Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.
844 F.2d 170
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1988-04-13
- Topic
- general
PER CURIAM: We again consider this case on remand from the Supreme Court's decision in *171Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987). In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court held that § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), does not confer federal jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations, but does permit such suits when there is a pattern of intermittent violations, even if there is no violation at the moment suit is filed. Upon due consideration of the supplemental memoranda filed by the parties, we remand to the district court for further findings on whether citizen-plaintiffs have proved an ongoing violation within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s decision. We do not think that the deci-sional process would be aided by further oral argument.
Citator
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- Authority status
- pending
- Cited by
- 16 opinions
James Thornton, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., New York City, and Jeter M. Watson, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., Ashland, Va., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Joseph E. Lees, Dept. of Justice (F. Henry Habicht II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nancy B. Firestone and David C. Shilton, Dept. of Justice, Glenn Unterberger, Elizabeth Ojala, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, E.P.A., Bruce J. Terris, Nathalie V. Black, Washington, D.C., on brief), for amicus curiae.
an intermittent polluter — one who violates permit limitations one month of every three — is just as much "in violation" of the Act as a continuous violator.
[3]108 S.Ct. at 384.
[4] The Supreme Court remanded in light of its holding that "§ 505 confers jurisdiction over citizen suits when citizen-plaintiffs make a good faith allegation of continuous or intermittent violation. . . ."108 S.Ct. at 385. As the Supreme Court observed(id.),we perceived "a very sound argument" that plaintiff's allegations of continuing violations were made in good faith, but expressly declined to rule on the district court's finding of a sufficient good faith allegation.791 F.2d at 308n. 9. We must now review the district court's finding that citizen-plaintiffs made a good faith allegation of ongoing violation sufficient to maintain jurisdiction.
[5] We also think that we are confronted with an additional issue on remand. Consistent with the language of the majority opinion, we must also review the district court's decision for a determination of whether citizen-plaintiffs have proved their allegation of continuous or intermittent violations, as required in order to prevail.See108 S.Ct. at 386.1
[8] Consistent with the guidance of the Supreme Court majority and concurring opinions, the district court may wish to consider whether remedial actions were taken to cure violations, theexanteprobability that such remedial measures would be effective, and any other evidence presented during the proceedings that bears on whether the risk of defendant's continued violation had been completely eradicated when citizen-plaintiffs filed suit.
[9]REMANDED.
- The Supreme Court Justices who concurred in parts of the majority opinion and the judgment suggest that because the majority views subject matter jurisdiction to be met by good-faith allegations, the majority implies that a "plaintiff can never be called on to prove that jurisdictional allegation."108 S.Ct. at 386-87. We think that the majority does expressly require that a citizen-plaintiff prove the existence of an ongoing violation (continuous or intermittent) in order to prevail.108 S.Ct. at 386. The majority and the Justices concurring separately differ as to when this proof would be required, with the concurrence requiring proof of an ongoing violation as a threshold jurisdictional matter. ↩