Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Benz v. Celeste Fur Dyeing & Dressing Corp.
Benz v. Celeste Fur Dyeing & Dressing Corp., 136 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1943)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1943-06-24
- Topic
- general
FRANK, Circuit Judge. The process which plaintiffs contend the defendants are infringing involves the use of formaldehyde and an acid catalyst, but not the use of cresol. The claims in suit do not, by their terms, call *847for the use of cresol. But defendants assert that those claims, if read so as not to make the use of cresol mandatory, are invalid. This argument requires recourse to the file-wrapper.
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BENZ v. CELESTE FUR DYEING DRESSING CORP.,136 F.2d 845(2nd Cir. 1943)
BENZ et al. v. CELESTE FUR DYEING DRESSING CORPORATION et al.
No. 260.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
June 24, 1943.
Page 846
Action at law by George W. Benz and others against the Celeste Fur Dyeing Dressing Corporation and others for damages for infringement of patent No. 2,240,388. From a judgment on a verdict for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
Plaintiffs are the owners of Calva's Patent No. 2,240,388 issued April 29, 1941 on a divisional application filed February 24, 1941, the original application having been filed October 19, 1936. They brought the suit at law against defendants for damages resulting from alleged infringement of claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 10 and 13. The claims, so far as they are pertinent here, relate to a method of chemically treating the wool hairs of sheepskin so as chemically to modify the hairs, in order to straighten them and to give a desired lustre to permanently uncurled hairs, and to simulate more expensive furs.
The case was tried before a jury. At the trial, defendants' counsel offered the file-wrapper in evidence; plaintiffs' counsel objected; the court sustained the objection, stating that defendants' counsel "can pick out what you think is proper"; defendants' counsel remarked that the selection was for his adversary. The file-wrapper was neither marked for identification with a specific number or letter, nor included in the stipulated list of exhibits to be made part of the record on appeal; it is, however, printed in that record and the printed record contains a stipulation by the parties that it is a "true copy of the Transcript of Record of the District Court * * * as agreed upon by the parties", and the Clerk of that court so certified.
The evidence made it clear, and plaintiffs admit, that cresol is not used by defendants in their alleged infringing practices. At the close of plaintiffs' case, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and, at the close of the entire evidence, for a directed verdict, on the ground, inter alia that cresol was a necessary part of the plaintiffs' process. These motions were denied. The trial judge instructed the jury that the claims in suit were not to be construed as including cresol and were not to be limited in that respect. He refused to charge, as requested by defendants, that "cresol was an essential element in the process of the patent, and that, if defendant does not use cresol, it cannot be held to have infringed." Defendants duly excepted. The trial judge submitted to the jury questions as to whether each of the claims was valid and had been infringed, and told them that, in order to hold the claims valid, they must determine whether each of the claims revealed "a flash of genius." The jury found that each of the claims was valid and infringed, and awarded damages of $11,135.28. Defendants' motion for a new trial was denied and judgment on the verdict was entered against them. The case is here on defendants' appeal.
Bergner Bergner and Daniel L. Morris, all of New York City, (Daniel L. Morris, David Bergner, and Alexander Mencher, all of New York City, of counsel), for defendants-appellants.
Before SWAN, CLARK, and FRANK, Circuit Judges.
