Opinion · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
EVANS v. UNITED STATES, 43 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1930)
EVANS v. UNITED STATES., 43 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1930)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1930-10-13
- Topic
- general
EVANS v. UNITED STATES, 43 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1930) EVANS v. UNITED STATES. No. 6204.Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. October 13, 1930.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed EVANS v. UNITED STATES, 43 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1930). The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
EVANS v. UNITED STATES,43 F.2d 719(9th Cir. 1930)
EVANS v. UNITED STATES.
No. 6204.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
October 13, 1930.
Action by Mildred Evans, individually and as executrix of the last will of William Wallace Evans, deceased, against the United States. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
George Neuner, U.S. Atty., and Livy Stipp, Asst. U.S. Atty., both of Portland, Or.
Before DIETRICH and WILBUR, Circuit Judges, and WEBSTER, District Judge.
A witness, Dr. Ralph M. Dodson, testified that in February, 1920, or within thirty days thereof, he examined the insured and found definite rales which made him believe William Wallace Evans had active tuberculosis. The witness again examined the insured in February, 1922, and the diagnosis was positive. The witness believed that Evans had active pulmonary tuberculosis when he examined him in February, 1920. The witness also testified that any man with active tuberculosis is totally disabled during the period the disease is active. It was admitted that the insured was totally and permanently disabled in September, 1923, by reason of pulmonary tuberculosis and remained so until his death in 1926.
The bill of exceptions recites that the foregoing was all the medical testimony as to the state of health of William Wallace Evans presented to the jury for its consideration. Assuming, without deciding, that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the presumption that his disease was of service origin, we are unable to perceive how he was prejudiced by the refusal of the court to give the instruction. The appellant's case did not depend upon the question of the service origin of the disease from which he died, but upon the degree of his disability therefrom. Unless that disability was total and permanent during the life of the policy, the appellant could not recover.
Judgment affirmed.
WEBSTER, District Judge, concurs.