Opinion · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Crockett v. Reagan
720 F.2d 1355
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1983-11-18
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- affirming the trial court’s reasoning in dismissing the case because it “did not have the resources or expertise to resolve the particular factual disputes involved in this case”
- affirming dismissal of case challenging the President’s use of military force under the War Powers Resolution on political question grounds because “Congress had taken no action which would suggest that it viewed our involvement in El Salvador as subject to the WPR”
- U.S. advisors in El Salvador
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Crockett v. Reagan. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Authority status
- pending
- Cited by
- 29 opinions
CROCKETT v. REAGAN,720 F.2d 1355(D.C. Cir. 1983)
GEORGE CROCKETT, JR., INDIVIDUALLY IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE UNITED
STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. RONALD WILSON
REAGAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ET AL.
No. 82-2461.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued October 18, 1983.
Decided November 18, 1983.
As Amended November 18, 1983.
Vincent M. Garvey, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom J. Paul McGrath, Asst. Atty. Gen., Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Atty. and Brook Hedge, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellees. Neil H. Koslowe, Washington, D.C., Atty. for Dept. of Justice also entered an appearance for appellees.
Steven M. Schneebaum and Keith R. Fisher, Washington, D.C., were on the briefPage 1356for Intern. Human Rights Law Group, amicus curiae, urging reversal.
Sara E. Lister and Sarah E. Burns, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for Nat. Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of America, et al., amici curiae, urging reversal.
Alan Dranitzke, Washington, D.C., was on brief, for Catholic Peace Fellowship, et al., amici curiae, urging reversal.
Jose Acosta, El Paso, Tex., was on brief, for Border Ass'n for Refugees from Central America, amicus curiae, urging reversal.
Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar and Nicholas E. Calio, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for Senators Jepsen, et al., amici curiae, urging affirmance.
Before EDWARDS and BORK, Circuit Judges, and LUMBARD,fn*Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
[2] The District Court dismissed all of plaintiffs' claims without resolution of the merits of their suit.Crockett v. Reagan,558 F.Supp. 893(D.D.C. 1982). Judge Joyce Green held that the war powers issue presented a nonjusticiable political question. In particular, Judge Green found that the trial court did not have the resources or expertise to resolve the particular factual disputes involved in this case,id.at 898, 899, and that Congress had taken no action which would suggest that it viewed our involvement in El Salvador as subject toPage 1357the WPR.Id.at 899. Judge Green's dismissal of the FAA claim was based on the equitable discretion doctrine, which counsels judicial restraint where a congressional plaintiff's dispute is primarily with his or her fellow legislators.Riegle v. FederalOpen Market Committee,656 F.2d 873,881(D.C. Cir.),cert.denied,454 U.S. 1082,102 S.Ct. 636,70 L.Ed.2d 616(1981).
[3] We have reviewed with care the parties' contentions and submissions and we can find no error in the judgment of the District Court. We therefore affirm the dismissal of this case for the reasons stated by the District Court.
[4]So ordered.
[7] I also adhere to my view that separation-of-powers considerations are properly addressed as part of the standing requirement. InRiegle v. Federal Open Market Committee,656 F.2d 873,879-80(D.C. Cir.),cert. denied,454 U.S. 1082,102 S.Ct. 636,70 L.Ed.2d 616(1981), a panel of this court concluded that separation-of-powers concerns have no bearing on standing analysis. Instead, theRieglecourt created a "doctrine of equitable discretion" within which those concerns would be addressed.656 F.2d at 881. InVander Jagt,the panel majority expanded the doctrine and assumed the virtually "unconfined judicial power to decide or not to decide" cases.699 F.2d at 1185(Bork, J., concurring). I do not consider myself bound by the panel decisions inRiegleandVander Jagt.Prior to those cases, this circuit had worked out a "fairly definite formula to relate separation-of-powers concerns to the problem of legislator standing."Vander Jagt,699 F.2d at 1180-81(Bork, J., concurring).RiegleandVander Jagtpurported to change the law of legislator standing in this circuit without submitting the issue to the full court. Under the established practice of this court, that may not be done.See Irons v. Diamond,670 F.2d 265,268n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1981).Page 407
- Sitting by designation pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (Supp. V 1981). ↩
- 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548(1976). Section 4(a) of the WPR,50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (1976) provides:
In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced —
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation; the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth —
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
↩ - U.S. CONST. art.1, §8, cl.11. ↩
- 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2443 (1976 Supp. V 1981). Section 502B of the FAA prohibits security assistance to "any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights," unless the President certifies that "extraordinary circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance."22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981). ↩