Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Mary B. Johnson v. Richard H. Snyder and Marion J. Snyder

Mary B. Johnson v. Richard H. Snyder & Marion J. Snyder, 639 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1981)

Type: Opinion
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1981-01-23
Topic: employee-benefits-and-executive-compensation

How later courts describe this case

“[w]hile relevant, the nominal nature of [a plaintiff’s] recovery speaks only to the amount of attorney’s fees permissible, not whether the party is eligible to recover attorney’s fees.”
judgment final although amount of attorney’s fees not yet determined

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Mary B. Johnson v. Richard H. Snyder and Marion J. Snyder. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by: 27 opinions

JOHNSON v. SNYDER,639 F.2d 316(6th Cir. 1981)

MARY B. JOHNSON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. RICHARD H. SNYDER AND MARION J.

SNYDER, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

No. 79-3459.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued December 17, 1980.

Decided January 23, 1981.

Page 317

Robert J. Potter, Bowman Potter, Toledo, Ohio, for defendants-appellants.

Joseph R. Tafelski, James M. Klein, Toledo, Ohio, Avery Friedman, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

Before ENGEL, MERRITT and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

[1] Plaintiff, Mary B. Johnson, sued Richard H. and Marion J. Snyder for damages and injunctive relief under the Fair Housing Act,42 U.S.C. § 3601et seq.,and under42 U.S.C. § 1981and §1982, alleging that the defendants, owners of an apartment building, had refused to show her an apartment for rent because she is black. After a temporary restraining order was issued, Johnson withdrew her application for a temporary injunction when the defendants agreed to show her the apartment. The case ultimately went to trial, and the jury awarded damages in the amount of $1.00.

[2] Thereafter plaintiff, whose complaint prayed for attorney's fees, filed a motion for attorney's fees pursuant to42 U.S.C. § 1988. At the time this motion for attorney's fees was filed, the judgment on the jury verdict had become final. Plaintiff had not, pursuant to Rule59(e), Fed.R.Civ.Proc., moved to alter or amend the judgment within ten days after her motion for a new trial had been denied and had not, pursuant to Rule4, Fed.R.App.Proc., within thirty days thereafter, filed a notice of appeal.

[3] Defendants contended that the district court had no authority to entertain the motion for attorney's fees. The district court disagreed, and after a hearing, awarded such fees in the amount of $8,600.00 and costs of $118.06.470 F. Supp. 972(N.D.Ohio, W.D. 1979). Defendants have appealed, contending, again, that the motion for attorney's fees came too late and that, in any event, the amount awarded constituted an abuse of discretion.

[4] We conclude that, as to the amount of the fees, such did not amount to an abuse of discretion; the award was based upon compensation at the rate of $50.00 per hour for the time consumed by the attorneys.

[5] Defendants contend that the motion for attorney's fees came too late because plaintiff did not timely file motion to alter or amend judgment or a notice of appeal.

[6] On this issue, we agree with the holdings of the Fifth Circuit inKnighton v. Watkins,616 F.2d 795(1980), andVan Ooteghemv. Gray,628 F.2d 488(1980), that attorney's fees awarded under § 1988 are awarded as costs and are not controlled by the time limitations that defendants here assert. We recognize that the First Circuit inWhite v. New Hampshire Department of EmploymentSecurity,629 F.2d 697(1980), refused to followKnighton,supra,but we conclude thatKnightonis the better reasoned opinion.

[7] The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.Page 318