assistance in the prosecution of the Fine Paper case. Accordingly, he arranged a meeting attended by himself, James Nelson, Douglas Nelson and Walter Riordan at a Minneapolis hotel on October 2, 1979.

This meeting was the first time either Riordan or Perry met James Nelson. At the meeting, James Nelson gave Riordan and Perry a detailed description of how the defendants fixed prices. He related that he had diaries and memoranda of price conversations among the defendants and photographs taken at meetings attended by various officers of the defendants. Riordan and Perry concluded that they had found a “gold mine”. They arranged a meeting with Granvil Specks and his son Gary in Chicago on October 10, 1979. Granvil Specks was most impressed with the detailed and first-hand information Nelson gave of the alleged price-fixing conspiracy.112 At his evidentiary hearing, Granvil Specks testified that “Mr. Nelson was the most important witness that the private plaintiffs and certified states had in the Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation.” N.T., 2/8/82 at 9.113

*172 After this meeting, Specks ordered Riordan to conduct a thorough search of the documents of the General Paper Corporation in order “to develop the testimony of Mr. Nelson.” N.T., 3/2/82 at 1052. Pursuant to this request, Riordan began the task of searching through 390 boxes in a basement of an office building in Minneapolis. In addition to obtaining the help of the Minneapolis firms then in the case, Riordan hired several young lawyers at $15 per hour, including James Rude of the firm of Rogers, Rude, Candlin, Faulkner and Sjostrom. He also hired a private investigator, Michael Melloy, for $13 an hour and two young men to move the boxes for $5 to $8 an hour. N.T., 6/10/81 at 106.

Perry assisted Riordan with this document search. They were looking for a document known as a “Pattern A” which, according to Nelson, was circulated among the defendants and contained the formulae for setting the prices. They also hoped to locate James Nelson’s personal memoranda of price conversations. To assist him, Perry hired his two sons, Shawn and Shane, who were of college and pre-college age at the time. In his fee petition, Perry requests the class to pay his sons $25 and $15 per hour for their time.

Specks traveled to Minneapolis on December 7,1979 to obtain a formal statement from Nelson. Perry claims that on that occasion, Specks told him how happy he was with Nelson and as a reward told Perry to “Get hours.” Perry Deposition at 76; Perry affidavit, September 1981. Howard Fink, a lawyer in the Specks firm also told Perry that he “would be assigned depositions as a reward for producing Nelson and for the good work done in the record search.” Perry Affidavit, September 1981 at 7.114

Perry interpreted Specks’ “Get hours” statement to mean that he should continue his work reviewing General Paper documents.115 With this understanding Perry advertised in the newspaper for lawyers to work on the document search at a rate of $9.35 per hour. Perry, apparently acting on Riordan’s advice, in his fee petition asks for compensation for these lawyers at the rate of $75 per hour. Perry claims Riordan told him that “the way it is done is you hire an attorney and you pay them so much per hour, you will then charge [the class] $75 per hour for these attorneys.” Perry Deposition at 76. As a result of this ad, Perry did manage to hire some lawyers to assist him in the document search. Perry deposition at 77. Furthermore, to stimulate their initiative, he promised a reward of $1000 to the first worker to find the crucial “Pattern A” document. Class Objectors’ E 141.116

On January 7, 1980, Specks and Fink decided that they had procured a sufficient *173 number of documents from the General Paper Document Depository to take the deposition of James Nelson and decided to terminate the search of GPC records. On this same day, Fink informed Perry of the decision. When Perry heard the news, he became “quite distraught.”117 He thought if he were allowed more time, he could find a “Pattern A” document which had not yet been found.

As a result, Specks permitted Perry to continue the GPC document search “for an additional 10 days, but no longer.” Specks’ affidavit, November 10, 1981 at 14. In violation of Specks’ order, Perry continued his search up to January 28,1980 in order to “finish all cartons and not risk missing the pot of gold.” Perry letter to Specks and Kohn, Feb. 4, 1980, Class Objectors’ E 140.

