Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Jesse L. Allen and Constance G. Allen v. Lee A. Gifford and Charles R. Samuels

462 F.2d 615

Type: Opinion
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1972-06-21
Topic: general

How later courts describe this case

an action for refusal to sell a house to a black

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Jesse L. Allen and Constance G. Allen v. Lee A. Gifford and Charles R. Samuels. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Authority status: pending
Cited by: 32 opinions

ALLEN v. GIFFORD,462 F.2d 615(4th Cir. 1972)

JESSE L. ALLEN AND CONSTANCE G. ALLEN, APPELLANTS v. LEE A. GIFFORD AND

CHARLES R. SAMUELS, APPELLEES.

No. 72-1234.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued June 6, 1972.

Decided June 21, 1972.

Filmore E. Rose, Norfolk, Va. (Stanley E. Sacks and Sacks, Sacks Tavss, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellants.

Norris E. Halpern, Norfolk, Va. (Gordon E. Campbell and Campbell, Lustig Hancock, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

Before BUTZNER, RUSSELL, and FIELD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

[1] Jesse L. Allen and Constance G. Allen appeal from an order of the district court which held that their complaint charging racial discrimination in the sale of real estate in violation of42 U.S.C. § 1982was barred by Virginia's one-year statute of limitations. The complaint, which seeks compensatory and punitive damages, alleges that the Allens suffered humiliation, emotional stress, and anxiety when the defendants initially refused to sell them a house. Later the Allens succeeded in purchasing a home in the subdivision the defendants were developing.

[2] While this appeal was pending, we held, in Almond v. Kent,459 F.2d 200(4th Cir., 1972), that the state's two-year statute applies to actions brought under42 U.S.C. § 1983for personal injuries. Both § 1982 and § 1983 were enacted to redress the infringement of civil rights. Both allow the recovery of damages for personal wrongs. We conclude, therefore, that the reasons stated inAlmondfor applying Virginia's two-year statute of limitations to actions under § 1983 make the same limitation period appropriate for personal injury suits based on § 1982.

[3] Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is vacated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings. Each party shall bear his own costs.Page 650