Standard Oil Company v. State of Iowa

"It is further ordered that the plaintiffs may not in any manner use the seized items or any knowledge gained by the illegal searches against the party from whom the knowledge was gained or the items seized, except that the plaintiffs may make use of all evidence and knowledge if it is gained from an independent source."281 F. Supp. 391,411.

"InMappandWeeksthe defendant against whom the evidence was held to be inadmissible was the victim of the search. However, in the cases before us each petitioner demands retrial if any of the evidence used to convict him was the product of unauthorized surveillance, regardless of whose Fourth Amendment rights the surveillance violated. At the very least, it is urged that if evidence is inadmissible against one defendant or conspirator, because tainted by electronic surveillance illegal as to him, it is also inadmissible against his codefendant or coconspirator.

"This expansive reading of the Fourth Amendment and of the exclusionary rule fashioned to enforce it is admittedly inconsistent with prior cases, and we reject it. The establishedPage 1175principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. Coconspirators and codefendants have been accorded no special standing."394 U.S. 171,89 S.Ct. 965,22 L.Ed.2d 185.

"We adhere to these cases and to the general rule that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.

"There is no necessity to exclude evidence against one defendant in order to protect the rights of another. No rights of the victim of an illegal search are at stake when the evidence is offered against some other party. The victim can and very probably will object for himself when, as and if it becomes important for him to do so.

"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth."394 U.S. 174,89 S.Ct. 967,22 L.Ed.2d 187.

"[T]he defendant who independently has and successfully invokes the right to move for suppression, would normally be successful in obtaining a severance to avoid possible prejudice. Had each defendant in the instant case been tried separately, or had Edge been granted a separate trial, appellants clearly would have lacked standing to object to the introduction of the fruits of the `search' of the cars. To hold to the contrary at this time, merely because of the joint trial, would give them a windfall to which they are not justly entitled."

"Looking to the factors considered in Lord v. Kelley, as weighing in favor of a limited suppression order, it is well to point out here that the government has tacitly admitted wrongdoing, that the illegal method of gaining access to the corporate records was unique and will not soon occur again, and that the defendants have vindicated the right to be free from misuse of statutes as a means of violating constitutional rights. A limited suppression order is far short of immunity but it is not a futile gesture. The relief to be granted in this case complies with the exclusionary rules as they now stand. In some cases a limited suppression order is of great benefit to the complainant while in others the impact is less. It is not the duty or the inclination of this Court to ensure the greatest effect. The defendants will be restored to their earlier position but will not gain immunity. In ruling on any discovery motions by the plaintiffs, the Court will take care to prevent, insofar as possible, the use of illegally obtained information."281 F. Supp. 391,410.

"The only ground for suppressing the use of these records in evidence is not to allow the Government to gain advantage from violating the Bill of Rights and those high standards of fair play which should govern men entrusted with official power. The owner of the records is entitled to be as well off as if Flattery had not unlawfully seized those papers, but he is not entitled to be any better off. He is not entitled to gain perpetual immunity from ever responding, in any future criminal proceeding or civil suit or administrative, tax inquiry, to an appropriate summons to produce those records which the tax statute require him to keep and which before the unlawfulPage 1177seizure the Government knew he had."223 F. Supp. 684,691.

"The order of the district court herein is not violative of any asserted rights of appellants. It is consistent with the doctrine of theSilverthorneLumber, Nardone,andWong Sun[371 U.S. 471,83 S.Ct. 407,9 L.Ed.2d 441] cases. To strike down the district court's order on the facts of this case would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment conferring upon appellants a windfall benefit far beyond anything required by the Fourth or Fifth Amendments. Cf. Walder v. United States,347 U.S. 62,74 S.Ct. 354,98 L.Ed. 503(1953)."

"It is clear to us that this is not a case where an illegal search has revealed unsuspected data which is sought to be blanketed under a later `legal' subpoena.

"To impose the greater sanction of permanent immunization whenever a seizure of ordinary business and corporate records has been invalidated would place an incommensurate burden on the government, unnecessary for the protection of commercial privacy."