Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jose Manuel Quijada Gaxiola v. United States
435 F.2d 264
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1970-11-27
- Topic
- bankruptcy
HAMLEY, Circuit Judge: In this proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Jose Manuel Quijada Gaxiola wants the court to set aside his conviction, under 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a), for failure to pay the marihuana transferee taxes provided for in 26 U.S.C. §§ 4741 and 4771. The district court granted the application and the United States appeals. *265On September 27, 1967, appellee was indicted at Phoenix, Arizona, in Cause No. C-17829 Phx., for importation of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174, and importation of marihuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 176a. On April 1, 1968, after he waived indictment, appellee was informed against at Phoenix, in Cause No. C-18013 Phx., for failing to pay the marihuana transferee tax imposed by 26 U.S.C. §§ 4741 and 4771, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a).
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QUIJADA GAXIOLA v. UNITED STATES,435 F.2d 264(9th Cir. 1970)
Jose Manuel QUIJADA GAXIOLA, Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America,
Appellant.
No. 25774.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
November 27, 1970.
Jose Manuel Quijada Gaxiola, in pro. per.
Before HAMLEY, ELY and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges.
On September 27, 1967, appellee was indicted at Phoenix, Arizona, in Cause No. C-17829 Phx., for importation of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174, and importation of marihuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 176a. On April 1, 1968, after he waived indictment, appellee was informed against at Phoenix, in Cause No. C-18013 Phx., for failing to pay the marihuana transferee tax imposed by 26 U.S.C. § 4741 and 4771, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a).
Plea bargaining then took place with regard to all three charges. As a result, appellee pleaded guilty on April 1, 1968, to the section 4744(a) charge filed in Cause No. C-18013 Phx. On April 22, 1968, based upon this plea, the district court adjudged appellee guilty and sentenced him to an eight-year term of imprisonment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (a)(2), the sentence to run concurrently with a state sentence he was then serving in California. The court then dismissed the indictment in Cause No. C-17829 Phx. containing the heroin and marihuana counts.
In his section 2255 application, appellee advanced three reasons why the conviction on the section 4744(a) count should be vacated: (1) he is entitled to the benefit of Leary v. United States,395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969), in which it was held that a timely and proper assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination provides a complete defense to a prosecution under section 4744(a); (2) he did not plead guilty with an understanding of the consequences of the plea; and (3) he did not have adequate representation by counsel at the time he entered the plea of guilty.
The district court granted the section 2255 application on the first of these grounds and did not pass on the other two. The court held, on the authority of Meadows v. United States,420 F.2d 795(9th Cir. 1969), that appellee's failure to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination when he pleaded guilty on April 1, 1968, did not constitute a waiver of the privilege inasmuch as theLearydecision was not announced until May 19, 1969.
TheMeadowscase involved the fire arms registration law,26 U.S.C. § 5841and 5851. As to that law the Supreme Court had ruled, in Haynes v. United States,390 U.S. 85, 88 S.Ct. 722, 19 L. Ed.2d 923 (1968), that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, if claimed, is a complete defense. InMeadows,we held thatHaynesis to be applied retroactively. We also held that, while Meadows failed to claim the privilege against self-incrimination, this did not constitute a waiver of the privilege becauseHayneshad not been decided when Meadows pleaded guilty.
The case now before us involves not the firearms registration act but 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a), failure to pay the marihuana transferee tax. It was not until May 19, 1969, in Leary v. United States,395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, that the Supreme Court held that a timely and proper assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination provides a complete defense to a prosecution under section 4744(a). Appellee in the case before us pleaded guilty of a violation of that statute on April 1, 1968, which was more than thirteen months prior toLeary. The district court in the case before us thus reasoned that, as inMeadows,a failure to claim the privilege did not constitute a waiver of the privilege because the availability of the privilege was not then known.
However, in United States v. Weber,429 F.2d 148(9th Cir. 1970), decided three months after entry of the district court order herein, this court held that since Weber pleaded guilty to a section 4744(a) charge after Marchetti v. United States,390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968), Grosso v. United States,390 U.S. 62, 88 S.Ct. 709, 19 L. Ed.2d 906 (1968) and Haynes v. United States,390 U.S. 85, 88 S.Ct. 722 (1968), this constituted a waiver of the privilege even though his plea was entered prior toLeary. The court stated that the rationale ofLearywas based upon theMarchetti-Grosso-Haynesrationale, andPage 266therefore Weber "had ample reason to foresee theLearydecision."
The circumstance which led theWebercourt to distinguishMeadows,and affirm denial of a section 2255 application, is also present in the case now before us. Appellee pleaded guilty beforeLeary,but afterHaynes. It is true that, inWeber,theHaynesdecision was nine months old when Weber pleaded guilty while here the span was only two months. We think, however, that a two-month interval is enough to warrant the assumption that appellee or his counsel, if reasonably competent, was then aware of theHaynesdecision. In this case, as inWeber,there was also plea bargaining, as a result of which very serious heroin and marihuana charges against appellee were dismissed.fn*
We conclude on the authority ofWeber,which has recently been followed in Cochran v. United States, 432 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1970), and Lineker v. United States, 432 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1970), each of which involved a section 4744(a) prosecution, that appellee's plea of guilty constituted a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.
As stated above, the district court did not pass upon appellee's two additional grounds for section 2255 relief. We therefore reverse the order granting such relief on the self-incrimination ground, and remand the cause to the district court for consideration of the additional grounds not yet considered.
- The element of plea bargaining distinguishes this case from United States v. Ingman,426 F.2d 973(9th Cir. 1970), where the defendant failed to raise a Fifth Amendment defense at trial to a charge of violating 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a). (1). The trial followed the decisions in theMarchettitrilogy but, as the court noted inWeber, supra,the absence of plea bargaining inIngmannegates the possibility of a strategic decision not to raise this complete defense to the charge, and no waiver of the defendant's constitutional privilege would be presumed. ↩
- While we strive mightily for correct interpretations, the law is not an exact science. During the past six years, the Supreme Court has found it necessary to overturn three mistaken opinions for which I, as the author, was principally responsible.SeeCraycroft v. Ferrall,397 U.S. 335, 90 S.Ct. 1152, 25 L.Ed.2d 351 (1970), rev'g408 F.2d 587(9th Cir. 1969); Reetz v. Bozanich,397 U.S. 82, 90 S.Ct. 788, 25 L.Ed.2d 68 (1970), rev'g D.C.,297 F. Supp. 300(D.Alaska 1969); Parks v. Simpson Timber Co.,388 U.S. 459, 87 S.Ct. 2115, 18 L.Ed.2d 1319 (1967), rev'g369 F.2d 324(9th Cir. 1966). ↩