Examining the file-wrapper and the testimony, we discover the following: In the application as originally filed there were broad claims not calling for the use of cresol; but those claims were rejected as invalid by the Patent Office as reading on the prior art. The claims in suit were subsequently inserted by amendment. Calva testified that, at the time of filing the original application in 1936, in carrying out experiments and in himself working his process, when he used formaldehyde and an acid catalyst he also used cresol.1Subsequently — at some undisclosed date but before February 24, 1941 — he discovered that the use of cresol was not necessary.2The testimony does not show when he made this discovery. There is, however, evidence which sheds some light on the subject. Testimony introduced by the plaintiffs shows that "late in 1937 or early in 1938" there was a remarkably successful public commercial use of the process which defendants are said to infringe. But that public use was by Laskin Co., a stranger to Calva and the plaintiffs, and it is not without significance that the first effort made by Calva importantly to amend his claims occurred on December 7, 1937; moreover, at that same time, Calva changed the reference in the specification to cresol, as "most important" of the ingredients described in his Example I, to "useful." It is therefore a possible inference that Laskin's public use first led Calva to discover that he could dispense with the use of cresol. Moreover, the file-wrapper indicates that the claims equivalent to the claims in suit came into the application by way of amendments as a result of interference proceedings and not earlier than January 19, 1939.
Plaintiffs try to procure for their own benefit this public use by Laskin. They point to Calva's testimony to the effect that Laskin was in interference with Calva and that, in the Patent Office, Calva was successful in those interference proceedings. Plaintiffs then argue that Laskin must be deemed to have learned of the process, thus publicly used, from Calva through the interference proceedings. But that argument does not stand up for the following reasons: The record of the interference proceeding was not put in evidence and no testimony was given as to its details. Calva merely stated that they related to "two claims"; he did not identify those claims except to say that they did not call for the use of cresol; he did not give the date of the interference proceedings. There is uncontradicted testimony that, while the decision was in favor of Calva, the matter is "still on appeal"; and there is also uncontradicted testimony that no suit has been begun against Laskin for infringement of plaintiffs' patent.
It is true that cases, cited by plaintiffs, hold that, if an applicant, while his application is pending, discovers new uses to which his invention can be put, he may properly amend to omit a non-essential in the process originally disclosed by him, provided that he shows that the amendments involved "something that might be fully deduced from the original application", and that they do not broaden the patent to "interfere with other inventors who have entered the field in the meantime" or "appropriate that which has, in the meantime, gone into public use."3There isPage 848doubt on the evidence in this record, whether Calva comes within the doctrine of those cases.
Cases like Crown Cork Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co.,304 U.S. 159, 58 S.Ct. 842, 82 L.Ed. 1265, and Writer v. Kiwad, 63 F.2d 259, 20 C.C.P.A., Patents, 869, relating to abandonment of matters shown to have been originally disclosed, are not in point where there was not originally a sufficient disclosure.
Plaintiffs point to a stipulation made by the parties, long before the trial, that the divisional application on which the patent was issued in 1941 "was a true division of" the "parent application * * * which was filed * * * on October 1, 1936, and that * * * Calva is entitled to antedate said parent application to the year 1934, by reason of said Calva's conception and reduction to practice of the subject matter of such parent application in * * * 1934." As defendants did not, before or at the trial, ask to be relieved of that stipulation, it is doubtful whether we may disregard it.4But the terse reference in the stipulation to the divisional application as "a true division" cannot serve to dispense with the proof needed to bring plaintiffs within the doctrine of the cases they cite. The stipulation means, at most, that the claims in the application as they stood at the time when the divisional application was filed were such that it was necessary or proper to divide them;5but those brief words in the stipulation do not mean that, without regard to the contents of the file-wrapper, plaintiffs can assert that they are entitled to have the claims construed so as not to call for the use of cresol, no matter how broadly the claims were amended between the time of the filing of the parent application and the time of the filing of the divisional application.6
