Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

John Murray v. Branch Motor Express Company and Local 557, International Brotherhood of Teamsters

John Murray v. Branch Motor Express Co. & Loc. 557, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 723 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1983)

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1983-12-20
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • "DelCostello was not a clear break from prior law and notice of a shorter period being applicable was given in Mitchell."
  • "retroactive application of DelCostello would further the policy of prompt settlement"
  • "[T]he purpose of the DelCostello rule require[s] retroactive application."

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed John Murray v. Branch Motor Express Company and Local 557, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Authority status
pending
Cited by
35 opinions
MURRAY v. BRANCH MOTOR EXP. CO.,723 F.2d 1146(4th Cir. 1983)
JOHN MURRAY, APPELLANT, v. BRANCH MOTOR EXPRESS COMPANY AND LOCAL 557,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, APPELLEES.
No. 82-1202.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted October 3, 1983.
Decided December 20, 1983.
Page 1147
Harry Goldman, Jr., Richard P. Neuworth, Baltimore, Md., for appellant.

James A. Matthews, Jr., Francis M. Milone, James F. Anderson, Morgan, Lewis Bockius, Philadelphia, Pa., Frank W. Stegman, Gebhardt Smith, Baltimore, Md., for Branch Motor Exp. Co.

Bernard W. Rubenstein, Carl S. Yaller, Edelman Rubenstein, P.A., Baltimore, Md., for Local 557, International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
Before WINTER, Chief Judge, CHAPMAN, Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge:
[1] After John Murray was discharged by Branch Motor Express Company, his union filed a grievance on his behalf. When the parties failed to resolve the dispute, the matter was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that Murray's discharge was proper in an award dated April 22, 1976.

[2] On September 13, 1978, Murray filed an action under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,29 U.S.C. § 185, charging Branch with breach of the collective bargaining agreement, and the union with breach of its duty of fair representation by mishandling the matter. The district court granted summary judgment for Branch and the union because, in addition to the claim's lack of merit, the action was barred by Maryland's 30-day statute of limitations for vacation of arbitration awards which was made applicable byUnited Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,451 U.S. 56,101 S.Ct. 1559,67 L.Ed.2d 732(1981). While Murray's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that the six-month statute of limitations contained in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,29 U.S.C. § 160, applies to actions brought by an employee for breach of contract and breach of fair representation.DelCostello v. International Brotherhood ofTeamsters,___ U.S. ___,103 S.Ct. 2281,76 L.Ed.2d 476(1983).

[3] Generally, "an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision."Thorpe v. Housing Authorityof the City of Durham,393 U.S. 268,281,89 S.Ct. 518,525,21 L.Ed.2d 474(1969).See United States v. Schooner Peggy,5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110,2 L.Ed. 49(1801). Murray contends, however, thatDelCostelloshould not be applied retroactively, relying onChevron Oil Co. v. Huson,404 U.S. 97,106-07,92 S.Ct. 349,355,30 L.Ed.2d 296(1971).Page 1148

[4] We are persuaded byPerez v. Dana Corp.,718 F.2d 581(3d Cir. 1983), thatDelCostelloshould be applied retroactively.fn*In that case, the court found that, applying theChevrontest, the six-month statute of limitations was not an abrupt and fundamental shift in a doctrine on which the plaintiff relied because the prior law was erratic and inconsistent. The court also found that the purpose of theDelCostellorule and the equities of the plaintiff's case required retroactive application of the decision. We can only add that the equities of the instant case, including the fact that Murray waited almost 29 months to file suit, do not change our conclusion. Murray's claims against Branch and the union are barred by the six-month statute of limitations, and the judgment of the district court dismissing the action is affirmed.
  1. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, without discussion of the issue, have appliedDelCostelloretroactively.Ernst v.Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc.,717 F.2d 1036(7th Cir. 1983);Hand v. International Chemical Workers Union,712 F.2d 1350(11th Cir. 1983).See also Curtis v. International Brotherhood ofTeamsters, Local299,716 F.2d 360(6th Cir. 1983) (dicta). ↩