Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Franks v. Oklahoma State Industries
Franks v. Okla. State Indus., 7 F.3d 971 (10th Cir. 1993)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1993-10-18
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- a Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. 32.1: 10th Cir. R. 32.1. prisoner is not an “employee” under the FLSA and is not entitled to minimum wage
- inmates working in prison not FLSA employees
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Franks v. Oklahoma State Industries. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 12 opinions
FRANKS v. OKLAHOMA STATE INDUSTRIES,7 F.3d 971(10th Cir. 1993)
ALTON C. FRANKS, JOSEPH OSBORNE, MICHAEL TIDWELL, TERRY LEE STEWARD, JOHN
TIMKO, PHILLIP SPARKS, JAMES VAUGHN, FREDERICK GILES, LANCE FOSTER, ROBERT
MOHUNDRO, JESSE THOMAS, CHESTER LYONS, BILLY RAY WALTERS, HAROLD HUNTLEY,
ROBERT SCHNEIDER, TIMOTHY CLARK, JERRY HALLMARK, KELVIN MOORE, DELFINO
PORRAS, ARCHIE ROSE, DARRELL ALLEN, GEORGE WRIGHT SMITH, JOHN TARAPEN, ED
BLASKOVIC, JAMES CLABORN, WESLEY EDWARDS, JOHN McPHAIL, T.L. RHINE, KENNETH
BURNS, STEPHEN JONES, RICKEY WYATT, ARTHUR BROWN, WAYNE EASTER, JAMES POPE,
LARRY BUTCHER, RANDALL SWANSON, JUSTIN SAMUEL, JACKIE PARRET, CHARLES
PETERS, JACK HENRY, ROBERT DEAL, BILLY THOMAS, LARRY NED, PAUL QUICK, ANDREW
BARBOZA, TYRONE WILLIAMS, MARK CHESTER, FRANK McQUEEN, ELZA NASH, STEPHEN
CHRONISTER, MARVIN MORRIS, PAUL SANDERS, ROBERT EUGENE KING, ELVIN FAGANS,
GILBERT PAYNE, DAVID SPEAKS, CALVIN BARNETT, JAMES WALLACE WOLFE, DENNIS
MILLIGAN, RONNIE MCGOWAN, VIRGEL MILES, JERRY LEE STILES, DUANE CRONIC,
REPRESENTATIVE PARTY PLAINTIFFS ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER INMATES EMPLOYED OR
FORMERLY EMPLOYED BY OKLAHOMA STATE INDUSTRY, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v.
OKLAHOMA STATE INDUSTRIES; MAX NEWBERRY, ADMINISTRATOR; GARY D. MAYNARD,
FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; LARRY FIELDS,
DIRECTOR OF THE OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; JIM WESTBROOK, INDUSTRY
COORDINATOR; DANNY WILSON, INDUSTRY MANAGER; PAUL RIDGWAY, INDUSTRY MANAGER;
M.C. RIDGEWAY, INDUSTRY MANAGER; DON POPE, INDUSTRY MANAGER; RON JACKSON,
INDUSTRY MANAGER; RICHARD HALL, INDUSTRY MANAGER; BETTY WARD, INDUSTRY
MANAGER; JIM DODD, INDUSTRY MANAGER; ROY BEASON, INDUSTRY MANAGER; BILL
JOCK, INDUSTRY MANAGER; LEROY BOND, INDUSTRY COORDINATOR; MIKE STROLL,
INDUSTRY MANAGER; JOHN HAMMER, INDUSTRY MANAGER; SHARON SCHAFFER, INDUSTRY
MANAGER; BILL CARPENTER, INDUSTRY MANAGER; ROGER GLENN, INDUSTRY MANAGER;
LES GUTTERT, SUPT. I; FIDEL LUJAN, INDUSTRY MANAGER; LAURA WEBB, INDUSTRY
MANAGER; NANETTE HOLT, INDUSTRY MANAGER; ALEX LUNN, INDUSTRY MANAGER; LEON
MOORE, INDUSTRY COORDINATOR; WAYNE LONDON, INDUSTRY MANAGER; DARRYL RHOADS,
INDUSTRY MANAGER; CHARLES KELLY, INDUSTRY MANAGER; HAROLD CANTRELL, INDUSTRY
MANAGER; GEORGE DUGAN, INDUSTRY MANAGER; GARY FRANKS, INDUSTRY MANAGER;
SHIRLEY TURNER, INDUSTRY MANAGER; KEN GROTHE, INDUSTRY MANAGER; BOB
TOMLINSON, INDUSTRY COORDINATOR; DANNY BROWN, INDUSTRY MANAGER; CHARLES
HARRIS, INDUSTRY MANAGER; JESS TOWELL, INDUSTRY MANAGER; FRANK HUDSON,
INDUSTRY MANAGER; BOBBY BOONE, WARDEN; DAN REYNOLDS, WARDEN; JACK COWLEY,
WARDEN; NEVILLE MESSEY, WARDEN; EDWARD EVENS, WARDEN; L.L. YOUNG, WARDEN;
RON CHAMPION, WARDEN, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
No. 93-7020.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
October 18, 1993.
Page 972
Before McKAY, BARRETT and SETH, Circuit Judges.
