Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Schroble v. Lehigh Valley R.
62 F.2d 993
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1933-02-06
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- “[T]he instruction about the burden of proof was confused by the prior statement.”
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SCHROBLE v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. CO.,62 F.2d 993(2nd Cir. 1933)
SCHROBLE v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. CO.
No. 8.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
February 6, 1933.
Action by Barbara Schroble, as executrix of the estate of William Schroble, deceased, against the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff for $28,103.90, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
This action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA §§ 51-59) by the widow of William Schroble as executrix and sole beneficiary to recover damages for the death of her husband, which occurred on February 12, 1931, as a result of his being pinned under a caboose which was overturned when struck by the derailed cars of a passing freight train operated by the defendant railroad company.
The complaint alleged that the cars became derailed and the caboose was overturned because of the negligence of the defendant and its agents and by reason of defects and insufficiencies in the track, roadbeds, switches, and other appliances, and in the brakes and equipment of the cars, because the train was operated at an excessive and negligent rate of speed, because the defendant failed to have proper, sufficient, and efficient brakes and braking appliances and equipment on one of the cars which became derailed, because it failed properly to inspect the cars and to discover the condition of the braking appliances and other appurtenances and failed to remedy and repair them, and failedPage 994fully to comply with the Safety Appliance Acts (45 USCA § 1 et seq.) in regard to the brakes, braking equipment, and appliances. The answer contained a general denial of the acts of negligence and the failure to comply with the Safety Appliance Acts.
In the early morning of February 12, 1931, Schroble and a crew in which he was a brakeman were engaged in switching cars in defendant's railroad yard at Coxton, Pa. A freight train known as P.M. 1, consisting of an engine and some thirty cars, came along a track known as the Mountain Cut-Off, stopped at a signal post about five hundred yards from the point of the accident, and proceeded thence along a track known as track 4. The decedent's engine and caboose, with some cars attached, had backed onto track 10 in order to get out of the way of P.M. 1, and one of the members of decedent's crew had thrown the switch to track 4 so that P.M. 1 could proceed down that track. Decedent was standing beside the caboose of the train on track 10. As P.M. 1 proceeded along track 4, fire or sparks were observed flying from some place in the vicinity of the brake rigging of one of the cars (fol. 135), the noise of the wheels pounding across ties was heard shortly after, and car Michigan Central No. 82355 and two Lehigh Valley cars were derailed and broke away from the train. One of the derailed cars continued on up track 4 a distance of about fifty feet. Two of the other cars ran across two tracks adjacent to track 4 and over to track 10, where they struck the caboose by which Schroble was standing, overturned it, and pinned him under the step.
There was testimony by one Howley that after the accident he examined the brake rigging on the derailed car that had run up track 4 and from which he had seen the sparks flying and that he found one pair of wheels, one truck and the brake, the skid that the brake goes in, the brake key, and the brake hanger, missing on this car. He also testified that he found a part of the brake rigging in such a position that it would have dragged on the ground had the car then been in operation, that he found marks in the snow and on the ties between the rails of track 4 for some distance back of switch No. 4 at which the cars had become derailed, and that the brake rigging would have made such marks if it had dragged along the track. He said that this trail in the snow ran back of the switch for a distance of about one hundred yards. There was further testimony that the sparks near the brake rigging were seen prior to the derailment and that they were caused "by iron rubbing against iron, or iron rubbing against wood." The plaintiff contends that some part of a power brake hung down and dragged so as to cause the derailment as the train went over the switch.
Evidence was introduced that there was a rule of the defendant against running cars in this railroad yard at a speed of more than fifteen miles an hour, and that the train P.M. 1 was running at twenty miles an hour at the time when the cars were derailed.
Testimony was offered and excluded showing several inspections of the power brakes and appurtenances on Michigan Central No. 82355 within two days prior to the accident; but evidence was received that a running inspection of all the cars in train P.M. 1 was made a few minutes before the accident and no defects in the brakes were found.
The trial judge left two questions to the jury: (1) Whether any negligence of the defendant caused the death of the decedent; and (2) whether his death was caused by violation of the Safety Appliance Act.
From a judgment entered upon a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant has appealed.
John C. Robinson, of New York City (John C. Robinson and Morris A. Wainger, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before MANTON, AUGUSTUS N. HAND, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.
The violation of the Safety Appliance Acts which plaintiff relies on is apparently based on sections 1, 3, and 9 of title 45 of the United States Code (45 USCA §§ 1, 3, 9). Section 1 requires that no train shall be run which has not a sufficient number of cars in it so equipped with power brakes that the engineer can control its speed without requiring brakemen to use the common hand brake for that purpose. Section 3 provides that any railroad which shall have equipped a sufficient number of its cars with power brakes may lawfully refuse to receive fromPage 995connecting lines any cars not equipped sufficiently with such power brakes as will work readily with the brakes in use on its own cars. Section 9 provides that not less than 50 per cent. of the cars shall have their brakes operated by the engineer of the locomotive drawing the train, and that all power braked cars which are associated together with the 50 per cent. shall have their brakes so operated. It likewise authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission to increase the minimum percentage of 50 per cent. of the cars required to be operated with power brakes.
In 1910 the Interstate Commerce Commission increased the minimum percentage of cars to be equipped with air brakes operated by the engineer to 85 per cent., and it is held that section 2 of the Safety Appliance Act (45 USCA § 9) is violated, even though the minimum percentage requirement is met, if all power braked cars in the train other than those coupled at the end of the train are not under the brake control of the engineer. New York Cent. R.R. v. United States,265 U.S. 41, 44 S. Ct. 436, 68 L. Ed. 892.
