Opinion · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Cardillo

Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Cardillo, 107 F.2d 962 (Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 1939)

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1939-11-13
Topic
employee-benefits-and-executive-compensation

EDGERTON, Associate Justice. In this compensation case, the deputy commissioner made an award in favor of the employee, Raymond W. Kicklighter. The employer sued in the District Court to enjoin enforcement of the award, and now appeals from a decree dismissing its bill. On May 24, 1935, Kicklighter was struck on the head by the metal end of an air hose.

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Cardillo. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
15 opinions
POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER CO. v. CARDILLO,107 F.2d 962(D.C. Cir. 1939)
POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER CO. v. CARDILLO, Deputy Com'r, U.S. Employees
Compensation Commission (KICKLIGHTER, Intervener).
No. 7375.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Decided November 13, 1939.
Page 963
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia.

Proceeding under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act by Raymond W. Kicklighter, claimant, opposed by the Potomac Electric Power Company, employer. From an award of Frank A. Cardillo, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, District of Columbia Compensation District, in favor of claimant, the employer appeals.

Affirmed.
S.R. Bowen and R.E. Lee Goff, both of Washington, D.C., for appellant.

David A. Pine, U.S. Atty., William S. Tarver, Asst. U.S. Atty., and Charles T. Branham, Associate Counsel, U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, all of Washington, D.C., for appellee Cardillo.

S. Preston Smith, of Washington, D.C., for appellee Kicklighter.
Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and EDGERTON and RUTLEDGE, Associate Justices.
EDGERTON, Associate Justice.
In this compensation case, the deputy commissioner made an award in favor of the employee, Raymond W. Kicklighter. The employer sued in the District Court to enjoin enforcement of the award, and now appeals from a decree dismissing its bill.

On May 24, 1935, Kicklighter was struck on the head by the metal end of an air hose. The accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. He was taken at once to Emergency Hospital, and treated for laceration and concussion. He left the hospital in two days, and returned to work in a week. At that time he had no claim to compensation, for the first seven days of disability are not compensable.1Up to November 16, 1936, or thereabouts, he was not again disabled by reason of the accident. After that date he worked very little. In the spring of 1937, he was first informed by a psychiatrist that he was suffering from a progressive disease of the brain caused by the accident of May, 1935. On August 18, 1937, he filed a claim for compensation. At the hearing doctors disagreed on the question whether he was, after November 16, 1936, disabled by reason of the 1935 accident. The record contains evidence which supports the finding in his favor, and other evidence which would support a contrary finding. It follows that the actual finding is conclusive.2As we have said repeatedly, the weight of the evidence is for the deputy commissioner and not for the courts.3

The compensation act provides, in section 13(a), that the right to compensationPage 964for disability "shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after the injury, and the right to compensation for death shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after the death."4Appellant contends that "injury" is here equivalent to "accident," and that the limitation began to run in 1935. We think that "injury" is here equivalent to "compensable injury," and that the limitation did not begin to run until the claim to compensation arose in 1936 or 1937. An intent to bar compensation claims before they arise cannot fairly be imputed to Congress. No reason appears for treating death claims and disability claims differently in this respect, or for thinking that the statute does treat them differently. Cases are collected in Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation v. Norton, 3 Cir.,93 F.2d 119, certiorari denied,302 U.S. 767,58 S.Ct. 480,82 L.Ed. 596, and Kropp v. Parker, D.C.,8 F. Supp. 290, both of which are in point.5We need not decide whether the limitation began to run in 1936, when Kicklighter became disabled, or in 1937, when he learned that his disability was caused by the accident of 1935. On either view, his claim was timely.

Affirmed.Page 965Page 1007
  1. 44 Stat. 1426,33 U.S.C.A. § 906(a). ↩
  2. Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America,288 U.S. 162,166,53 S.Ct. 380,77 L.Ed. 676, 87 A.L.R. 245. ↩
  3. Powell v. Hoage,61 App.D.C. 99,57 F.2d 766; Malone v. Hoage,64 App.D.C. 38,73 F.2d 855; Associated General Contractors of America v. Cardillo,70 App. D.C. 303,106 F.2d 327. ↩
  4. 44 Stat. 1432,33 U.S.C.A. § 913(a); cf. D.C. Code, Tit. 19, Ch. 2,33 U.S.C.A. § 901note. ↩
  5. Cf. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hoage, Equity No. 57926, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, January 29, 1935 (not reported). ↩