Is Sidney Porterfield v. Ricky Bell, Warden still good law?

Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Sidney Porterfield v. Ricky Bell, Warden

258 F.3d 484

Type: Opinion
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 2001-07-18
Topic: general

How later courts describe this case

stating that the court of appeals obtains jurisdiction even when a certificate of ap-pealability is improvidently granted
remanding motion for certificate of appealability for district court’s analysis of claims
“[I]n granting a certificate of appealability as to all claims, the court did not provide us with any analysis to indicate that it had engaged in the two-pronged inquiry set forth in Slack as to each of the procedurally defaulted claims.”
“Under these circumstances, we believe a review of the district court’s decision [to grant a certificate of appealability] is appropriate, if only to provide guidance to district courts faced with the task of certifying claims for appeal.”
noting “a disturbing lack of uniformity” in applying these standards

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Sidney Porterfield v. Ricky Bell, Warden. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by: 95 opinions

PORTERFIELD v. BELL,258 F.3d 484(6th Cir. 2001)

Sidney PORTERFIELD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ricky BELL, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 01-5107.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

July 18, 2001.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, James D. Todd, Chief District Judge.Page 485

David C. Stebbins, Columbus, OH, William D. Massey, Massey, McClusky Johnson, Memphis, TN, for petitioner-appellant.

Alice B. Lustre, Gordon W. Smith, Asst. Attorney Gen., Michael E. Moore, Glenn R. Pruden, Paul G. Summers, Office of the Attorney General, Nashville, TN, for respondent-appellee.

Before: ALAN E. NORRIS, BATCHELDER, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.

ALAN E. NORRIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BATCHELDER, J., joined. CLAY, J. (pp. 487-88), delivered a separated dissenting opinion.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.

In this capital case, the State of Tennessee, representing respondent Ricky Bell, the warden of the Riverbend Maximum Security Facility, has filed a motion to dismiss a number of claims certified as appealable by the district court pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). The State takes the position that the district court violated the requirements ofSlack v. McDaniel,529 U.S. 473,120 S.Ct. 1595,146 L.Ed.2d 542(2000), when it certified claims that it had decided adversely to petitioner on procedural grounds. While we deny the State's motion to dismiss, we remand this cause to the district court to permit it to make the kind of individualized determination as to each procedurally defaulted claim that we believeSlackrequires.

Before proceeding, we must first decide whether this court should review challenges to the grant of a certificate of appealability or simply decide the certified claims on their merits. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has noted, a certificate of appealability, even if improvidently granted, vests jurisdiction in the court of appeals.UnitedStates v. Marcello,212 F.3d 1005,1008(7th Cir. 2000). Under normal circumstances, considerations of judicial economy will discourage review of certificates of appealability: the district court will have already invested substantial time in the certification process; the parties may have already briefed the merits of the claims; and review by this court would not only duplicate the district court's efforts, in capital cases such as the casesub judice,it will further delay an already lengthy process. In this case, however, none of these reasons is present. The parties have not submitted merits briefs to this court and the district court has not engaged in any individualized assessment of whether, pursuant toSlack,"jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling."Slack,529 U.S. at 484,120 S.Ct. 1595. Under these circumstances, we believe a review of the district court's decision is appropriate, if only to provide guidance to district courts faced with the task of certifying claims for appeal.

Since the enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a litigant who seeks to initiate an appeal of the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition must satisfy thePage 486following certificate of appealability requirements:

(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from —

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). In parsing this statutory language, the Court inSlackfirst observed that "Congress expressed no intention to allow trial court procedural error to bar vindication of substantial constitutional rights on appeal."Id.,529 U.S. at 483,120 S.Ct. 1595. Nonetheless, the Court went on to hold:

When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. This construction gives meaning to Congress' requirement that a prisoner demonstrate substantial underlying constitutional claims and is in conformity with the meaning of the "substantial showing" standard provided inBarefoot, supra,at 893, and n. 4,463 U.S. 880,103 S.Ct. 3383,77 L.Ed.2d 1090(1983), and adopted by Congress in AEDPA. Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further. In such a circumstance, no appeal would be warranted.

Id.at 484,120 S.Ct. 1595. Furthermore, the Court went on to underscore that this inquiry has two components, "one directed at the underlying constitutional claims and one directed at the district court's procedural holding."Id.at 485,120 S.Ct. 1595.

In the case before us, the district court granted summary judgment to the respondent on a number of claims based upon procedural default. Yet, in granting a certificate of appealability as to all claims, the court did not provide us with any analysis to indicate that it had engaged in the two-pronged inquiry set forth inSlackas to each of the procedurally defaulted claims. Rather, the court simply ordered, "In accordance with the standard set forth inBarefoot v. Estelle,463 U.S. 880,893,103 S.Ct. 3383,77 L.Ed.2d 1090(1983), andLyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.,105 F.3d 1063,1073(6th Cir. 1997), the Court hereby GRANTS a certificate of appealability as to each of the claims raised in the petition." Order, January 17, 2001.