[2] Alton C. Franks, et al., (Plaintiffs), appearingpro se,appeal the district court's order dismissing their complaint wherein they sought a decree directing the Oklahoma State Industries, a division of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, to tender to them minimum wages alleged to be due pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),29 U.S.C. § 201,et seq.The Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, back wages and damages. The district court, in a well-reasoned order, (Vol. I, Tab 5), dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6) on the ground that Congress did not intend to extend the FLSA's definition of "employee,"29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C), to inmates working in prison. We agree that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
[3] The district court observed that althoughWilliams v. Meese,926 F.2d 994(10th Cir. 1991) did not deal with the minimum wage standard of the FLSA as applied to prison labor, it did hold that a federal prison inmate was not an "employee" under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The court held:
. . . We conclude that plaintiff is not an "employee" under either Title VII or the ADEA because his relationship with the Bureau of Prisons, and therefore, with the defendants, arises out of his status as an inmate, not an employee. Although his relationship with defendants may contain some elements commonly present in an employment relationship, it arises "from [plaintiff's] having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in the [defendants'] correctional institution. The primary purpose of their association [is] incarceration, not employment." Prisoner Not Protected From Racial Job Bias, 2 Empl.Proc.Guide (CCH) ¶ 6865, at 7009 (April 18, 1986) (EEOC Decision No. 86-7).
[4]Id.at 997.
[5] We believe that the same rationale applies in the instant case.
[6] InIngram v. Papalia,804 F.2d 595,596(10th Cir. 1986), we held that an inmate has no right to a job in the prison or to any particular job assignment, but that prison officials cannot discriminate against an inmate based upon his age, race or handicap.
[7] InGilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc.,931 F.2d 1320(9th Cir. 1991), Judge Trott reasoned that the FLSA's minimum wage protection was not intended by Congress to extend to felons serving time in prison. Judge Nelson dissented. Judge Rymer concurred but expressly refused to reach the issue. Judge Trott opined:
. . . Not a word can be found anywhere in the relevant statutes or authorities indicating an intent by Congress to include such a distinctive class of "workers" [convicted murderers, rapists, burglars, armed robbers, swindlers, thieves, and the like] in the FLSA . . . [it is] singularly unconvincing . . . that the statutory scheme'sfailureto include "prisoners" on . . . "an extensive list" of workers who are excepted expressly from FLSA coverage provides somehow a rationale to bring them within the statute's mandate. . . . It is equally plausible, indeed more so, that in view of the manifestPage 973purpose of Congress in enacting the FLSA, it did not cross any member's mind — even for a moment — that felons serving hard time in prison and working in the process would be covered by this economic protection.
[8]Id.at 1325.
[9]Seealso:Miller v. Dukakis,961 F.2d 7(1st Cir.),cert.denied,___ U.S. ___,113 S.Ct. 666,121 L.Ed.2d 590(1992) (holding that Sexually Dangerous Persons who have been committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center are prisoners for wage purposes, not entitled to minimum wages under the FLSA as employees);Hale v. State of Ariz.,967 F.2d 1356(9th Cir. 1992), rehearingen banc,993 F.2d 1387(9th Cir. 1993), pet. for cert. filed, 62 USLW 3166 (Sept. 1, 1993, case No. 93-353) (while refusing to hold that, as a matter of law, prisoners may never be "employees" of a prison, held that inmates working for a prison, in a program structured by the prison pursuant to state law requiring prisoners to work at hard labor are not "employees" entitled to minimum wages pursuant to the FLSA);Alexander v. Sara, Inc.,721 F.2d 149,150(5th Cir. 1983) (state prison inmates performing work on prison grounds for a profit-making private entity under contract with Dept. of Corrections are not employees entitled to minimum wage coverage under FLSA);Emory v. United States,2 Cl.Ct. 579, 580,aff'd,727 F.2d 1119(Fed. Cir. 1983);Wentworth v. Solem,548 F.2d 773,775(8th Cir. 1977) (FSLA's minimum wage coverage does not extend to convicts working in state prison industries).Alsosee Watson v. Graves,909 F.2d 1549(5th Cir. 1990) (inmates in work release program working for private employers who select the inmates held to be employees entitled to minimum wage coverage of FLSA);Carter v. Dutchess Community College,735 F.2d 8(2nd Cir. 1984) (prisoners as a class are not expressly exempted from FLSA coverage; inmates employed by community college within prison as teaching assistants may be covered under the economic reality test).
[10] InDoty v. Elias,733 F.2d 720(10th Cir. 1984), we held that in determining whether an individual is an "employee" within the meaning of the FLSA, the court must look to the economic realities of the relationship:
. . . The focal point in deciding whether an individual is an employee is whether the individual is economically dependent on the business to which he renders service . . . or is, as a matter of economic fact, in business for himself . . . In applying this test, the courts generally focus on five factors: (1) the degree of control exerted by the alleged employer over the worker, (2) the worker's opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the worker's investment in the business; (4) the permanence of the working relationship; and (5) the degree of skill required to perform the work.
[11]Id.at 722-23.
[12] In our view, the economic reality test was not intended to apply to work performed in the prison by a prison inmate.
[13]AFFIRMED.