Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Freddie J. Mitchell v. Johnny Inman
682 F.2d 886
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1982-08-09
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- holding the district court should not dismiss the action of a pro se plaintiff based on a local rule when “there is nothing to indicate [the] plaintiff ever was made aware of it prior to dismissal”
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Freddie J. Mitchell v. Johnny Inman. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 19 opinions
MITCHELL v. INMAN,682 F.2d 886(11th Cir. 1982)
FREDDIE J. MITCHELL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JOHNNY INMAN, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
No. 80-7861.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
August 9, 1982.
Page 887
Paul L. Hanes, Atlanta, Ga. (Court-appointed), for plaintiff-appellant.
Webb, Young, Daniel Murphy, P.C., Harold T. Daniel, Jr., Peter A. Schuller, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.
Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, RONEY and WOODfn*, Circuit Judges.
[2] While the facts are confused and largely undeveloped, the following emerges from the record, oral argument, and the parties' post-argument submissions. Prior to commencement of this action in federal court, plaintiff filed a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC against the Fulton County Personnel Board, alleging the same retaliatory extension of his probationary period that is the subject matter of the instant litigation. Approximately one month after the federal court complaint was filed, the EEOC issued a determination of no reasonable cause to believe the truth of the retaliation charge. Roughly one and one-half years later, the Department of Justice issued a notice of right to sue letter.
[3] While the plaintiff'spro secivil rights complaint specifically cites42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983,1985and1986, read liberally, it invokes Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000eet seq.,as well.See Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519,92 S.Ct. 594,30 L.Ed.2d 652(1972). Oral argument proceeded on that basis.
[4] It is impossible to discern from the conclusory dismissal order whether plaintiff's Title VII claim was even considered by the district court. Without passing on the propriety of Local Rule 91.2per se,we note generally that it should not serve as a basis for dismissing apro secivil rights complaint where, as here, there is nothing to indicate plaintiff ever was made aware of it prior to dismissal. Moreover, although defendants represented at oral argument that because plaintiff never received a notice of right to sue his Title VII claim should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it now appears that in fact a right to sue letter was issued.
[5] The state of the record in this case is such that meaningful review of the district court's order of dismissal is not possible. Accordingly, we vacate the court's order and remand for reconsideration. The attorney appointed to argue the appeal and the able attorneys for the defendants should be able to quickly put this case in such a posture that the district court can give meaningful consideration to the plaintiff's claims. If, as it appears may be the case, plaintiff has filed other actions raising thePage 888same or similar claims, the district court should review them for possible consolidation under Fed.R.Civ.P.42. We express no opinion one way or the other on the merits of this cause.
[6] VACATED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
- Honorable Harlington Wood, Jr., U.S. Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. ↩