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Summary: The defendant had given an obligation to make Clark a deed in fee-simple to 640 acres of land, his choice out of 2000 acres on the waters of Stone's River, to join some corner of the tract.

Summary: This was an ejectment brought to recover a tract of land lying in Franklin county. This principle, however, can only apply to such of our land claims as arise under those parts of the land law which speak of the entry being the beginning of the title.

Summary: The plaintiff procured a grant for the land in controversy from the State of Tennessee, dated in the year 1808, and proved the defendant was in possession at the time of the service of the declaration in ejectment.

Summary: The plaintiff produced in evidence an entry made upon a military warrant the 10th day of May, 1809, a survey of the entry made the 9th day of August, 1809, and a grant thereon, dated the 8th day of January, 1811, covering the land in controversy.

Summary: In Equity. — The facts were that, on the 6th of April, 1804, Alexander Roulstone, one of the defendants, shipped at New Orleans, in the barge called Deborah, Lindsey Shannon, master, a quantity of goods for account and risk of Col. Charles Lynch, of Shelby county, Kentucky, another of the defendants; to be delivered to the said Lynch or his assigns, he or they paying freight at the port of Louisville on the Ohio. This was discontinued, and a writ of replevin sued out of the same court; this more.

Summary: Hezekiah Johnson commenced a caveat in the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions for the county of Humphries against Spraggins, to prevent the emanation of a grant for eighty-one acres of land.

Summary: There is one point in this case that I wish the plaintiff's counsel to attend to particularly, which is this: If Pinkham Eaton's heirs are satisfied as to the proceedings in obtaining the judgment at law, and selling the land, can strangers take advantage of any errors in those proceedings, or complain of them in a collateral way?

Summary: In support of the title of the lessor of the plaintiff, he produced a grant from the State of North Carolina to William Mebane, dated the 14th day of *Page 354 March, 1787, for seven thousand two hundred acres of land, and a deed from Mebane to him dated the 1st day of October, 1790.

Summary: The plaintiff introduced a grant from the State of North Carolina to John Haywood, for five thousand acres of land, dated the 20th of December, 1791, describing the land in contest as follows: "On the waters of Richland Creek, a branch of Elk River, on a small creek which the commissioners and guard came down on their return from Elk River, the day before they encamped on the north side of Richmond Creek, beginning on the bank of said small creek at a white oak, one mile above a large spring; more.

Summary: [EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] That statute states in part: (a) A petitioner may file a motion in the trial court to reopen the first post-conviction petition only if the following applies: (1) The claim in the motion is based upon a final ruling of an appellate court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing at the time of trial, if retrospective application of that right is required. Such motion must be filed within more.

Summary: In this case both plaintiff and defendant claimed under grants from the State of North Carolina. The defendant produced in evidence an entry made on the 23d day of October, 1783, in the following words: "Jonathan Greaves enters three thousand acres of land, lying on the north side of Duck River, on the first creek above Spring Creek, beginning on said river three quarters of a mile below the mouth of said creek, running north and east for quantity."

Summary: Where statutes declare that proceedings shall be void, he was inclined to think they should be considered absolutely void either in law or equity. The circumstances disclosing the avoidance, he was of opinion, might be shown in a court of law as well as in equity, in the single case of an older entry under these two statutes. But it is not understood that the courts of Tennessee have decided any other point bearing *Page 158 on the subject than this, — that under their statutes declaring an more.