III. James Nelson Deposition

Plaintiffs’ counsel noticed the deposition of James Nelson for January 29, 1980. The day before the deposition, Specks told Riordan, that his strategy was to “low key” Nelson’s testimony. By doing this, Specks hoped that the defendants would assign their “second-string” lawyers to attend the deposition. Consistent with this plan, Specks ordered that there should be no unnecessary attendance on the plaintiffs’ side at the deposition. Only Specks and Fink would attend for the plaintiffs.118 Riordan would attend as counsel for Nelson.

On the morning of Nelson’s deposition, Riordan’s investigator, Michael Melloy, approached Perry and told him not to attend Nelson’s deposition because Specks and Riordan did not want him there. Melloy, however, did not tell Perry the reason for the decision. Perry ignored Melloy’s message and attended the deposition anyway.

Perry was not invited to attend any of the remaining Nelson deposition sessions or any of the many meetings spent preparing for the deposition. Moreover, Specks did not give Perry any further work assignments. As a result of this treatment and Specks’ decision to close down the GPC document search, Perry concluded he was being excluded from the Fine Paper case by Specks and Riordan and decided to withdraw from the litigation.

The Nelson deposition lasted eighteen days, with hundreds of hours involved in its preparation. The petitioning lawyers claim to have spent and seek compensation from the class for more than 1,475 hours — the equivalent of three attorneys each spending two and one-half months doing nothing else except preparing for and taking this deposition.119 The total fees sought for this one deposition approximate a half a million dollars. Granvil Specks, assisted by Howard Fink, took the deposition on behalf of the plaintiffs. Walter Riordan entered an appearance at the deposition on behalf of General Paper Company and Nelson. Perry appeared for his client, Eagle Drug, Inc. for the first day and a half of the deposition.

IV. Perry’s Dispute with Specks and Riordan

On February 4, 1980, Stewart Perry began writing a series of strongly worded letters to Specks, Kohn, and Riordan about his alleged exclusion from Fine Paper by Riordan and Specks. At the heart of Perry’s caustic rhetoric was his allegation that Specks and Riordan wanted Perry out of Fine Paper so that they, alone, could claim credit for the Nelson testimony and, moreover, so that Specks could have the exclusive use of Nelson in class action suits against the paperboard and fiberboard industries which Specks was planning to bring after the completion of Fine Paper. *174 See N.T., 5/11/82 at 2254; Perry affidavit 11/6/81, at 34.120

About the time the plaintiffs’ attorneys filed their fee petitions with the court in March 1981, Perry filed a complaint in a Minnesota state court seeking compensatory and punitive damages against Riordan121 for, inter alia, interference with Perry’s attorney-client relationship with James Nelson. In the complaint, Perry states that as a result of Riordan’s “theft” of his client, Riordan will earn in excess of $300,000 in attorney fees and therefore he has been unjustly enriched.122

On June 18, 1981, Perry filed in this court a “Notice of Attorney’s Lien” purporting to attach any fees payable to Walter Riordan in Fine Paper. Riordan has filed a motion to dismiss this lien and to declare that this court has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters relating to fees to be awarded in Fine Paper. Perry has also filed a similar motion requesting this court to determine whether it has concurrent jurisdiction with the Minnesota Court over Mr. Perry’s suit.

I have carefully reviewed these motions. It is clear that this court is without any jurisdiction to determine the merits of the Riordan-Perry controversy because no action with respect to this matter has ever been commenced in this court. Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” “Until an action has been commenced in this court, obviously, it has no jurisdiction to act.” In re Market Basket, 122 F.Supp. 321, 322 (W.D.Mo.1954). All that has been filed is a “Notice of Attorney’s Lien”, which does not comply with Rule 3. Cf. Application of Howard, 325 F.2d 917, 918 (3d Cir.1963). It follows that the jurisdiction of the court has never been properly invoked by Perry.

Moreover, I note that Perry’s complaint filed in the Minnesota court against Riordan sounds in breach of contract, quantum meruit, tort and alleges violations of the rules governing the conduct of attorneys in Minnesota. While the operative facts which are the basis of Perry’s charges stem from his involvement in Fine Paper, the issues presently pending before the Minnesota court are completely beyond the scope of this court’s responsibility in determining the fee award. I also note that Riordan filed a motion to dismiss Perry’s action in the Minnesota court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and this motion was denied. Perry’s “Notice of Attorney’s Lien”, therefore, does not prevent this court from awarding fees to either Riordan or Perry. The Minnesota court can determine whether Perry is entitled to any part of the fees awarded to Riordan.

