Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
United States Ex Rel. D'Istria v. Day
20 F.2d 302
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1927-06-06
- Topic
- bankruptcy
How later courts describe this case
- “[A] soft drink competitor would be entitled to compare 21 its product to Coca-Cola or Coke, but would not be entitled to use Coca-Cola’s distinctive 22 lettering.”
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed United States Ex Rel. D'Istria v. Day. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 18 opinions
UNITED STATES v. DAY,20 F.2d 302(2nd Cir. 1927)
UNITED STATES ex rel. D'ISTRIA v. DAY, Commissioner of Immigration.
No. 386.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
June 6, 1927.
Habeas corpus by the United States, on the relation of Ciro D'Istria, against Benjamin M. Day, Commissioner of Immigration, Port of New York. From an order of dismissal, relator appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Appeal from an order dismissing a writ of habeas corpus to review the detention of the relator by the commissioner of immigration.
The relator, an Italian, was a member of the crew of the steamer Cherca, which arrived in the port of New York on February 27, 1927. An immigration inspector boarded her at Quarantine and examined the manifest of aliens in the master's possession. Against the names of seven seamen, including the relator, in the column stating which of the crew were to be paid off or discharged at the port of arrival, there was no entry. Learning that these men were to be discharged at New York, the inspector inquired of the master why the space had been left blank, and was told that this had happened through a mistake. Being suspicious for this reason, and also because of a letter received by the Department of Labor, which advised it that part of the Cherca's crew meant unlawfully to enter the United States, the inspector refused to allow any of the seven to land, and directed the master to detain them on board, which he did. The inspector did not examine any of the men personally, or give them any opportunity to prove that they intended to enter temporarily and to reship upon another foreign ship.
The relator alone of all the seven sued out this writ and appealed from the order denying it.
Albert D. Smith, of Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellee.
Before MANTON and L. HAND, Circuit Judges, and CAMPBELL, District Judge.
The cause comes up upon the petition, the return and the evidence taken before the District Court. This was irregular. As there was no traverse under Revised Statutes, § 760 (Comp. St. § 1288), and as the return did not show that the relator had not had a fair hearing, there was, strictly speaking, no issue, and nothing for the court to try, since the return is conclusive unless traversed. Crowley v. Christensen,137 U.S. 86, 94, 11 S. Ct. 13, 34 L. Ed. 620; Stretton v. Rudy, 176 F. 727 (C.C.A. 5). However, since the parties treated the return as though it had been impeached by a traverse, and the court took evidence on that understanding, we ignore this formal error.
Section 33 of the act of 1917 (Comp. St. § 4289¼rr) makes it unlawful to discharge a seaman in the United States, unless he intends to reship on another vessel bound to a foreign port, and then only in conformity with such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may promulgate. This section survives and is consistent with the Quota Act of 1924, section 3(5), being Comp. St. § 4289¾aa, which exempts from the quota seamen seeking to enter temporarily in pursuit of their calling. Section 19 of the Quota Act (Comp. St. § 4289¾ii) forbids any seaman "excluded from admission" to land except as allowed by the regulations. We read it as meaning that an alien seaman discharged in the United States is "excluded from admission" by section 33 of the act of 1917, unless he intends to reship and satisfies the regulations passed to ascertain that intention. Possibly section 19 is redundant, but like section 3(5) it is consistent with section 33 of the act of 1917. The only relevant regulation is rule 6, subdivision E, paragraph 4, which requires a seaman to establish to the satisfaction of the immigration inspector that he seeks to enter solely in pursuance of his calling and that he does not intend to abandon it. This is a valid regulation and lawfully imposes the burden upon the seaman.
However, while we agree that the procedure may be summary, and indeed was intended so to be, we think that the inspector must accord the seaman a fair hearing, and give him the chance to show that he is landing as the statute requires. The record shows that in the case at bar the inspector did not do this. Relying upon the suspicious evidence of the manifest, his questions to the master, and the letter to the department, he merely passed the suspected seamen before him in line, and thereupon ordered their detention. Thus he deprived them of any opportunity to disabuse him of his suspicions and to prove their intent.
The detention was therefore unlawful, and the writ should have been allowed. However, this does not involve the release of the relator. The proper procedure is to remit him to the custody of the Commissioner, who should then give him a hearing before a duly detailed immigration inspector. Tod v. Waldman,266 U.S. 113, 45 S. Ct. 85, 69 L. Ed. 195. Detention by that inspector, assuming that the hearing be fair, and that the relator does not succeed in carrying the burden of proof imposed by the regulation will be valid. We have no reason at this stage of the case to pass upon any questions which may be raised at that time, as the record will almost certainly be different.
The act of 1917 does not give a seaman the right to a hearing before a board of special inquiry, nor to an appeal to the Secretary of Labor. Hearings before such boards and appeals from their findings are provided by section 16 of that statute (Comp. St. § 4289¼i), but they are only meant for immigrants seeking general admission to the United States. The interest here involved concerns no more than the seaman's temporary entrance in search of another berth, and is limited to 60 days by rule 6, subdivision I, paragraph 2. It is a much less vital matter than an unrestricted entry, which generally presupposes a change of domicile, and the hope of a change in allegiance. What Congress thought necessary protection in the one case was presumptively not meant to apply to the other. At least there is no intimation of it.
Nor does section 20 of the Quota Act of 1924 (Comp. St. § 4289¾j) give an appeal to the Secretary of Labor as the relator argues. Detention and deportation are quite different things; only the Secretary may deport. We incline to believe that the section speaks distributively and refers detention to the action of the inspector, and deportation to that of the Secretary. That is consistent with the general plan of the immigration statutes, and best suits the language used, which on any other construction becomes obscure. However, we need not go so far as to hold that this is a necessary interpretation. It is enough to say that if any appeal had been intended, it would have been more clearly put, as it was in section 16 of the act of 1917. Once more we suggest that the interest at stake is not of deep importance, and the right granted an easy cover for surreptitious entry. Seamen hoping to change to a better berth in ourPage 304ports must be content to accept as final any fair determination by an inspector who will hear their story. Indeed, in the case at bar, unless the appeal is pressed to settle the law, it seems curious that, if no more was really at stake, so much trouble should have been taken.
Order reversed, and cause remanded, for further proceedings in accordance with the foregoing opinion.