Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

MacKethan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

MacKethan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 557 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1977)

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1977-05-23
Topic
general

PER CURIAM: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company appeal the orders of the district court dismissing a third party complaint against Norfolk Savings and Loan Corporation and its receiver and refusing to disqualify counsel for the receiver and depositors. We conclude that the order denying disqualification of counsel is appealable because it is a final order collateral to the main proceeding. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974). Contra, Community Broadcasting v.

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Cited by
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MacKETHAN v. PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL CO.,557 F.2d 395(4th Cir. 1977)
EDWIN R. MacKETHAN, RECEIVER OF THE NORFOLK SAVINGS AND LOAN CORPORATION,
APPELLEE v. PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL COMPANY AND ITS INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS,
APPELLANTS, LEON C. HALL, FRANK F. WARREN, A. PAGE WARE, JR., CHARLES H.
McCOY, SR., F. LITTLETON POWELL, UNITED SEABOARD BANK/SEABOARD NATIONAL AND
MRS. DANIEL M. THORNTON, AS EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF DANIEL M. THORNTON,
DECEASED, DEFENDANTS.
SHIRLEY A. ALEXANDER ET AL., APPELLEES v. PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL AND
COMPANY AND ITS INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS, APPELLANTS v. EDWIN R. MacKETHAN,
RECEIVER OF NORFOLK SAVINGS AND LOAN CORPORATION, AND NORFOLK SAVINGS AND
LOAN CORPORATION, APPELLEES.
THOMAS L. HOFHEIMER, ET AL., AMICUS CURIAE.
Nos. 76-1979, 76-1980.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued May 4, 1977.
Decided May 23, 1977.
Rehearing Denied June 27, 1977.
R. Gordon Smith, Richmond, Va. (Robert H. Patterson, Jr., James L. Sanderlin, McGuire, Woods Battle, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellants Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Co.

Oren R. Lewis, Jr., Arlington, Va. (John E. Fricker, Lewis, Wilson, Cowles, Lewis Jones, Ltd., Arlington, Va., on brief), J. Vernon Patrick, Jr., Birmingham, Ala. (Barton S. Sacher, Berkowitz, Lefkovits Patrick, Birmingham, Ala., on brief), for appellees in 76-1979 and 76-1980.

Marshall T. Bohannon, Jr., Norfolk, Va. (Herbert Bohannon, Norfolk, Va., onPage 396brief), and Jordan A. Pugh, III, Norfolk, Va., for appellees in 76-1980.

Alan J. Hofheimer, Norfolk, Va. (Hofheimer, Nusbaum McPhaul, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for Amicus Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
Before MOORE, Senior Circuit Judge, Second Circuit, sitting by designation, and BUTZNER and HALL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
[1] Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Company appeal the orders of the district court dismissing a third party complaint against Norfolk Savings and Loan Corporation and its receiver and refusing to disqualify counsel for the receiver and depositors. We conclude that the order denying disqualification of counsel is appealable because it is a final order collateral to the main proceeding.Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,496 F.2d 800(2d Cir. 1974).Contra, Community Broadcasting v. FCC,546 F.2d 1022(D.C. Cir. 1976). Although dismissal of a third party complaint is ordinarily not appealable, we will consider the order under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. On the merits, the district court committed no error.

[2]Affirmed.
[3] ORDER ON REHEARING
BUTZNER, Circuit Judge.
[4] While the petition for rehearing filed by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Company was pending, the Supreme Court held that although an order denying a plea of double jeopardy constituted a final decision within the meaning of28 U.S.C. § 1291and therefore was immediately appealable, the court of appeals should not have considered other non-appealable assignments of error under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.Abney v. UnitedStates,___ U.S. ___,97 S.Ct. 2034,52 L.Ed.2d 651(1977). We believe that the principles of that case are applicable here.

[5] Consequently, although we reiterate our ruling that the district court's order denying disqualification of counsel is appealable, we withdraw that part of our opinion in which we reviewed the dismissal of the third-party complaint under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. We now hold, in accordance withAbney,that we lacked jurisdiction under § 1291 to allow an appeal of the district court's interlocutory order dismissing the third-party complaint.

[6] In all other respects the petition for rehearing is denied.

[7] Entered with the concurrence of Senior Judge MOORE and Judge HALL.