V. Compensation for the Nelsons

Two additional aspects of the Perry dispute with Riordan and Specks remain to be discussed. First is Specks’ alleged promise to pay James Nelson compensation in return for his testimony; and second, the purported agreement among Perry, Riordan, and James Nelson’s sons, Douglas and Walter to divide any fees awarded to Perry and Riordan as a result of their work in Fine Paper.

*175 1. James Nelson .

Perry claims that in December of 1979 he told Specks of James Nelson’s concern regarding the loss of income he would incur as the result of his giving testimony in the Fine Paper case. Perry states that when he told Specks of Nelson’s demand for compensation, Specks told Perry to tell Nelson not to worry about money, because he would “be taken care of.” Perry gave Nelson Specks’ message. After the case was settled, James Nelson sent an itemized bill to Specks for $19,627.94 in reimbursement of his costs and loss of income. Specks responded to this request by denying he made any promise to reimburse Nelson for his losses; Specks instead suggested that Nelson look for remuneration to whatever sum General Paper Corporation would receive from the fund.

In view of Specks’ refusal to pay Nelson, Perry has filed a motion with this court requesting the class to pay Nelson $37,-039.11 for his time. By affidavit, Nelson affirms Specks’ promise to reimburse him.

In response to this motion Specks relies on a February 24, 1980 affidavit in which Nelson states:

At all times when I discussed any aspect of the fine paper antitrust litigation and when I gave testimony or any information pursuant to the fine paper antitrust litigation, I did so voluntarily and without any promise or inducement of any consideration whatsoever (except the $30.00 witness fee which was tendered to me at the time of service of the subpoena.)

In view of these inconsistent affidavits, I will not award James Nelson any class funds. Accordingly, the motion filed by Perry on behalf of James Nelson is denied without prejudice to any rights or claims for compensation Nelson may have against Specks.

2. Douglas and Walter Nelson

Douglas Nelson is the son of James Nelson and a former employee of General Paper Corporation. He is not a lawyer. Douglas claims that he was promised by Perry and Riordan that he and his brother Walter, a lawyer in California, would share in any fees awarded to Perry and Riordan in Fine Paper in return for their assistance in the prosecution of the case.

Initially, Douglas Nelson was very reluctant to get involved in Fine Paper, but he changed his mind after Riordan and Perry told him that he would make a great deal of money if he assisted the plaintiffs’ lawyers. As he stated in his deposition:

When I first heard about this thing from Perry I was ... very reluctant to get in .... I decided to go ahead and explore it a little further, but I was not mentally committed to it because, to be frank, I saw these men chasing a rainbow, and I just didn’t need any fantasy in my life at that time ....

As I recall, Mr. Riordan and Perry both emphasized to me that there was a lot of money to be had and that the money that General Paper would get would be a tremendous amount, and that considering my small interest in the General Paper stock, which is maybe 5 percent or something like that, that the minimum amount that I would get, I believe Mr. Riordan said, was $250,000, and that if I would just cooperate and tell the truth, and so on, that all these big floods of money would be pouring into the family coffers as well.

Douglas Nelson Deposition at 5, 7.

Lured by the prospect of receiving a small fortune, Douglas Nelson agreed to help Perry and Riordan. Douglas had been working as an accountant for Touche Ross and Co. One of the clients of that firm was Mead Corporation, a defendant in this litigation. Douglas quit his job at Touche Ross because he was told by Specks that a conflict of interest would exist if he continued to work there while aiding the plaintiffs.123

*176 As time passed, Douglas Nelson decided he wanted a more firm financial arrangement with Perry and Riordan. He decided to approach Perry and Riordan and negotiate an agreement with them whereby Douglas and his brother, Walter, would receive a share of any fees awarded to Perry and Riordan. As explained by Douglas at his deposition:

I talked to them [Perry and Riordan] at first and finally, I believe it was in the Fall, they were starting to take up more and more of my time, and I had accumulated enough time with these two so that I felt it was time to, oh, I guess, bring the thing to a head. So I resolved in my mind that I was going to get an agreement from them and that not only would General Paper get some money out of this thing, then I would be entitled to my 5 percent, but I also wanted a share of all the fees that would come out of all of this, because the fees are normally, at least to me, 20 percent or 33 percent or something like that, and these men had told me they would be getting large fees, and I thought that if anybody would be getting paid on this thing, the lawyers would be.

