Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Rieck v. Cockrell
321 F.3d 487
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2003-02-10
- Topic
- litigation
How later courts describe this case
- Ex Post Facto Clause permitted the application of a Texas statute that required sex offender counseling to a person who was convicted before its effective date
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Rieck v. Cockrell. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 5 opinions
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-40649
Summary Calendar
GEORGE WILLIAM RIECK, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
--------------------
January 21, 2003
Before JONES, DUHÉ, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
George W. Rieck, Jr., Texas prisoner # 654389, was convicted
of indecency with a child and was sentenced to 16 years in prison.
He was released on mandatory supervision, but it was revoked when
he failed to abide by its conditions and was involuntarily
discharged from a sex offender counseling program. He filed the
instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254
petition to challenge the revocation of
his mandatory supervision. The district court denied him relief,
and this court granted him a certificate of appealability on the
issue “whether the revocation of [his] mandatory supervision due to
his failure to comply with the statute requiring him to attend sex
offender counseling which was enacted after he was convicted and
sentenced is a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.”
This court applies an “intent-effects” test to determine
whether a law is punitive and thus violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause. See Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional Center, 253 F.3d 870, 872-73
(5th Cir. 2001). Under this test, “courts ask whether 1) the legislature intended the sanction to be punitive, and 2) the sanction is ‘so punitive’ in effect as to prevent courts from legitimately viewing it as regulatory or civil in nature.”Id.
Our analysis of the law at issue here convinces us that it was
not intended to be punitive and serves important nonpunitive goals.
See id.; see also McKune v. Lile, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2023-26
(2002); Kansas v. Hendricks,421 U.S. 346
, 350 (1997). Rieck has not shown that the state courts acted unreasonably in rejecting this claim. See DiLosa v. Cain,279 F.3d 259, 262
(5th Cir. 2002); see also Lockhart v. Johnson,104 F.3d 54, 56-57
(5th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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