Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Claude C. Clifton v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections

Claude C. Clifton v. Dr. George J. Beto, Dir., Tex. Dep’t of Corr., 411 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1969)

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1969-05-07
Topic
general

PER CURIAM. The District Court, 298 F.Supp. 1384, denied habeas corpus relief to this state prisoner and he appeals. We affirm. We must agree with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that Clifton is not entitled to credit for time spent on parole prior to the revocation of his conditional pardon, Ex parte Clifton, 415 S.W. 2d 661 (1967). The facts in Clifton’s case are materially different to those in Shields v.

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UpLaw has not yet analyzed Claude C. Clifton v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
16 opinions
CLIFTON v. BETO,411 F.2d 1226(5th Cir. 1969)
Claude C. CLIFTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. George J. BETO, Director,
Texas Department of Corrections, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 26851.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
May 7, 1969.
Sam R. Wilson, Houston, Tex., for appellant.

Crawford C. Martin, Atty. Gen. of Texas, Allo B. Crow, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., Nola White, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Hawthorne Phillips, Staff Legal Asst., Robert C. Flowers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for appellee.
Before COLEMAN and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges, and SKELTON, Judge of the Court of Claimsfn*.
PER CURIAM.
The District Court,298 F. Supp. 1384, denied habeas corpus relief to this state prisoner and he appeals. We affirm.

We must agree with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that Clifton is not entitled to credit for time spent on parole prior to the revocation of his conditional pardon, Ex parte Clifton, 415 S.W.2d 661 (1967).

The facts in Clifton's case are materially different to those in Shields v. Beto, 5 Cir., 1967,370 F.2d 1003. Texas did not surrender him to another jurisdiction and thereafter "lose interest in him". To the contrary, the appellant violated his Texas parole and subsequently was convicted of and imprisoned for offenses committed in other jurisdictions. Thus he, not Texas, was the efficient, moving cause of the delay now sought to be invoked.

Affirmed.Page 1227Page 56
  1. Sitting by designation as a member of this panel. ↩