So I told both of them that the only conditions under which I would continue to work with them would be if I was to share in the lawyers’ fees. They asked me how much I wanted and I said well, first of all, and this is my first point, I can remember this one clearly, “first of all we have to take out the expenses.” I said “We’ll take the net fees, or the gross fees less the expenses, then we’ll be left with the net fees and we’ll divide those some way.” And I wasn’t greedy. I didn’t say that I wanted this amount or that amount. I said, “What do you guys think?” And they said, “Well, how about a third?” Everybody gets a third, there are three of us here, that’s the way we’ll do it.

Now I said I want to get this clear because this is important to me. I don’t want to spend any more time on this unless we have this understanding, and the understanding again, gentlemen, is that we divide up the attorneys’ fees among us, so that each of us gets a third after the expenses are paid. And I said, “Now is that clear?” And I thought to myself there is no way Pm going to get a written agreement on this issue because I think it. is unethical for them to make this agreement. If they want to be unethical, that’s their business but I want a gentleman’s agreement. That is just as good.

I’ve studied the law too as part of my education and I know verbal agreements are just as binding as written agreements. Here I had a verbal agreement with two men of reputation. I said, “I want to confirm this agreement, let’s shake hands.” And we shook hands. From that point I figured I don’t have any problems. These guys aren’t going to break their word.

* * * * *

Mr. Riordan said, “I’ve got a better deal for you.” He said, “This is what we’ll do: Instead of splitting it a third, what we’ll do is give 20 percent to myself” — Mr. Riordan would get 20 percent, Mr. Perry will get 20 percent, and I was to get 60 percent and I was going to share that with my brother Walter, who we were also going to bring into the case. The reason for this, Mr. Riordan said many times, “I’m going to restore you and your family to your former financial position.”

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And I just thought, well, this is good enough for me. A man’s handshake. A man who has been in the legal profession all of his adult life, I can certainly trust him. And I knew I could trust Mr. Perry. So I didn’t have any qualms about it. I never once thought that they wouldn’t keep their agreement.

Douglas Nelson Deposition at 7-10.

Riordan denies having made any such agreement. Perry, on the other hand, acknowledges the agreement and supports Douglas’ version.

Douglas Nelson has not petitioned the court for compensation, as his father has *177 done, although he apparently has never received any compensation from either Riordan or Perry. Perry, however, in his fee petition does ask for remuneration at the rate of $150 per hour for the consulting services of Douglas Nelson. This request will be discussed below. Furthermore, both Riordan and Perry claim to have compensated Walter Nelson for some of the time spent by him on consulting work and they each seek reimbursement for this expense from the class.

With this background in mind, I now come to the fee petitions of Riordan and Perry.

VI. Petition of Walter E. Riordan, P.A.

Mr. Riordan claims to have devoted 2,304.5 hours to the case124 primarily on the Nelson deposition and preparing for it, reviewing GPC documents, coordinating the 30(b)(6) merchant discovery program (for which Riordan billed 25 minutes of actual deposition time), and representing Nelson at the Majority States trial. He seeks $125 per hour for his time and requests a multiplier of 2.5 to 3. His total request is $795,-482 in fees. He asks an additional $45,-061.59 for expenses, most of which resulted from Riordan’s retention of the private investigator, Michael Melloy.

(A) Hours Expended

After a thorough review of the testimony, time records and exhibits, I have concluded that the following hours are not compensable:

1. 201 hours spent obtaining immunity from criminal prosecution for James Nelson and for preparing him to testify as a witness in the Majority States trial. This time was spent after the private class action had been settled and thus did not benefit the class.