Much can, then, be said for the position that Calva was not entitled to the broad claims eliminating the use of cresol and that the trial judge should have directed a verdict for defendants. The plaintiffs, however, contend that the issue as to whether the original claims were sufficiently broad and as to whether there was public use by others intervening before the claims were amended was not raised by defendants' pleadings in the court below. Muncie Gear Works v. Outboard, Marine Mfg. Co.,315 U.S. 759, 766, 768, 62 S.Ct. 865, 86 L.Ed. 1171, indicates that such a contention would not be cogent were the facts relating to that issue fully presented in the record. Unfortunately, that is not the condition of the record here, and that condition may be due to the fact that plaintiffs were not adequately warned by the defendants' pleadings. To be sure, plaintiffs seemingly recognized the embarrassment created for their case by the evidence which they themselves introduced as to Laskin's public use, for they endeavored, although not successfully, to relieve themselves of that embarrassment by Calva's testimony with reference to the interference proceedings to which Laskin was a party. All things considered, however, it seems unjust for us to decide the case adversely to plaintiffs on so unsatisfactory a record — one which, while it makes the case considerably doubtful as to the right of plaintiffs to the broad claims eliminating the use of cresol, does not sufficiently illuminate that subject. We shall, therefore, remand for a new trial "to the end that injustice may not be done."7Page 849
At the new trial, the character of all the interference proceedings and the relations between plaintiffs and Laskin should be made clear; also in the light of the fact that plaintiffs, in their brief, suggest that the file-wrapper now in the record is not complete, there should be assurance that the full file-wrapper is in evidence.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
- "Q. Up to the time you filed your application on which the patent was issued, when you used formaldehyde and acid catalyst you also used cresol along with it? A. Yes, I did." ↩
- There was much testimony concerning Example I of the specification. The mixture in that Example includes cresol. The testimony shows that originally the specification stated that cresol was "most important," in Example I, and that, in December 1937, by amendment, "useful" was substituted for "most important." Calva testified that "when I drew the specification I might have thought that it was first very important, then I found it was useful, and now I find it is not useful, it is not necessary." ↩
- Hobbs v. Beach,180 U.S. 383, 394, 397, 21 S.Ct. 409, 414, 45 L.Ed. 586, distinguishing Railway Co. v. Sayles,97 U.S. 554, 563, 24 L.Ed. 1053; see, also, Novadel Process Corp. v. J.P. Meyer Co., 2 Cir.,35 F.2d 697, 701-703; Michigan Carton Co. v. Sutherland Paper Co., 6 Cir.,29 F.2d 179, 184; Cleveland Foundry Co. v. Detroit Vapor Stove Co., 6 Cir., 131 F. 853, 857. ↩
- Cf. Carnegie Steel Co., Ltd., v. Cambria Iron Co.,185 U.S. 403, 22 S.Ct. 698, 46 L.Ed. 968; but cf. Swift Co. v. Hocking Valley R. Co.,243 U.S. 281, 289, 37 S.Ct. 287, 61 L.Ed. 722. ↩
- Cf. In re Ferenci,83 F.2d 279, 23 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1023; In re Land,109 F.2d 251, 253, 27 C.C.P.A., Patents, 869. ↩
- This too is to be noted: Calva's testimony shows that he had not reduced to practice, as far back as 1934, the process without the use of cresol. Accordingly the stipulation, which concedes that Calva is entitled to antedate the parent application to the year 1934 because of reduction to practice of the subject matter of that parent application in that year, supports the conclusion that the parties to the stipulation did not intend, merely by speaking of "a true division," to eliminate the necessity of proof that the claims in suit, resulting from amendments so far as they dispensed with the use of cresol, derived from the claims in the parent application. ↩
- Cf. United States v. Rio Grande Dam Irrigation Co.,184 U.S. 416, 423, 424, 22 S.Ct. 428, 46 L.Ed. 619; Estho v. Lear, 7 Pet. 130, 8 L.Ed. 632; Armstrong v. Lear, 8 Pet. 52, 74, 8 L.Ed. 863; Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers,278 U.S. 149, 159, 160, 49 S.Ct. 84, 73 L.Ed. 236; Pfeil v. Jamison, 3 Cir., 245 F. 119; Finefrock v. Kenova Mine Car Co., 4 Cir.,22 F.2d 627, 634; Wyant v. Caldwell, 4 Cir.,67 F.2d 374; Columbia Gas Fuel Co. v. City of Columbus, 6 Cir.,55 F.2d 56, 58. ↩