Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Roger Ammann
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Roger Ammann, 828 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1987)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1987-09-14
- Topic
- commercial
How later courts describe this case
- explaining the rule of “separate accrual” provides a new limitations period for each distinct 18 injury arising from a RICO violation, beginning when the plaintiff knew or should have known of 19 the injury
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Roger Ammann. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 35 opinions
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INS. CO. v. AMMANN,828 F.2d 4(9th Cir. 1987)
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. ROGER AMMANN, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
No. 86-6275.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submittedfn*September 14, 1987.
Decided September 14, 1987.
K. David Olsen, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellee.
Before KENNEDY and PREGERSON, Circuit Judges, and CROCKER,fn**Senior District Judge.
[2] The district court applied a three-year limitation period beginning when the plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury complained of.Compton v. Ide,732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984). The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that State Farm's and Farmers' claims were time barred because "the plaintiffs knew this pattern of racketeering long before three years before filing the complaint on October 4, 1985. . . . [They knew] back in 1982, '76, '75; long before the complaint was filed October 4, 1985."
[3] The Supreme Court decidedAgency Holding Corp. v. Malley-DuffAssociates,___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987), after the district courtPage 5granted summary judgment. Although the Court did not rule on when the civil RICO limitations period begins, it did establish a uniform four-year limitations period. Because the district court applied a three-year period, and because it is possible that the district court would have decided differently if it applied a four-year period, we reverse and remand for a disposition of the motion for summary judgment in accordance withMalley-DuffandCompton,732 F.2d at 1433 (as to each injury civil RICO limitations period "begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action").
[4] REVERSED and REMANDED.
[7] We hold that as to each injury the civil RICO statute of limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.Anteat 5. This rule of separate accrual has not been announced by the Supreme Court, which specifically declined to address the issue inAgency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff Assocs.,___ U.S. ___, ___, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2767, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987), nor by our circuit in a published opinion. The closest we have come was inCompton v. Ide,732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984), in which we announced the rule that the RICO cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury. Because all the relevant events occurred outside the limitations period in that case, however,see id.at 1432, we did not have occasion to decide the extent to which separate injuries sustained within the limitations period might be actionable despite the existence of some time-barred causes of action.
[8] The basis for our holding comes not fromMalley-DufforCompton,but fromHennegan v. Pacifico Creative Serv., Inc.,787 F.2d 1299(9th Cir.),cert. denied,___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 279, 93 L.Ed.2d 254 (1986), andGibson v. United States,781 F.2d 1334(9th Cir. 1986),cert. denied,___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 928, 93 L.Ed.2d 979 (1987).Henneganwas an antitrust case, andGibsonwas a section 1983 case; but as we have said, the same federal accrual rule applies in RICO actions as in section 1983 and antitrust actions.Compton,732 F.2d at 1433. The rule is that a cause of action accrues when new overt acts occur within the limitations period, even if a conspiracy was formed and other acts were committed outside the limitations period.Hennegan,787 F.2d at 1301;Gibson,781 F.2d at 1340. A corollary rule is that damages may not be recovered for injuries sustained as a result of acts committed outside the limitations period.Hennegan,787 F.2d at 1302;Gibson,781 F.2d at 1340.
[9] These rules, applied to this case, yield a clear result. The plaintiffs may recover damages for acts committed after October 4, 1981, four years before the filing of the complaint, but they may not recover damages for acts occurring before that date. As I understand it, this must be the essence of our holding.