2. Riordan seeks compensation for 678 hours spent representing James Nelson at his deposition. Nelson, a third party to this litigation, was deposed by both plaintiffs and defendants. Granvil Specks appeared, along with various other plaintiffs’ counsel, on behalf of the class at these depositions. Indeed, Specks & Goldberg bill the class more than 500 hours for the preparation and taking of these depositions. During the depositions, Riordan entered his appearance on behalf of Nelson and defended his client’s interest throughout the proceedings. It is clear from a reading of the transcript that Riordan was not representing the class during these depositions.125 The class will not be required to pay for the 678 hours Riordan spent representing Mr. Nelson at his deposition. The class was represented by Specks.

3. Riordan spent 78.25 hours reviewing pleadings and other documents that had nothing to do with any phase of the case assigned to him such as briefs relating to disqualification, contribution and class certification. Riordan will not be compensated for this time. As explained earlier, attorneys such as Riordan, who did not have any leadership role in the litigation, will not be compensated for simply reading every piece of paper filed in the case. These activities may have benefited Riordan or his individual client, but they did not benefit the class.

4. Riordan’s remaining hours amount to 1,347.25. After a careful analysis of the time sheets submitted, however, I have concluded that Riordan should not receive remuneration for all these hours. For the following reasons, I will award Riordan fees for only half of this time or 673.63 hours.

First, Riordan’s claims are excessive and unreasonable. For example, on October 9, 1979, Riordan spent 14 hours in conference with lawyers and his investiga *178 tor on “J. Nelson discovery”; 10 hours on September 30, 1979 at a meeting with his private investigator regarding Nelson; and another 10 hours on October 2, 1979 on “conferences with Doug Nelson, Jim Nelson and Tom Bartsh.” He spent five hours in a general discussion about General Paper Corporation on October 1, 1979 and on October 5, 1979, he spent an additional 8 hours on this same subject. Similarly, on June 6, 1980, Riordan billed 3 hours; on June 11 and 12 — 17 hours; on June 23 — 12 hours; on June 26 — 5 hours; and on July 1 — 7 hours, just for conversations with his co-counsel and investigator regarding Rule 30(b)(6) discovery. From February 19-23, 1979 he billed 30 hours for conferences with a member of the Arizona Attorney General’s Office regarding “price fixing data”. There are other examples of excessive billing throughout Riordan’s petition which will not be listed here. Riordan entered this litigation at a late stage. Despite this circumstance, he seeks a fee award for over 2300 hours. By way of contrast, Harold Kohn, the plaintiff’s co-lead counsel, expended less than 1700 hours during the entire period of the litigation. I am convinced that Riordan’s hours are grossly inflated.

Second, Riordan requests compensation for nearly 100 hours (at the rate of $125 per hour) spent on tasks that should have been performed by a non-lawyer. For example, on March 22-23, 1979, Riordan bills the class for 22 hours spent Xeroxing documents. He also expended numerous hours searching for documents, ordering paper catalogs, telephoning the American Paper Institute regarding the definition of fine paper, examining microfilm of airline records, and obtaining and distributing Canadian Mill price records.

Last, some 858 hours of Riordan’s time are reflected by vague entries, making it difficult, if not impossible, to determine what work was done, or whether it was excessive or duplicative of work done by other firms. For example, some 400 hours are reflected by the entry “J. Nelson investigation (documents depository)”. Other hours are reflected by such entries as “Conference with Bartsh”; “Conference with Melloy”; “re J. Nelson deposition”; “multiple meetings and telephone conference re J. Nelson and records”; “Conference with Melloy re: Fine Paper”; “re: Nelson discovery proceedings and defendant’s examination of records in Plymouth Bldg.”; and “re Nelson deposition”.

In view of the excessive hours billed by Riordan, the nature of the tasks he performed and the incompleteness of the supporting records, I will not allow Riordan compensation for all of the remaining 1,347.25 hours. To do so would be to condone inefficiency, incompetency and overreaching. Accordingly, I will reduce this time by one-half. Only 673.63 of Riordan’s hours will be compensated by the class. A reduction by one-half may seem arbitrary, but given the circumstances outlined above, it represents the court’s best judgment of Riordan’s actual contribution to the creation of the fund.