After respondent filed a motion for reconsideration in light ofSlack,the district court issued a second order denying the motion:

While the Court does not take the Supreme Court's decision inSlacklightly, the petitioner in that case was not under a sentence of death. It is this Court's opinion that certificates of appealabilityPage 487should not be unduly restricted in death penalty cases.

Order, February 2, 2001. While we do not necessarily disagree with the view that trial courts should err on the side of caution when it comes to the certification of claims that arguably have merit, there is nothing to suggest thatSlackdoes not apply with equal force in capital cases.

Since the enactment of AEDPA, this court has noted a disturbing lack of uniformity throughout the districts of our circuit with respect to how trial courts are to determine the extent to which certificates of appealability should issue. The approaches vary from a blanket grant as to all issues, as in this case, to blanket denials. Both of these approaches undermine the gate keeping function of certificates of appealability, which ideally should separate the constitutional claims that merit the close attention of counsel and this court from those claims that have little or no viability. Moreover, because the district court is already deeply familiar with the claims raised by petitioner, it is in a far better position from an institutional perspective than this court to determine which claims should be certified for appeal.

Accordingly, we vacate the certificate of appealability granted by the district court in this case and remand the matter in order to permit the court to engage in the reasoned assessment of each procedurally defaulted claim as required bySlack.Respondent's motion to dismiss is likewise denied.

CLAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

DISSENT

Although I agree with the majority that we retain jurisdiction to exercise our discretion over a certificate of appealability,see United States v. Marcello,212 F.3d 1005,1007-08(7th Cir. 2000), I disagree with the majority's decision to vacate the certificate of appealability granted to Petitioner by the district court in this case. The district court was obviously aware of the requirements ofSlack v. McDaniel,529 U.S. 473,120 S.Ct. 1595,146 L.Ed.2d 542(2000), but applied them liberally inasmuch as this is a capital case. Because I agree with the district court's approach, I see no reason to remand the matter for further consideration. I therefore respectfully dissent.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") allows for the issuance of a certificate of appealability when "the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right[,]"see28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the AEDPA further requires the applicant to make such a showing with respect to each issue he seeks to raise on appeal.See28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). InSlack v. McDaniel,the Supreme Court noted that "[e]xcept for substituting the word `constitutional' for the word `federal,' § 2253 is a codification of the CPC [certificate of probable cause] standard announced inBarefootv. Estelle,463 U.S. 880,894,103 S.Ct. 3383,77 L.Ed.2d 1090[(1983)]."See529 U.S. at 483,120 S.Ct. 1595. The Court went on to state that "we give the language found in § 2253(c) the meaning ascribed it inBarefoot,with due note for the substitution of the word `constitutional.'"Id.Accordingly, while relying onBarefoot,the Court held that

[t]o obtain a COA [certificate of appealability] under § 2253(c), a habeas prisoner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a demonstration that, underBarefoot,includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were "`adequatePage 488to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'"Barefoot,463 U.S. at 893, and n. 4,103 S.Ct. 3383("sum[ming] up" the "`substantial showing'" standard).

Id.at 483-84,120 S.Ct. 1595(alteration inSlack). Although not addressed by the Court inSlack,likely becauseSlackdid not involve a capital matter, it is important to noteBarefoot'scommand that "[i]n a capital case, the nature of the penalty is a proper consideration in determining whether to issue a certificate of [appealability]. . . .[,]"Barefoot,463 U.S. at 893,103 S.Ct. 3383, which I find no less controlling thanBarefoot'sother commands upon which the Supreme Court relied inSlack.

In the matter at hand, the district court noted in its order denying Respondent's motion for reconsideration of the certificate of appealability that it was aware ofSlack'srequirements, but that the court was also of the belief that "certificates of appealability should not be unduly restricted in death penalty cases."See Porterfield v. Bell,No. 97-2362-To, at 2 (W.D.Tenn. Feb. 6, 2001) (Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Certificate of Appealability). Indeed, the district court's decision was in keeping withSlackandBarefoot,and in my opinion, remanding the matter back to the district court for further consideration underSlackserves no useful purpose but to undermine the court's decision to applySlackliberally in a capital case. Again, althoughSlackmay not state that it should be applied liberally in capital cases,Barefoot— the case upon whichSlackrelies and § 2253 is based — clearly states that the nature of the penalty should be considered when issuing a certificate of appealability.SeeBarefoot,463 U.S. at 893,103 S.Ct. 3383. Several of our sister circuits which have reviewed certificates of appealability in capital cases in the aftermath ofSlackhave likewise considered the nature of the penalty involved, and have thus applied theSlackstandard liberally.See Petrocelli v.Angelone,248 F.3d 877,884(9th Cir. 2001);see also Peoplesv. Haley,227 F.3d 1342,1344(11th Cir. 2000);Alexander v.Johnson,211 F.3d 895,897(5th Cir. 2000).

Therefore, contrary to the majority, I would deny Respondent's motion to dismiss and would proceed with the matter.