Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

United States v. Gerald Lawrence Hallam

United States v. Gerald Lawrence Hallam, 472 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1973)

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1973-01-09
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • stating that Santobello “demands that once a defendant has carried out his part of the bargain the Government must fulfill its part.”

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed United States v. Gerald Lawrence Hallam. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
12 opinions
UNITED STATES v. HALLAM,472 F.2d 168(9th Cir. 1973)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. GERALD LAWRENCE HALLAM,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
No. 72-2359.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
January 9, 1973.
Martin Levine, Deputy Federal Public Defender (argued), John K. Van de Kamp, Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant.

Barry Russell (argued), Eric A. Nobles, Asst. U.S. Attys., William D.Page 169Keller, U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before MERRILL and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and ENRIGHT,fn*District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
[1] This appeal is taken from conviction of possession of an unregistered weapon in violation of26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).

[2] In January, 1971, appellant was indicted upon two counts. Count I was for violation of § 5861(d). Count II was for violation of the lesser offense of possession of a weapon by a felon. 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a).

[3] As the result of a plea bargain, count I was dismissed, and appellant pleaded guilty to count II, was adjudged guilty and was sentenced to three years probation.

[4] A year later appellant was charged with violation of probation and a hearing to consider resentencing was had. At that time the Government called the court's attention to a decision of the Supreme Court raising serious question as to the sufficiency of count II of the indictment to state a crime, and expressed its fears that appellant might, at his pleasure, repudiate the bargain by attacking judgment on count II under28 U.S.C. § 2255after the statute of limitations had run on count I. The court then, over the objections of appellant, in effect reached past the adjudication to rescind the plea bargain upon which it was based. It set aside the guilty plea and dismissed count II of the indictment.1The United States then reindicted appellant on count I. Protesting double jeopardy, and asserting his right to stand on his plea bargain, appellant nevertheless stipulated to the facts and was thereupon adjudged guilty. This appeal followed. We reverse.

[5] Judgment having been entered upon count II, it did not lie with the Government unilaterally to seek to set it aside over the objections of the appellant. It is clear from Santobello v. New York,404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971), that due respect for the integrity of plea bargains demands that once a defendant has carried out his part of the bargain the Government must fulfill its part. Here, this required that the dismissal of count I of the original indictment must stand.

[6] Reversed and remanded with instructions that the judgment appealed from be set aside and the indictment dismissed.Page 290
  1. Honorable William B. Enright, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation. ↩
  2. It is not clear whether the court also set aside judgment on count II. Apparently appellant does not wish it set aside or to be placed in the position of repudiating the plea bargain. ↩