(B) Hourly Rate

Riordan requests $125 per hour for his time. This request will be denied. Riordan has no historic non-contingent hourly rate. N.T., 3/3/82 at 1089. Riordan’s compensable time was spent on document review and on the coordination, rather than the actual conduct of the 30(b)(6) depositions. In view of the associate-level tasks he performed, and Riordan’s adjunct role in this litigation, he will be compensated at $50 an hour for his time.

(C) Total Lodestar

673.63 hours X $50/hour = $33,681.50

(D) Multiplier

Riordan asks for a multiplier of 2.5 to 3. This request is denied. This result is justified because all of Riordan’s time was expended after the initial 30 million dollars of settlements were consummated. Thus, no substantial contingency factor existed which would justify an increase in his lodestar amount. Similarly, no increment to the lodestar is justified for the quality of his services. Riordan did not assume a *179 leadership role in this litigation; all of his compensation is for routine discovery matters. Although Riordan’s initiative along with that of Perry resulted in the unearthing of the witness James Nelson whom the plaintiffs deemed to be essential to- the success of their case, nevertheless, once he was authorized by the trustee to represent the bankrupt GPC, the contact with Nelson was inevitable. Accordingly, I cannot say that Riordan demonstrated such “an unusual degree of skill” as to warrant a multiplier for quality. Lindy II at 118. The total amount awarded to the Riordan firm for attorney fees is $33,681.50.

(E) Expenses

Riordan requests reimbursement for $45,061.59 in expenses. After carefully reviewing the expense vouchers submitted by the firm, I have concluded that the following expenses will not be reimbursed by the class:

1. $4,914.66 in meal expenses incurred by Riordan during the course of the 1'itigation. Riordan bills the class for numerous lunches and dinners for himself, his co-counsel, Nelson, and his investigator. Most of the meals were costly, and were incurred when Riordan was working on the General Paper Corporation documents or on the Nelson deposition. Riordan justifies charging the class for these meals because he was working on the Fine Paper case on these days. See N.T., 3/3/82 at 1102. This rationale does not support the imposition of such large meal expenses upon the class. I fail to see any benefit to the class as a result of these meals and accordingly, the class will not be required to pay for them. Seventy-five percent (75%) or more of the meal expenses were incurred during Riordan’s attendance at the Nelson deposition which I have determined was of no benefit to the class.

Several of Riordan’s meal charges were for dinners attended by Riordan, Nelson, Melloy and their respective wives or fiancees. Riordan claims that these dinners were purely business engagements. He testified that at these dinners the discussion concerned Nelson’s “testimony as to the price fixing and the various methodologies used.” Riordan Deposition at 138. This assertion is somewhat contradicted by Nelson who stated that although business was discussed, much socializing occurred during these meals. James Nelson Deposition at 45. I am unable to conclude that those meals inured to the benefit of the class. It is more likely that the sole beneficiaries were Messrs. Riordan, Nelson and Melloy and their respective guests. Accordingly, no reimbursement will be authorized to Riordan for these meals.

2. Riordan asks for remuneration at a rate of $25 per hour for 1,007 hours of work expended by his investigator, Michael Melloy. This request comes to $25,175. The record reveals, however, that .Riordan agreed to pay Melloy only $13 an hour. See Melloy Deposition at 6 & 64. Accordingly, Riordan will be compensated for Melloy’s time at the $13 rate for a total of $13,091.126

3. $248.70 in expenses are merely described as “Misc. exp.” or “Misc. supplies” and no vouchers were submitted to support these expenses. I cannot tell from these vague descriptions whether these expenses resulted in a benefit to the class. Accordingly, Riordan will not be reimbursed for these expenditures.

4. Riordan and Perry paid $1,802.96 to James Nelson’s son, Walter, an attorney, for his services. Part of the bill included a $109.24 expense for dinner for Walter, his father and his father’s fiancee. The class should not be required to pay for this dinner. Accordingly, Riordan will not be reimbursed for $54.62 of his payment to Walter Nelson. A similar deduction will be made from Perry’s claimed expenses.

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