Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

John C. Shimman, Cross-Appellant v. John Frank, Cross-Appellees

633 F.2d 468

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1980-10-01
Topic
bankruptcy

KEITH, Circuit Judge. ORDER In this case, we affirmed a finding of liability as to all defendants except the International Union of Operating Engineers. We reasoned that given the local nature of the controversy and the absence of any evidence of international participation, the International Union could not be liable. We also declined to rule on the plaintiffs cross-appeal that the International violated plaintiff’s rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 for the reason that liability was established under the Landrum-Griffin Act and the pendant state claim. The plaintiff now claims that we must determine whether the International is liable for its “inaction” under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986.

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Cited by
7 opinions
SHIMMAN v. FRANK,633 F.2d 468(6th Cir. 1980)
JOHN C. SHIMMAN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CROSS-APPELLANT, v. JOHN FRANK ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, CROSS-APPELLEES.
Nos. 77-3339, 77-3343.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
October 1, 1980.
N. Victor Goodman, James F. DeLeone, Topper, Alloway, Goodman, DeLeone Duffey, Stephen Lewis, Columbus, Ohio, for defendants-appellants, cross-appellees.Page 469

Cary Rodman Cooper, Hayward, Cooper, Straub, Walinski, Cramer Co., T. Scott Johnston, Toledo, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.
Before ENGEL and KEITH, Circuit Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.
KEITH, Circuit Judge.
[1] ORDER
[2] In this case, we affirmed a finding of liability as to all defendants except the International Union of Operating Engineers. We reasoned that given the local nature of the controversy and the absence of any evidence of international participation, the International Union could not be liable. We also declined to rule on the plaintiff's cross-appeal that the International violated plaintiff's rights under42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and1986for the reason that liability was established under the Landrum-Griffin Act and the pendant state claim. The plaintiff now claims that we must determine whether the International is liable for its "inaction" under42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and1986.

[3] We think it clear from our opinion that the International Union is no more liable for its alleged "inaction" under42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and1986then under the Landrum-Griffin Act or Ohio tort law. As we noted in our opinion, inRizzo v. Goode,423 U.S. 362,96 S.Ct. 598,46 L.Ed.2d 561(1976), the Supreme Court declined to find certain city officials liable for inaction under42 U.S.C. § 1983, a sister statute to42 U.S.C. § 1985and1986. The facts of this case are less compelling than the facts inRizzo.There are certainly situations where inaction can lead to liability under the civil rights act. See the excellent discussion inTurpin v. Mailet,619 F.2d 196(2nd Cir., 1980). This case simply does not present such a situation.

[4] The petition for rehearing,625 F.2d 80(6th Cir., 1980), is denied.