Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Roger Anthony Brown v. James Morgan, Warden James B. Mitchell Doug Sapp

209 F.3d 595

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
2000-04-07
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • noting that statute of limitations to prisoner’s civil rights action was tolled during period which prisoner was exhausting state remedies
  • “[T]he statute of limitations which applied to Brown’s civil rights action was tolled for the period during which his available state remedies were being exhausted.” (emphasis added)
  • “[T]he statute of limitations which applied to Brown's civil rights action was tolled for the period during which his available state remedies were being exhausted.”
  • “Prisoners are . . . prevented from bringing suit in federal court ‘such administrative remedies as are available.’” (emphasis added)
  • “[T]he statute of limitations which applied to [plaintiff’s] civil rights action was tolled for the period during which his available state remedies were being exhausted.”
  • "the statute of limitations which applied to [the prisoner's] civil rights action was tolled for the period during which his available state remedies were being exhausted"
  • in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, “the statute of limitations which applied to [plaintiff’s] civil rights action was tolled for the period during which his available state remedies were being exhausted”
  • when a claimant is required to exhaust such remedies before bringing suit, the limitations period is tolled while he does so, as long as such remedies are pursued diligently and in good faith

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Cited by
185 opinions
BROWN v. MORGAN,209 F.3d 595(6th Cir. 2000)
ROGER ANTHONY BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES MORGAN, WARDEN; JAMES B.
MITCHELL; DOUG SAPP, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 99-5457
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Submitted: February 3, 2000
Decided and Filed: April 7, 2000
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
Page 596
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington. No. 98-00492 — Karl S. Forester, District Judge.
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF:Roger Anthony Brown, West Liberty, Kentucky, pro se.
Before: MERRITT and MOORE, Circuit Judges; HEYBURN, District Judge.fn*
OPINION
MERRITT, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from pro se Kentucky prisoner Roger Anthony Brown's civil rights suit against prison officials for allegedly denying him access to the courts. The District Court dismissed his civil rights suit as frivolous for failure to comply with the statute of limitations pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The case has been referred to this panel pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. We unanimously agree that oral argument is not needed.SeeFed.R.App.P.34(a).

Brown, proceeding in forma pauperis, claimed in a complaint dated November 30, 1998, that several Kentucky corrections officials denied him access to the courts by denying him access to legal books and legal aides. The District Court dismissed Brown's suit, concluding that it was barred by Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations. In his timely appeal, Brown argues that the district court erred by dismissing his suit as barred by the statute of limitations. The defendants have not been served. We reviewde novoa judgment dismissing a suit as frivolous under § 1915A.See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,114 F.3d 601,604(6th Cir. 1997).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act amended42 U.S.C. § 1997eto provide: "No action shall be broughtwith respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1999) (emphasis added). This language unambiguously requires exhaustion as a mandatory threshold requirement in prison litigation. Prisoners are therefore prevented from bringing suit in federal court for the period of time required to exhaust "such administrative remedies as are available." For this reason, the statute of limitations which applied to Brown's civil rights action was tolled for the period during which his available state remedies were being exhausted.See Harris v. Hegmann,198 F.3d 153,157-59(5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam);Cooper v. Nielson,194 F.3d 1316,1999WL 719514 (9th Cir. (Cal.)).

In the case before us, it is not clear when the period of exhaustion expired. In order to properly determine the last possible date on which Brown could file hisPage 597complaint, it is necessary to determine the period of time during which the limitations period was tolled in order for Brown to pursue his administrative remedies. Therefore, we REVERSE the District Court's dismissal and REMAND in order that the District Court may consider and decide the period during which the statute of limitations was tolled and for such other proceedings as may be necessary.
  1. The Honorable John G. Heyburn II, United States District Judge for the Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation. ↩