Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Strohbar v. Dwinnell

29 F.2d 915

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1929-01-07
Topic
general

FOSTER, Circuit Judge. On August 25, 1927, appellant, the bankrupt, applied for his discharge. The court fixed October 4, 1927, as the return day for the filing1 of oppositions. On September 29th, appellee, the trustee, filed specifications of opposition to the discharge, phder a standing rule of court, the ease was referred to the referee for a hearing. Under the said rule the trustee had 30 days to take his testimony, but did not do so.

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Strohbar v. Dwinnell. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
3 opinions
STROHBAR v. DWINNELL,29 F.2d 915(5th Cir. 1929)
STROHBAR v. DWINNELL.
No. 5421.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
January 7, 1929.
Rehearing Denied January 28, 1929.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida; Lake Jones, Judge.

Application by Wm. P. Strohbar, bankrupt, for his discharge, wherein P.L. Dwinnell, trustee, filed specifications of opposition. From an order denying a motion to strike the opposition and granting additional time in which to take evidence, the bankrupt appeals. Affirmed.Page 916
K.I. McKay, R.W. Withers, M.B. Withers, and Maynard Ramsey, all of Tampa, Fla. (Wm. Hunter, of Tampa, Fla., on the brief), for appellant.

E.G. Grimes and Alvan B. Rowe, both of Palmetto, Fla., for appellee.
Before WALKER and FOSTER, Circuit Judges, and DAWKINS, District Judge.
FOSTER, Circuit Judge.
On August 25, 1927, appellant, the bankrupt, applied for his discharge. The court fixed October 4, 1927, as the return day for the filing of oppositions. On September 29th, appellee, the trustee, filed specifications of opposition to the discharge. Under a standing rule of court, the case was referred to the referee for a hearing. Under the said rule the trustee had 30 days to take his testimony, but did not do so. On June 26, 1928, appellant moved to strike the opposition and for a discharge. The court denied the motion and granted appellee 20 days' additional time in which to take his evidence. From that order this appeal is prosecuted.

It is evident that the rule fixing the time in which the parties are to take their evidence is merely directory, and it was within the province of the District Court to so construe it. Furthermore, it is fundamental that federal courts, in common with other courts, have inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice, within the scope of their jurisdiction. 7 R.C.L. par. 62. "It is always in the power of the court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it." U.S. v. Breitling, 20 How. 252,15 L. Ed. 900. The reason for the delay in taking evidence is not shown, but we must assume that it was sufficient to justify the court in granting the extension, in the exercise of sound discretion.

Affirmed.Page 961