Because sparks were seen flying underneath the truck of one of the cars prior to the derailment, it is argued that the power brake was out of order. Such an inference, if permissible at all, must be based largely on the condition in which the brake equipment was found after the truck of the car to which it belonged had been forced from its position and the car itself had broken away from the rest of the train. But there is no evidence that the power brakes did not work prior to the derailment or that any part of the equipment which is supposed to have hung down interfered with the due application of the brakes and thus violated the Safety Appliance Act. We therefore think that it was error for the trial court to refuse to charge that the jury was not warranted in finding that the accident was caused by the violation of any of the statutes or laws relating to brakes or other safety appliances.
There was enough evidence to go to the jury that the dragging of some part of the brake equipment caused the derailing of the cars. It is true that no one saw any equipment dragging, but the flying sparks underneath the truck, the marks on the ties and in the snow for a considerable distance back of Switch No. 4, and the condition in which the brake equipment was found after the accident were bits of evidence which, taken together, were enough to enable a jury to infer that the derailment occurred because something hanging down from the truck interfered with the wheels as they passed over the switch and caused them to leave the rails. These circumstances did not indicate that the defendant had failed to comply with the statute requiring power brakes sufficient for the control of the train, but did tend to show that the railroad had neglected proper care in the maintenance of an equipment which, if in good order, would not hang down and derail the cars. To prove that it had exercised due care, the defendant offered to show by several witnesses that the car Michigan Central No. 82355 had been inspected twice within less than two days prior to the accident, and that its brake equipment was found in good order. This evidence was objected to by the plaintiff on the ground that inspection would afford no excuse for failing to maintain in proper condition the brake equipment required by the Safety Appliance Act. Defendant's counsel argued that the evidence was competent to show that, when the railroad had the car inspected and no discoverable defects were found, it had done its duty, but the objection was sustained and the preferred testimony excluded. The judge allowed the jury to render a verdict for the plaintiff if they found a violation of the Safety Appliance Act or found negligence in maintaining the equipment in proper condition which occasioned the accident. Testimony that the Michigan Central car had recently been inspected was relevant to rebut the imputation of negligence. It is true that the record does not show that the car underneath which the sparks were seen to fly and from which some of the brake equipment is said to have been hanging was the Michigan Central car, but the bill of particulars stated that such was plaintiff's claim, and the defendant had a right to prove the Michigan Central car in particular as well as the other two cars had had recent inspections and that it was found to be without flaw or blemish. In spite of the fact that the plaintiff abandoned her original claim that a failure to inspect was one of the acts of negligence contributing to the accident, the defendant might properly prove inspection to rebut the general inference of negligence, and the exclusion of evidence offered for that purpose was error. Whether the plaintiff sought to have the jury find negligence from the testimony about the flying sparks and the marks on the ties and in the snow, or from the testimony about the speed of the train or to infer it merely from the derailment, one of the most obvious ways of meeting the imputation was to show that the braking equipment had recently been inspected and was found in good order. Even ifPage 996there had been evidence that the power brakes were defective and did not hold, proof that, on recent inspection, they were found in good condition, would have been competent to rebut that evidence. There was no evidence that they would not hold or that the Safety Appliance Act was violated, but there was prima facie proof of negligence.
The defendant criticizes the charge because the judge instructed the jury that there was a "presumption of negligence" arising from the happening of the accident which the "defendant should meet." The judge said: "There are cases where the circumstances connected with the accident are of such an unusual character as to justify the inference that it was due to the negligence of the one having possession and control of the thing, in this case the railroad train, causing the accident, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the jury that such negligence did not exist." He then proceeded to refer to certain testimony for the defendant that the cars had been inspected prior to the accident and were in good condition, and added: "It is for you to consider whether that testimony explains away the presumption of negligence that I have just outlined to you."
As the charge then stood, the jury might have thought that the defendant was obliged to explain how the accident happened and to overcome by evidence any inference of negligence that arose from the derailment. There was, however, properly speaking, no "presumption" which the defendant had to overcome, but an inference of negligence. Because of that inference, it was the duty of the defendant to go forward with proof that the railroad had exercised due care to see that its tracks, rails, cars, and equipment were in good order. Erie R. Co. v. Murphy (C.C.A.)9 F.2d 525; Sweeney v. Erving,228 U.S. 233, 33 S. Ct. 416, 57 L. Ed. 815, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 905; Southern Ry. v. Bennett,233 U.S. 80, 34 S. Ct. 566, 58 L. Ed. 860. But the burden of establishing by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant was negligent was always upon the plaintiff, and, if the inference of negligence arising from the unusual occurrence and defendant's proof of inspection and due care finally left the jury in doubt whether the derailment was caused by the negligence of the railroad or not, the defendant was entitled to a verdict. Consequently the instruction that the defendant was bound to "explain away the presumption of negligence" was not correct. Nor was it fairly cured by the instruction that "the burden is on the plaintiff to prove negligence," for the instruction about the burden of proof was confused by the prior statement that it was the duty of the defendant to "explain away the presumption of negligence." The defendant was not obliged to explain the cause of the derailment, but only to go forward with proof that it had exercised due care to furnish a safe equipment.
Finally there was error in refusing to strike out the oral testimony that there was a regulation of the railroad prohibiting the running of trains in the freight yard at a speed of more than fifteen miles an hour. The testimony that P.M. 1 ran at a higher rate of speed was slight and strongly controverted. It was prejudicial to allow the oral proof to stand when it was shown that the regulation was embodied in printed instructions in a schedule or time-table. The writing was the best evidence, and precluded the oral proof, unless a foundation could be laid for secondary evidence. The oral testimony accordingly should have been expunged.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed.